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CHAPTIM FIVE 
Ii19. "'e 
I. mcH 1655-mAy 1657 1 
Ife have indications that the dissolution of the first 
Protectorate Parliament caused a lot of hard thinking about how the 
government of the country was to be given the substance and appearance 
of legality. It seems as if, temporarily at leastp the whole eonsti- 
tutional question had been thrown back into the melting pot. It was 
out of this melting pot that the system of the Major Generals evolved. 
The Major Generals were an expedient devised to help sort out the 
pressing problem of national security in the aftermath of the deep 
psychological blow caused by the Royalist risings and the short-lived 
discontent in the army. They were never intended to be a long-term 
solution to the problem of settlement, That issue still continued 
to haunt all those involved or interested in the nation's politics. 
However, before moving on to discuss these developments 
in more detail it is necessary to pause to examine the Western Design. 
This ambitious innovation in foreign policy had been under discussion 
since early 1654. Lambert was opposed to it on the grounds that it 
was too grandiose and that there were more immediate concerns nearer 
home. He felt that the cost would far outweigh any benefit. His view 
did not prevail and in December the expedition under the command of 
Penn and Robert Venablesp who had commanded a regiment in Ireland, 
set sail. The expedition came close to disaster largely as a result 
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of inadequate planningt poor supplies and the inferior quality of 
the men. Penn and Venables on their return were committed to the 
Tower but released on resigning their commissions. 
(') 
Penn went on the expedition as Admiral and Venables as 
General. Venables had five foot regiments under him together with 
a company of reform dos, a troop of horse and a small detachment of 
artillerymen. The Colonels of the five regiments were Venables himselft 
James Heane, a member of the army who had commanded the expedition 
which helped the fleet under Blake reduce Jersey in October 16519 
Richard Fortescue who had left the army in 1647 during the dispute 
with Parliament and who now returned to the army probably because he 
needed money as his personal affairs were in a very unsound position, 
Anthony Duller-%-rho had fought during the first Civil Ifar in the west 
of England and had been governor of Scilly when his men revolted in 
favour of the King after which he was out of the armyq and Andrew 
Carter who had served in Lambert's foot regiment. Heaneq Fortescue 
and Carter died in the West Indies and Buller returned home in June 
1655 to give an account of the expedition. He did not go back but 
took no part in army politics in England. " 
According to Venablest none of the other officers were 
taken on 
"but such as had the commendation of some of 
his Highnes Council, Chief Ministers of State, 
or Officers of the Army" 
Clarke Papersl, III, pp. 203-208; Gardiner, Commonwealth 
and Protectorateg 1119 pp. 161-166; Lbid., IV, pp. IN- 
145p 214-223- 
(2) C. H. Firth (ed. ), The Narrative of General Venablesp 
Camden Society, p new series, 
60, pp. XVIII-XXI; Firth 
and Daviesp P. 707. 
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which of course did not necessarily mean that they were the most suited 
to meet the challenge demanded by the grand design. 
(') 
The men were 
recruited from the existing regiments but, according to Venables, the 
officers in these regiments "generally gave us the most abject of their 
Companies" in order "to spare their old Blades". The balance was made 
up by impressment and the total size of the force was probably about 
2,500, although it had been planned to be 3POOO strong. 
(2) 
In 1656 William Brayne was sent to Jamaica to , reinforce 
-the design. His regiment was raised by recruiting from the regiments 
in Scotland. Fortyýtwo men were drawn out of each regiment to form 
the new regiment which totalled 504 men, The officers were supplied 
by promoting from the ranks with the exception of the most senior in 
which officers no longer in employment were given commissions. These 
included John Bramston who had been cashiered for his part in Overton's 
IF* 
plot but who was re-admitted to the army after giving a personal 
declaration of loyalty to the Protector. He died on his way to the 
West Indies. 
(3) 
The regiments in Jamaica had no effect on army politics 
in Britain. The nature of the recruiting of officers and men for the 
original expedition and for its reinforcement once again supports the 
view that has been argued above that there was no attempt to get rid 
of radical regiments by dispersing them to far off places. 
(4) 
(1) Firth (ed. )t Narrative of General Venables, p. 91. 
(2) ibid., PP- MaI-XMI, 5-6,9,107. 
(3) Dodl. Rawlinson Ms: 
)A24, 
f. 2o6; Firth and Daviest pp. 
704-706; Firth (ed 9 Narrative of General Venablest 
pp. 171-173. 
(4) C. f. 9 Hill, God's Englishman, p. 183. 
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Evidence for the deliberations over the sumer months 
about how to cope with constitutional matters and whether it would 
be necessary to change yet again the form of government stems largely 
from Royalist newsletters and the dispatches of the Venetian ambassador. 
It would seem that there were two lines of action being suggested to 
Cromwell; one from the army and the other from civilians. According 
to the Venetian ambassador, the army, after a series of meetings, 
pressed Cromwell to re-assume the legislative power and rule by issuing 
ordinances in much the same way as he had done before the Parliament 
had met. This was hardly a surprising reaction on their part as the 
failure of yet another Parliament made them even more disillusioned 
with Parliaments tout court. However, all but the most naive officers 
must have realised that such a situation could not last indefinitely. 
The ambassador says -that some of Cronnirell's supporters were trying to 
sell the idea to -the army that Cromwell should become %eror and that 
successive Fnperors should be chosen by the army as in Roman times. 
Perhaps this is not so far-fetched as at first appears when we consider 
Napoleon's career at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries. The ambassador alleges that by early September 
the officers had decided against offering Cromwell what amounted to 
absolute power because they were afraid that he might use that power 
against them to reduce pay and even to purge the regiments. 
(') 
c. s. p. v. 1655-1656, pp. 65-669 68-69t log; C. S. P. D. 16559 
p. 221. 
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In a petition that appeared on 30 July some City civilians 
also urged Cromwell to reassume the legislative powerp thus altering 
The Instrument, and in time to call a new Parliament. Possibly because 
the petition was interpreted as being part and parcel of other attempts 
to get Cromwell to become King it was suppressed. 
(') 
A more likely analysis of these developments I sp ing 
June and July, is that Cromwell was taking advice from all quarters 
about how to give the government and the administration of Justice 
legal authority and that after a number of consultations with lawyers 
and army officers it was concluded that in the existing circumstances 
it was best for legislative power to reside in the Protector and Council 
of State. It would be fantastic to believe that the army would really 
be content with or actively wish absolute power to be in the hands of 
one person. That would have gone too much against the grain of all 
that they had stood for. In the event the government was carried out 
by the Protector and his Council until circum tances forced the calling 
of a second Parliament. 
(2) 
It is dangerous to read too much into these 
deliberations and to suggest that there was a split in the Council of 
State between the civilian members favouring kingship and the army 
officers favouring Cromwell as Duperor. 
(3) 
(1) C. S. P. D. 1655, pp. 277-278; C. S. P. V. 1655-16561, pp. 99-100; 
Weekly Postv 15-21 August 165-5. 
(2) c. s. P. v. 1655-1656, P. 71 Nicholas Papers,, IIP P. 313- 
(3) Gardinerg Commonwealth and Protectorate, HIP P- 304; 
c. f. ibid. 9 Pp- 304-308. My interpretaýion differs from Gardiner's. 
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The newsbooks give no indication of these political 
discussions. They confined themselves to reporting the efforts being 
made to cut back on the costs of maintaining the armed forces. Ifeet- 
ings of officers were held in July and August to work-out a new 
establishment and for cutting back on numbers. This appears to have 
been the work of the Council of State and some of the chief officers 
of the army. 
(') 
The officers who worked on the proposals were 14halley, 
Reynoldsp Goffe and Broghillq already becoming an influential political 
personality. 8rojhil6regiment had been disbanded in 1653 but he continued 
to command an unregimented troop and to hold the rank of Lt. General 
of the Ordnance in Irelandp although he tends to be more of a civilian 
than a military inan in terms of his political activity. 
(2) 
Others 
named as being on the committee of officers, presumably a standing 
committee to deal with all aspects of army administration were Twisletong 
Packert Francis Whitep Barksted and Iforsley. 
(3) 
The names include a 
fair number of future Major Generals. Lt. Colonels John Mlls of 
Ingoldsbyl s regiment, Waldine lagoe of Pride Is and Major John Hiller 
of Barksted's also sat on a committee charged with administering the 
(1) Faithful Scout, 6-13 july 1655g 20-27 July 1655; Ifercurius 
'Politicus 
rq---ý6 July 1655; Perfect Diurnalt 23-30 July 
1655; Perfect Proceedirwst 2-9 August 1655; 9-16 August 
1655t 19---23 August 1655; Perfect Account, 8-15 August 
1655. For the new establishment which was passed by the 
Council of State on 26 July with effect from 23 July 
and the proposed cut back in men q. v. C. S. P. D. 1655, 
pp. 2389 251-252,256,26o, 261,263v 278-279; Mercurius 
Politicus, 16-23 August 1655t Gardinert Commonwealth and 
Protectorate, IlIt P- 317. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1655p pp. 229-230; Firth and Daviest p. 588. 
(3) C. S. P. D. 1655t pp. 74P 89P 1259 148P 171t 181- 
425. 
arms and ammunition in those garrisons which were to be reduced. 
(') 
What is beyond dispute about developments over the suruner is that 
there was a considerable amount of soul searching after the January 
dissolution and that various suggestions were put forward from a 
variety of sources. However, in the end it was decided not to alter 
the foundations of the government as laid down in The Instrument. 
The countryt especially in the aftermath of Penruddock's rising, 
and the armyt in the afterm th of the 'plots',, were in no condition 
for yet more political turmoil caused by a fundamental alteration 
or suspension of The Instrument,. It was felt that the question of 
internal security was far more pressing and the Major Generals were 
designed to deal with this. 
The presence of military governors in charge of large 
ri 0 
areas was by 
A, 
means new. As Professor Aylmer has pointed out Haselrig, 
Lambert and Lilburne held such important positions in the late forties 
and early fifties. Disborowe's appointment as overlord in the south 
west in the spring of 1655 was therefore not without precedent. 
(2) 
Officers also acted as militia commissioners in some of the localities 
in the interests of national security. 
(3) 
Thus the system of Major 
Generals Wmj. no innovation comparable in scale or conception to the 
Barebone's assembly or to The Instrumentl which it was in no way intended 
to supplant. The system evolved gradually over the summer and autumn of 
M C. S. P. D. 1655v P. 303. 
(2) Aylmer, State's Se. rvants,, p. 48. 
(3) Q. v. p for example, C. S. P. D. 1655p PP. 78-79. 
426. 
1655. It was not ready and waiting, fully developed to fill an 
important political gap. The origins of the system have been well- 
covered by Rannie and most recently by Professor Roots. 
(') 
What 
emerges is that the initiative for the Major Generals came from 
the Council of State and that the philosophy underlying it was 
basically militaryp the securing of the peace in the wake of the 
Royalist rising. The official inauguration of the system on 31 
October emphasised the importance of the Major Generals and the 
militia they were to supervise as a security force. Even the so- 
called moral instructions can be seen in the light of the governments 
desire to create an effective way of coping with internal security. 
(2) 
It would be wrong to look for an individual as responsible 
for the system. It emanated from the Council of State and bears all 
-the marks of being a corporate measure. The assumption that the 
Major Generals would work hand-in-hand with the local authorities, 
not usurp their powers, could be seen as furthering the policy of the 
respectable revolution to which Cromwell remained committedg although 
in practice it turned out to be a very clum y way of trying to achieve 
this. The Yajor Generals were less successful in reconciling than in 
alienating the localitieso even if this was not entirely their fault. 
(3) 
(1) D. W. Ranniel, 'Cromwell's Major Generals'. E. H. R., X9 
1895P PP. 471-506; 1. A. Roots, 'Swordsmen and Decimators - 
Cromwell's Major-GeneralsIt in R. H. Parry (ed. ), The 
English Civil War and After, 1642-1658, London, 1970, 
PP- 78-92. 
(2) Rannieg art. cit. t p. 430; Gardinerg Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1119 Pp- 319-3219 325-326. 
(3) For a good assessment of the relations between the local 
and central governments during the Protectorateg including 
an evaluation of -the Major Generals q. v. D. Underdownp 
'Settlement in the Counties' in Aylmer (ed. )v Interrep-mumv 
pp. 165-182. 
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The emphasis on improving the moral tone of the nation could also 
appeal to the armyp especially to those who felt that the advancement 
of reform must proceed in conjunction with the advancement of godliness. 
Lambert certainly played an important role in the drafting of the original 
. nstructions of 22 August to the Major Generals and a paper devised by 
him giving further orders and instructions to them was read in Council 
on 4 September and referred to a committee made up of himself, Pickeringp 
Fien'es, Lislev Ifulgrave and Strickland, all civilians, with the exception 
of Lambert of course. 
(') 
However, it would be stretching the evidence 
too far to speculate, as does Gardinerg that Lambert 
"may fairly be regarded as probably the originator, 
certainly the organiser" 
of the system. 
(2) 
All we can safely say is that he played an important 
part in helping to work out a satisfactory administrative framework 
in which the Major Generals could operate. He remained involved in 
this work into 1656 and in June of that year he presented a report to 
the Council of State with additional instructions which were read and 
agreed to. 
(3) 
Two overlapping criteria seem to have been behind the 
appointments of the individual Major Generals to their respective 
areas. The first was that most of them had been born in their areas, 
and the secondq their connection with their areas by virtue of military 
(1) C. S. P. D. 1§M, pp. 296P 370. 
(2) Gardinerg Co=onvealth and Protectorate, HIP P- 326; 
c. f. Abbott, Writings and Speecheal, Ill. p. 838- 
(3) C. S. P. D. 1655-1656v P. 332. 
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service. The former applies in the case of Goffey Fleetwood, Skippong 
Whalleyp Botelerg Berryp Iforsleyq Lambert and his deputies Robert 
Lilburne and Charles Ilowardq of Fleetwood's deputyt liezekiah Haynest 
and Berry's deputiest Rowland Dawkins and John Nicholas. Kelsey was 
a native of London but had been governor of Dover in succession to 
Algernon Sydney since at least August 1651, thus making him very 
familiar with the counties under him. 
(') 
Disborowe had also served 
in the west country at various times between 1649 and 1651, before 
his return there in 1655- Barksted was also a native of London and 
as Lieutenant of the Tower he was well qualified for his role as Major 
General for that part of Essex which was not under Skippon's juris- 
diction. 
By and large the Major Generals and their deputies were 
men of administrative experience both in military and civilian matters. 
The record of men such as Lambert, Fleetwood, Disborowe and Lilburne 
needs no mention in this respect. Skippon appears to have been 
appointed in his capacity as a much respected veterang the grand old 
man of the army. Kelseyp Goffe, Barksted and Iforsley had all been 
active in army administration during the fifties,, and Berryp as we 
have seen, allegedly helped Lambert draw up The Instrument. 
(2) 
Whether 
or not this 'was the case he devoted himself wholeheartedly to his new 
job. Of the full Hajor Generals a question mark hangs over the person 
S. P. 28/809 f. 266; A. Everittq The Communi! Z Of Kent and 
the Great Rebellion 1640-60,171"c-estert 1966t index sub 
Kelseyt Thomas. 
(2) Religuiae Baxterianae, p P- 72. 
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of William Doteler. Ile did not have a regiment of his own. He had 
had a troop which he had raised in 1648 by order of Parliament and 
had attended the Army Council in November and December of that year. 
In March 1651 he commanded a troop serving under Harrisong although 
it was probably not in Harrison's regiment itself but in the forces 
under his command at this time. 
(') 
But after this he was more involved 
with civilian activities in his native Northamptonshire and in trying 
to sort out some troubles in Bristol which involved the former 
secretary for intelligence, George Bishop. 
(2) 
Boteler condemned 
the toleration shown to the Quakers. This was not inconsistent with 
his own belief in a wide ranging liberty of conscience. Many 'liberals' 
in this respect considered the Quakers as dangerous subversives. In 
selecting him as one of the Major Generals Cromwell must have had 
quite a high opinion of Boteler and of his suitability for the job. 
It is ironical that Boteler who came close to impeachment in 1659 
and who was technically not a member of the army until his appointment 
as Major General# should have ended up as personifying all that was 
unacceptable about the Major Generals and by inference of the army 
in the eyes of the nation. 
Of the deputy Major Generalso Haynes and Packer, who took 
over from Bridges as deputy to Fleetwood early in 1656, were familiar 
with administrative work. Bridgesq who succeeded to the Colonelcy 
(1) S. P. 28/779 f-479, payment to Berry, March 1651; P. Hardacre, 
'William Boteler, Cromwellian Oligarch', Huntington 
Library Quarterly, 1.19479 pp. 1-11. 
(2) Thurloe, III, pp. 153-154P 1619 165v 169-1729 176-177. 
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of Okey's regiment on the latter's dismissalt became a full Major 
General in July 1656 on Iforsley's death. Howard, Dawkins and 
Nicholas were chosen for their strong local connectionsq although 
Howard as the former Captain of the Life Guard was clearly well- 
known to Cromwell. Thust the Major Generals were appointed on the 
basis of their-past record. They were all men of proven ability, 
andt with the exception of Boteler, men of standing in the army# 
although not necessarily in their localitiesq and they set to work 
with -the energy and zeal that had been expected from them. 
(') 
It 
is not intended to discuss the administrative efficiency of the 
Major Generals and their impact on the localitiesq this much needed 
task is being undertaken by Professor Roots, 
(2) 
Daring the winter of 1655-1656, when the Major Generals 
or their deputies were busy in their areas and the country was being 
governed by the Protector and Council of Statef the n4tion was more 
settled. It was during these months that Lambert and Fleetwood 
emerged more clearly as the leading officers in the army. They 
could rely on the diligence of their deputies to carry out the 
Instructions. Disborowep who had been busy over the summer, as 
a member of the Council of State, did not go down to the west country 
until the beginning of December. Before that he delegated responsi- 
bilities to his subordinate officers, as he had done since his 
There are lives of all the Major Generalst except Botelert 
in the D. N. B. 
(2) In the meantime q. v. Ranniet art. cit.; Roots, art . cito-y 
Gardinerv Commonwealth and Protectorate III,, chapter XL; 
J. Berry and So G. Lee, A Uromweffhaýrjor General, 
Oxford# 1938, and the various local studies which have 
appeared in recent years. 
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previous appointment in March. His talents were widely respected and 
in February 1656 there were rumours that he would be sent to the 
fleet to re-assume his position as General-at-sea which he had held 
in 1653. 
(2). 
Those of the Major Generals or Deputy Major Generals who 
were near London appear to have continued to take part in army adminis- 
tration. 
(3) 
National security continued to be an overriding concern, 
if not an obsession, on the part of the government. Any sort of 
oppositiont real or imaginedv was stamped out no matter from what 
source it camep whether Quakerg Presbyteriang Fifth Monarchist or 
Royalist. It was a time when suspicion ruled in the government's 
calculationsp a reflection of the goverment's feeling of insecurity 
and of the political question mark still hanging over the nation's 
future. This atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust even pervaded the 
government itself and is manifested in the relationship between Henry 
Cromwell and Fleptwoodt which will be commented on at greater length 
below. There was also alarm for the safety of the Protector's life 
and this prompted the formation of a crack corpsp the reformed Life 
Guardq which was intended to be a sort of Praetorian guard. There had 
been rumours since early September that Cromwell was unhappy with his 
life Guard and Royalist sources speculated ýwildly that he was going 
to use the money raised for the Protestants of Piedmont to employ a 
body of Swiss mercenaries to act as his guard. 
(4) 
(1) C. S. P. D. 1655, pp. 234v 244v 2500 253; B. M. lansdovne 
Ms. 821, ff-54-55. 
(2) c. s. p. v. 1655-1656, p. 180. 
(3) C. S. P. D. 1655-1656, P. 325. 
(4) ibid. p PP. 316v 375P 334. 
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Before the reform, the Life Guard was quite smallp 45 in 
number. It was decided that this should be increased because of the 
assassination threats. However, the Life Guard had not been free from 
discontent. Thomas Buttevant, a former member of the guard, was 
reported by Deputy Major General Haynes for spreading subversive 
Fifth Monarchist literature in the Eastern Association. William 
Howardq a kinsman of the former Captain of the life guardq Charles 
Howardt was purged at the setting up of the new life guard and later 
in the year carried the Leveller demands to Charles Stuart. 
(') 
7hese 
cases may well have been isolated but discontent continued to linger 
on even in the reformed guard. John Toope revealed Sindercombels 
plot to -the authorities in 1657. It was also reported that other 
guardsmen supported the plot although the evidence for this is not 
really convincing. 
(2) 
The new blood for the reformed life guard was 
to come from 12 of the "most faithfullq valiant and proper souldiers 
. 
in each regiment of horse" and the chance to purge the older members 
of discontented elements, loosely referred to as Ianabaptists'. was 
also taken. This shows that political calculations could and did on 
occasion determine appointments and dismissals. The new life guard 
was to be placed under the comm nd of Captain 1lichard Beke*(3) 
Firth and Daviesp P. 54. For Buttevant q. v. also Capp, 
Fifth MonarchV Men, pp. 92g 1129 114t 116t 207t 243P 
although it is not as clear as Dr. Capp suggests that 
Battevant vas purged. He might have left voluntarily, 
q. v. Thurloev IV, p. 629; Cartep II, p. 81. 
(2) Thurloet IIIt Pp. 7749 790. 
(3) Clarke Papersp III, pp. 62,64; Carte, Up p. 81. For 
Beke q. v. biographical appendix. 
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Cromwell was said to have full confidence in the new body. 
(') 
It was 
left to Lambert to work out the establishment for the new life guard. 
His recommendations were approved on 8 March. 
(2 ) 
This caused Royalists 
to speculate that Lambert had become supreme in the army, its "darling". 
and that he had chosen all the new life guard which had become his 
creature. 
(3) 
Clearlyt this was far from the truth. 
Despite Fleetwood's gloving report to Henry Cromwell early 
in the new year that the work of the Major Generals "in reforming 
the severall associations and corporacious goes on very prosperously"(4) 
concern about the need for a long term settlement remained. At the 
end of February there appears to have been a meeting of army officers 
at Whitehall which the Venetian ambassador took to be a conference of 
the Major Generals. Some of them, especially those at or near to 
London may well have attendedg but Goffet Disborovet Berry and Iforsley 
were certainly busy in their respective areas at this time. 
(5) 
The 
reports we have of the meeting say that the question of keeping the 
legislative power in Cromwell and the Council of State was discussed 
and that there was talk of calling a Parliament at some unspecified 
future date. 
(6) 
A more likely reason for the meeting was to review 
(1) Cartep II, pp. 81-82. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1655-1656p pp. 192t 203. 
(3) ibid. 9 p. 236. 
(4) B. 11. Lansdowne lis. 821, ff. 74-75. 
(5) c. s. P. v. 1655-1656, p. 183; C. S. P. D. 1655-i656, t p. 209; 
Thurloev Ivt PP. 582-596. - 
(6) C. S. P. D. 1655-16569 p. 209; C. S. P. V. 1655-1656, p p. 183; 
Carte, 119 p. 81. 
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how effective the government was proving under the existing circum- 
stances and that what emerged was a consensus that, for the moment 
anyway,, things were going well enough and that the Major Generals were 
doin, gr their work satisfactorily. There might have been a mention of 
a Parliamentv but it is unlikely to have been any more than that. It 
was at this time that Royalist newsletters began to suggest that 
Lambert was the leading figure in the army even a rival to Cromwell 
and that the new life 
N 
guard was his creature. 
(') 
As we have seen this 
was far from the truth but the Royalists were drawing attention to his 
energy and hard work in government which must have enchanced his 
prestige and status)a role which no doubt appealed to him. 
(2) 
Cromwell's confidence in the 4ajor Generals was expressed 
at about this time in the speech in the City. In it he said that the 
I, ord was on the side of the Major Generals making them 
"more effectual then was expectedp and by receiving 
a good acceptation with those who of late stood att 
some distance with us. " (3) 
Cromwell was being over-optimistic and badly misju#ng the mood of the 
localities and their resentment of the Major Generals. By Mayp however, 
the government's ambitious but expensive foreign policy was running it 
into severe financial difficulties which demanded prompt attention and, 
(1) Cartep IIp pp. 899 91-92; C. S. P. D. 1655-1656, p. 236. 
(2) For his activity q. v. C. S. P. D. 1655, and ibid., 1655-16569 
passi . 
(3) Clarke Papersp III, p. 65- 
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possibly, a change of policy at home. It was decided to hold a meeting 
of all the Major Generals under the pretext of reviewing their work. 
(') 
In fact, Cromwell and the Council of State were going to sound out the 
Major Generals about what should be done to dealwith the financial 
crisis. They were to be asked how things were in their areas and 
presumably if more money could be extracted from them. All of them 
arrived by the appointed time, 17 May, except for Robert Lilburne who 
felt obliged to give priority to a meeting with some local commis- 
sioners in York. He apologised to Cromwell for this and promised to 
hasten southwards once it was over. lie wrote on 16 May and the first 
meeting took place on 21 Mayt suggesting that it was felt to be most 
important for all the Major Generals to attend and -that consequently 
it was put back to enable Lilburne to attend. 
(2) 
On the 27th Thurloe 
wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that the Major Generals had given an 
account of the situation in their areas 
"whereby it appeares -that their beinge in this trust 
hath much conduced to the safety of the countryes 
and to the satisfaction of honest men. " 
As with the Protector's assessment this was over-optimistic. Thurloe 
said they were going on to consider broader issuesp that is what was 
to be done to get the government out of its financial mess. 
(3) 
Once 
again our knowledge of the discussion is hampered by lack of evidence. 
(1) Thurloet Vq p. 45; Gardinerg Comnonvealth and Protectoratep 
IV9 p. 253- 
(2) Thurloeq Vp pp. 99 19t 33v 45. 
(3) ibid., p. 63. 
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However, the discussions lasted until well into June 
and were quite intense. 
(') 
The outcome was a decision to call a new 
Parliament as the only satisfactory way out of the crisis. This 
decision does not appear to have been as closely kept. a secret as 
both Thurloe and Fleetwood suggested in their respective letters to 
Henry Cromwell at the beginning of July. 
(2 ) 
The Venetian ambassador 
Imew about it as early as the beginning of June. Thurloe wrote to 
Montague on 10 June, in cypher, telling him of the decision to call 
a Parliament to get money. Ile was careful to give the impression that 
it was the government's unanimous decision to which the Major Generals 
agreed. He did not hint at any disagreements. Monck was informed of 
it sometime in June and wrote to Thurloe on 1 July supporting it. He 
considered it a tactical masterstroke because if the Parliament 
did not 
"mind more the publique good than their ovne ends 
the fault will be theirs" 
and there could be no blame on Cromwell and his Council for attempting 
to govern alone after that, but he hoped it would not come to that. 
(3) 
(1) Thurloeq V. p, 122; C. S. P. V. 1655-1656,, pp. 232-234; 
B. M. Lansdowne 11s. 8219 ff-84-35. 
(2) Thurloe, V, p. 176; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8219 ff- 84-85. 
(3) c. s. P. v. 1655-71656, Carteg IIv p. 109; Thurloe, V. 
P. 175. The fact that Montague and Monck were informed 
of the calling of a Parliament well before Henry Cromwell 
and that Henry was told after the official announcement 
on 26 Juneq lends support to Henry's contention that he 
was being kept in the dark about many things and reinforces 
the view that Ireland once subdued had a pretty low priority 
in the government's thinking. 
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It was quite a different view of Parliaments from that which he held 
in 1659 when the sovereignty of Parliament figured so largely in his 
thinking and when he felt nothinglincluding army unity, was too great 
to stand in its way. Monck was, if nothing else, a man who could 
sail effortlessly with the prevailing wind. 
The demand for a new Parliament probably originated from 
the Major Generals themselves and a significant number of the Council 
of State. Cromwellj supported by an indeterminate number of the 
Council, was opposed to the idea and favoured extending the decimation 
tax. 
(') 
Howeverp his Major Generals must have emphasised that this 
would be impossible and therefore urged the calling of a Parliament, 
no doubt exuding confidence that they could guarantee the election 
of one favourable to the goverment. In February 1657 during the 
kingship crisis, when relations between army and Parliament were 
turning sour yet againt Cromwell reminded his officers of his opposition 
to calling a Parliament and to their failure to control its membership : 
"After you had excercised this power awhilet 
impatient were you till a Parliament was 
called. I gave my vote against itq but you 
(wereD confident by your own strength and 
interest to et men chosen to your heart's 
desire. " (21 
Cromwell was being unfair to the Major Generalsp they had not wanted 
a Parliament but advocated one as the best way to overcome the financial 
crisis which had been caused not by them but by the government's policy. 
C. S. P. V. 1655-1656, pp. 230-231; C. f. Gardinerg Common- 
wealth and Protectoratet IIIt pp. 254-256. 
(2) Abbottv Writings and Speechest IV, pp. 417t 418. 
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The Major Generals were back at their posts by the end of June and 
in the case of Kelsey, at least, they were thinking hard about how 
to secure the return of members amenable to the government, 
(') 
The decision to call a Parliament was bound to raise 
the political temperature and to give encouragement to the various 
opponents of the Protectorate. In July there occurred the well- 
Imown attempt to co-ordinate left-wing opposition with the forth- 
coming Parliament in mind. Such an attempt had not been made in 
late 1654 and early 1655 at the time of the Three Colonelo' Petition 
and the Fifth Monarchist discontent with the Protectorate. In 1656 
the attempt involved former army officersp Rumpers and Fifth Monarchists. 
The basis for negotiation was Vane's A Healing Question which had 
appeared in May and which advocated the supremacy of successive 
Parliaments elected by faithful adherents of what was called "the 
good cause". These Parliaments would governt if need beg in con- 
junction with a single person and Council of Statet but the Parliament 
would be supreme and control both the civil and military branches of 
government. 
(2 ) 
This demand for parliamentary control over the army 
was one of the major causes of the fatal breach between the restored 
lh=p and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in the army in 
October 1659. As far as we 1mow the meetings were not attended by 
any serving officers but they did involve such diverse former officers 
as Okey, Richt Harrison and Richard Goodgroom who might have been the 
(1) Thurioet vt p. 165. 
(2) E379(5)p A Healing Question, (12 May 1656), repr. in 
Somerts Tracts, VIP PP. 304-315. 
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author of A Copy of a Letter from an Officer of the Army in Ireland. 
This polemic appeared at about the same time as Vane's tract,, and 
attacked the Protectorate for being too much of a neo-monarchy and, 
like Vane, called for an unlimited Parliament to govern the nation 
as the respository of supreme power, both civil and military. 
(') 
The meetings had little chance of success. The differences between 
a Harrison and an Okeyand ^ 
the essence of their opposition to Cromwell., 
were too great. However, the meetings are important because they 
mark the crystallisation of a particular sort of Republicanism that 
was to become vital by 1659, the sort of Republicanism that looked 
back to the Rump as the guardian of the 'good old cause'. In this 
respect the contacts between Okeyq Bradshaw and Goodgroom and the 
proposal that the legal authority under which it was suggested the 
anti-Protectorate group should work, some 40 members of the Long 
Parliameatt takes on a new dimension. The government reacted by 
rounding up what had become by now the usual suspectst including 
Okey, Richg Harrison, Lawson and Ludlow as well as Bradshaw and Alured. 
All were questioned and Richp Harrison and Alured were detained. 
(2) 
(1) Thurloev V9 p. 197; Lb-id-P VI9 PP- 184-186; E381 Wt 
A Copy of a Letter ... . repr. Exeter, 1974. The editors 
of this reprint speculate that Streater was the author. 
Q. v. also Pocock, 'James Harrington and the Gnod Old Cause' 
(PP- 35-36) and Barnard (Cromvellian Ireland )'P- 317n. 
) 
for discussions about the authorship of this tract. The 
claim that Ludlow was the author is very unlikely. If 
Streater was the author then he was possibly guilty of 
backsliding himself. In November 1656 he petitioned 
the Council of State complaining that he hadý%ZLed in 
six different actions including infringement of the 
Ordinance to enable soldiers who had served the Commonwealth 
to exercise any trade (C. S. P. D. 1656-1657, pp. 159-160). 
(2) Capp, Fifth Yonarchy Men, t P- 115; Gardiner, Commonwealth 
and Protectoratep IV9 p. 262. 
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At the end of August George Fenwick had his commission as 
Colonel of foot and governor of Leith and Ddinburgh Castle taken away. 
Fenwick, who was also returned as an M. P. to the new Parliament but 
refused admissiong was probably considered disaffected and too much 
under the influence of his father-in-law, Sir Arthur Haselrig . His 
regiment was given to Lt. Colonel Timothy Wilkes*(') 
It should be added that another Copy of a letter this 
one from the hand of "a true Commonwealthsman! l and "written to an 
officer of the Army" also circulated in the first part of 1656. It 
advocated a hereditary single person and urged Cromwell to place the 
succession in his family. The author attacked the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty calling it "a yoak which our fathers never 
knew of nor are we able to bear". He even went so far as to say that 
if there were a referendum "not one in twenty but would desire their 
old goverment again". 
(2) 
In the army there appears to have been some uneasiness 
with Cromwell's dual role as head of government and head of the army. 
According to the Venetian ambassador there was a desire for someone 
not so deeply involved in affairs of state to be at the head of the 
army thus raising its morale in case it had to take to the field in 
an emergency. He added that there were rumours about making Fleetwood 
(1) Clarke Paperst 1119 P. 71- 
(2) I; 831(2)t A Copy of a Letter written to an Officer of the 
Army by a true Comonwealthsman and no Courtier. 
Rxtracts of this tract are reprinted by Firth, 'Cromwell 
andt. trown', E. H. R. 9 XVII, 1902, pp. 431-433. There are 
two versions of the tractIthe first one (E370 5)) appeared 
on 19 March according to Thomason. 
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the General instead, but that there was a preference in the army 
itself for Lambert. If the report is accurate, it seems a rather 
surprising request as both Fleetwood and Lambert were as heavily 
involved in government as Cromwell. Perhaps too much should not 
be read into the story as the Venetian ambassador at this time, 
Giavarinav could be both surprisingly well-informedv as over the 
calling of the Parliament, and equally surprisingly mis-informed, 
as with his report of Barksted's death in October. 
(') 
Rit the 
story does give us an indication of the army's esprit at this time. 
The Major Generals failed to influence the elections to 
the Parliament decisively in the goverment's favourv and a number 
of M. P. s whom the goverment could not tolerate were returned and 
subsequently excluded. 
(2) 
It seems evident that the Major Generals 
had promised more than they could deliver. They were not, after all, 
petty dictators in their eýreas, but they did try hard to influence 
the outcome of the elections. The extent of their failure can perhaps 
be grasped from a letter by Kelsey to Cromwell on 26 August after 
elections had been held in Kent. Kelsey wrote that most of the 
"Cavaliers fell in with the Presbyterian against 
you and the Goverment, and the spirit is generally 
bitter againstswordtsment decimatorsp courtiersp etc., 
and most of those chosen to sit in the ensuing 
Parliament are of the same spirit. " 
c. s. p. v. 1655-1656, pp. 226v 272; c. f. Gardiner, Common- 
wealth and Protectorate q IV9 p. 254, who gives much 
credence to the report. 
(2) C. H. Firth, The Last Years of the Protectorate 1656-1658, 
Londong 19099 19 pp. 1-20. 
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In fact what happened in Kent was that the traditional M. P. s were 
being returned in the county to the second Protectorate Parliament. 
Kelsey favoured imposing a test on all M. P. s before allowing them 
to sit to ensure that they would not meddle with The Instrument 
"without your consent,, nor yet with what has been 
done by you and Councilt in order to the peace 
and safety of the nation. " 
Kelsey had# of course, helped promote The Instrument in 1653. A 
test was subsequently imposed on the members of the Parliament. 
Kelsey further declared that hes, and those under him, would stand by 
Cromwell "with life and fortune" to maintain 
"the interest of Godts people, which is to be 
preferred before 19000 Parliaments. " (1) 
It was strong language but it betrayed the realisation that there 
had been a failure to deliver the right sort of Parliament. Given 
this realisation drastic measures, including force if necessary, 
were recommended; the arts of politics, of compromise and reconciliation, 
of giving and takingof the possible, were not even mentioned. In 
this respect the attitudes reflected in Kelsey's letter symbolise 
those of the army during the next three years or so. The army was 
to fluctuate from one extreme to the other; from making a great show 
of wanting to achieve a settlement by legal and constitutional 
means to trying to hasten on that settlement by sweeping any obstacles 
aside with the exercise of naked military force. By ignoring the arts 
of politics it is no wonder that it lost credibility in the period 
after the death of Cromwell, its supreme politician. 
C. S. P. D. 1656--16579 pp. 87-88; Everittt Community of Kent, 
pp. 294-295; c. f. H. M. C. Portland, III, p. 208. 
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Before the start of the Parliament the government decided 
to make sure of the unity of the army especially in view of the recent 
R=per-Fifth Monarchist activity and the inevitable politicisation of 
the country at election time. There was a partial return to the Army 
Council of the late 1640's. although in a very much more watered down 
form. A field officer from each regimentwas sent for to attend a 
Council of War ostensibly to advise on military matters especially 
a planned recruitment of the regiments. 
(') 
The officers sent up by 
the regiments were not elected but appointed by the regimental commanders 
and no soldiers were represented. The occasion was used by Cromwell 
to give the officers a lecture justifying the government's policy. 
Once again national security was emphasised, particularly the 'threats' 
from the Royalists and Fifth Monarchists. Major Ralph Knight one of 
the representatives who had been sent from Scotlandq and to whom we 
owe the account of the meeting, hoped it would I'much strengthen and 
cement the army". 
(2) 
It was at this meeting too that new resolutions were 
passed to tighten up discipline in the army. Evidence of -these 
measures comes from a letter from Lambert to Monck inclosing the 
various resolutions of the Council of liar. It shows that there was 
a determination to ensure that officers returned to their commands 
Clarke Papersp HIP P. 71. For the additions to the regiments 
and garrisons q. v. C. S. P. D. 1656-16579 pp. 94t 114t 128-129. 
The regiments were recruited to 1200 at this time but were 
,d, p. 161). soon cut back to 1,000 in November 
Qbi 
(2) Clarke Papersp IIIP P. 72, 
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and stayed there. In Scotland this was a problem that had dogged 
I'llonck's predecessors. Officers were to return to their charges 
regardless of any previous passes that had been issued, no matter 
by whom, and in future only those who had a pass from Cromwell, or 
the general officers of the army in England and Scotlandq were to be 
absent without leave. This was not to apply to those officers chosen 
as H. P. S. The officers were also to enforce a strict discipline over 
the soldiery and to deal severely with swearingt drunkenness and all 
other vices. Lambert recommended the holding of monthly Councils of 
War. The officers were also required to have 
"a careful inspection into their respective charges 
that noe suspicious person or persons come among 
them to disaffect them. " 
Lambert felt that this waý "not the least materiall" and left it to 
the vigilency and discretion of the officers to enforce. 
(l) 
No doubt 
the resolutions were sent to all the regiments with the representatives 
when they returned to them. In order to keep the army content more 
money seems to have been made available to cover its arrearsp especially 
those of the regiments around London. The Venetian ambassador speculates 
whether this was done to prevent riots and to stop the army from going 
to the Parliament to get its arrears, but this seems an unlikely 
interpretation. 
(2) 
But whatever the reason Cromwell and the government 
clearly recognised the need for the presence of a reasonably contented 
and peaceable army when the Parliament met. 
Clarke 11s. 43, f . 76 + v.; c. f - C-S. P. V. 1655-1656, pp. 
112-113 where the newly arrived Venetian ambassador, 
Sagredo, shows himself highly impressed with the 
disciplinet appearance and equipment of the army. 
(2) c. s. P. v. 1655-1656, p. 264. 
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The regiments which were ordered to be recruited at this 
time were the Protectorts two regiments, Lambert's, Barksted's. Mills's. 
Hewson's. Pridelsq Salmon's and Briscoe's. It is probable that Cromwell's 
regiments together with Lambert's, Mills's. Barksted's and Hewson's were 
in London. Mills's regiment had formerly been Ingoldsby's. Mills took 
over in September 1655. Ingoldsby took over Charles Howard's horse 
regiment (formerly Rich's). Howard returned to the life guard and Beke 
was given the Majority in 11ills regiment. 
(') 
Hewson's original 
regiment had been one of those selected by lot for the Irish service in 
1649. Four companies of it along with other Irish companies had 
returned to England in 1655 at the time of the Royalist rising. Hew- 
son's companies did not return to Ireland but were incorporated into 
a new regiment formed for him in October 1655- Of the other strengthened 
regiments Pride's appears to have still been in Scotland, Salmon's 
was ordered from Scotland to the strategically important town of Hull 
in August 1656, Briscoe's which had fo= lly been Constable'sp before 
his death in June 1655, had served in Scotland and might have returned 
to Englandt possibly even to London. 
(2) 
Mills and Briscoe along with 
the newly promoted Waldine Lagoeq who took over from the deceased 
Major General Charles Worsley as Lt. Colonel of Cromwell's foot regi- 
ment, were responsible for examining the admission tickets of the new 
M. P. s. a scene which must have recalled Pride's Purge to many M. P. s, 
All men were officers of long standing. In the late 1640ts they had 
been jtA-Ai-or officers. 
(1) Firth and Daviesg pp. 151-152. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1655t p. 106; ibid., 1656-16579 pp. 949 128-129; 
Firth and Daviesp PP. 3329 410P 5329 402; Firth# 'Scotland 
and the Protectoratelp P. 305. Pridels, Hewson's. Mill's 
and Goffe's were still in London in June 1653 (C. S. P. D. 
1658-591, pe 78). 
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The second Protectorate Parliament, in which all the 
Major Generals sat and in which the army was well representedt was 
to bring the English Revolution to yet another important -turning 
point. Cromwell who had been severely disappointed with his first 
Parliamentv and possibly with Parliaments in general, had been, 
as we have seen, very hesitant to have another one, but in the end 
had given in to the view that a Parliament should be called. During 
the first months of the Parliamentary session Cromwell gradually lost 
this suspicion and began to be impressed with the Parliament's attempts 
to put forward proposals for settlement and what appeared as its 
genuine desire to get on well with the Protector. 
(') 
This does not 
mean that the Parliament met in September armed with blueprints for 
settlement. As so often in the course of the English Revolutiong the 
proposals evolved in response to a serious crisis. At this juncture 
the catalyst was Naylor's case and the proposal for settlement which 
emerged out of it was The Humble Petition and Advice,,, including 
originally the offer of kingship. Here at last the tantalising 
prospect of a settlement that was the work of civilians was held 
before Cromwell's eyes. To accept it in full Cromwell would have 
been forced to alienate large and important sections of his army; 
even in accepting it without the kingship clause he was placing quite 
a strain on the loyalty of the majority of the army which had faith- 
fully followed him up till then through all the twists and turns of 
C. f. Professor Underdown's argument that by 1657 many of 
the older families vere beginning to accept the Protectorate 
and to return to active politics, and thus to make a more 
positive contribution to the problem of settlement (D. 
Underdown "' Settlement in the Counties 1653-16581, in 
Aylmer (ed. ) Interregnum, p. 177. - 
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the 1650's- When we talk about the army in the crisis of 1656-1657P 
we mean effectively the army around London especially those officers 
stationed therep or as M. P. s. This emphasises once more just how 
important the forces in ornear the capital were. In the crisis over 
kingship Cromwell had to give in to their opposition to kingship. 
He did not try to appeal over their heads to the forces in Ireland 
or Scotland. It is doubtful if such a course were viable anyway. 
Daring the crisis the Protector tended to listen more to the advice 
of civilians and appeared to be prepared to follow a more civilian 
path. The knowledge of this, together with a feeling that he was 
somehow cutting his previous close bonds with the army and perhaps 
a perception that in the long term it could only mean a weakening 
of the army's direct role in politics# helps explain the way in which 
many of the officers dug in their heels and forced Cromwell to reject 
kingship. This sense of alienation had already manifested itselfp as 
we have seent as early as June with the reports that the army were 
wanting a new General. 
Initially great things were expected from the Parliament. 
Henry Whalleyp the Judge Advocate of the army in Scotlandt wrote to 
his comrades north of the border on 11 October 
"The whole House are unanimous in carrying, on the 
best things for the good of the natiousq both 0 
spirituall and temporal. 19 so as truly I feare 
not through mercy but that God will owne us. " (1) 
(1) Clarke Papersp IIIP P- 76. 
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Howevert even before hTaylor's case arosev and threw a spanner in the 
constitutional worksp a proposal was made on 23 October to discuss 
the question of successiont whether it should be elective or hereditary. 
The proposal did not get very far. 
(') 
But once the question had been 
brought upt public discussion of it proceeded apace and started rumours, 
especially among the foreign ambassadors, that Cromwell was being asked 
to become King, although at this stage this was not the case. 
(2) 
It 
soon became clear that the whole question was divisive, not just 
between the civilians and the military, but within the army itself. 
Sir Charles Firth has shown that the question of a hereditary 
Protectorate even kingship was nothing new and, as we have seen, The 
Instrument in its original form might well have included kingship. 
It is possible, if the report of the French ambassador can be relied 
on, that in the first Protectorate Parliamento when the succession was 
discussed, Lambert supported the idea of a hereditary Protectorate. 
This would be consistent with his 1653 view. 
(3) 
11oweverg the sugges- 
tion of styling the single person King was quickly dropped in 1653 
after a sounding out process in the army. 
(4) 
Thusq it is not surpris- 
ing that the re-emergence of this issue in late 1656 should arouse 
passions in the army once more. This can be seen in the letter from 
(1) C. II. Firth, 'Cromwell and -the Crown'. E. H. R., XVII9 
19029 PP. 433-434. 
(2) ibid.,, pp. 437-438t 442. 
(3) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown'. 1902t pp. 429- 
438; Burtont I. p, LI, 
(4) Q. v. above. 
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Colonel John Bridges to Henry Cromwell on 25 November. Bridges,, whose 
title was a courtesy oneq was an Irish M. P. in 1656 and although he 
is said to have had a foot company in Ireland he was essentially a 
civilian and not a military man. In his letter he says that Berry 
was opposed to the notion of a hereditary succession and that Disborowe 
supported him in this. Disborowe argued that it would be unwise 
suddenly to change the constitution from an elective to a hereditary 
one at this stage. Bridges, on the contrary, put forward some very 
sound reasons for the change. 
(') 
However, the intervention of Naylor's case helped put 
an end for the time being to the attempts to change the successiont 
and no doubt gave those who favoured a change a breathing space to 
work on something more comprehensive, the proposals that eventually 
became The Humble Petition and Advice. The article by Messrs. Wilson 
and Merli has gone over quite effectively the constitutional problem 
raised by the case. 
(2 ) 
They show that the administration was unaware 
of the full implications of Naylor's case. But it was not just the 
administration that was unaware of this; many members were similarly 
ignorant and only realised the powder-keg with which they were playing 
after Cromwell's letter arrived. One might also take issue with th, 0tr 
view that The Instrument "ordained" positions of "reciprocal responsi- 
bility" for "the triumvirate of Armry, Protector and Parliament" and 
even their conclusion that Naylor's case "demolished the ephemeral 
spirit of unity and co-operation" between "the three partners in 
Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E. H. R., 1902p pp. 439- 
440. 
(2) T. A. Wilson and F. J. Merli, 'Naylor's Case and the Dilemma 
of the ProtectorateIg Universitv of Birmingham Historical 
Journalp X, 1965, PP- 44-59- 
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in government" on the grounds that The Instrument did not formalise, 
let alone institutionaliseq any such partnership. One of the basic 
problems of the 1650's is that the power of -the army was not really 
institutionalised. The Protector, in the person of Cromwell as head 
of government and head of the army, went some way towards trying to 
solve the problem but it raised the question of Oliver's successor. 
Would the army always be satisfied that future Protectors were suitably 
qualified to hold the two positions? Professor Aylmer has argued 
that the pre-June 1657 Council of State with its solid block of senior 
officers had given institutional form to the power of the army. 
(') 
But this was an informal expression of that power. One would also add 
that the administrative activities of many of the officers relating 
to matters which were not purely military which we have noted at times 
especially after 1653, for example in the post office and at the 
Admiralty, were further manifestations of this as well as the officers 
who sat in the Protectorate Parliaments. Bat this sharing in the 
burdens of government, while it no doubt kept many officers from 
brooding too much over politics,, was never formalised despite the 
fact that the Other House went some way towards trying to do this and 
that was the root of the problem. 
The debates over Naylor's case revealed that there was 
no unified view amongst the officers in the House over the issues 
raised by it. On the question of liberty of conscience and that of 
(1) Aylmert State's Servants, p. 49. 
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the rights of the individual there was a big difference between Sydenham 
who said 
"I shall choose rather to live in another nation, 
than where a man shall be condemned for an offence 
done by a subsequent law" (1) 
a view supported by Packer 
(2) 
1 and the views of Skippon, 
(3) 
Whalley(4) 
and Boteler who went so far as to say that 
"If I were sure to loose my life in the next 
parliamentg for the principles I hold nowt I 
should not stick to give my vote that this 
deserves death. " (5) 
Boteler's words are very ironical given events at the Restoration. 
Clearly he would not have minded ifg to paraphrase Cromwellp Naylor's 
case became his own. On the 26 December the Protector's letter in 
'which he demanded to Imov on what grounds the House proceeded was read. 
Adam Baynes had 
. warned 
the House that it was vulnerable to this 
danger as early as 8 December. 
(6 ) 
The letter threw the officers and 
the House in general off balance. Scout Master George Downing argued 
unequivocally that the House had complete competence to deal with the 
case. He claimed that the existing House of Co=ons now united the 
powers of the previous Lords and Commonst but he soon changed his view. 
(7) 
Goffep before the arrival of the letterp had in his accustomed Godly 
(1) Burton, I. p. 86; c. f. pp. 68-69. 
(2) ibid. t p. 99. 
(3) ibid. t P. 101. 
(4) ibid. t P. 101. 
(5) ibid. P- 113- 
(6) ibid. 9 P- 59. 
(7) ibid. g pp. 248p 254. 
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fashion, perhaps gone too far in his demand for a strict punishment 
for Naylor than he would have done in retrospect. He said 
"I shall not entertain an irreverent thought of 
The Instrument of Government. I shall spend 
my blood for it. Yet if it hold out anything 
to protect such persons I would have it burnt 
in the fire. " (1) 
Sydenhamp Hewson and Fleetwood showed themselves to be rather taken 
aback and worried by the letter. They favoured setting up a committee 
to look into the matter to try and come up with an answer to Cromwell. 
(2) 
Boteler displaying insecurity wished that Cromwell had intervened 
earlier, while Packer favoured a debatet which would involvet he felt, 
less loss of face to the House and in which the House's constitutional 
position could be examined. He was supported in this by Sydenham and 
Worsley. 
(3) 
Whalley showed himself both politically naive as well as 
tactless when he said that the House of Lords and Star Chamber had 
passed greater sentences and thatt thereforev the present House could 
do so as well. 
(4) 
It was an extraordinary remark to come from a man 
who had fought against royal tyranny to make, but quite in keeping 
with his character. Reynolds suggested a way out by urging the House 
to vote that Naylor's case and punishment should not be made a 
precedent. His suggestion was backed by Sydenham. 
(5) 
Both failed 
to see that a mere vote of the House could not stop it from becoming 
a precedent. 
(1) ibid. # P. 103. 
(2) ibid. 9 pp. 2479 2489 253. 
(3) ibid. 9 p. 257. 
(4) ibid., v p. 26o. 
(5) ibid. 
19 pp. 
270t 274. 
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Disborowe, who appears to have been absent when the letter 
cameq favoured rectifying the mistake if it turned out that one had 
been made. Ile was worried that it might become a precedent. 
(') 
Like 
the other speakers he did not want to get on the wrong side of Cromwell. 
This was evident in the speech by Luke Robinsonp a correspondent of 
Robert Lilburnep in which he asked 
"What is above the jurisdiction of a Parliament? " 
He felt that it was not the multitude and hoped that the jurisdiction 
of Parliament would not be questioned. However, he was aware that 
there could be a possible conflict between Protector and Council and 
Parliament and advocated a commission to look at precedents and present 
them to Cromwell. Nevertheless, his assumption was that Parliament 
should argue from a position of strengthq very much the view of a 
Rumper. 
(2) 
Finally, came Lambert's speechp an impressive onet in 
which he still adherred firmly to the line of 1653 embodied in The 
Instrument,. But in his speech he also shows signs of being slightly 
on the defensive. He said it was no good supporting a commission 
until Parliament had worked out exactly what its position was. He 
hoped that it could be safely assumed that 
"A right understanding between his Ilighness and 
the Parliament is certainly the salus populi. " 
But he addedq in a somewhat threatening tonep "I hope it will also be 
thought supremalex". Fearing that Naylor's case was being exploited 
(1) ibid. 9 p. 271. 
(2) ibid. f p. 271. 
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by some to question the constitution established by The Instrument 
he proceeded to justify the Council of State and its recent policies. 
"Some of us wish that we might serve you in any 
other place with greater hazard of our lives". 
possibly a reference to the army members'of the Council and further 
active service on behalf of the cause. He argued that the recogni- 
tion had been necessary and that free Parliaments would have resulted 
in a situation whereby 
"those may creep into this Houseq who may come 
to sit as our judges for all we have done in 
this Parliament, or at any other time or place. " 
This was an argument that the Three Colonels had overlooked. Lambert 
then swung the debate back to the question of the power of Parliaments,, 
and the dangers of a parliamentary dictatorship arising therefrom# the 
alleged motive for the expulsion of the Rump in 1653. Lambert skill- 
fully denied that he was arguing about Naylor in particular 
"lest it may seem to plead too far for liberty 
of conscience". 
but warned of the dangers of free Parliaments in the future. They 
might result in the present servants of the state being hauled before 
the bar of the House. Lambert felt that for an unspecified time in 
the future a necessarily unrepresentative groupp a revolutionary minority 
in modern parlanceg would have to guide the cause forward. He added 
"We ought to take care to leave things certain and 
not expose the people's liberties to an arbitrary 
power. " (1) 
(1) ibid. 9 pp. 231-282. 
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In the rejection of Lambert's views by the Parliament because they 
wanted to see Protector and Parliament as the dynamo for progress, 
not Protector and Council with the army in the background, one of the 
main causes for the disequilibrium of the next few months and also one 
of the principal reasons for Lambert's fall can be seen. 
The House showed no inclination to raise the sleeping 
dog once more when early in the new year the Speaker reminded it that 
it still had to reply to Cro=well. As Burton put it 
"I heare it will never be mentioned again, if it 
be, I dread the consequence. Absit. " (1) 
Naylor's case was soon surpassed in importance by other developments 
and it is possible that those who had realised that the constitution 
was in need of amendment were hard at work devising an alternative. 
It is generally agreed that it was the Major Generals 
themselves who were in favour of going to Parliament to get the decimation 
approved. 
(2) 
However, in this they were not just supported by the 
"military party" on the Council. Thurloe also supported the move. 
(3) 
The debates reveal differences of opinion amongst the officer M. P. s, 
Hewson, Kelseyp Packer and Lambert were in favour of a tax against 
Royalists defined broadly and in the case of Lambert for a hard line 
against all malignantsp while Whalley felt it ought to be stressed 
that it was only against those who had been active for Charles Stuart. 
Whalley's caution was shared by Colonel Philip Jones. Disborove, who 
(1) ibid. p p. 296; Wilson and Iferli, art. cit., p. 56. - 
(2) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 19; Firth, Last Years, pp. 107-103. 
(3) Durtont I. p. 237. 
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had introduced the bill, was for defining cavaliers more closely 
"It is their reformation. not their ruin, is desired". 
(') ih, 
debate was re-opened in the new year when the question of a possible 
contravention of the Act of Indemnity, touched upon at its first 
airingp received further attention. Broghill in a very eloquent 
speech spoke out against the bill and in what seems to have been a 
deliberately condescending tone, suggested that the Major Generals Vho 
had acted under it in the interim of Parliaments should be indemnified. 
He argued that they had acted "in emergencyt and mere necessity for 
self preservation". 
(2) 
Yot surprisingly this raised the hackles of 
some of the Major Generals. Robert Lilburne muttered that 
"he swrned to accept that indemnity, he would 
venture his indemnity. " (3) 
Broghill was gleefully emphasising that the assumption behind the 
Major Generals seeking a parliamentary confirmation of the decimation 
tax was that they were inferior to a Parliamentt and, that by implica- 
tion, the whole army was as well. He also realised that the Major 
Generals had advanced their Achilles heel for the Parliament to strike 
at. Dat that is not how the officers viewed matters. Perhaps they 
thought they were being magnaminous in putting the bill before Parlia- 
ment. Broghill was certainly growing in influence at the Protector's 
court and in his circle of advisers. Henry Cromwell was glad that 
his father was taking Broghill's advice and felt that it was time to 
ibid. 9 pp. 2350 2370 240-42; c. f. Firtht Last Years,, 
pp. 108-110. 
(2) Burtont It PP- 310-313- 
(3) ibid. p P. 313. 
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do something to counteract what he saw as the designs of the Major 
Generals especially as he felt the Protector had "so complyant and 
well-affected a parliament to back him therein". 
(') 
Henry Croi3nrell 
was in favour of power being more heavily weighted in favour of 
civilians. 
The debate provoked quite an abrupt and frank outburst 
from Disborowe defending the actions of the Major Generals. As in 
Lambert's speech over Naylor's case there are signs of defensiveness. 
Disborowe said that the decimation tax was too low and should be higher, 
thus throwing his old-year plea for reconciliation out of the window. 
"It is blows not fair words that settled and must 
settle the peace of lhgland. Haplyt you may find 
them speaking good words. Let us consider what 
they would do by us, if they had the power ... 
It is our swords must indemnify us. " (2) 
The Major Generals made the decimation tax into a vote of confidence 
in themselves, and effectively into one on the army too. Lambert said 
"The quarrel is now betwýen light and darkness, not 
who shall rule, but whether we shall livep or be 
preserved, or no. " (3) 
In the end the House did:, not-see it that way; they could envisage 
settlement without the need for a military presence bearing down 
as heavily as the Major Generals had. The rejection of the bill and 
Cromwell's indifference, if not thankfulness for its defeatq increased 
(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ils. 823P f-336; c. f. Thurloet VIP P- 93- 
Ile was not so outspoken to his father Fi-bid., p. 222). 
(2) Durton, Ii PP- 315-317. 
(3) 
_ibid. 9 
P- 319- 
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the sense of alienation among the officers, and presented a frightening 
prospect to the more perceptive of them, that in terms of politics, for 
the first time since 1647 the army could become superfluous. 
(') 
In the meantime the question of the succession had come 
up once more. After a debate on 19 January in which it was decided 
that the House should express their thanks to Cromwell for the recent 
seizure of Spanish ships, John Ash urged that Cromwell should be 
requested to take upon himself the government according to the ancient 
constitution. Disborowe was somewhat startled by this and said firmly 
that it would be "but a slendour prop (ffor the ProtectorD without 
taking care to secure his enemies. Downing came out in favour of king- 
ship. Perhaps Ash was letting the kingship cat out of the bag pre- 
maturely. 
(2) 
The question of kingship was the subject of discussion 
behind the scenes during the next month until Pack presented his 
proposals for a new constitution on 23 February. 
The chronology of the kingship crisis has been very well 
covered by Sir Charles Firth in the second part of his article in the 
English Historical Review, 
(3) 
and it is not proposed here to cover the 
same ground. What emerges from the sources Firth prints is that there 
was a clear civilian/military split over this issuep one which emerged 
from the very presentation of Pack's proposals. Howevert there was 
also a split within the military itself. It is this split and the 
impact of the crisis on the army that will be focused upon here. The 
For the rejection of the bill q. v. Firth, Last Yearsp 
It pp. 124-125; Clarke Paperaq IIIP PP. 87 + n., 91; 
q. v. also Durton, 9 It P. 331 for the sort of anti-armyg 
not just anti-Major Generalp gossiping that went on among 
some M. P. s. 
(2) Burtont It PP- 362-365. 
(3) C. 11. Firtho 'Cromwell and the Crown', R. H. R. 9 XVIII9 1903P Pp. 52-80; q. v. also Firth, Last YearEq It Chapters 
V and VI. 
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officers who appear to have been uncompromisingly against kingship 
were Lambertp Sydenhamq Baynes,, Ilewson,, Sankeyp Salmon, Millsp Mason, 
Lilburne and Pride. Those who were for it were the ageing Skippon, 
Philip Jones, Richard Ingoldsbyp Howardq Reynolds and Broghill. 
Fleetwood and Disborowe were opposed to it but didn't want to see it 
blown up into a crisis of major proportions if this could be avoided. 
Whalleyq Goffe and Boteler wavered and Cooper moved from opposition 
to support for the move. The attitude of the rest of the officersp 
and of the army in general, is less easy to determine. But one thing 
is clear, the crisis really only affected that part of the army in and 
around London. The forces in Scotland and Ireland waited upon events 
although the authorities in London were worried lest some of the 
opponents of kingship should try and spread their propaganda to the 
other armies. Henry Cromwell wrote to Droghill after the army petition 
of 8 May that some "incendiaries" had come to Ireland but he hoped 
they would not get far. 
(') 
Monck was warned by Cromwell of the 
possibility that copies of the army petition might be sent northwards 
and he was instructed to search the posts to prevent any copies of 
the petition from being distributed. Monck promised Cromwell that 
there would be no trouble in Scotland and immediately wrote to his 
fellow officers warning them to be on the look out for the petition 
which he said had a post-script 
Hs 
D. If. Lansdovne, 8239 : ff-337-338; Thurloe, VI, p. 291. 
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flof a very bad and dangerous consequencet and itt 
-is certainly sett on by some people ill disposed to peace and settlement. " 
He added that the original petitioners "have dissociated themselves 
from the post-script"t which in fact they had. 
(') 
By all accounts lambert was vehemently opposed to the 
kingship proposal from the moment of its introduction. According 
to the Venetian ambassador, he denounced the proposal as contrary to 
the oaths and protestations every one had made and to the reasons why 
they had fought the war, and that he saw no real reason to make any 
change. He would be content if Parliament would nominate a successor. 
(2) 
Lambert was opposing the offer of kingship and not necessarily the 
rest of Pack's proposals. The Major Generals approached Cromwell; 
of all the officers they obviously had the easiest access to the 
Protector. They went to see him on the very evening of the day that 
Pack had presented his proposals. It was a tense and awkward situation 
with no words passing between either side for a quarter of an hour, 
showing both the awe and deference they still had for Cro=well. At 
this stage they were not coming to threaten or challenge Cromwell. 
They felt somewhat confused and appeared to be coming to Cromwell 
to ask him to do somethingt to pull something out of the hat to save 
the situation. Cro=well must have sensed this and after they had 
complained to him about the parliament he turned on them and not mincing 
Firth, 'Scotland and the Protectoratelp P. 354; Thurloe, 
VIt P. 310. 
(2) c. s. p. v. 1657-16599 p. 22; Firthp 'Cromwell and the Crown'. 
E. 11-R-9 1903P P. 55; Firth# Last Yearst I. pp. 132-133. 
p 
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his vords asked 
1111hat would you have me doe? Are they not of 
your own garbling? Did you not admit whom 
you pleased and keep out whom you pleased? 
And now do you complain to me? " 
It was unfair, but showed once more that Cromwell was dissociating 
himself from the Major Generals. 
(') 
The Major Generals were soon made aware that disquiet 
over Parliament's proposals extended to other officers as well and 
. ediately Lambertt as the chief figure opposing kingship took swift 
action to control and co-ordinate these sentiments, to prevent them 
from becoming unmanageable. 
(2 ) 
There are good grounds for arguing 
that Lambertp while appreciating the tactical value of having a good 
number of fellow officers opposed to kingship, was determined not to 
let their opposition get out of hand. Moreoverg it appears that this 
extended opposition emerged spontaneously and was not stirred up by 
Lambertv but that he tried to control it. 
(3) 
Thurloe tries to convey 
the impression that Lambert was fomenting the trouble and even to 
make the crisis appear as a personal difference or even rivalry between 
Lambert and Cromwell, 
(4) 
The outcome of these rumblings in the army 
was the famous meeting between Cromwell and the officers on 27 
February when the Protector rounded on them and gave a very persona- 
lised and distorted account of the way in which he felt he had been 
(1) Firthp 'Cromwell and the Crown'. 19039 P. 59- 
C. f. Trevor-Roper, 'Oliver Cromwell and his Parliaments'. 
in Religion, the Reformation and Social Change, q P- 3829 
for a different interpretation of Cromwell's relationship 
with his Major Generals at this time. 
(2) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown'. E. H. R., 1903P P. 59- 
(3) Clarke Papers, III# P. 93. 
(4) Thurloep VIP PP. 74P 93 especially the latter. 
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pushed around by the army. 
(') 
It must have been delivered with the 
same sort of confidence he had exuded a few days before, a confidence 
inspired by the belief that at long last perhaps the odds for the much 
sou, r, r, ht after harmony with Parliament were extremely favourable and 
that in future instead of the Protector having to bare hjj'powe, - -, on 
the army he could bRse 4, maci rt4re - ori. Parliamentq and that 
thus the policy of healing and settling could flourish on surer ground. 
There is no doubt that he was encouraged in all this by his civilian 
advisorsq particularly Brogbill, whose standing increased throughout 
the crisis. 
(2) 
Cromwell's own evaluation of what Pack's proposals 
meant to him is made in one of his speeches during the crisis, on 8 
April, in which he says 
"No man can put a greater value than I hope I dop 
and shall dot upon the desires and advices of 
the parliament. " (3) 
However, Cromwell and his advisers were making a basic tactical error 
if they felt they could dispense with the army's advice, or ignore it 
as Henry Cromwell was urging Broghill to get Cromwell to do. 
(4) 
There 
is a great deal in Sir Charles Firth's remark that 
"the officers were the representatives of the 
Crom;, 7ellian party, the army was the constituency 
Cromwell represented. " (5) 
Abbottq IIritir4-, s and Speechesq IVP PP- 417-418- C-f- 
Thurloe's remarks on the speech, ( Thurloe, VI, p. 93. ). He 
glosses over the differences between Cromwell and the officers 
as does Reynolds( B. M. Lansdowne 11s. 821, ff-316-317); C. f. 
the Venetian ambassador's report where Cromwell is alleged to 
have said that the meeting "deserved to be called a threat 
rather than a friendly conference" (C. S. P. V. 1657-1659, p. 27). 
(2) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821, ff-326-327. 
(3) Abbott, Writings and Speech-e-s. IV9 P. 453. 
(4) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 832, ff-329-30P 331-329 3369 337-338; 
Thurloet VI9 P- 93- 
(5) Firthq Last Years, I. p. 133. 
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Ileanvhile, efforts were made by the pro-kingship members 
of the army to organise themselves. This lobby contained a number 
of the Irish officers many of whom sat for Irish constituencies in 
the Parliamentv and most of whom, with the exception of Hewson and 
Sankey were in favour of kingship. 
(') 
The meetings took place at 
Downing's house. Downing was apparently responsible for leaking the 
account of the meeting of 27 February. Charles Howard and Colonel 
Ingoldsbyv although it is not clear if this was Richardt the regicide, 
or his younger brother Henryt are specifically mentioned as attending. 
(2) 
It is possible that those who attended these meetings were also responsible 
for the deputation that went to Cromwell on 5 March. Dut this deputa- 
tion, of some nine or ten officers chosen from a much larger numbert 
is not necessarily identical with the pro-kingship group. It is 
equally conceivable, and in some ways more plausibley that they were 
the delegation Cromwell had recommended the officers to send him for 
further satisfaction when he made his speech on 27 February and that 
they represented the middle ground of the officers who were genuinely 
shocked by Cromwell's speech and were keen to try and patch up the 
differences and to restore the harmony between Cromwell and the 
officers. 
(3) 
(1) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown'. 13.11.14,1903P P. 55- 
Cooper who is also mentioned as anti-kingship changed 
sides. 
(2) B. M. Lansdowne 11s. 8219 : ff-312-313- 
(3) Abbottv Writinas and SDeeches, IV, p. 419; Clarke Papers, 
IIIP PP. 93-949 95-96; Thurloe, VI, p. 107. C. f. Firth, 
'Cromwell and the Crown', E-11-R., 1903t p. 61 for a 
different interpretation. 
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The crisis was abated somewhat by the resolution to 
postpone the debate on the question of kingship until the extent of 
the powers to be granted the King had been worked out in detail. 
(l) 
Jephson, on whose account we rely for this, claimed that this was done 
with Cromwell's consent in an attempt to gain time to win over Fleet- 
wood and possibly Disborowe whom he hoped would then use their influence 
on the rest of the army. Perhaps Cromwell and his advis(-rs were hop- 
ing to play on Fleetwood's well-known indecisiveness, but their belief 
that they could win over Disborowe seems to have been unwarranted as 
he had opposed the idea of kingship from the days when it was first 
mentioned in January. 
(2) 
They might also have been hoping to drive 
a wedge between Lambert on the one hand and Fleetwood and Disborowe 
on the other. 
Daring March the other clauses of Pack's proposals were 
debated, including those for the setting up of the 'Other House' and 
religious toleration. 
(3) 
It was resolved unanimously to accept in 
principle the provision for a bi-cameral parliament. The army could 
agree to the idea of a second chamberg provided it was not either in 
(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821t ff-312-313. 
(2) ibid., loc. cit. Jephson's letter-is partly written in 
cypher some of which the editor of a very usefulp but 
unpublishedg edition of Lansdowne Uss. 821-823 has been 
unable to decypher with complete assurance (c. Jones, 
'The Correspondence of Henry Cromwell 1655-1659, and other 
Papersq from the B. 11. Lansdowne Mss. 821-823'9 Lancaster 
M. Litto 1969t P- 337). Q. v. alsov Burton, IP P. 363- 
(3) Q. v. Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown'. EX-R., 1903t 
pp. 62-64. 
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name or power the same as the old Rouse of Lords. The 'Other House' 
could be seen as resolving the shortcomings of The Instrurnent that 
had become apparent during Naylor's case and as a way of further 
preventing the danger of perpetual parliaments which had been one of 
the army's consistent dislikes in the 1650's- Besides, the 'Other 
House' could offer many of the officers a chance to be actively and 
fo= lly involved in politics. Later in the year Fleetwood and 
Disborowe argued that the power of nomination to the 'Other House, 
should be in Cromwell alone. Disborove said that 
"if we have the same confidence in His Highness that 
formerly we had, that he will do things for the 
good of the nationt we need not fear to leave it 
to him. 11 
Sydenham was worried lest the traditional peers would try to claim 
that they had a right to sit in -the 'Other Houset and had some qualms 
about giving the power of nomination to Cromwell solely. However, the 
point to be emphasised in all this is that the military were not opposed 
to the idea of a second chamber per seýl) The attitude of Lambert in 
early March to the decision of the House to proceed with the other 
clauses of Pack's proposals is unclear. Sometime after Cromwell's 
speech on 27 February the Venetian ambassador says that he withdrew 
from the Parliament. Other commentators say that he was silent in 
the House over the next few days. Either way he remained active on 
the Council of State during, these daysp indeed, up to the time of his 
dismissal. 
(2) 
Unlike Harrison before his eclipse he did not withdraw 
Burton,, II, pp. 297-301; c. f. Firth, Last Years, I. 
pp. 141-149. 
(2) c. S. P. V. 1657-1659, p. 27; Pirth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', 7-H-R-9 1903t pp. 58,63; C. S. P. D. 1656-16579 p. xxii. 
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from positions of power. On the question of religious toleration the 
House passed a clause which was altogether more restrictive than that 
of, The Instrumentf news of which Downing passed on approvingly to 
William Clarke in Scotland. 
(') 
With the re-emergence of the kingship question for debate 
on 24 March, controversy began to rage once more. The opponents of 
kingship must have taken heart from some of the reports reaching them. 
On 8 March one of Captain Adam Baynes's correspondents in the north 
wrote that he met 
"with none of ye Army or their frends that are 
free but averse to it in these parts and is 
rather looked upon as a Touchstone upon some 
differences of great persons then any free offer 
to yt. change. " 
He hoped God would direct "our Grandees to peace and unity" least the 
common enemy benefited. He added that he found 
"ye Presbyter smile at this difference in hopes 
my Lord will sue his interest, ye Cavaleer does 
laugh to see us setting up ye thinges wee have 
pulled down but I am still in your opinion my 
Lord Prot(ector)v our best master upon earth, 
will find his best friends they that havep must 
and will defend him and ye peace of this poore 
nation when he commands, X Cand? ) they be ye 
. 46rMW. 
11 
On 10 March the same correspondent wrote 
"I am sure I meet not with an honest true lover 
of my Lord Protector in the west riding but 
rather wish my Lord ProtF would refuse ye title. " 
(1) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown', E. H. R,., 1903t p. 62. 
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He repeated that the common enemy continued to rejoice at the planned 
change 
"And ye army frends are punctually Cemphaticallyt 
. 
O. E. Dj- 
.) 
against it. " (1) 
Baynes himself was, of course, one of the original opponents of king- 
ship and had favoured calling Pack to the bar of the House for introduc- 
ing his proposals. 
(2) 
What is interesting about this grass roots 
opinion reaching London is the fundamental trust in Cromwell and the 
belief that his strength was in the army. 
On 26 March the House voted in favour of asking Cro=well 
to become King and this caused a fatalistic response among some of the In 
Hajor Generals, six of whom were reported to have gone to Cromwell 
"and tolde him that although whilst it was in debate 
they opposed itp yet nowe observing a series of -- 
Providence in itt they were sattisfyed,, and withall 
that itt was his duty to accept it. " (3) 
The six probably included Whalley, Boteler and Goffe all of whose 
attitudes towards kingship were beginning to soften. 
(4 ) 
The-attempts 
during April to get Cromwell to accept the title and his prevarications 
are vell-Imown and have already been well-covered. 
(5) 
During this 
period Fleetwood and Disborowe were won over to accepting the other 
provisions in Pack's proposals. 
(6) 
But the kingship crisis came to 
(1) B. M. Add. Ms. 21424p ff. 224l 225; c. f. ibid., f. 216. 
(2) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown'. 1903P P. 55. 
(3) ibid. PP. ý"5,66. 
Ms 
(4) ibid. 9 p. 67; B. M. Iansdowne/822, f-34; q. v. also Thurloev VIP P. 157 for Colonel Thomas Cooper's reasons for his 
conversion to kingship. 
(5) Firth, 'Cromwell and the Crown'. E-11-R., 1903P pp. 67-74; 
Firth, Last Yearst 19, Pp- 150-191; Abbott, Writings and 
Speechesp IVY PP- 433-509- 
(6) Thurloe, VIP p. 219; Firth 'Cromwell and the Crown't 
1903P p. 69. 
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a head early in May with the presentation of the army petition on t4 
Stý. By this time "the spattering dirte which is throwne about here"t 
as Richard Cromwell had described the intrigue surrounding the whole 
crisist(l) was becoming by turns maliciousq petty and nasty and it 
was obvious that a decision would have to be taken one way or the other 
to end the speculation and restore some sort of stability in the govern- 
ment and in the army. Reynolds, a supporter of kingship, who was about 
to be appointed commander of the expeditionary force to Flanders, was 
reluctant to go. He accused Fleetwood to his face of trying to get 
rid of himp which Fleetwood denied. Francis Russelldid not support 
such a view. He felt that Cromwell was behind the appointment and 
that he was pressing Reynolds too hard to go on this important expedi- 
tion. Reynoldsts reluctance must be ascribed to personal reasons and 
not to political ones. The command of a Dritish expeditionary force 
was quite prestigious. Reynoldsreservationsp besides a basic unwill- 
ingness, may well also stem from the fact that he was originally to go 
as second-in-command, but that he stuck to his guns and made it clear 
that he would not accept the inferior position but would only be content 
with the full command. He got his wayp and on 25 April he was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the force. On 22 April Henry Cromwell had written 
to his father recommending that Reynolds who had 
It bin allwayes faithfull and industrious in your 
-highnes service" 
(I) B. 11. Lansdowne Ils. 821, : ff-324-325- 
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be given a comn-and equal to his merit. He also referred to the rumour 
that Reynolds was being sent to France for political reasons. 
4) 
Sir 
Francis Russel wrote to Henry Cromwell to tell him that Pride had 
charged Russel with being pro-kingship because he hoped Henry would 
become King eventually. 
(2 ) 
These baseless accusations and insults 
continued even after the refusal of kingship. On 12 May the inflame4' 
passions between civilians and army officers came to a head in a verbal 
clash between Pride and John Goodwin, M. P. Pride said that Goodwin 
should be called to the bar for claiming that the evil counsellors 
advising Cromwell not to listen to his Parliament -presum bly he meant 
the anti-kingship army officers- were like those who brought about the 
quarrel with the last King. Goodwin tartly replied that Pride ought 
to be brought to the bar for killing the bears, for which he was 
applauded. 
(3) 
Pride was also one of the main instigators of the army 
petition of 8 May to Parliament. Another was Dr. John Ovenp one of 
Cromwell's chaplainsv who was to become even more influential among 
the senior army officers in 1659 when Lambertp Disborowep Fleetwoodp 
Berryt Whalley, Goffe and Sydenham were members of his Church at White- 
hall. Oven also had links with old R=pers like Ludlow and Vane and 
00 ibid. 9 822t ff. 45-. 46t 47-48t 57-53p 63-64; Thurloe, VIP P. 223t 230-231. Meynolds' forcevus partly recruited 
from existing regiments, C. S. P. D. 1656-1657, P P- 374. For 
a discussion of the composition of the force and the circum- 
stances surrounding Reynoldsts death in December 1657 
q. v. below. 
(2) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822, ff-57-58- 
(3) ibid., ff. 71-72; Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 26n. 
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it is quite conceivable that his Church became in 1659 what the Nag's 
Head had been in 1647p an informal meeting place for politicians of 
differing views to talk things over and work out tactics. 
(') 
However, 
this is to look ahead. In 1657 Owen was vehemently opposed to king- 
ship and at the beginning of March, shortly after the decision to 
postpone debate on the title, he was reported to have left London in 
great haste and anger. 
(2) 
According to Ludlow it was Pride who advocated 
the approach to Owen who is said to have drawn up the petition. Pride,, 
Ludlow suggests, stampeded Disborowe into itv and, with the help of 
Lt. Colonel Mason, some 26 or 27 officers were cajoled into signing. 
(3) 
Howeverp a newsletter in the Clarke Uss. says that both Lambert and 
Disborowe denied any foreknowledge of the petition. This ties in with 
Fleetwood's account that he was ignorant of it until Cromwell told him 
about it. This would sulgest that the petition was indeed a spontaneous 
act and that it did not originate from the trio of most senior officersp 
but from the next level down. The involvement in the presentation to 
who 
Parliament of a man of Goffe's stature in the armyl/had previously been 
said to be coming round to favouring kingship, was a warning that it 
could not be taken lightly. This would also explain why Fleetwood 
found the petition "honest" but "unreasonable". It couldq after allt 
be read as a challenge to the army leadershipp although it was certainly 
not intended to be so. 
(4) 
The House saw the petition as further proof 
(1) P. Toon, God's Statesnan, the Life and Work of John Owen . 
Exeter, 1971t Pp. 1069 110; B. M. Lansdowne 11s. 8203P f. 251- 
(2) ibid. p 821p ff-324-325- 
(3) Ludlow, 1! emoirsp II, p. 25; Thurloe, VI, p. 231; Firth, 
Last Yearsl It pp. 190-191. 
(4) Clarke Ms. 29t f. 60v; Clarke Papers, 1119 P- 105; Firth, 
'Cromwell and the Crown', E-11-R-, 1903P P. 75; Thurloe, VI, 
p. 281 says Mason was the chief promoter of the petition. 
471. 
of the threat the army could be to its own statusp and it must have 
made many M. P. s even more determined to press on with getting the 
proposals accepted. The petition has not survived. Ludlow gives what 
is probably a pretty full and accurate precis. The petition alleged 
that the supporters of kingship were hoping that Cromwell's acceptance 
of the title would destroy him and weaken the hands of those who had 
been faithful to the cause. 
(') 
This can be read simplý, 
_-_ _- 
either 
as paranoiat or as the natural reflexive response of members of a body 
which saw itself as the vanguard of the cause. The conspiracy theory 
is a common reaction among any strongly committed ideological group. 
The army petition and the threatened reEignations of 
Lambertg' Disborowe and Flee-taTood forced Cromwell to make up his mind 
and to reject kingship. Attractive as it may have appeared to have 
been able to go forward in harness with a solid civilian backing, 
Cromwell realised that the army was still the most important variable 
in politics. 
It is necessary to try and account for the reasons why the 
offer of the crown became such a major crisis. A number of general 
points can be made. Firstly, the crisis represents primarily a civilian/ 
military conflict but with both groups being internally divided as well. 
Secondly, the military opponents of kingship cannot be equated with 
either R=pers or Republicans, although such groups tried to exploit it. 
(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, p. 27. 
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The army petition of 8 May 11slipt into the presse'19 as one of William 
Clarke's correspondents put it. Perhaps this was deliberate. It was 
published with a post-script inviting two men from each regiment to 
own and subscribe to it. The post script was apparently in favour 
of a commonwealth. Some of the officers were questioned about it 
and denied any knowledge of it claiming that it was a part of a design 
to discredit them. The other officers also dissociated themselves 
from it. 
(') 
Thirdly, the proposals, or Humble Petition and Advice, 
was the first attempt at settlement to emerge from civilians. Fourthly, 
the crisis helped make the possibility of a split within the army a 
distinct possibility. It marked the most serious threat to unity 
among the officer corps since the Presbyterian officers had left the 
army in the spring and summer of 1647. Harrison, as has been showng 
had no real following in the army in 1653 and the sort of discontent 
associated with the 'plots, of 1654-1655 was much more individualised 
and easily contained by silencing the officers involved. During these 
crises the officers had stood by Cromwell. Bat in 1657 the crisis was 
taking place at the centre not in Scotland, on the periphery, where 
its impact was much diminished. There was a danger of a rift between 
Cromwell and a sizeable number of his officers. Opposition to king- 
ship ran quite deep amongst them. For this reason Professor Trevor- 
Roper's view that the opposition to kingship would have "evaporated" 
Thurloe, VI, p. 291; Clarke Papersl, III, pp. 109-110; 
c. f. C. S. P. V. 1657-16599 P- 59- 
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if Cromwell had cashiered a few of the senior officers "silently" 
is very questionable. 
(') 
Cromwell was in no position to carry out 
a night of the long Imives. 
As for the soldiery we have few glimpses as to how they 
reacted to the crisis. It seems as if they were apathetic for the 
most part. On 21 April Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that 
"Many of the souldiers are not only content, but are 
very well-affected with this change. Some indeed 
grumble, but that's the most for ought I can 
perceive. " 
In June the Venetian ambassador said that "the simple soldiers" were 
happy-with the refusal of the title. Ile added his subjective view 
that the officers did--notlike so much power concentrated in the hands 
of Cromwell and were trying to convey this to the soldieryq but that 
they would not listen as they only objected to the title. 
(2) 
The question of kingship aroused so much passion in the 
army and hostility to the Parliament because in a way it was a challenge 
to the army's supremacy in politics. In the background was the 
general instability of the Protectorate and the doubts about its 
ability to become a lasting form of government. The experience of 
the first Protectorate Parliament which had tried to alter the constitu- 
tion, the resort to the Major Generalsq the issues raised by Naylor's 
case all showed the need for an overhaul of The Instrument if the 
Cromwellian policy of healing and settling was to be accepted by and 
take a firm hold on the nation. Sindercombels plot and the plans for 
M Trevor-Roper, 'Oliver Cromwell and his ParliamentsIt 
in Religion, Reformation and Social Changep P- 384- 
(2) Thurloe, V19, p. 219; C. S. P. V. 1657-16599 P. 71. 
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a Fifth Monarchist rising (Venner's plot)(') gave a further and more 
imediate impetus to the desire to settle the government on a more 
solid foundation. The political nation was at long last looking to 
Cromwell to provide this foundation and he in return was beginning 
to realise that he could look to them also. The problem was the army. 
The army's opposition to kingship, as with its support for a dissolution 
of the Rump in April 1653, was prompted by both rational and irrational 
factors. There was the feeling of wounded pridev a dislike of being 
outflanked by civilians interfering with The Instrument which was 
felt to be the army's child. This was exacerbated because it came at 
a time when the army itself was at a loss to come up with any alternative 
itself. It was reaching a stage of uncreative bankruptcy. The fact 
that the army petition of 8 May had to be drafted by a civilian 
symbolises this in a dramatic way. But there was also the perception 
that the civilian promoters of the Humble Petition were getting at 
the army, trying to reduce its power and influence in politics. The 
point was made quite clearly by Thurloe when he summ rised the views 
of the kingship lobby : 
"The title is not the questiong, but it's the office, 
which is 1mowne to the lawes and this people. They 
Imowe their duty to a kinge and his to them. What- 
ever else there is will be vholly new, and be nothinge 
else but a probationer, and upon the next occasion 
wil be changed againe. Besides they say the nowe 
protector came in by the sword out of parliament, 
and will never be the ground of any settlement, nor 
will there be a free parliament soe-longe as that 
Firth. Last Yearsp 19, Pp- 36-389 212-217- 
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continues; and as it savours of the sword now, 
soe it wil at last bringe all thinges to be 
military. These and other considerations make 
men who are for settlement steady in their 
resolution as to this goverr=ent now in hand; 
not that they lust after a kingev or are peevish 
upon any account of opposition; but they would 
lay foundations of libertye and freedomep which 
they judge this the next way to. " (1) 
It was a point also made by T. B. t 
(2) 
a member of Parliament and supporter 
of kingship. He felt that the anti-kingship group opposed it because 
"Sword dominion is too sweet to be parted witht and 
the truth is (whatsoever kind of squeeziness we may 
pretend to) that the single issuet the maine dread 
is that the civill power shall swallow up the 
military. " (3) 
At one stage Cromwell appeared to be being won over. to this idea of 
curbing the military. On 11 April at the meeting with the parliamentary 
commissioners Oliver was said to have remarked 
"that he would rather take any title from the 
Parliament than keepe a title given him by 
anybody elSe. 11 (4) 
The fear that civilians were trying to undermine the cause lies behind 
the army petition of 8 May. The kingship crisis as a whole reinforced 
the view in -the army that it was the guardian of the good old cause. 
The attempt to give the government a much more obviously civilian 
appearance and quali-ky. had run into dangerous waters and the success 
(1) Thurloe, VI, p. 219. 
(2) Thomas Burton? 
(3) Carte 11s. 227t f. 84, quoted in Clarke Papers, III, 
P. 105n. 
B. 11. Lansdowne 11s. 822, ff-37-33; c. f. the retrospective 
account of this meetingt possibly by Fiennesq Monarch 
Reasserted, repr. in Somers Tracts, VIt P. 346 ff.; 
Abbottt Writings and Speeches, IV, PP. 456-461. 
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Cromwell had had in carrying along the vast majority of the army with 
him in pursuing the policy of the respectable revolutiong a policy 
which by and large had been followed since 1649, was beginning to come 
unstuck. Ironicallyp this was to push the army further to the left, 
into the hands of R=pers and Republicans. It is in early 1657 that 
a collapse of unity among the officers on a dangerous scale comes 
close to reality and that the seeds of the chaos of 1659-1660 are 
sown. It is in 1657 that the army's creative political energies 
run out with the disastrous consequences this was to have both for 
itself and for the h2glish Revolution. 
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mAy 1657-sEpmgm 1658. 
The political controversy did not stop with Cromwell's 
refusal of kingship. It took over another two weeks for the House 
to vote to change the title from King to Protector and for the 
Humble Petition and Advice to be formally offered to Cromwell with 
this change. 
(') 
The tension between the pro and anti-kingship members 
persisted during the debates on the powers of the Lord Protector. The 
pro-kingship group seemed to feel that they had suffered only a tempo- 
rary setback. Downing favoured leaving -the first article of the 
Humble Petition as it stood, that is that all acts should be valid 
under either titleg King or Lord Protector. Sydenham queried thisp 
but Downing replied 
"I would have it stand as it does. It may be 
that his conscience Cbromwell's) may receive 
conviction. " (2) 
Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell that any mention of the word King in 
reference to the constitution went down badly with the anti-kingship 
group. 
(3) 
Outside the House and in the army there was concern to 
stop attitudes favourable to kingship from spreading. Robert Lilburne 
wrote to his fellow Yorkshire M. P. p Luke Robinson about the change of 
(1) Firth, Last Yearsq Ip pp. 193-200. 
(2) Burton, II, pp. 140-141, 
(3) Thurloe, VIP PP- 310-311- 1 
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the title from King to Protector. He asked Robinson to speak to 
Captain Thomas Strangeways about Major William Goodrick. Lilburne 
feared that Goodrick was "much a new royalist" and might well try 
to disseminate his views among the soldiery. Ile suspected that there 
was some ulterior motive behind Goodrick's departure for the north 
and recommended that the officers and soldiers of Lambert's horse 
regimentq then stationed in the north, should be informed about all 
this. Lilburne's letter was "intercepted". 
(') 
This could either be 
because the governmentq or at least Thurloep was still suspicious 
of some of the anti-kingship officers or it might be that all letters 
to Robinson were being intercepted. 
The Parliament continued to sit until it was prorogued 
on 26 June. Daring the last weeks of the Parliament the opponents 
of kingship played as full a part in its proceedings as any of the 
other members. But the vindictiveness between the pro and anti-king- 
ship groups continued to smoulder. It became more open in the debates 
over settling lands on both Broghill, and Fleetwood in recognition of 
past services. The moves to award these grants came at a time when5ome- 
members were beginning to feel guilty about the amount of time being 
spent on private rather than public business. On 1 June there was a 
debate over the question of settling lands to the value of EltOOO per 
annum on Broghill, Samuel Highland,, Colonel Mathews (a courtesy title) 
(1) ibid. # pp. 292-293. 
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and Kelsey opposed the move on the ground that the Parliament should 
settle its own debts before handing out gratuities. Lamberto Fleet- 
woodp Sydenham, and Disborowe withdrew before the question was putp 
probably as a deliberate snub to Broghill. 
(l) 
On 8 June Major Anthony 
Morgan and Major William Aston moved that some reward be given to 
Fleetwoodp and Whitelocke and Strickland moved that it might be L19500 
per annum in lands. Morgan wrote to Henry Cromwell saying that he had 
been encouraged to present his motion by Lambert and others. Fleetwood 
was said to be delighted with the move. Perhaps Lambert and the other 
supporters of the proposition were trying to get even for the money 
given to Broghill, but as other members# including Disboroweq commented 
such largesse to fellow M. P. s could do the House's reputation no good 
in the eyes of the nation. As Disborowe put it 
"You are in debt to many poor people that want 
breadt whose cries ascend high; many poor 
soldiers unsatisfiedt and great occasion for 
monies as ever you had. " 
His colleagues Whalley and Goffe supported the motion and Lambertq some- 
what facetiouslyp commented :- 
"I would not have it said the nation is in that 
weak condition that this will undo them. The 
honourable person deserves a great deal more. " 
What Lambert was playing atg by pressing behind the scenes for the 
proposa, 19 remains a mystery. It could have been, as he said, that he 
thought Fleetwood deserved such a revardp or that he was getting tit-for- 
(I) Bt=ton, Ht PP- 175-179- 
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tat with Broghill or even that he was trying to wreck the proceedings 
and prestige of the House. One would tend to suspect that there was 
a more subtle reason than merely benevolence. Either way the motion 
was recklessq-as Robert Beake pointed out : 
"We cannot cloister up this vote within. these 
walls. It will appear without doors. You 
have followed the very worst path and track 
that the Long Parliament trod in. " 
No wonder the junior officers and the soldiery became so profoundly 
disillusioned by 1659. Fleetwood was more tactful and gallantly 
refused the award. 
(') 
The last few days of the session were devoted to amending 
-the Humble Petition into what became known as the Additional Petition 
and Advice. There was a fierce debate on the question of oaths for 
the Protectorg the Council of State and the Parliament. It was over 
the question of oaths that Lambert was to resign at the beginning of 
July. The debates show that there were considerable differences 
among the officers on this issue. 
On 23 June the new oath for Cromwell was debated. The 
justification for a new oath was felt to be based on the fact that 
the HuAle Petition was setting up a new form of government and that 
the Protector should be bound to it. Both Boteler and Whitelocke 
argued that at the moment there was an "Interregnum" (sic) and that 
Cromwell should swear the new oath as soon as possible, 
(2) 
Lambert 
Burton 119 pp. 197-2009 224; B, M, Lansdowne Ilso 822# 
ff. 84-85; C. S. P. V. 1657-1659,9 PP. 74-75- 
(2) Burton, 119 pp. 279t 280. 
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did not feel the question of oaths to be so important and queried its 
timing, but at the same time making it clear that he was not opposed 
to oaths, per se 
(1) 
On'the question of preparing an oath to present 
to'Cromwell Sydenhamg Sankey and Lambert were among those opposed to 
it and Disborowe and Philip Jones among those for it. The debate on 
the oath continued during the next day when it was broadened out to 
include the oath to be imposed'on the Council of Stateg or Privy 
Council. There is no evidence of any filibustering-on the part of 
M. P. s during the debate. Lambert took a full part in-it and moved 
at least one amendment to the oath for the Council which was not 
accepted. 
(2) 
Sydenhammaintained his opposition to all oiths. 
(3) 
There was further division over the proposed oath to be tendered 
to Parliament. - Whalley, Disborowet Goffe and Philip Jones were in 
favour-of binding Parliament by an oath on the simple grounds that 
they felt that if Cromwell and, the Council were to be under an oath 
then so too should the Parliament. Sydenham and Lambert opposed it. 
Syden'bam argued that it would make it easy for opportunists to come 
in and for men of conscience to be kept outp thus showing how far 
the wheel had turned since the days of the Engagement and how much 
oaths had been debased over the past few years. He did not like 
the idea of binding future Parliamentsp 
(IL) ibid. 9 pp. 276p 277. 
(2) ibid. # p. 287; Gardiner# Constitutional Documenim. 
p. 4 2. 
(3) Barton, 119 p. 289. 
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"You have said you would have Parliament free, 
and will you now lay a force upon you? I had 
rather soldiers stood at the door, than my 
conscience to keep me out. It is worse than 
a file of musketeers. " 
Lambert opposed the oath because he felt it would lead to conflict 
between the legislature and the executive. This was Lambertp the 
architect of. The Instr ent speaking. Baynes and Sankey supported 
an amendment to the oath calling for members to swear to maintain 
the privileges of Parliamento which Goffe felt was unnecessary. 
(1) 
For the remainder of the 24 June the right of nomination to the Other 
House was discussed. This has already been mentioned above. There 
was also some debate on plans for Cromwell's second installation as 
Protector, Disborowe favoured a modest ceremony and Lambert one 
involving the sword: "A sword is an emblem of justice". 
(2) 
All these 
debates show that the coalition of anti-kingship officers had split 
up and that they now found themselves on opposite sides during 
divisions. Lambert and Sydenham, remained cool towards the new 
constitution, but Disborowe displayed a keenness to get it off the 
ground and working. 
On 26 June Oliver Cromwell was installed for the second 
time as Lord Protector in a ceremony more pompous than the first one. 
The persons attending him were more noticeably civilian on this occasion. 
The Earl of Warwick carried the sword and Lislep Montagu and Whitelocke 
were conspicuous. Lambert and most of the officers were said to have 
00 Burtong II, pp. 291-297- 
ibid. t PP. 302-303. 
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boycotted the proceedings which must have appeared as a deliberate 
snub to Cromwellt but Fleetwood and Claypolep the Master of the 
Horse (a ceremonial title) and a vigorous opponent of the decimation 
tax, were in attendance. 
(') 
Howevert within a couple of weeks the 
officers had been won over to a firmer support for the new govern- 
ment. At the beginning of Julyt Francis Russel wrote to Henry 
Cromwell that Fleetwood and Disborove "beginne to grow in request 
at Uhitehall". He also'said that Disborowe had made a speech in 
Parliament in reply to Lambert. 
(2) 
This was probably during the 
debates over oaths when differences of view between Lambert and 
Disborowe had been apparent. 
It was during these debates that Lambert and Sydenham 
appeared to be isolating themselves. Of all the senior officers 
Sydenhamt a Dorset mang was Lambert's ally, Baynes, a fellow 
northerner,, was more like a client. As we have seeng at one stage 
Lambert felt obliged to reassure the House that he was not opposed 
in principle to oathsp an indication that he was having to justify 
his position. During the debates he had taken every opportunity to 
show his basic prejudice against the Humble Petitiong but he had not 
opposed it root and'branch. By early July he had also isolated him- 
self in the army and manoeuvered himself into such a position whereby 
Whitelocke, Memorials IVP PP- 304-305; Clarke Ms. 29t 
f. 90v.; Abbott, Writings and-Speecheag IV, PP. 561-562; 
Firth, Last Yearog I, p. 200. 
(2) B. M. Lansdowne Hs. 8229 ff- 132-133- 
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Cromwell was able to purge him easily and with no overt response in 
his favour from the army. Why was this so? The reason must lie in 
the fact that during the crisis although there was a lot of revulsion 
in the army against the title of King which finally forced Cromwell to 
reject itp there was a very solid middle ground feeling among the 
officers; that is those who were opposed to the title but who were 
still prepared to follow Cromwell once that divisive issue had been 
cast aside. This middle ground feeling had surfaced in the aftermath 
of Cromwell's speech of 27 February after whicht it was suggested 
above, a delegation representing a large number of officers went 
along to Cromwellp on 5 March, to try and patch up the differences. 
This middle ground was probably made up of officers who either 
genuinely believed that the fate of the cause was bound up inseprc. &Ij 
with the fate of Oliver Cromwellq org at a more mundane levelp that 
their own self-interest was tied up with Cromwell's fate. Lambert 
miscalculated and underestimated the strength of this feeling; Fleet- 
wood and Disborowe probably subscribed to itt hence their desire to 
see the new constitution work. Lambert also miscalculated -the extent 
to which he could disagree with the new constitution and get away with 
it. He was not as important in terms of public relations as Fairfax 
had been in 1649 when he did not subscribe to the Engagement and yet 
remained Lord General. Thust Lambert's fall which there is every 
reason to believe he did not want to come aboutt given his continued 
activity on the Council of State almost up to the moment of his 
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resignation and his participation in the Parliamentv came about very 
easily. It seems likely that Lambert might in fact have wanted to go 
back on his decision not to take the oath as member of the Council of 
State. Thurloe wrote to Henry Cromwell on 28 July saying that an 
unnaxned person 
"desired to serve in the coun elleg and offerrd 
to take his oath : that is paused upon. He is 
now retired in appearance. " (1) 
There are good grounds for believing he meant Lambert. 
Given the tensions between Protector and army over the 
previous months Cromwell was lucky only to have to pay such a seemingly 
small price for the restoration of army unity* 
(2) 
But Lambert's 
dismissal swelled the ranks of former officers with the most sub- 
stantial figure of all. No pro-Lambert group arose in the army. 
Sydenham took the oath and was admitted to the Council of State. 
(3) 
ThuFloeq ever worried about such things, was relieved that Lambert's 
resignation passed without incident. He wrote to Henry Cromwell 
"The armye, for ought I can perceivet is generally 
in a very good posture, and quiett at leastp if 
not fully satisfied, which I hope it is. I am 
sure there is noe such thinge as a formed knottt 
nor any such endeavours as are spoke oft to 
remove H. H. backe to his former station. Some 
little men may discourse at randome thinges that 
they themselves will not actp if it were come to 
that I believe H. H. need noe help to governe his 
armyet nor are thinges in so dangerous a posture 
as some men ma fancye them. (I speake my own 
apprehensions. I beeleve both the parliament 
and arm3ye have a very ood opinion of and affection 
for his highesse. " (45 
(1) Thurloe, VIp p., 425; Co H. Cattarallq 'The Failure of the 
Humble Petition and Advice"p American Historical Review, 
IX, p. 46. 
(2) For an account of the events surrounding Lambert's fall 
q. v. Firthp Last Years, II, PP- 3-5; CoSoPoVo 1657-1659, 
ppo 87-88o 
(3) Clarke Papers " III$ P. 1140 
(4) Thurloep VI9 P. 412o 
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Thurloe was perhaps being over optimistic, but he was aware ofq and 
drawing attention to the fact that uneasiness with the goverment's 
sense of direction and its more civilian appearancet -the subconscious 
fears behind the kingship crisiag lingered on in the army and could 
break out into discontent in the future.. For the momentt howevert 
his assessment that the army was in a quiet posture was pretty 
accurate. 
At the end of July the officers in London held a meeting 
at, which 
ihey 
"appeared most unanimous ... that the present 
settlement was the best that had yet, been 
brought forth and that it was their dutyq in 
their places and their stations, to strengthen 
his Highness's hands. " 
Even those suspected of disaffection were said to "shev ... satisfaction", 
The officers of two regiments vrote to the Protector pledging loyalty. 
Thurloe felt that an address might be made by the whole army. 
(') 
Iam- 
bert's foot regiment was given to Fleetwood who was also said to be 
designated for the Lt. Generalship of the armyp and his horse vas given 
to Disborove who vas said to be about to become General of the horse. 
Eventaally lambert's horse passed to Falconb. er3,,. and Whalley became 
(2) 
Lt. General of horse,, and Goffe Major General of foot, Fleetwood's 
comment on Lambert's fall was brief and unemotional : "such passages 
of providence are to be teachings to us". Henry Cromwell was glad 
ibid. 9 p. 425. The officers of the two regiments making 
the address to Cromwell judging from the context of 
Thurloe's letter were probably Lambert'st but they might 
well have been Cromwell's. Firth takes them to have been 
Lambert'sp (Last Yearsp II, p. 6). 
6 
(2) Clarke Papersp IIIt PP- 114# 132t 141; C. S. P. D. 1657-589 
P. 373* 
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about Thurloe's news that Cromwell needed no help to govern his army 
and Monck casually mentioned that he was pleased the officers at 
their meetings had declared 
"soe much affection to the present governmentp 
his highnesse and familie. " (IL) 
During the summer and autumn of 1657 the acute financial 
plight of the nation persisted and prompted plans to cut back on the 
numbers in the armed forces and on the assessments to support. them. 
(2) 
There were plenty of discussions in the Council of State about how 
best to achieve this. Fleetwood favoured a smaller forceg well-paid 
and well-disciplined. As far as the army in Ireland was concerned# 
when Henry Cromwell heard of the proposals to reduce the army there 
he wrote to Thurloet saying that he would have favoured cutting back 
on the numbers of officers, not of the soldiers; no doubt thereby 
hoping to rid himself of what he considered disaffected elements. 
Hoveverq the plans for reducing the armed forces were agreed to by 
all the officerst but they ran into difficulties on two counts; 
firstly public safety, or national securityt and secondlyq the lack 
of funds to pay off those to be reduced. The planned disbanding 
does not appear to have got any further than an order to reduce one 
soldier from each regiment on guard duty throughout the country and 
for the pay saved thereby to be used for fire and candle*(3) 
(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8220 ff. 146-147; Thurloel VIg 
pp. 404p 438. 
(2) Aylmer, State's Servantop P- 50- 
(3) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8229 ff. 174-175P 182-183P 184-1859 
188-1890 202-203; ThurloOv VI9 PP- 516,5389 6349 6479 
657-658, 66o; Clarke Papersp 1119 P- 131- 
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In the middle of November the horse regiments were 
reported to be 18 weeks in arrears and the toot 14 weeks. For 
political reasons free quarter was not allowed; 1647 remained firmly 
implanted in the collective consciousness of the government. This 
meant-that the officers had to seek credit for their men and there 
were-fears that the officers$ credit was almost spent. 'Fleetwood 
informed Henry Cromwell that the problem of arrears vas, not so bad 
in Ireland as in Scotland where it was intended that the reduced 
forces would be paid off with money originally designed for the 
standing army. To solve the problem he said that an account of the 
army's and navy's arrears was being prepared for the next"Parliamentary 
session. 
(') 
In the event this got nowhere. Fleetwood tended to play 
dovn the problem of arrears in-Ireland. In July 1657-the Irish officers 
had sent over a petition for satisfaction of their pay arrears and 
complained also that the lands assigned them fell far short of the 
debts-oving them. 
(2) 
By early January Fleetwood wrote that the 
fleet and the army were 
"in a goode condicion. This army never hade such 
an occation to be tempted as they have now# yet 
are,, and I trust will be# in a very staunch and 
quiet condicion. " 
He looked forward to the next session of Parliament directing things 
towards a settlement and felt confident that there was much in the 
B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 822g ff. 274-275t 296-297; Clarke MA 
A f- 13. 
(2) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A. 52t f-7- 
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existing government that preserved the liberties of the people in 
religious and temporal matters. 
(') 
In the meantime the government had also been busy select- 
ing persons to sit in the Other House. Selection was completed on 
10 December and the writs of summons were drawn up. 
(2) 
In all 67 
men received summonses to the Other House. Of these, 19 were members 
of the armyl, spanning a wide spectrum of the, senior officers at that 
timeg ranging from Falconbergq Richard and Henry Cromwellp through 
Disborove and Fleetwood to Pride# and John Jones now back in the army 
as governor of Anglesey, No one below the rank of Colonel was called 
and those officers who were summoned were well-known to Cromwell either 
as Councillors of Statet Major Generals or men who had been active on 
army administration. Mathew Thomlinsont an Irish Councillor recently 
knighted by Henry Cromwell who now held a high opinion of him despite 
his former distrust, can also be identified as an army 
although technically he was not a member of the army as this time. 
Three other men were connected or were soon to be connected with the 
army : Broghillq Edward Montagu, at present Admiral of the Fleet but 
before the end of the year to be Colonel of the regiment late Stephen 
Winthorp'st and Lockhart who succeeded Reynolds as Co-nander in Flanders 
after the latter's death, 
(3) 
It was certainly not the Protector's 
intention to swamp the Other House with army officers. In the end 
42 men accepted the summonses and 37 actually appeared at the first 
(1) B. M. I-an dovne Ms. 8239 ff -, 9-10- 
(2) Firth, Last Years, Ht pp. 10-11; B. M. Lansdowne Ila. 
822t ff. 292-293- 
(3) The circm tances surrounding Reynolds' death will be 
discussed below. 
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sitting of the Other House. Assuming that most of the officers summoned 
were fairly regular attenders this still did not give them a majority 
in the new house, even had they been a united bloct which they certainly 
were not. 
(') 
The second session of Parliament in which some of those 
excluded from the first session and from the first Protectorate 
Parliamentq including Haselrig and Scottt were allowed to sit, began 
on 20 January 1658 and all the field officers around London were 
ordered to attend Cromwell at Westminster Hall either for a briefing 
oe: more likely to hear him make his speech to the Parliament. 
(2) 
Any hopes of harmony prevailing in the new session were soon dashed 
and in just over two weeks the Parliament was dissolved in a spon- 
taneous act of fury by the Protector. The reasons for this are well 
enough known : the dispute over the Other Housep the wrecking tactics 
of the Ramperst Haseirig and Scott,, the attempt to stir up disaffection 
in the armyq and the pro-Rump petition. 
The debate over what to style the Other House began on 
22 January but actually got under way a week later on 29 January and 
the House remained preoccupied with this issue until it was dissolved 
on 4 February. When the question was first raised Kelsey and Botelerp 
realising that the issue could become a serious stumbling blockg urged 
the House not to get bogged down with such a contentious problem. 
Abbott, Writings and Speechesp IV, pp. 684-685. (My tally 
of army officers differs slightly from Abbott's); Thurloe 
VI, p. 634 A Second Narrative of the Late Parliament 
(so-called 
(2) Clarke Ms- 309 f. 8v.; Firth, Last Years, II, pp. 16-18; 
Abbott, Writings and Speeches,, IV# PP. 704-709. 
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Adam Baynes favoured a debatet wondering why the members of the Other 
House styled themselves Lords when Cromwell did not allow them that 
title. 
(l) 
At the height of the debate the following week the speeches 
are noteworthy because they show that the current political discussion 
within the Houseq and by implication outside as well, was by this time 
being influenced by Harrington's ideasp set out in his Oceana, which 
had appeared in the autumn of 1656. We have seen that until now the 
sort of Republicanism that had manifested itself in the arny in opposi- 
tion to the Protectorate had tended to emphasise the importance of free 
sovereign Parliaments and that this led to a hearkening back to the 
Ramp. This nostalgia for the Rump grew stronger and was at the basis 
of the abortive attempts to unify the major opposition groups in 1656 
over Vane's Healing Question. But Harringtonts neo-classical Republi- 
canismp with its emphasis on an elected rotating senatet was qualitatively 
different from the Rumper Republicanism and capable of broader appealf 
once the Protectorate had finally broken downp among the army which 
still retained strong reservations about unlimited Parliamentsq which 
the Rump, rightly or wrongly, was remembered as aspiring towards. 
These two very different sorts of Republicanism were to become important 
in the context of 1659 but their emergence in the language of parliamentary 
politics can be traced back to early 1658. 
(2) 
As Sir Charles Firth and 
W Durtonp 119 P- 342.1 
(2) This distinction is not new. It has been made by Professor 
Pocockg('James Harrington and the Good Old Causetq Pp- 30-48p 
esp. p. 42) and by Sir Charles Firth before him (Last Years-, 
I, pp. 67-68). Pocock draws the distinction between "true 
ConmonvealthAmen" like Ludlow and Nevilleg and "unrecon- 
structed Rumpers" like Haselrig and Scottq the main issue 
dividing them being that of a rotating senate ('James 
Harrington and the Good Old Cause', p. 42). Firth adds 
a third brand of Republicanism that of "the Fifth Monarchy 
men and the extreme sectaries" harking back to Barebones 
"as the model to be imitated" (Last Years# I, p. 67)- Bat 
Ahis millenarian strain was of no real importance in army 
politics between 1658 and 1660. 
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Professor Pocock have pointed out Scott's speech to Parliament on 
29 January 1658 showed great familiarity with Harrington's historical 
analysis. 
(') 
Howevert it was. not just Scott who displayed such 
familiarity. Boteler gave an impressive and well argued speech in 
favour of calling the Other House a House of Lords in which he argued 
that "religion# piety and faithfulness to this Commonwealth" were "the 
best balance" and that the members of the Other House had these qualities. 
"It is not estates will be the balance". 
(2) 
Robert Beake also argued 
in favour of styling the Other House a House of Lords. His point was 
that the sword was there. 
"Is not that also a good balance? He that has a 
regiment of foot to command in the armyq he is 
is good a balance as any I Imov .. e" 
(3) 
No doubt these remarks were welcomed by many of the officerst especially 
those in the Other Housev although they would not have put it quite so 
bluntly. The debatcsover the Other House were a dress rehearsal for 
those which were to take up so much time in the next Parliament. 
It dich, hcttake very long for Cromwell to become disillusioned 
with the proceedings in Parliament and to feel that no positive steps 
towards settlement could come from them. He intervened on 25 January 
with a long speech calling for unity in the face of the common enemy 
and his patience finally ran out early in February. Finallyp on Ut 4tý 
(1) Burton, UP PP- 382-3929 esp. p. 389; Pocockq 'James 
Harrington and the Good Old Cause', pp. 43-44; Firthq 
Last Years, I. p. 23- Pocock is wrong to say that Adam 
Baynes did not sit in the second Protectorate Parliament. 
He did and, as we have seenp was vocal and already opposed 
to styling the Other House a House of Lords. 
(2) Burton, II, pp. 407-409, esp, p. 408* 
(3) ibidep pp. 414-417, esp. p. 416. 
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he dissolved it. This decision was entirely his own and took everyone 
by surprise. 
(') 
The incident that provoked it was the pro-Rump 
petition, circulating in London, and - as Cromwell suspected - in the 
army as well. If it was being circulated in the army, and there is 
every reason to suppose that it vast then it was done without -the 
connivance or knowledge of the most senior officers. Whalley and 
Disborowe told Cromwell that they had not heard of such a petition. 
(2) 
The petition itself was printed(3) and was the outcome 
of a renewed attempt to weld together a coalition of the various 
elements opposing the Protectorateg especially the Ihmpers and Pifth 
Monarchists. The petition also made a direct bid for army support 
by demanding that no officer be removed from the army except by a 
Council of War, This old chestnut was meant to appeal to the officers. 
The rank and file did not enter into the calculations of the petitioners. 
If they had, then pay arrears would have found a more obvious response 
among the soldiery. As with the dissolution of the R=p and later 
with the establishment of the Protectorate Cromwell realised the need 
to ensure that the army was behind him. The evidence recently printed 
by Professor Underdovn from the Bennet Papersq now in the Folger Library, 
Washington, shows that dissatisfaction in the army centering around 
Packer had already manifested itself before Cromwell's speech to the 
officers in London on 6 February. 
(4) 
This confirms Thurloe's report 
(1) C. H. Firth (ed. )p 'Lette3s concerning the Dissolution of 
Cromwell's last Parliament, 16581, E. H. R. 9 VIIt 18929 
pp. 102-110; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, IV9 PP. 172-721p 
726-733- 
(2) Firthq 'Letterslp p, 108, 
(3) B. M. 669 f. 20(71)9 A True Copy of a Petition signed by veEZ 
many peaceable and well-affected People inhabiting in and 
about the Citv of London .. 
D. Underdownt 'Cromwell and the Officers# February 16581, E-IT-R-, 
L=IIt 1968t pp. 101-107 esp, pp, 1039 105- 
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that Packer and his fellow Captains voiced their discontent first to 
Fleetwood and Disborowe and then to other senior officers including 
Kelseyq Haynest Berrys Creedt Goffe and Whalley. According to Thurloe 
they persisted throughout in speaking in generalities referring loosely 
to "the good old cause". They seem to have felt that their criticisms 
were not so great as to move them to leave the army. They declared 
that they were willing to follow Cromwell "upon the grounds of the 
good old cause"t and this remained their attitude right up to their 
dismissal. 
(') 
It is possible that Cromwell suspected Packer was in 
some way associated with the pro-Rmmp petitiong but we have no evidence 
for this. Packert who had been branded a notorious anabaptist as early 
as 16449 had been authorised to preach in July 1653 at the same time 
as William Kiffint so clearly the petition's call for an all-embracing 
religious toleration would appeal to him. Kiffin was also mentioned 
as disliking the Protector "in the way he is in" at the time of Packer's 
dismissalp but he was opposed to any alliance between Baptists and 
Fifth Monarchists. 
(2) 
At the meeting on 6 February Cromwell told his officersq 
more defiantly than almost ayear beforeg 
"that such as were not satisfied he would have them 
give him theyr Commissions and be as honest (at 
least as the German souldiers) that if they could 
not goe further with him, to tell him soe. " (3) 
(1) Thurloe, VI, p. 806; c. f. ibid. 9 P- 786; Underdovnq 
'Cromwell and -the Officers', p. 106. 
Sub (2) D. N. B., /Packer; C. S. P. D. 1653-549 p. 13; Underdownp 
7-cromwell and the OfficersIv p. i05; Capp, Fifth Monarchy 
Men, p. 122. 
(3) Underdovnq 'Cromwell and the OfficersIt pp. 105-106; 
Abbottg Writings and Speeches, IV# P. 737. 
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It was fighting languagel but it was also the language of anger and 
Cromwell's behaviour at this time has rightly been seen by Professor 
Underdown as a further indication of his declining mental state. 
(') 
But the use of terror as a political tactic by men with charisma# 
especially in the face of those who have little or nothing to offer 
as an alternativep can be an effective weapon to counteract opposition, 
as we have seen in our own twentieth century. As has been said before, 
the officers' creative energies had already begun to run dry. After 
the kingship crisis they had nailed their colours firmly to the Crom- 
wellian mast and now more than ever their fate appeared to be bound 
up with that of Cromwell because they could not conceive of any alter- 
native way towards settlement at this particular time. However, in 
just over a year the situation was to change very dramatically. Bat 
obversely Cromwellq even in his fit of temperp realised that his fate 
was tied up with that of the army. After his discourse with Packer 
and the other Captains, Cromwell discussed the options open to him 
with some other officerst no doubt including Disborowe and Fleetwoodt 
and it was decided to dismiss Packer along with Captains Gladmant 
Malint Barrington and Spinage and Captain It, Hunter, These officers 
accepted this with some reluctance and pledged to live peaceably in 
their retirement. Of the other officers present at this interchange 
only Biscoe spoke outt saying that Cromwell "had dismissed 6 as honest 
Underdovnt 'Cromwell and the Officers', p. 1041 Pirth, 
'Letters', pp. 108-109. 
ý4%0 
officers as any were in his Army". 
(') 
Perhaps he was suggesting that 
the vhole affair was little more than a storm in a teacup. In the 
cases of Packer and Gladmant two old veteransp Discoe's comments 
were undoubtedly true. Monck vrote to Thurloet saying that he had 
long thought of Packer 
"as a discontented and dangerous persong and he 
hath gotten many discontented persons both of 
officers and troopers into His Highnes's 
regimentt that I lookt upon itt as the vorst 
regiment in the army for disaffection to the 
present goverment. " 
He did, "not-substantiate the charge. At the time of Overton's 1plot1q 
howeverp Tobias Bridge, the future Major-Generalt had written to 
Thurloe saying that Packer "is not so firm as is pretended"t which 
suggests that Monck's view was not necessarily without foundation. 
Monck also commented favourably on 11itchell'st Talbotts and Cobbett's 
declaration to Cromwell. It was the sort of gesture that would appeal 
to a disciplina ian like Monck. 
(2) 
Professor Underdown is probably 
correct to suggest that Thurloe and William Clarke's correspondents, 
tried to play down the affair. 
(3) 
This was Thurloe's usualt and 
understandablet response in such situations. A campaign in the 
press and among the regiments to drum up support for the Protector 
(1) Thurloe VIt pp. 786 (Fleetwood to Henry Cromwellq 
-8 Februaryg three days before their dismissal where he 
says that he thinks racker and Gladman would be dismissed), 
827; Underdovn, 'Cromwell and the Officers', p. 106. 
(2) Thurloe VI, p. 807; C. Clar. SqP#q 1119 p. 4. 
(3) Underdownt tCromwell and the Officers', p. 103; C. S. P. D. 
1657-58 p,. 288; Thurloe VIq p, 806; Clarke Paperst III'q 
P. 141. 
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was started up pretty quickly. It was almost like a vote of confidence 
in Oliver Cromwell. A newsletter written to William Clarke said 
"Its expected that all the chiefe officers should 
declare them selves and in pursuance thereof Col. ' 
Cobbettq Col. Mitchellt and Col. Talbot have 
declared to continue their faithfull service to 
his Highesset being satisfied vith what have 
been done. " (1) 
Even before the dismissal of the Captainst Lfercurius 
Politicus had condemned the Fifth Monarchists for trying to spread 
seditious literature in the army. On 19 February it reported that 
the people who scattered the seditious papers would not have felt 
encouraged to do so had they known "how little the Soldiers minde 
them", It attacked those amongst them who were ex-officersq saying 
that the soldiers have had past experience of howp when they were 
officers they had been proud and tyrannical andq libellouslyg that 
they had been apt to cheat the soldiery of their pay. 
(2) 
All Of 
these charges could of course quite easily have been levelled at 
some of the officers still servingt but this escaped Mercurius, 
Politicustslattention. 
No doubt partly encouraged by the decision to speed up 
pay for the armyt declarations of loyalty from the forces in Scotland 
poured into London over the next month. The addresses were published 
in the newsbooks and are all very similar in style and content. 
Cromwell is looked upon as God's chosen instrument for the good of the 
nation. 
(3) 
The regimentst or parts of regimentst which sent in 
(1) ibid. 9 p, 141; q. v, also Thurloe's report 
to Henry Cromwell 
T-Thurloe, VIp p. 806) written three days later which implies 
-that the action of the three colonels was spontaneous. 
(2) Mercurius Politicus, 4711 February 1658,18-25 February 1658. 
(3) Clarke Papersp III, p. 141. For references to the printed 
versions of the declarations from the forces in Scotland q. v. 
Catterallq 'The Failure of the Humble Petition and Advicelp 
American Historical Reviewt IX, p. 56n. The declarations 
are also to be found in Clarke Ms. 30t ff. 25v, 32 3 v. 36, 
37vt 43,46 48v, 52t 54 56 6ov, 669 70vt 
A 
191 -U-e-' ill officers. where the signatories are also named, They re 
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addresses were Wilkesl;, Talbotlsg Charles Fairfaxtsv Monck's foot and 
horset Readelsq Cobbett'st Thomas Cooper's, the Dundee ganisont 
Ashfield's. Robert Lilburne'sp Fitch's, Inverloughy garrisong 
St. Johnston garrison (alias Perth)t Hacker'st Morgan'st'Orkney garrison 
and Disborowe's. On 17 February Henry Cromwell wrote to Thurloet 
saying that those officers who were in Dublin when news of the purge 
of officers reached Ireland offered "freely and unanimously" to make 
an address of loyalty to Cromwell. Henry did not want to damage this 
spontaneity and enthusiasm for his father but wanted to get Thurloe's 
advice before sending in a petition. A petition was eventually drawn 
up after discussion amongst a relatively small group of officers and 
circulated in the army in Ireland. There were only about 12 dissenters 
from itv including Major William Lowe of Cooper's regiment who opposed 
it on the grounds that it had pro-kingship tendencies. But Sankey and 
Philip Carteret, the Advocate General for Irelandt said that if king- 
ship "were really most suitable to the constitution of these nations, 
that then they would desire it". The address was sent over with Colonel 
Abbottt Lt. Colonel John Nelson and William Pettyq and was later 
published in the press with the comment that it was "cheerfully" 
subscribed to by all the officers and soldiers. 
(L) 
In England it was decided to present an address subscribed 
by all the officers in or around London. This was done after a general 
meeting of the officers at which Fleetwood made a plea for unity in the 
Thurloeq VIp pp. 219 71-73p 849 114-1159 142; D, M* 
lan downe Ks, 823t ff. 377-380; Mercurius Politicus, 
17-24 June 1658; Firtht last Years, 11, pp, 49-50, 
4990*, 
army. In all 224 officers signed it and it was decided to present the 
address to Cromwell in the presence of all the officers above and 
including the rank of Captain. In these meetings the seeds of the 
return of the Council of Officers can be seen. Mention was made of 
the Humble Petition and Advice in the addresso but there was no 
unlimited enthusiasm for it. Howevert the officers expr6ssed their 
intention to remain united and loyal to Cromwell "as our general and 
chief Magistrate". 
(1) 
The garrison of Hull sent in its own address of loyalty 
to Cromwellp as did Biscoels, Richard Cromwell's and Daniels' regi- 
ments. The one from Richard Cromwell's amounted to a justification 
of government by a single person. The regiment said they were 
convinced that the safety of the nation next to God depended on the 
security of Cromwell, who was also called "our lawful Prince". From 
Flandersp Morgan and his fellow commissioned officers also sent an 
address. It was rather verbosep claiming that "peace and Plenty" 
ruled at home. The officers were in danger of being deceived by their 
own rhetoric. 
(2) 
The address from Richard Cromwell's regiment shows 
some signs of desperationt a reluctance to face up to the fact that 
Oliver Cromwell would not be around for ever. This reluctance also 
marks the addresses from the regiments in Scotland. If one were 
looking for a present-day analogy one would choose Spain in the 
months before Franco's death where the ruling classp including the 
armyp were gripped by paralysis. 
Clarke Papersp IIItpp. 143-145; Ifercurius Politicusq 
25 Mareh-1 April 1658; Firthp Last Yearst Ilt pp. 4 9. 
(2) Boldl. Rawlinson Ms. A57, f-312; Publick Intelligencerg 
29 March-4 April 1658,3-10 May 05-8,10-17 May 1658; 
Mercurius Politicus 8-15 July 1658. 
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The next few months up to Cromwell's death were chara- 
cterised by an atmosphere of acute insecurityp an atmosphere common 
in succession crises. The Protectorate government was felt to be 
under attack from Royalistst Commonwealthsmen and Fifth MonarchistS. 
This insecurity was reflected in the reports reaching Henry Cromwell 
in Ireland. Ile wrote to Thurloeq asking if itwere true that Fleet- 
wood and Disborowe were seeing Lamberto not just out of old friendship 
but to discuss other things, including politics. He said he hoped 
his father would have an eye to such matters and would 
"supply the vacancies now in the army with such whose 
principles must and will lead them to what is good, 
rather than sucho who out of levity, and not under- 
standing themselvesq are apt to talk liberally of 
living and dying with his highnes etc. " (1) 
Eventually Cromwell filled the vacancy caused by Packer's dismissal 
with Botelert the foxmer Major Generalp of whom Henry disapproved. 
Henry might well have had a valid point about the ease with -which 
the army could chant sloganst and this ability was to increase during 
the next couple of yearsp but the army were behind Cromwell 
at this timet out of a mixture of self-interest and genuine conviction 
and because they could not envisage anyone else who would guarantee 
the revolution in which they had played the role of midwife and out 
of which they had done quite well. Butp as we have seen, they did 
not wax-as hot about the Humble Petition and Advice. Henry was also 
perhaps over-worried by the reports that Fleetwood and Disborowe were 
(1) Thurloev VI9 P- 857- 
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seeing Lambert. 
4) 
It is quite understandable that such close ex-colleagues 
should keep in touch with one another. After all Lambert had resigned 
his commissions and was not implicated in any kind of opposition to 
the Protectorate 
I unlike such former officers as Harrisong Rich or Okey. 
The report, significantly originated from Droghill who was keen to 
retire to Ireland at this time, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health. 
Perhaps he sensed that Cromwell's days were numbered and that a 
diplomatic withdrawal to Ireland to bide his time was the best policy. 
It could well be that Broghill deliberately played up the report in 
the hope of discrediting Fleetwood and Disborowe. 
(2) 
Rumours also 
circulated in some Royalists circles that Monck was discontented. 
Howevert Hyde was not convinced by these stories. 
(3) 
As'far as Yfonck 
is concerned it would be wrong to identify him conclusively with the 
more obviously civilian Cromwellian groupp as does Professor Woolrych. 
(4) 
This implies more consistency in his views than had appeared until then 
or was to be evident later. Monck was, as has been stressedp a 
pragmatic man with quite a strong streak of opportunism. 
Ifeanwhilep the financial crisis continued. Various 
expedients to raise money, if necessary without recourse to Parliament, 
were under considerationq including a new decimation tax -on 
Royalists. It seems that Disborowe was one of the main advocates 
of this scheme. However, Fleetwood felt that there would be a new 
(1) Thurloeq VII9 PP- 38P 102. 
(2) Thurloe, Up PP- 8579858- 
(3) C. Clar. S. P., IVP PP- 17p 22p 25. 
(4) A. Ifoolrych, 'Last Quests for Settlement 1657-16601, 
in Aylmer (ed. )p Interregnum, p. 187. But c. f. Thurloe, q 
VII, PP- 317-318. 
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Parliament. The vacillation continued throughout March but by the 
beginning of April Cromwell appears to have been coming round to favour 
a new Parliament and by late June a committee of nine was meeting daily 
to consider what matters should be laid before the Parliament. Clearly, 
the uncertainties surrounding government policy continued. The feeling 
of uncertainty is reflected in the report that Ludlow, Itich and Vane 
were to be offered places on the Council of State. Howevert the one 
reference we have for this episode (a reply by Henry Cromwell to a 
letter from Thurloe) is very obscure and it could be that they were 
only called before the Council of State rather than asked to be members 
of itp which would have marked a considerablep if not to say impossible, 
about-turn both on their part and the part of the government. Never- 
thelessq the three supported the-idea of a new Parliamentq as well 
they might. 
(') 
The evidence for all this is very thin and much of it 
depends upon letters written by Henry Cromwell in Ireland in which he 
paraphrases some of the reports reaching him. With this reservation 
in mind it seems to me that Firth perhaps goes, too far in suggesting 
that Disborowe headed a party in the Council of State which favoured 
using the power of the sword to raise money and that he was backed by 
Fleetwood in this. 
(2) 
A new decimation was probably one of a number 
of proposals under discussion. It is very unlikely that Disborove 
pushed it with the intensity and conviction that Harrison and Lambert 
(1) Thurloe, VI9 p. 840; ibid. t VIIP PP. 389 399 56t 146t 192; 
Clarke Papers. IIIp ]p7p-. 142-143 + n. On the toffert to 
Ludlowt Rich and Vane# qev. Thurloe, VII, p. 154 and c. f. 
Firthq Last Yearsp Hp p. 274. 
(2) Firthq Last Yearaq Up p. 271 (footnote 2 on this page 
should refer to fburloeq VII9 p. 820, not p. 821. The 
references he gives in n. 1 do not really support his case). 
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had promoted their respective schemes in 1653. He was not in the 
same political class as Lambertq not even in that of the Harrison 
of 1647-1649. If on the other hand he did intend the proposal to 
be taken seriously as a long term solution to the problem of 
settlement, as Firth implies, then given the fate of the previous 
decimation tax and the unpopularity of the Major Generals he was not 
just being short-sighted politically but ultimately reckless and 
desparate. 
The 
committee had a majority of officers on it : Fleetvoodp Disborovet 
Whalleyt Philip Jones, 
(') 
Goffe and Cooper. The other members were 
Fiennes and Pickering and an unidentified ninth member. 
(2) 
Ilenry 
Cromwell wrote sarcastically to Thurloe at the end of June (the two 
men were by then quite close confidants)t 
"The wise men were but 7- It seems you have 
made them 9; and having heard their namesp 
I think myself better able to guess what 
they'll do, then a much wiser man; for no 
very wise TnAn can ever imagine it. " 
(3) 
It might well be that this committee was the one that reported to 
Crowell on 8 July about the question of the successionp declaring 
M Technically Jones was still a member of the army but he 
was more important in a civilian capacity as Comptroller 
of the ]Protectoral Household (Aylmer State's Servants, 
PP. 55P 110P 152p 1649 2909 300,3611. 
(2) Thurloe, VII, p. 192. 
(3) ibid., j p. 218. 
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"that it was desireable to have it continued 
. elective; that is that the chief magistrate 
should alwayes name his successorp and that 
of the hereditary avoyded. " (1) 
Perhaps it was felt better to make this point because of fears that 
Cromwell might fall back on kingshipp although the evidence that the 
resurrection of kingship was very much in the air at this time is by 
no means as hard and fast as Firth suggested; it rests on very 
inconclusive evidence which the sources he cites do not support. 
Moreover, he tends to play down the extent of feeling against kingship 
in the army. 
(2) 
Over the next two months -the Protectorate was in a state 
of hiatus. Cromwell's deteriorating health was obvious to all. There 
was a realisation that Cromwell might soon be dead and this caused 
concern. Henry Cromwell hit the nail firmly on the head at the end 
of June when he wrote to Thurloe : 
"Have you any settlement? Does not your peace 
depend upon his highness's lifet and upon his peculiar 
skillq and faculty and personall interest in the 
army as now modelled and commanded? I sayq beneath 
the immediate hand of God (if I Imov anything of the 
affaires in England) there is no other reason why 
wee are not in blood at this day. " (3) 
Allowing for some obvious exaggeration# especially in the last part 
of the statement,, it is quite a shrewd assessment of Oliver Cromwell's 
Protectorate. Once Cromwell was removed from the scene this was to 
become apparent. 
(1) ibid. 0 p. 269; Firtht Last Yearaq II, pp. 277-278. 
I (2) ibid. 9 pp. 278-279 + n. 1 and 2. 
ibid. 9 p. 218. 
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The circilm tances surrounding the death of Cromwell are 
well-Imown. 
(l) 
The army officers involved in the appointment of a 
successor were Fleetwoodq Disborowet Whalley and Goffe. Firth 
(2 
questions the latter 
) 
but there is no reason to doubt his presence. 
He had been one of the committee of nine and had been quite important 
throughout the 1650's among those officers who were in London most 
of the time. However, at the end of Augustp when Cromwell was in 
his death struggle, there are indications that the army officers were 
at last waking up to the likelihood of his death and were trying to 
prepare themselves for it and to work out their response. Signs of 
the future division between Protectorate and anti-Protectorate 
officersq the latter centering around Fleetwood's residence at Walling- 
ford Houseq also emerged. Fauconbe3g wrote to Henry Cromwell about 
these meetings. He alleged, in a gossip-like wayp that Berry and 
another officer "onely praid very notionally" at the meeting anj that 
Ingoldsby and B(arksted? D were the only officers not summoned to the 
meeting "by which you may guess at something". Fauconberg also hinted 
at trying to win over Lockhart and his officersý thus fearing some sort 
of division in the army with Cromwell's deathP) Thomas Clarges, also 
writing to Henry Cromwellq said that the meetings took place at Walling- 
ford House and thatq as well as praying for Cromwellq there was also 
some discussion of public affairst but he did not elaborate beyond 
this. 
(4) 
(1) q. v. Firth, Last Yearsp 119 pp. 299-306; Abbott, Writings 
and Speeches, IV, pp. 866-872* 
(2) Firth, Last Yearst UP P- 305n. 
(3) Thurloet VIIt P. 365. 
(4) ibid. # P- 369. 
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With the death of Cromwell and the hand-over of power 
to Mchard the officers adopted a policy of wait and see; the political 
situation had become fluid once again. 
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III, sEpmmEn 1658-MAY 1659 
Fall accounts of the narrative of events and intellectual 
background to 1658-1660 already exist in the works of Godfrey Davies 
and Professor Woolrych and it is not intended to retread ground where 
it is adequately covered by them. 
(') 
Howevert the questions which 
have to be answered in this section are how the army moved from 
acquiesence in the Protectorate, even in its more civilianised and 
conservative form, into opposition to it and into support for a 
restoration of the Rump; whether that support was unconditicnal and 
whether we can see any signs of divisions within the army in April/May 
1659 especially along the lines of Rumper/Harringtonian ones. We have 
also to consider the renewed politicisation of the armyq that is when 
and to what extent the junior officers began to push the senior officers 
into intractable opposition to Richard Cromwell's Protectorate. 
A good number of the senior officers signed the proclama- 
tion of Richardt but none were below the rank of Colonel. 
(2) 
On 18 
September the army officers in London including some who were absent 
G. Daviesp Th-e-Restoration of Charles Up San Marino, 1955; 
G. Davies, 'The Army and the Downfall of Richard Cromwellt, 
Huntingdon Library Dalletint VIIt 1935; A. Woolrych, 
tPolitics and Political Theory in England 1658-i66o,, 
Oxford B, Litt,, 1952; A. Woolrycht tThe Good Old Cause 
and the Fall of the Protectoratelq Cambridge Historical 
Journal- XIII, 19579 Pp. 133-161; A. Woolrýcht 'Last 
. 
2uestýý or a Settlementt. in Aylmer (ed. )v Interregnum, 
pp., l83-RW*, --Comi4-eteIIrose Works of John Miltonl, VII, 
New Havent 19749 introduction by A, Woolrych, 
(2) Mercurius Politicus, 2-9 September 1658; Daviest 
Restorations P. 5- 
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from Scotland and Irelandg presented an address of loyalty to Richard 
on behalf of the whole army. This last point is important. There can 
be no doubt that the army was starting to look upon itself as the 
guardian of the "cause" in the face of those who were at beat luke- 
warm towards some of the ideals that had been fought fort ort at 
worst favoured swinging the pendulum further back in a more conservative 
or reactionary direction. The officers in or around London, and there- 
fore at the centre of the natiorýs political activityt were aware of 
this, more by instinct than by intellectual calculation. For them it 
was most important to ensure that army unity remained intact so far 
as this was possible. Bat they must also have realised that neither 
Monck nor Henry Cromwell would be enthusiastic and uncritical followers 
of whatever their comrades in London laid down as army policy. 
The army address was presented to Richard on 18 September 
after being passed unanimously by a general meeting of the officers at 
Whitehall the day before, a meeting which amounted virtually to an old- 
style Council of Officers. Fauconberg wrote to Henry Cromwell saying 
that the officers largely responsible for the address were Sydenhamp 
Berry and Hewsong and claimed, inaccuratelyp that only a very minimal 
number of officers from Ireland and Scotland were present. 
(') 
Unlike previous addresses of loyalty to Oliver# which 
never attempted to force a particular course of action on himg this 
address to his son can be seen asa veiled ultimatum* The address 
(1) Thurioe, VII, p. 406. 
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said that Oliver 
"will be had in perpetual remembrance amongst good 
men as having been the great Assertor of the 
Liberties of Goa, s peoplep an Instrument to 
restore these Nations, to Peace# a lover of 
their Civil Rightsp and so indefatigable in 
his enaeavours after Reformation. " 
Oliver was said to have von much respect abroad. As for the Army 
"he reckoned the choicest Saints, his chiefest Worthies". Throughout 
the address ran the refrain of Oliver as champion of civil and religious 
rights. There was also concern for the future and advice for Richard 
on how beat to follow in these enormous footsteps. He was requested 
to leave the army under the command of officers "of honest godly prin- 
ciples" and that they be allowed 
"to adventure all that is dear unto them by all 
lawful ways and means to maintain an equal just 
liberty to all persons that professe godlinesst 
that are not of turbulent spirits as to the peace 
of these Nationst nor disturbers of otherst though 
differing in some things from themselves according 
to the true intent of the Humble Petition and 
Advice. " 
Here the army was claiming a right to have a say in civil affairs even 
going so far as interpreting "the true intent" of the Humble Petition. 
They also had their own viewst even if these were somewhat vaguet as 
to what they meant by "the good old cause'll, a phrase used in -the 
address (its first usage in an official army communiqu. 4). They 
implied that if the Protectorate of Richard Cromwell did not safe- 
guard what had been achieved in advancing the cause and to further 
it then they would seek for an alternative government that would 
fulfil this aim. The army's claims were put even more directly when 
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the address suggested that the Privy Council should be composed of 
men "of known Godlines and sober principles" and '"that they with 
your Highess and your Army" should carry on the work of reform. In 
other words the officers envisaged a kind of tri-partite government 
of Protector, Privy Council and Army as the ideal solution to the 
problem of settlement. It was the closest they had ever come to 
suggesting that the power of the army should be formalised in some 
sort of constitutional way. The successive attempts at settlement in 
the 1650's had always tried to avoid thisp and Oliver encouraged and 
supported these attempts. With the second Protectorater more openly 
civilian in charactert he aligned himself firmly to such a course 
even at the risk of alienating the army. 
These pretensions of the officers had certainly not been 
the true intent of the Humble Petition. The address went on to assert 
that they were not acting out of motives of self-interest but that they 
would be loyal to Richard. However# they hedged this in, and - none 
too subtlj made it clear that they expected him to support the 
sort of aspirations they had outlinedv and that if he did he would 
have their unequivocal support for the existing constitutiont that 
is government by a single person and two Houses of Parliament. Accord- 
ing to Mabbott some 220 officers were present at the meeting on 17 
September and all signed it. Howeverp the manuscript copy of the 
address in the Rawlinson Mss. gives some 276 signatories. 
(') 
OoPsHop M9 pp,, 233-236; Ifercurius Politicus, 16-23 
September 1658; Clarke Paperst III, pe 164; B, M. Lans- 
downe Ms. 823P ff, 104-105; Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A611 f-3; 
c. f. Daviesp Restoration, q pp. 8-10, Woolrychp Ifilton, 
p. 12. Both Davies and Woolrych wrongly state. that the 
officers met on the 20th and that the address was presented 
on the 21st. 
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On 21 September Fleetwood wrote to Henry Cromwell justifyý- 
ing the inclusion of the Irish army in the address, but at the same 
time betraying a suspicion that Henry might resent this. Fleetwood's 
argument vas army unity : 
"Here was great union and surely that should be 
preserved with utmost care and diligencet and 
rather let all things of a doubtfull acceptation 
remaine as they aret then hazard the breach of 
union upon an indifferent, much lesse doubtfull, 
account. " (11 
In the eventq Henry had an address of loyalty drawn up and sent for 
subscription throughout the army in Ireland. The newsbooks gave the 
impression that Henry had been approached by some of his officers in 
Dublin to present an address to Richard. 
(2) 
Monck was not quite so 
independent as Henryt despite the fact that the two men appear to have 
maintained a correspondence. 
(3) 
Fleetwood had forwarded the Army's 
address of 18 September to Monck requesting -that -the officers in 
Scotland sign it. But Monck had already set in motion his own address. 
On 21 September he ordered all of the senior commanders who could to 
come to Dalkeith the following day to subscribe an address of loyalty. 
One hundred turned up and signed it. By the 23rd the other address 
had arrived from England. According to the Publick Intelligencer 
"the qeneral thought it adviseable to decline the former" and sub- 
scriptions were made to the address newly arrived from England 
(1) Thurloe, VII, pp. 405406. 
(2) ibid. g p. 400; Publick Intelligencerg 13-20 September 
IM. The address of the Irish officer: B. M. Add. 11s, 
4159v f-71) was printed in the newsbook 
ýIfercurius 
Politicus, 23-30 September 1658)- It is very bombastic 
t apolitical. 
(3) Thurloe VIIp p. 384. 
512. 
"to testifie how great a harmony there is 
amongst the Officers of the three nations 
in their obedience and faithfulness to his 
Highness. " (1) 
But all was not as harmonious as the newsbook tried to make out, 11onck 
sent the address he had originally intended to Thurloe "for your own 
satisfactionlIp presumably to show that he was prepared to maintain 
his independence. Thomas Clarges, Monck's brother-in-law who had been 
sent by Richard shortly after his accession to find out how Mfonck stood 
in relation to his governmentq 
(2) 
writing to Henry even says that Monck 
forwarded both addresses to Richard and also ordered petitions from 
individual regiments to be drawn up. 
(3) 
The latter assertion is very 
likely (petitions were also sent in by individual regiments in England), 
but the former is doubtful. 
Thust the pledges of loyalty to Richard contained in the 
address of 18 September hardly concealed the an iety and fears of the 
officers in London about the future of the revolution and for how 
Richard's government would work out in practice. The separate addresses 
from the forces in Ireland and Scotland helped to demonstrate that the 
unity of purpose between the three major sections of the army in 
England, or rather London,, Scotland and Ireland could no longer be 
taken for granted. 
(1) ibid. 9 p. 404; Publick Intelligencer, 27 September-4 Tetober 1658, 
(2) R. Baker, A Chronicle of the Kings of England, Londong 
16849 p. 636; Thurioeq V119 p. 414; Daviesq, Restoratioa, 
pp. 19-21. 
(3) Thurloeq VII9 pp. 411p 424. The two addresses from the 
forces in Scotland are in Clarke Ms. 30, ff. 164,165 ff- 
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The officers in London had flexed their muscles in the 
address and over the next few weeks seemed determined to test the new 
Protector in what amounted to an attempt to win back some of the 
influence they felt they had lost since the establishment of the 
second Protectorate. In terms of army politics what was happening 
was a re-emergence of the early 1647 situation when the army became 
a political force for the first time. Then it was largelyt but not 
exclusively, the soldiery who made the running. They forced the 
officers handq coaxing them along paths not all of which were 
unwelcome to them but along which they themselves were hesitant to 
proceed. But in 1647 the officers had been successful in ensuring 
that they retained control over the direction that the army followed. 
In late 1658 the senior officers were being pressurised once againg 
but this time by their more junior commissioned colleagues. As in 
1647 there was a reciprocal relationship: the senior officers were 
being forced by pressures from below into certain channels but at 
the same time these channels were not necessarily anathema to them. 
They were genuinely suspicious of the new rrotector and his entourage 
and they wanted to restore what they believed by now to be the army's 
inherent right to a voice in politics. At the same time they were 
aware of the political dangers in this. The general political context 
of late 1658-April 1660 is similar to that existing between March 1647- 
January 1649. It is one of great fluidity with constantly shifting 
alignments. But in terms of army politics there is one great 
difference. In the earlier period there had been much consistency in 
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army's stance andp perhaps more important, there had been firm and 
decisive leadership. In the later period these were lacking. The 
army was not itself creating alternative constitutions as it had 
done with the Heads of the Proposals. There was not the same level 
of political consciousness as had been manifested in the Putney debates. 
Even when the army leadership had had to ally itself with other groups 
in late 1648 and early 16499 such as with the parliamentary Indepen- 
dents or the Levellersp they never relinquished the upper hand. 
In the late 1650's the army shoved itself once more to 
be aware of and responsive to some of the most progressive political 
thought of the dayq but that thought was not being crystallised or 
matured within its own ranks as it had in the past by men of the 
calibre of-Ireton or even Lambert. The army had no clear idea of 
where it was going in the late 1650! s. It dabbled and it became torn 
within itself. First it tried to see how far it could go with Richard 
Cromwellp and eventually got rid of him, then it re-called the Rump, 
failing to realise the extent of the ambitions and genuinely felt 
convictions about parliamentary suprem cy of men like Haselrig and 
Scott# and then it flirted with Harringtonian notions, By then it 
was too late and the lack of direction and leadership over the previous 
months made itself felt in a dramatic fashion. The tensions within 
the armyt already in evidence in September 16589 were aggravated 
beyond control and the army tore itself# and the good old causet 
to pieces. This could have happened at various times between 1647 
and 1649. It did--rat because'of the reasons already advancedp leader- 
ship and a remarkable degree of unity. 
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Professor Woolrych and -the late Godfrey Davies have drawn 
attention to-the strains in the Council of State between the civilian 
elements. and the military ones over all aspects of policy in late 
1658. 
(1) 
Howevert despite Royalist optimism about these strainst 
a trial of strength was not attempted at this stage over the composi- 
tion of the Council of State. Indeed from the Order Book of the 
Council of State it is clear that the officers on that body played 
a full part in its administrative work. 
(2) 
Such a show-down so early 
on in the new Protector's career would have been politically disastrous; 
it would have been too obvious an intervention of the sword. Besides, 
it, i. 5 not certain if the military members of the Council had the ability 
to carry out such a coup. They had their matchq and more# in the 
civilian members. The testing ground between the Protector and army 
was to be the army itself. It is in this respect that the petition 
emanating from the junior officers in early October is to be vieved. 
(3) 
The petition, which called for Fleetwood to be made Commander-in-Chief 
with the power to commission officers and which was concerned only with 
seem to 
army affairsq/have emanated without the connivance of the senior 
officerst but there are good grounds for believing that the petition 
was welcome to them. They shared the petitioners' implied resentment 
at having someone as head of the army who was not an officer of long 
standing and who lacked the experience of having fought, for the cause; 
(1) Woolrych, Milton,, p. 14; Daviesp Restoration, 9 PP- 31-339 
38-39t 4ýý47. 
(2) Boldl. Clarendon Ms., 59t; f- 355; 'Order Book of the Council 
of State'of the rrotector Richard Cromwellq September 1658- 
January 16591p Longleatt Passim. 
(3) For the full narrative of events for what follows q. v. 
and c. f. Daviesq Itestoration, g' PP- 34-40 and Woolrychg 
Milton, 9 pp. 12-14. 
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it offended their esprit de corps. We have also seen how there had 
been some grumblings under Oliver for the separation of the roles of 
Commander-in-Chief and headship of government because the officers 
felt the army's morale was suffering as a result of their union. 
There was nothing inherently dangerous about separating the two roles. 
It would have been feas, ible and workablep provided -the army and the 
civilian government were in close harmony. But in the context of 
late 1658 this was not the case. Besidesq as Richard reminded the 
officers in a speechq drafted by Thurloeq which he made to them on 
18 October, to concede their demand for a separation of the two roles 
would be contrary to the Humble Petition and Adviceq and thus uncon- 
stitutional. He was aware of how essentially military grievances 
could spill over into political ones as the army's material grievances 
had done in 1647. The citing of the dismissal of Lambert as a dangerous 
and unfair precedent and the feeling among some of the officers in 
favour of restoring cashiered officers such as Okey no doubt sharpened 
this awareness. 
(') 
The ease with which Fleetwood and the other senior officerst 
including Whalley and Goffeq who both stood by Richard the following 
yeart were able to re-assert their ovn authority suggests that the 
junior officers had not yet become a group with clear-cut political 
aspirations. This only happened graduallyt but in a sense inevitably, 
given their regular weekly prayer meetingsp always in the past a prelude 
Thurloe, VII,, pp. 447--4499 eSP- P- 447; IT. M. C. 5th Reportq 
P- 172; Clarke Papersp III, p. 165; C. Clar. S. P. 9 IV9 p. 106; 
Davies, Restorati_onp PP- 36-37- 
517. 
to some sort of actionp the activity of Lambertq who there is every 
reason to suppose was at work behind the scenes, no doubt sensing a 
favourable wind that might sweep him back into the army and politics 
againg(l) and later on the influence of the Republicans. 
Fleetwood and his more senior colleagues welcomed the 
noises being made from below so long as they could control them. 
Clarges suggestE; that Disborowe and Berry were especially favourable 
to the petition. 
(2) 
In the middle of October Fleetwood reminded a 
meeting of the officers located in and around Londont and presumably 
including the junior officers, of the need for unity and discipline. 
(3) 
For a while the political temperature was lowered. The clear warning 
in Richard Cromwell's speech that the officers ran the risk of provok- 
ing a constitutional crisis may have caused them to think again about 
their proceedings. The argument that there were close contacisbetween 
some of the officers and some Republicans at this time is unproven. 
It originates from Fauconberg and was spread abroad by the French 
ambassador who met Fauconberg regularly on official business and must 
have got the story from him. Even if some meetings took place their 
importance should not be played up and Fauconberg was probably hoping 
to spread the story to discredit the army officers. Howeverp Henry 
Marteng Okeyt Haselrig and 11ackert a serving officer and the officer who 
took the lead in accepting his commission from the Speaker the following 
(1) The references to Lambert's activity are not conclusivet 
but as Davies suggested it is very likely, and would be 
quite in characterg although it is very doubtful that he 
was working hand in hand with Disborowe at this stage as 
Fauconberg suggests (Daviesp Restoration, p. 389 n 35; 
Thurloe,, VI19 P- 328; q. v. also ibid., pp. 459-460i. 
(2) Thurloeq VIIP P. 437. 
(3) Clarke Paperst III, p. 166. 
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summerp were among those who were said to be members of a Republican 
club founded by Wildman in 1657. Other members might have included 
serving officersp but Hacker is the only recorded one. 
(') 
By mid-November feelings began to run high once again 
and Richard felt compelled to address the officers on 19 November to 
try and remove the jealousies and misunderstandings between them. 
According to a newsletter sent to William Clarke the reason for the 
renewed disquiet was that unlike previous weekly prayer meetings at 
St. James's. which were confined to discussions of scripturet some 
rumours that there were to be changes in the army "as if good men were 
put outg and worse put in" had been discussed. At the meeting Goffe 
suggested they were mistaken about this. 
(2) 
As in the past rumour 
played an important part in stirring up emotions. Clargesp writing to 
Henry Cromwell on 16 November,, said that he had heard that it was the 
officers themselves who wanted five or six of their comrades purged. 
He also suspected that Henry's elevation to the Lord Lieutenancy did 
not go down well with them. A Royalist newsletter said that the army 
were petitioning for the disbanding of the regiments whose Colonels 
were related to Richard such as Fauconberg'sq Ingoldsby's. Howard's 
and two others. No mention was made of Disborowe's or Fleetwood's. 
also relatives of the Protector. The story is unlikely. 
(3) 
Thurloet VIIt p. 528; M. Guizotp History of Richard 
Cromwell and the Restoration of Charles 11,11 Vols., 
London# 1856, It p. 253; C. S. P. D. 1661-629 p. 86; J. Walker, 
'The Secret Service under Charles 11 and ýames III, 
T. R. H. S. 9 4th Seriesp 1932p p. 235. C. f. Davies 
(Restoration, 
P- 38)- 
(2) Clarke Papersp III, p. 169; C. S. P. V. 1658-59, pp. 257t 2599 261. 
Thurloep VII9, P. 511; C. Clar. S. P., IVp p. 109. 
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The meeting between Richard and the officers on the 19th 
was designed to prevent any further political discussions. Two points 
emerge from the incident. Firstly, army concerns still preoccupied 
the officers above all else at this stage. Secondlyt Goffe's presence 
at St. James and his remarks tend to suggest that the officers meeting 
at St. James were not exclusively junior officers. In other words 
the view -that St. James's was for junior officers only is open to 
doubt. It is unlikely that the junior officers would attend in any 
great numbers, if at all, at Wallingford House. The officers having 
access there would be known to Fleetwood or his senior colleagues 
personally or else be involved in some aspect of army administration. 
On the other handt there is every reason to suppose that, at this 
time anyway, the senior officers attended meetings at St. James's. 
How regular these attendences were ist of courset unknown; there are 
no records comparable to William Clarke's for late 1648 and early 1649. 
After Richard had spoken 
"The officers seemed to be much affected with what my 
Lord said, except some few of the inferior sort who 
mattered a little after they were goneg but they were 
persons unconsiderable. 11 
The anonymous writer was confident that unity would prevail in the 
army now. 
(') 
A calm did indeed return after the Protector's speech. 
Most people were looking towards the new Parliament. Tensions continued 
(1) Clarke Papersp III, pp. 169-170. 
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to exist between the civilian and military members of the Council, 
even in a melodramatic fashion if we are to believe the French ambassador 
and a Royalist newsletter which said that Fleetwood charged Montagu, 
Fauconberg and Ingoldsby (the latter two were not members of the 
Council of State) with conspiring to abduct himself and Disborove, 
a dubious tale. 
(') 
The final decision to call a new Parliament was 
made on 3 December after much debate in Council. 
(2) 
In the army, at 
any ratet they had been discussing the future Parliament since at 
least early October. 
(3) 
By the end of the year Thurloe reported to 
Henry Cromwell that "all is hushtq in expectation of what the parlement 
will doe". 
(4) 
By then it was not just the army that was preparing for 
the new Parliament but also the anti-gover=ent Republicans. 
(5) 
On 
6 January in a gesture of appeasement Richard invited the army officers 
of the rank of Captain and above to Whitehall to what was described as 
"a royall treatment". 
(6) 
On 11 January Fleetwood and Disborowe were 
made joint wardens of the Cinque Ports and constables of Doverg positions 
previously held by Lambert. 
(7) 
The new Parliamentp far from being constructive and 
positive from the government's point of viewv sparked off new tensions 
00 Guizotq Richard CromwelIq Iq p. 271; C. Clar. S. P. t IVp 
p,. 118, Both Davies (Restoration't p. 47Tand Woolrych 
(Ifilton, p. 14) accept the story* 
(2) Daviesg Restoration, q P- 45- 
(3) Thurloeq VII9 p. 425. 
(4) ibid. 9 P. 581- 
(5) Ludlow, Itemoirs,, II9 p. 50 + n. 
(6) Clarke Papersp 1119 P. 173- 
(7) ibid. t loc. cit. 
\ 
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and crises and ultimately helped bring about the fall of the Protectorate. 
There is no need to revise the accepted view that in this Parliament 
the Republicans, especially of the R: umper variety like Haselrig and 
Scottq were intent on filibustering and tried to undermine the govern- 
ment at every turng even if this group was much divided within itself. 
the 
Professor Woolrych has also drawn attention to the fact thatl"conservative 
majority" in the House, the people whom Oliver Cromwell had been trying 
to win over with the policy of the respectable revolution and who showed 
signs of responding to these overtures as continued by his son, played 
an important part in alienating the army by anti-militaryq anti-religious 
toleration attitudes and their nostalgia for the old constitution*(') 
The Republicans were supported in the House by former 
officers like Okeyq Alured and Packers 
(2) 
Indeed in one vote on 18 
April Alured changed his mind at the direction of Haselrig. 
(3) 
low- 
evert Lambert's attitude is much more ambivalent than Professor Wool- 
rych suggests. 
(4) 
On 11 February he said 
"I would have no reflections upon any persong as 
that they were for or against the Protector. We 
are all for this honourable person that is now 
in power. "t 
and on 8 April he was quite warm towards the Other Houset 
"I would have you go hand in hand together. " 
I 
Daviesp Restoration, Chapters IV and V; Woolrychq 'Last 
Qaests'. p. 191; Woolrychq Milton# pp. 17-18. 
(2) ibid. 9 p. 16. 
(3) Burton IVP P. 459. 
(4) Woolrych, Milton, p. 16. 
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He vas also very sensitive about -the pastp and his own role in recent 
history. On 30 March he declared 
"I vould have as little looking back as may 
be. If all actions be questioned that have 
been done in these late transactionsp who of 
your friends that have served you 14 years 
can excuse his. "t 
an important point regardless of the special pleading. 
(') 
Lambert's 
motives remain inscrutable. Before long he was to become one of the 
chief advocates within army circles for the return of the RMP butt 
as we shall seet this tactic had strong political motives on his part, 
and anyway he was not in favour of an unconditional return of the Runp. 
An unconditional return would have been too much to expect from the 
architect of the first Protectorate which was designed to counteract 
what were considered to have been the excesses of unlimitedt 
unbounded and perpetual Parliaments. All Lambert's contributions 
in Richard's Parliament are of a very high standard. 
As in previous Protectorate Parliaments the army members 
did not behave as a unified groupp much less as a party. There were 
even splits amongst them over issues where one might have expected 
the equivalent of a modern three line whipp such as the charges against 
Petty and Boteler. The charge against Petty was brought by Colonel 
Jerome Sankey who had been associated with Wallingford House from at 
least mid-16589 although this might have had more to do with matters 
(1) Barton, III, p. 231; ibi '- d. 9 IVv pp. 28-299 3039 376-377- 
N3K ' 
concerning the Irish army than any political ones. 
(') 
Sankey went 
on to support the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in October 1659- 
(2) 
Of the army officerog and ex-ofhcersp Kelsey# Baynesp Lambert and 
Morgan showed themselves very sympathetic to Petty. 
(3) 
In the bitter 
and acrimonious debate over Botele3; Baynesq Ludlow and Alured were 
against Boteler; Kelseyq Morgan and Whetham gave him support and 
Bennetq and Thurloet spoke on his behalf. 
(4) 
In the middle of Februaryl at about the time of Moyer's 
pro-Rump petitiong there was a further outburst of activity in the 
army. Moyer's petition was the same as the one which had caused 
Oliver to dismiss his last Parliament so abruptly. It was suggested 
above that at -that time the petition probably circulated in the army* 
and in February 1659 no doubt -this happened once again. As usual the 
senior officers did not wish to be outflanked by civilians and sought 
to counteract too much outside interference in the army by preparing 
a petition of their own. Richard got wind of it and went in person to 
Wallingford House to caution and admonish the officers. According to 
a Royalist report he is alleged to have said that he would part with 
the generalship and his life togetherv but it seems very unlikely 
that Fleetwood and Disborowe were thinking in terms of a direct 
challenge to the Protector at this stage. No doubt the petition that 
B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8239 ff. 45-46. 
(2) Q. v. also biographical appendix. 
Burton, IV, pp. 244-247- 
(4) ibid. p pp. 403-412. 
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was being concocted by the officers I and 
the senior officers were as 
involved in it as the junior onesq concerned itself with the question 
of the headship of the army. After the Protector's visit to Walling- 
ford House the officers decided not to press on with a petition but 
debated broader issues 11 and seemed resolved to acquiesce in the 
Parliamentts determinations". Howeverp a committee was appointed to 
draw up a stand-by list of heads to be presented to the Parliament if 
need be. The members of the committee were Colonels Fleetwood# Dis- 
borowep Whalley* Berry, Lilburne and Ashfieldt Lt. Colonel Mossp Major 
Ellisonp Captain Deane and others. This committee included members 
of what Ludlow and subsequent historians have seen as the three groups 
in the army at this time : the Wallingford House officersq the officers 
junior ranks 
who in association with the, /supported the Commonwealthsmenq and the 
Protectorians. 
(1) 
But the fact that these officers were sitting on 
this committee and had doubtless been participating in the discussions 
that preceeded its formation would suggest that these groups were not 
so rigid at this time. 
(2 ), 
The fact that Whalley and Goffe# who both 
stood by Richard Cromwell, were members of Owen's congregation at about 
this time as well as Lambertq Disborowep Fleetwoodq Berry and Sydenham 
For these divisions q. v. Ludlowg Memoirsp II, p. 61; 
Daviest Restorationt P. 74; Woolrycht Mitonp pp. 10-12. 
(2) Clarke Papers, III, pp. 182-183; ThurloeqVIIt p. 612; 
T. 11. Lansdowne Hs, 823# ff. 223-224t 251; Clar. S. P., 
1119 p. 426; Toon# God's Statesmang, pp. 108,110; c. f. 
Davies,, Restorationg Pp. 58-59; D; ýies, 'Army and Downfall19 
pp. 146-=47 i ýdWoMrychq Miltong p. 21 for different 
interpretations. Barwick's report to Hyde (Thurloe, 
vii, pp. 615-616) which is usually cited in relation 
to this incident seems to me reliable in its general 
assertion that there were some rumblings in the armyg 
but very unreliable in its interpretation of these 
rumblings. Barwick includes Fairfax as a Republican and 
Fleetwood as a "Protectorist" veering towards the 
Republicans. 
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tends to support this view, although we have no record of their 
attendences. It is possible that Lambert was by this time present 
"under covert" at the Wallingford House meetings but there is no 
evidence to suggest that he was fomenting the army petition. 
(') 
If he were present it was only on suffrance from Fleetwood and 
Disborove. Lambert, however, urged the Parliament to take Moyer's 
petition into consideration. 
(2) 
His short speech on this is very 
characteristic of the others he made in this Parliament; he was 
trying to project himself as a statesman. 
Meanwhilep Monck wrote to Thurloe saying that the army 
in Scotland was quiet and that he felt confident it would remain so. 
He had also ordered a ban on petitioning and interference in affairs 
of state. 
(3) 
Monck had already expressed his sympathies with the 
aspirations of the civilian Cromwellians in a paper to Richard which 
Clarges brought back with him after his trip to Scotland in early 
September. 
(4) 
]Iis frankness in that paper had been prompted by the 
hopep albeit short-livedt that Richard would be able to further his 
father's policy of healing and settling. When it became apparent 
that this was not the case, he dropped Richard 'UP-rj It4ick I. J., 
(1) Thurioep VII, p. 612; Woolrychl Miltong p. 21. 
(2) Barton, III, pp. 292-293- 
(3) Thurloe,, VII, p. 616. 
(4) ibid. 9 PP- 387-388; Daviest Restorationg pp. 20-21. 
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Suspicion and mistrust between the triangle of Protector, 
Parliament'and army was always present under the surface and it grew 
in intensity over the next few weeks. Two well known incidents helped 
sour relations between the army and the Protector. The first was, the 
altercation between Cornet Sumpner and Major Thomas Babington of 
Ingoldsby's horse. Sumpner alleged that Babington was advancing 
ungodly men in the regiment, even cavaliers. At a hearing before the 
Colonel and Protectort Richard dismissed the allegations as spurious 
making his famous rema k to Ingoldsby 
"Go thy way Dick Ingoldsby, thou canst neither 
preach nor prayq but I will believe thee 
before I believe twenty of them. " 
Suamnerp according to the two Republican accounts we have of the jr, 
incident was cashiered, but there is no other evidence to support this. 
Babington was purged after-the fall of the Protectoratet no doubt out 
of-a desire to get even, and was arrested for refusing to appear in 
answer to the s-ons of a court martial. 
(') 
Sumpner became a 
Lieutenant. The-second was the quarrel between Edward Whalley and 
Lt. Colonel William Gough of'Ronck's footp not to be confused with 
William Goffe the Major Generalt and Richard Ashfield over the Other 
House, It almost came to blows, The quarrel smouldered on throughout 
March. 
(2 ) 
This incident was more serious because it is the first 
reliable evidence we have of a serious rift developing among the 
Ludlowp Memoirs, II, pp. 62-63 + n; Daviest RestoratioR, 
p. 64; Woolrych, Ifiltong PP. 59-60; Firth and Davies, 
pp. 153-155. 
(2) Clarke )Is- 31t f. 46; D. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8239 ff. 245-2460 
278-279; Davies, Restoration., pp. 64-65; Woolrych, Milton, 
P. 59. 
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senior officers. No doubt Ashfield was very popular with the Baptist 
Churches, but vhat made Richard Cromwell's handling of the affair so 
obnoxious in the eyes of many of the officers was the prospect that 
one of their colleagues would be tried before a court martial in an 
undignified way. The Ashfield affair was also made one of the bargain- 
ing counters between Ludlow and -the officers in late March when 
overtures were made by the army to the Republicans in Parliamente(l) 
The army's distrust of the Parliament was caused by a three fold 
fear. Firstly, that, as with previous Parliamentsq if left to them- 
selves they would set about undermining the revolution; secondly the 
fear that the legality of the Rumpts legislation was being questioned; 
and thirdly. the fear of the motives,,, Cf_- some of the members who 
seemed anxious to court the Royalists. The generous attitude of some 
M. P. s towards the Royalists was made very explicit in the debate on the 
petition of 70 Royalists sold as slaves to Barbados* 
(2 ) 
This took 
place on 25 March at the same time as the senior officers approached 
Ludlow. Ludlow was of course a former officer well-known to them and 
especially to Pleetwood and less obviously anti-military than the other 
Republican ex-officer Haselrig. The officers at this stage seemed 
intent on finding some way of counteracting the civilian conservative 
majority in the Parliament. All of this mistrust was encouraged by a 
barrage of propaganda directed at the armyp accusing it of backsliding 
(1) Ludlowq Memoirsq II, p. 64. 
(2) Burton IV9 pp. 255-273; Daviest &storatiollg pp. 65-67. 
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and advocating a return to the vague concept of the "good old cause". 
The barrage got underway shortly after the Parliament began to sit. 
(') 
What took place at the meeting between Ludlow and the 
senior officers at Wallingford House and the outcome of it are already 
well Imown. 
(2 ) 
The officers also decided in their meetings at Walling- 
ford House, and possibly the most senior of them in their other meet- 
ings as members of Oven's congregationt to reconvene the General 
Council of Officers. Mere was nothing really new in this. It was 
merely regularising a state of affairs that had existed over the past 
few months, It could also help promote army unityt but as Professor 
Woolrych has reTna ked 
"Fleetwood was no Cromwell. He and his fellow 
commanders grossly overestimated their influence 
over their subordinatesp and the republican 
politicians were not to be used for any purpose 
but their own. " (3) 
The senior army command was itself divided, Fauconberg who attended 
the first meeting of the General Council on 2 April commented that 
the under officers, or "rabble" as he put it, who were entitled to 
be present by right which Fauconbergv not an officer of the late 1640's 
vintage seemed unable to appreciatep had enthusiastically backed 
Robert Lilburne and Ashfield whom they might have viewed as a sort of 
(1) For an analysis of this literature q. v. Ifoolrychl, 'The 
Good Old Cause Camb. Hist. Journal, XIII, 19579 
PP- 137-145- 
(2) Ludlowp ILemoirag IIt pp. 63-65; Daviesq Restoration,, 
pp. 75-76; Wooliych, Miltong pp. 61-62., 
(3) ibid. t p. 
62. Q. v. also his analysis of the motives for 
the overtures to'the Republicans in 'The Good Old Cause', 
pp. 146-147. For Owen's growing importance with the 
Wallingford House officersp especially towards the end 
of Aprilp q. v, t Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston. 
III Vols. p Scottish Historical Societyq Edinburgh,, 1911-1940t 
1119 pp. 106v 107. 
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ma tyr figure. 
(') 
A committee was appointed to draw up a petition 
to Parliament and to tone down some of the demands made by Lilburne, 
Ashfield and their supporters; its members were Colonels Lilburne, 
Ashfield, Mill, Lt. Colonels Masont Pearsonp Hainest Arnop and Mayer 
and Captain Deane. 
(2) 
Professor Woolrych has said that not a single 
Wallingford House man was appointed to the committeet incidently 
revising an earlier view that the committee was elected. 
(3) 
But as 
has been argued above the view that the categories originally set out 
by Ludlow were both rigid and accurate is open to doubt. The category 
of "Commonwealthsman" is particularly unsuitable as well as being 
inadequately defined both by Ludlow and subsequent historianst 
especially if it is meant to imply a long term commitment to the 
Rmnp. The committee for drawing up the petition is quite diverse 
in terms of peoples' behaviour over the next few months. Lilburnet 
Ashfield and Pearson turned against the Ramp in Octobert Mill adhered 
to Richardq and Haines,, if he is the same person as the Lt. Colonel 
of Lillington's regiment in Flandersq was accused of being "a great 
Protectorian" to the committee responsible for nominating officers 
over the summer. This could easily have been a malicious and unfounded 
accusation for he was kept on. 
(4) 
At the time of the petition the 
W B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823t ff. 291-292. 
(2) Clarke Papers, III, P. 187. 
(3) Woolrych, Milton p. 62; Woolrychp 'The Good Old Cause', 
p. 148. 
Firth andýDavies, pp. 679t 691. 
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officers were in a state of flux. They were building up to a conflict 
with Parliament and ultimately with the Protectorg and differences of 
opinion about how far to proceed in their opposition certainly existed 
amongst them,, but to attempt to categorise them is hazardous and self 
defeating. Neverthelessq the pressures from the junior officers for 
a more radical course should not be underestimated at this time. 
Fauconberg also reported to Henry Cromwell that the officers 
were determined to have approval of the King's death as "a touchstone 
or text" for members of the army and Council. Whether he meant the 
Council of Officers or the Council of State is not clear. Howeverg 
judging from Barwick's account it seems likely that some form of 
engagementg or "attestation" as he called itq supporting the execution 
of Charles I was envisaged ) one 
that would be required of government 
officials, MoP*s as well as army personnel. Fauconberg also said that 
a friend of his had purportedly seen a bill to this purpose in Disborowe's 
possession. 
(') 
It was intended that the officers should meet on the 
20th to sign the engagement or "attestation" supporting the King's 
execution and to press Parliament to pass a vindication of the trial 
and execution. Howeverv all this was overtaken by the crisis leading 
up to the dissolution of the Parliamento 
(2) 
The petition itselfq presented to Richard on 6 April and 
by him to the Parliament two days laterp ma-ks the return of the army 
I 
(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 823v ff. 291-292; Thurloeq VIIv P. 662. 
(2) ibid.. loc. cit.: Clarke Papersq III, pp. 189-90; Guizot, ! G-Mid7C-romwell; Tt' P. 363; Woolrychp 'The Good Old Causelt 
P. 149. 
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openly into the political arena. It was stating in no uncertain 
terms its claim to have a say in politics. Reference was made to 
the Solemn Declaration of June 1647 and to the alleged backslidings 
from the cause and to the dangers to the cause from the common enemy. 
Mention was also made of the genuine grievances of pay and indemnity. 
It was indeed "a challenge to the civil authorities" and as Whitelocke 
remarked "the beginning of Richard's fall". 
(') 
Pride's late regiment, 
now under Richard Mossp sent in an address to Fleetwood and the General 
Council supporting the petition. It was signed by -the junior officers 
and soldiery. 
(2) 
There is little that can be added to the existing very 
full accounts of the events leading to the dissolution of Richard's 
Parliament. 
(3) 
Both army and Protector realised a conflict vas likelyt 
and Richard showed some signs of panic* On 20 April he knighted Hackerg 
-the commander of the guardsp presumably in an attempt to gain his 
support and consequently that of his men, 
(4) 
It did him no good. 
The petition is printed in O. P. H., t M9 Pp- 340-345; 
q. v. also Daviest Restoration, 9 PP. 76-78; Whitelockep 
Memorials, IV9 P- 342. 
(2) E974(5)) To his Excellency the Lord Fleetwood and the 
General Council of the Armies of England. Scotland and 
Ireland Csic. 1 the-Humble Address of the Inferior Officer 
and Soldiers of the late Lord Pride's Regiment (8 Apri 
The address is printed in Burtont IVt PP- 388-389- 
(3) Davies, Restorationj pp. 78-85; Woolrych, Milton 
pp. 62: -66-, -. WooT17 
7ch, 'The Good Old Cause', pp. 149-150. 
(4) Clarke Paperst IIIp pe l9le 
11 
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Hacker became firmly committed to the Rump over the next fev months 
and remained loyal to it in October. He was also the first officer 
to set an example and receive his commission from the Speaker. In- 
deedp apart from a few senior officers including Fauconberg, q Ingoldsbyt 
Hovard (all of whom recommended that Richard carry out a jou p against 
Wallingford House by dismissing Fleetwood,, Disborove and other senior 
officers)t Goffe and Whalley, the Protector's support in the army was 
negligible. He could summon only two troops of horse and three - 
companies of foot to his side during the night of the dissolution. 
Even those officers who supported him could not get their regiments 
to act against Fleetwood and Disborowe. 
(l) 
It must be emphasised that there was no consensus in the 
army as to where to proceed once the Parliament had been dissolved. 
There were strong inducements to recall the Rwmpe The contacts that 
had already been made with the Republicans# the feeling among the 
junior officers and their sympathisers in the senior ranksq and the 
intense pro-Rump propaganda campaignp much of it directed at the army 
made a recall all the more likely. The sort of pressure coming from 
below can be seen from the petition of Goffe's regimentp presented 
Baker, Chroniclep p. 641; Clarke Papersp IIIP PP- 1939 
212-213; Guizott'Richard Cromwellp It PP- 370-371; Davies, 
Restoration 
' q. 
pp. 80-84; Woolrych# Miltong pp. 64-66. 
Both Davies and Woolrych include Goffe among those officers 
2 against Walling- recommending Richard, to-carry out a 22u 
ford House, "'They'give-no evidence for this. Phillips, 
who mentions the storyt, does not include Goffe 
(Davies, 
Restoration., p. 80; Woolrychv Milton. p. 64; Baker, 
Chronicle, p. 641). According to the Venetian ambassador 
Thurloe informed Fleetwood and Disborowe that there might 
be a coup against them (C. S. P. V. 1659-61, p. 18). 
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to the General Council of Officerst which called for a purge of 
the army and the return of the Rump, 
(') 
The re-admission of Okey and 
Saunders whose Rumper Republicanism was of long-standing was a further 
lurch in this direction. They were admitted late in April along with 
Lambertq Packer and Gladman. 
(2) 
Overton's and Rich's re-admission to 
the army was still under consideration at the end of the month. 
(3) 
Overton's case is interesting. As we have seent he had 
been imprisoned in 1655, eventually ending up in Jersey, for his part 
in the 'plot' that bears his name. On 5 October 1658 his sister 
petitioned the Council of State for his release and the petition was 
referred to a committee of the Council whose members included Fleet- 
woodg Disborowe and Sydenham. Nothing was done in relation to the 
petition so that she eventually presented a second petition on 20 
January 1659. The Council of State voted against removing him. His 
sister took the matter before Parliament on 3 February and the House 
ordered his release the following month after a debate. During this 
debate the legality of some of the proceedings of Oliver Cromwell's 
Protectorate were questioned and the very nature of the army's role 
in government and in politics in general came close to being put under 
close scrutiny and criticism which could have provoked a constitutional 
(1) 
(2) 
E979 (6) 9 
(3) ibid. t p. 196. 
Clarke Paperst IIIt p. 195 
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crisis in the manner of Naylor's case. Overton returned to London 
amidst scenes of rejoicing and triumphq presumably because he was 
personally looked upon by opponents of the Protectorate as a martyr 
figure who had suffered for his opposition to government by a single 
person, and his case as useful and much-needed propaganda. As we 
shall seeg he was restored to the army on 23 May along with Rich and 
Alured. Why his erstwhile colleagues appear deliberately to have 
hesitated to bring him back into the army is open to speculation. A 
possible explanation is that his strong individualism and unpredictability 
were not the sort of qualities that they were keen to have in the army 
at this particular juncture. Another explan tion is that they suspected 
him of being too much a supporter of the Rump which coupled with his 
proven capacity for polemical self-expression could be a potential 
source of tension. On 10 June the Rump voted that Overton be given a 
comand in the army "as becomes his merit" (interestinglyg this was 
the same day that the Rump voted the verdict of Alured's court ron tial 
unjust and ordered it to be removed from the army rolls and that he 
be given a regiment of horse). It was rumoured that Overton would be 
made Major General of foot in Ireland. In fact he returned to his 
previous appointment as governor of Hull and received back his foot 
regiment. Perhaps some of the Rampers hoped that he would be a useful 
ally tý them in the army's senior command. As it turned out this was 
not to be the case, norwere the possible suspicions of his senior 
colleagues that he might be too uncritically enthusiastic for the 
Rump at all well-founded. As we shall see it was Overtonýs individualism 
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that determined his political stance over the next months. 
(') 
The question of Lambert's return to the army remains 
intriguing. As we have seeng he was quite active in the Parliament 
and there is good reason for supposing that he remained closely in 
touch with what was happening in the army. One suspects that he 
realised that it was in the army that his real power base lay and not 
in the Parliament, hewas not after all by experience or temperament 
a parliamentarian. In the interval between the dissolution of 
Richard's Parliament and the recall of the R=p there was much discussion 
about the future form the goverment of the nation was to have. 
(2) 
Mabbott's newsletter of 26 April to Henry Cromwell reported that the 
Council of Officers was discussing this question and whether the 
goverment should be according to the Humble Petitiong that is including 
a Protector,, by the Long Parliamentq or whether a new constitution 
should be devised. He reported that nothing had been agreed upon as 
yet. 
(3) 
A sizeable number of the senior officers appear to have 
favoured ending the Protectorate. According to Bakerg when anything 
was mentioned at the meetings at Wallingford House about keeping 
Richard in powert "it was obstructed or diverted by Propositions of 
Government". But some sort of compromise emerged whereby the Protector 
'Order Book of the Council of State of the Protector 
Richard Cromwell September 1658-January 16591P Longleat, 
f. 68; C. S. P. D. 1658-59v pp. 2599 375; C-J-v VII9 Pp. 5979 
678-679; Burtont IV9 PP. 151-lblt Clarke Papers, t IV, 
,tp. 
64 wrongly attributes p. 19. Davies (Restoration, t p. 64 
the remarks of Judge Advocate Henry Whalley during the 
debate on Overton in March to Edward Whalley. 
(2) B. M. Add. Ms. 22919, f. 96 (Thurloe to Downing, 29 April 
1659)- 
(3) B, M. Lansdowne Ma, 823# ff. 304-305- 
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was kept ont for the moment at least, with limitations to his power 
and vhereby Fleetwood became Co=Lander-in-Chief with power to issue 
and revoke commissions. 
(') 
That this could only be a stop-gap measure 
must have been obvious to Fleetwood and Disborowejývhom one suspects 
was a bit more astute and radical than Fleetwood. 
Ifariston probably hit on the reason for the reluctance to contemplate 
the ending of the Protectorate when he warned Fleetwood that the army 
could only make itself unpopular by first of all getting Richard Crom- 
well to dissolve the Parliament and then by ousting Richard, Wariston's 
account also confirms that during the last days of April there was 
talk in the innermost circle of the officers and their advisorst who 
included Owen, of recalling the Rump. He personally opposed this and 
made this clear to Fleetwood and Sydenham. He suggests that they 
and their advisors were determined that existing civil and religious 
liberties should be preserved but that beyond submitting themselves 
"to what government God shal inelyne them to" they had no idea about 
how to resolve the constitutional crisis* 
(2) 
Bat even if they did 
not want it, the ending of the Protectorate would be forced upon 
them, 
(3) 
were 
Central to any developments/the junior officers whose 
meetings at St. James's were by this time much more clearly distin- 
guishable from those at Wallingford House. Former Lt. Colonel Joyce 
was said to be involved in these meetings and Vane and Haselrig were 
(1) Bakerg Chronicle, p. 642. 
(2) Waristong Diary 1119 p. 106* 
For a different interpretation q. v. Daviesp Restoratioiip 
P. 87. 
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said to have some influence over them. 
(') 
The inferior officers still 
had their contacts among the senior officersq particularly Lilburne 
and Ashfieldp and it is possible that Lambert engineered his return 
to the army by associating himself with the junior officers and their 
enthusiasm for a return of the Rampt which was being stirred up by 
Owenp whose connections with the senior officerst including Lambertt 
we have already seen. According to one account Lambertp in association 
with otherst worked from behind the scenes and left it to his fellow 
north countryman Lilburne, at whose quarters there were meetingst to 
lobby for a restoration of the Rump. When the junior officers declared 
for the Rumpt Fleetwood and Disborowe brought back the officers purged 
by Oliver and ousted thosewho had sided openly with Richard in the 
recent crisis. These included Ingoldsbyg Fauconbergt Howardt and the 
unfortunate Major Babington. The fact that Haselrig was brought back 
into the army and given Havard's regiment shows the way things were 
going. Suspicions about Lambert's ambitions and doubts about restoring 
him to the armyt doubts which were encouraged by Waristont might have 
lingered on in the minds of Fleetwood and Disborowel, but official 
reports fostered the impression that the return of the purged officers 
was done amidst joy and acclamation. 
(2) 
Whateverg if anyp suspicions there may have been were 
soon laid aside. Daring the last few days of April lambertg Disboroweq 
Svdenhamg Cooper,, John Jones (technically -a member of the army- but 
(1) C. Clar. S. P. 9 IVg p. 191; B. M. Add. Ms. 22919p f. 96 (Thurloo to Dovningg 29 April 1659), Thurloe, VII, p. 666. 
(2) Clarke Paperýji IIIP P- 195; Wariston, Diaryt III, p. 106. 
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an able man and known to Fleetwood from his days in Ireland)t Berry, 
Rackerv Lilburneq Ashfieldt Salmon, Sankeyq Okeyt Saunderaq Clark, 
Kelsey and Barkstedt all senior officersq met at Wallingford House. 
(1) 
On 28 April they passed a number of resolutions relating to the army. 
(2) 
It was decided to purge it of those officers who were alleged to have 
tried to divide it and replace them with men 
"of godly honest principles# and alwayes faithfull 
to the good interest in which wee have bin soe 
longe engaged. " 
The officers who had been laid aside "without just cause" were to be 
restored, a decision which would no doubt gladden Cornet Sumpner. 
The Council of Officers was to continue but be somewhat reduced in 
number. 
(3) 
It was to consist of a field officer from each regiment 
in and around London, with some other officers appointed as the 
Conuminder-in-Chief saw fit. It was to advise on 
"such matters as shall be judged necessary upon 
this great emergencie. " 
This could well have been a conscious desire toýcounteract the growing 
influence of the junior officers. But a desire to ensure that 
sufficient numbers of officers returned to their charges for military 
reasons in anticipation of any possible trouble in the country must 
have influenced the decision as well. By, the beginning of May Fleet- 
wood had sent instructions to the strategically important garrison of 
(1) Clarke Papers, - IV, p. 196. 
(2) Clarke Papers, IV# pp. 1-3. 
(3) c. f. Baker, Chroniclep p. 642. 
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Hull for it to be kept "in a posture of defence and safety for ye 
good old cause". 
(') 
No doubt similar instructions were sent to 
other regiments and garrisons. They might well have included a 
call for a declaration of support for the actions of the army in 
London. At Hull the officers 
"ge erall desired to be at the penning the 
aZwer 
jo 
Fleetwood's instructions: ) but by 
his (the Governor'st Henry Smith! D rebukes 
they desisted, soe yt he gave what answer 
pleased him in their names. " (2) 
The officers at Wallingford House also resolved to set 
up a committee to draw up letters to the forces elsewhere in Englandq 
and in Scotland and Irelandt justifying recent developments and urging 
them to join with the forces in London 
"in maintenance of the Good Old Cause and interest 
in which wee have joyntlie engaged. " (3) 
For the first time the physical divisions of the army were seen as 
0 
crucial. Fleetvood had already realised this with his letter to 
Monck on 23 April, shortly after the dissolution of the Parliamentt 
in which he sought to justify the action for fear of misinterpreta- 
tionsp and urged unity between the armies. 
(4) 
On 29 April the officers 
W B. M. Add. Ms. 21t 4259 f. 44. 
(2) ibid. Smith was kept on but was eventually replaced by 
Overton. As compensation he was given a foot regiment 
(Fitch's) which was serving in Scotland. However# he did 
not go northwards and Monck appointed Miles Mann as 
Colonel instead (Firth and Daviesp PP. 515-516P 556-557). 
(3) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 2. 
(4) ibid. p 1119 p. 184. For the letter eventually sent to 
Monck on 3 May by the committee of officerst justifying 
their defiance of Parliament's order to dissolve the 
General Council and the dissolution of the Parliamentt 
but making no mention of the fall of the Protectorate, 
q. v. ibidep IV, pp. 4-6 and also pp. 7-8. 
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discussed what was to be done about a future government. According 
to a newsletter they "incline to the recalling of the L*nge Parliament" 
but there was some disagreement over a new Councilp or possibly Senate, 
especially as to whether it was to have any control over the restored 
Parliament or not. One can reasonably suppose that Lambert was in 
favour of some sort of control over the Parliament, a fact of some 
significance for the future. Eventually it was decided to leave this 
to the Parliament to decide. 
(l) 
Daring the next few days a-certain number of officers, 
of whom Lambert appears to have been the leaderp was deputed to meet 
with the Republican leaders to work out more definite plans for the 
return of the Ramp. The officers (in addition to Lambert)g whose 
names we have were Kelseyj Berryq Sydenham. and John Jones. Haselrig 
was also back in the army but his behaviour was more that of a civilian 
than an army officer. Ludlow too was soon to be back in the army. The 
Republicans were of the Rumper variety. The army put forward four 
demands t an act of indemnity was to be passedt provision was to be 
made for Richard Cromwellq reform of the law and of the clergy was to 
be undertakent and the government of the nation was to be by a representa- 
tive of the people and a select senate. The first three were assented 
to without much difficulty, but the final one proved to be problematic. 
(2) 
It was to cause division in the restored Parliament itself, and not 
all of the officers can have been enthusiastic about it either. When 
Clarke Papersp III, p. 196; Bakers Chronicleo pp. 642-643. 
(2) IAidlow,, Memoirs, IIP PP. 74-76; Waristong Diary, 
pp. 107-108. 
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the outcome of the meeting was reported back to the other officers 
Fleetwoodp Disborowe and Lambert showed a dislike of the Republicans 
cautiousness. 
(') 
It must have seemed to them as it the Republicans 
were playing hard to get. Dut within a few days the declaration of 
the officers for the return of the Rump had been delivered to the 
Speaker by Lambert and some 14 other officerst and the Parliament 
met on 7 May- 
(2) 
It is well-known that the army later claimed that 
the Rump had not been recalled unconditionally but had agreed to the 
army's propositions. Ludlow argues that the Republicans stressed 
that they were acting only in their private capacity and could not 
bind the House. Howeverg a remark made by Wariston in Julyp when 
tensions between army and Parliament were developingg tends to support 
the view that the Republican leaders and the officers agreed to 
certain "privat conditions" during these discussions which it was 
expected both sides would adhere to. 
(3) 
Pressure from below must have helped the senior officers 
make up their mindst(4) but there were other more practical and 
pressing considerations influencing them. The need for money and 
for a legal government to raise it was paramount as the problem of 
pay arrears, mentioned in the armyls petition in early April, had 
(1) Baker, Chronicle, p. 643- 
(2) ibid.. loc. cit. The list of officers presenting the N-clariation is printed by Berry and Leet A Cromwellian, 
Major GeneralP p. 223n. It includes Haselrig. 
(3) Ludlowv Memoirsq II# PP- 76-77n; Wariston, Diaryt 110 
p. 123; Woolrych (Miltong P- 70n 22) accepts Ludlov's 
account. 
Baker# Chroniclep p. 643; Clarke Papers, IVP P. 3- 
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not been dealt with. To remedy thisp the recall of the Rump seemed 
to offer the best and most readily available solution. 
(') 
Its return 
was never meant by the officers to provide a permanent solution to 
the underlying problem of settlement. In their eyes that still remained 
to be worked out as the negotiations with the Republicans in late April 
and early May demonstrated. Some members of the R=p chose to see 
things differently. The Rump's restoration and the circumstances in 
which it was done created new problems. Resentment against the army 
and its dissolution of the Rump in April 1653 could not be forgotten 
as easily cLS the newsbooks tried to make out. Tensions were bound 
to remain. The disagreements among -the officers on the question of 
a Council or Senate having a negative voice over the Parliamentp 
although they were not serious in April# were fundamental to the 
whole question of whether Parliaments should be completely sovereign 
and free or not, and thus also sovereign over the military as well, 
These were issues that were to divide the army amongst itself and 
to cause the fatal second dissolution of the Rump in October. The 
fact that in April some officers clearly felt that the Parliament 
should not be bound anticipates the eventual split within the army 
in October. The newly restored Colonels Okey and Saunders had long 
since declared for free Parliaments in their petition in 1654- 
Finallyp the appeals for unity to the commanders of the regiments 
(1) C. f. Ludlow, Memoirs, 119 P- 73- 
543. 
out of London, and especially that to Monckp although nothing new in 
themselves (declarations of justification had been sent out after all 
the major changes in the 1650ts), took on a more ominous character, 
and in the months ahead in terms of army politics, and by implication 
of national politics, the physical divisions within the army became 
one of the most decisive factors. 
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IV. TR LAND 1655-166o 
The arrival of Henry Cromwell in Ireland and Fleetwood's 
departure for England in September 1655 which made Henry de facto 
governor of Ireland (he was not appointed Lord Deputy until November 
1657 and even then he was not given an entirely free rein. Ilia 
instructions as Lord Deputy prohibited him from cancelling appointments 
made by Fleetwood)(') marks a shift to the right in Irish affairs. 
In the discussion of Ireland until Fleetwood's departure 
it was emphasised that discontent in the army was by no means endemic 
but was confined to a small number of mainly Baptist officers and thatp 
however much Fleetwood may have sympathised with the Baptists there is 
nothing to suggest that they posed a political threat to the Protectorate 
government. Fleetwood had sympathised with the Baptists; Henry Cromwell 
distrusted them. That had been clear from his first visit to Ireland in 
March 16549 and from the start of his secondp and more permanent,, stay 
he made this even more obvious. He openly mixed with Independent 
divines which led to the ridiculous charge that he was "priest ridden"t 
(2) 
and eventually so alienated the Baptist officers in the army that several 
of them resigned their commissions. In more obviously political matters 
Henry Cromwell sympathised with Broghill and favoured a hard line against 
the anti-kingship officers. 
(3) 
In Ireland Henry's policy paid far closer 
attention to the interests of the older established colonists. 
(4) 
(1) Barnardp Cromwellian Ireland, p, 21n 21, 
(2) Seymourg Puritans in Ireland,, p. 126. 
(3) This has been discussed more fully in the section of the 
main narrative dealing with the kingship crisis. 
(4) Firth, Last Yearst 119 PP- 173-174- 
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Henry's anomalous position as de facto governor was quite 
unsatisfactory'and soon caused some instability. On 14 November Reynolds 
wrote to Thurloe suggesting that Henry should be made Lord Deputy to end 
uncertainty and to place the government of Ireland on a much firmer foot- 
. ng. He said that Fleetwood's 11swetnes keept bonds upon some who have 
since manifested discontents". Reynolds was aware that he ran the risk 
of casting aspersions on Fleetwood's character andq although he said he 
would rather "cutt off my hand, than signe a paper reflecting upon his 
lordship's person and government". yet he had decided to risk thisq and 
had joined in a petition to the protector for Henry to be made Deputy on 
the grounds that Fleetwood's absence from Ireland might be a long one. 
He hoped that somehow Henry would be appointed Deputy before the petition 
reached landon. The petition originated from within the armyp and 
Reynolds, somewhat coylyp was sensitive to the charge that could be 
levied at the army, that it was involving itself in matters that did 
not concern it : 
"Things of this nature may in time to come beget 
a custome in our armyes to interpose in government 
vhich hath ruined many states. " (1) 
The petition was also signed by Theophilus Jonesq an older established 
colonist uhop although a member of the armyp had seen no service in 
Britain,, and Hardress Waller# who had been prominent in army politics 
between 1647 and 1649 but who had served in Ireland in the 165018. 
(2) 
00 Thurloe, IVP P- 197- 
(2) Lbidop Po 327; Bodl, Rawli'nson Ms, A5t f, 249, 
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It seems likely that another petition was drawn up by some 
civilians in Dublin, possibly with the connivance of some of the long 
standing colonistsq and that this was distributed in other parts of 
the country. This second petition was possibly more outspoken against 
Fleetwood. 
(') 
Howevert the petitions backfired seriously; they could 
be# and were in some circles especially Baptist onesp seen as an attack 
on Fleetwood and thus on toleration. Hewsonp Henry Pretty and Richard 
Lawrencep three officers who had come to Ireland with Olivert denounced 
the petition as the work of men who had deluded "many honest persons" 
and exploited Henry Cromwell's good nature in their desire to "Weaken 
the Godly interest" and promote their "private interest". They called 
for Fleetwood to be kept on as Deputy, 
(2) 
Henry disapproved of such 
an attackt and he appears to have taken steps to have it stopped. 
(3) 
The reaction to the petitioning in England is very interest- 
ing. Fleetwood chose to interpret the motives of the petitioners as 
aiming to cause division in the army. 
(4) 
As for Cromwellt Sankeyt who 
was in England at this timet said that he was very upset by the petitions 
because he felt they would give grounds for people to say that he was 
trying to advance his own family. 
(5) 
The Protectorate had not after 
Thurloev III, p 29; ibid. # IVp pp. 2279 348v 422; Clarke 
Paperag III, pp: 60-61; B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8219 ff---4=7- 
(2) Thurloet IV9 p. 276. 
(3) ibld-P PP- 348t 422; D. M. Lansdowne Ms, 821, ff- 52-53- 
(4) B. 11. Lansdowne Ila. 8219 ff. 44-45t 70-71t 80-81. 
(5) Lbid. 9 ff. 40-41. 
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all taken the strong roots in the country it was hoped it would and, 
as the discontent surrounding -the various 'plots' of late 1654 and 
early 1655 had shown, Cromwell could not be one hundred per cent 
certain of the army either. Thus, anything which could lead to the 
accusation that he was aiming at a personal despotism was most unwel- 
come to Cromwell, Sankey's other suggestiont that Cromwell recalled 
Fleetwood to England because he had heard from Stainesg Major Hezekiah 
Haynes and Captain Giffith Lloyd (the last two being members of Fleet- 
wood's regiment in England) that his estate was suffering in his 
absence is to be treated with scepticism. Sankey was quite an influen- 
tial officer but he was not one of the most influential and thus privy 
to what was happening in the innermost circles of government, although 
no doubt he thought that he was. 
(') 
To emphasise his displeasure with the petitions the Protector 
took the somewhat unusual step of writing to Hewsont with the intention 
that the letter should become public* The letter has not 'survived but 
judging from Hewson's reply it urged him to keep in touch and to try to 
serve Henry and to promote unity amongst the godly. Hewson, for his 
partt said that the differences in Ireland were quite small and assured 
Cromwell that the Baptistsp among whom he did not include himselfp were 
friends of the Protector. He said that he would obey Henry but drew 
attention to his inexperience and, somewhat disrespectfully and unfairly, 
ibid.. loc. cit. Q. v. also his letter to Henry Cromwell 
Wf'-4 be`ce-mb-e-r-ýibiA., ff. 52-53) in which he suggests that 
Henry should have dissociated himself more forcefully from 
the petitioning. 
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added that he hoped the Lord would keep Henry "from being puffed upp" 
with power. 
(') 
Cromwell wrote a further letter to Hewson in January 
which was delivered by Sankey# who returned to Ireland in the new year. 
Hewson's reply went over much the same ground as his previous letter. 
(2) 
As far as Cromwell was concerned his policy in Ireland was an extension 
of his policy towards the army in Diglandv that is of not alienating his 
officers from himself unnecessarily and thereby weakening his strong 
power base in the army. For him this was an overriding priority and 
contrasted with Henry's Irish policy which was to be aimed at trying 
to win over the older settled colonists. Oliver Cromwell looked at 
Ireland in terms of English politics. The army was the most important 
component of his power and authorityp the army had pacified Ireland 
and was there to keep it in a state of tranquillity. Cromwell was 
determined that the tranquillity of the armyp and hence of Irelandq 
should not be upset. It is another instance of the fact that the 
Protectorate government did not have a fully fledged colonial policy 
towards Ireland. 
The differences in the Irish army over the question of 
the headship of government were patched up. Sankey and Colonel Thomas 
Cooper, who arrived in Ireland with Sankey to take up command of the 
forces in Ulsterq and both of whom were Baptista played important parts 
in this with Cooper especially gaining Henry Cromwell's respect as a 
mediator. 
(3) 
A letter was sent to the Protector extolling Fleetwood's 
W Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A5t f. 249 ff. 
(2) Thurloep IV, p. 422. 
(3) Thurloep IV9 pp. 4089 422-423t 433. For Sankey and Cooper 
q. v. biographical appendix. 
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virtues and thanking Cromwell for sending over Henry to carry on the 
good work. A compromise was put forward suggesting that Fleetwood be 
made Lord Lieutenant and Henry Lord Deputy. The letter was signed by 
most of the senior officers in Dublin including Theophilus Jones, 
Reynolds and Hewson. 
(l) 
Accordingr to Reynolds who was sent across 
to England with the letter, and also to lobby the Council of State 
for action on Irish affairs, some thought the exaggerated praise for 
Fleetwood came near to blasphemy. 
(2) 
On 5 February 1656 Thurloe 
informed Henry that the letter was welcomed in London and had been 
passed on to Fleetwood and Lambert to consider. He promised that he 
would inform Henry of any decisions regarding it. 
(3) 
In the event 
nothing came of it. 
These divisions within the army in Ireland with their 
strong religious undertones did of course have political implications 
but these were really only important with regard to Irish affairs. 
They never grew into anything seriousq not even comparable to the Three 
Colonels' Petition or Overton's 'plot' which reflected deeply felt 
discontent with government by a single persont although, as we have 
seent such discontent was limited to relatively few officers. Rewson 
in one of his letters to Cromwell said that 
"if ever there should come a time of triall your 
Highnes would find them (the Baptists) thereon 
for the present government when others it may 
be would faint in the work. " (4) 
(1) ibid. t pp. 421-422. 
(2) B. 11. Lansdowne Ms. 821, f: f. 85-86. 
(3) Thurloeq, IVp P- 505- 
(4) Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A5t f. 251. 
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Perhaps he was going further than Allen or Vernon would have gone 
(they had, as we have seeng expressed some unease about the establish- 
ment of the Protectorate)v but he was correct in saying that the 
Baptists were not opponents of the Protectorate. They might be 
opponents of Henry Cromwell and his style of government in Irelandt 
but that was something quite different. If Henry had been a more 
experienced politician, then perhaps he would not have antagonised 
some of the Baptist officers to the extent that in November 1656 
Alleng Barrowt kxtell and Vernon all gave up their commissions. 
This move was condemned by some of their friends and according to 
Henry the officers -themselves did not boast much about itv implying 
that they felt they had made a miscalculation. But Henry was wrong 
to believe that they resigned because of their "general disaffection 
to the government"t unless he meant to his own in Ireland*(') Henry 
Cromwell's problems with the Baptists are to be seen more within the 
narrower context of personality differences than in the wider one of 
general opposition to the Protectorate. It is quite wrong to argue 
that Henry faced difficulties with these officers because Fleetwood 
had promoted officers who were "Republicans at heart" and "who had 
unwillingly accepted the Protectorate in 1653". 
(2) 
Henry Cromwell's attitude towards the Baptists did not 
stand him in good stead later ong during the political crisis surround- 
ing the downfall of the Protectorate. It poisoned his relations with 
Thurloe ! V, pp. 
67o-672,729. The four officers were 
re-commissioned in the sun-flner of 1659. 
(2) Daviesp Resto_rat-io-nt p. 239- 
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Fleetwood and the rumours that he was actively discountenancing the 
godly worried some of the officers in London. 
(') 
It is not surprising, 
therefore, that during the last days of the Protectorate all thist 
coupled with his Imown support of kingshipt made Henry deeply distrusted 
in army circles. 
During the kingship crisis in England there was very little 
trouble in Ireland. Henry wrote to what he styled "the well affected 
officers" to beware of trouble and planned to replace the guards of 
Dublin Castle who he-felt were too much under the influence of Hewson, 
Lawrence and John Jonesp who had by this time returned to Ireland. 
(2) 
Later in 16579 Henry had another confrontation with Hewson vhot along 
with Lawrence, had promoted a letter among the officers addressed to 
Fleetwood welcoming Oliver's refusal of the crown. There was nothing 
subversive about the letterg although strictly speaking they ought to 
have cleared it with Henry first of all. Henry took exception to the 
address for which he held Hewson responsible and sent various papers 
about it to England which Thurloe thought indicated "an unquiet and 
devideing spiritt" in Hewson. He backed up Henry's response to the 
letter on the grounds that he could not have sat Idly by "without too 
much prostituting your owne authoritie". Flýetwoodt on the other hand 
supported Hewson. 
(3) 
In September of the same year Henry cashiered Lt. Colonel 
Alexander Brayfield of Hewson's regiment for trying to revive Hewson's 
(1) B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 8219 ff- 78-79t 83-849 142-143P 
230-231; Lbidq 823t ff- 343-346. 
(2) Thurloe I VIt p. 94; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Ment 
p. 165- 
(3) Thurloet VI9 P- 352; Brown, Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men. 
P. 166. 
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letter against kingship. Brayfield had been an elected officer of the 
regiment in 1647 and was one of the officers ordered to secure the King 
and bring him to London in December 1648. Despite requests from Crom- 
wellq Thurloe and Broghill to think again about his movep Henry refused 
to reinstate Brayfieldq who wasp howevert recommissioned in 1659. 
(1) 
Once again the Protector's desire to maintain stability in the Irish 
army was uppermost. But such incidents should not be exaggerated. 
The opposition to kingship among the Irish officers did not reach 
the same intensity as in England and there appears to have been no 
reaction to Lambert's fall. In 1658 Sankey and Philip Carterett the 
Advocate General of the army in Ireland# were even prepared to support 
kingship if such a measure were required to bring about settlementt 
although this view would not have been supported by most of their 
colleagues in England, An address was sent to England in support of 
the Humble Petition and Advice. 
(2) 
Richard Cromwell's accession to the Protectorate in 
September 1658 was generally supported by the army in Ireland. Both 
Sankey and Lawrence signed his proclamation in Dublin. After the 
proclamation many of the field officers met with Henry in Dublin 
Castle and requested him to make known their loyalty and support for 
Richard. A more form 1 address was to be drawn up later to be signed 
by themselves and by those under their command. According to one 
Thurloev V19 P- 505; Clarke Paperst I. p, 437; ibid. t ý Up pp. 142t 1449 146; Brown, Baptista and Fifth Monarchy 
Men, p. 167. For Brayfield q. v. also biographical 
appendix, 
(2) Brownt Baptista and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 168. Davies 
(Restoration, p. 239) is mistaken to Suggest the Baptista, 
whom he equates with Itepublicanst disliked the Humble 
Petition and Advice more than the Instrument of Government. 
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newsbook an Easign in Waterford garrison was dismissed by the governorg 
William Leighl for being unwilling to attend the proclamationg although 
his non-attendance was not necessarily for political reasons. 
(') 
Henry Cromwell did not try to resist the fall of the 
Protectorate in May 1659 and he soon resigned his offices. He had 
expressed a desire to return to England on several occasions before 
and was now most probably glad to be relieved of his duties in Ireland 
which he cannot in any way have found a pleasant or rewarding experience. 
Colonel Robert Phayret one of the officers to whom the warrant for the 
execution of Charles I had been addressed and during the 1650's governor 
of Cork and a sympathiser with the Quakersp carried an address of loyalty 
to the PA=p from the Irish forces. The petition was said to include a 
request that all land grants in Ireland be confirmed. 
(2) 
Me RUMP 
re-established commissioners to govern Ireland. -Two of the five 
appointed were associated with the armyg John Jones and Hathew Thomlin- 
sono(3) Ludlow was, re-appointed Commander-in-Chief early in July and 
he set off for Ireland after receiving his commissions from the Speaker 
on 18 July. He arrived in Ireland in late july. 
(4 ) 
The sumer purges 
were also applied to the Irish regiments and the most notable changes 
were the return of the Baptist officers who had resigned in 1656. 
Allen replaced Daniel Redman who was to be influential in winning over 
the Irish brigade to Monck in 1659. 
Thurloe VII9 PP- 383-3849 400; Publick Intelligencer, 
13-20 September 1658,29 November-6 December 1658, 
(2) Faithful Scoutt 17-24 June 1659; Weekly Intelligencer, 
21-28 June lr55§. 
(3) ca. , vii,, p. 674. 
(4) B, M. Stowe Ms. 142t ff. 649 65 (warrants from Parliament 
appointing Ludlow Coynmander-in-Chief in Ireland (9 July), 
and Lt. General of horse and Commander-in- 
Chief (12 July)); C. J. 9 VII9 P. 722. 
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When Ludlow arrived in Ireland to take up his appointment 
he set in motion a full inquiry into the reliability of all the armed 
forcesq the results of which he intended to submit to the nominating 
committee. The inquiry was not just confined to the question of 
political reliability to the Ramp but included an examination into 
the extent of soldiers marrying Papists. After the return of the 
Rump in December one of the charges against Ludlow was that he had 
exploited this opportunity to purge the regiments of "friends and 
faithful servants" of the Parliament. 
(') 
This is a most unfair 
charge. Ludlow's attitude to public affairs after the October =U 
was certainly ambiguous and can be interpreted as either pragmaticq 
in so far as he was acting to secure the good old cause in what he 
considered to be the best way under the circilm tancest or as sheer 
opportunism, depending on one's point of view. Howevert it is absurd 
to suggest, given his well-known support for the Rumpt that he actually 
ousted officers loyal to the Parliaments during his stay in Ireland. 
His action in calling a Council of Officers to counteract the Derby 
petition which Sankey had sent to Ireland also tends to disprove this 
accusation. 
(2) 
However, Ludlow's assertion that on the dissolution 
of -the Rmp in October 1659 the officers joined in a petition to be 
sent to Haselrig supporting the R=p is wrong and stems largely from 
Ludlow's retrospective desire to whitewash his behaviour between 
October and December. 
(3) 
(1) Ludlowt Ilemoirsv Il. pp. 117 and n. 9 121# 468. 
(2) ibid. t pp. 118-119. 
(3) ibid. 9 p. 120. 
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The news of the c2y2 against Parliament threw the Irish 
officers into some confusion. Ludlow had already left for England when 
news of the coup came to Dublin. He had appointed John Jones as acting 
Commander-in-Chief. Jones was by no means confident nor relaxed in his 
new job. He had been appointed as a compromise in place of Sankey and 
Hardress Waller. 
(') 
Jones's first concern was for security and after 
calling his officers together he ordered them to repair to their 
commands to prevent any trouble. 
(2) 
Unlike Monck# howevert the army 
in Ireland decided to support the officers in England. But their 
support was qualified. On 26 October an address to the Lambert/Dis- 
borowe/Fleetwood faction was drawn up. It expressed "Astonishm 
t 
and 
Sorrow" at the dissolution of the Rumpvhich it said was treading 
"upon the Drinke of Ruine and Disolotion to them- 
selves and these Nationso in ye unfixing of yt 
Nationall authority -wch themselves ... had but 
few moneths restored to ye manadgmt and dis- 
chardge of their Trust. " 
However, they conceeded that "necessity and service of duty" must have 
caused their comrades in England to take this step andp arguing that 
national security (i. e. of Ireland) must have priority, they resolved 
to support the endeavours of the officers in London to settle affairs 
of state. They said that it was of the utmost concern to preserve 
unity between the three armies "that soe we may be in the hand of ye 
Lord as a threefold cord not easily broken". 
(3) 
Their misgivings were 
not so easily removed. The Declaration of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleet- 
(1) ibid. 9 pp. 121-123; Mayerv 'Inedited Letters', pp. 262-263- 
(2) ibid., Vp. 263- 
(3) lbid. g pp. 264-266. 
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wood faction as to why they had dissolved the Rump and outlining their 
intentions was felt by some of the Irish officers to be "but wrapped 
in Gen lls ". John Jones recommended that a further declaration of 
intent should be forthcoming to satisfy the unease felt by some of 
his officers. 
(') 
Ludlow suggests that Colonel Thomas Cooper and his 
Majort Edward Warreng in particularp were unhappy about the coup. 
(2) 
The reasons for the qualified support of the Irish officers 
for the coup are not far to seek. The main reason was one of wait and 
see. As a result of their geographical situation they were obviously 
not fully informed about developments in England. Moreover, the level 
of political consciousness in the Irish army was not, as we have seen, 
very high and it was most unlikely that they wouldt at first at any 
ratep seize the initiative themselves. In a choice between army and 
Parliament they instinctively sided with their colleagues. 
(3) 
Thus, 
there was genuine surprise at Monck's declaring against the Lambert/ 
Disborowe/Fleetwood factiong news of which reached Dublin in late 
October or early November in the form of letters and papers addressed 
to Ludlow. The officers in Dublin, including Hardress Waller, who 
was later to take part in the seizure of Dublin Castle on behalf of 
the Rumpq replied to Monck saying that his attitude was likely to 
bring about new bloodshed. Major John Barrett of Axtell's regiment, 
was sent with the letter to Monck and was subsequently in trouble in 
Scotland for allegedly trying to sow disaffection. 
(4) 
Monck could 
00 ibid. p p. 275. 
(2) Ludlowo Memoirsp 119 P. 147. For Cooper, howeverv q. v. 
biographical appendix. 
(3) For the problems of security in Ireland and the confusion 
in Irishaffairs brought about by the coup q. v. Jones's 
comments (Mayerg 'Inedited letters'. pp. 277t 279). 
(4) ibid. # pp. 271-274; Baker, Chronicle, pp. 668t 669. 
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well afford to remain unperturbed. Ile received word from his nephew, 
Henry Monck, who had been a Cornet in Henry Cromwell's horse regiment 
until he was purged in the simmer of 1659, that Sir Charles Coote, 
Theophilus Jones and some others in the army were prepared to support 
him in his desire to see the Rump restored and that they hoped to win 
over Hardress Waller. Henry Monck had kept up a pretty regular 
correspondence with Monck about Irish affairs from at least earlier 
in -the year. 
(') 
Monck remained in touch with the officers in Dublin 
but like many of his other letters at this time this was very much a 
propaganda exercise. 
(2) 
As we have seen Jones realised that not all of his officers 
were happy with the official position of support for the Lambert/ 
Disborowe/Fleetwood faction taken in the name of the Irish army. 
However, when news of the treaty between Monck and the army faction 
in London reached Ireland he decided to press on, with measures to 
enable the election of representatives of the regiments in Ireland to 
participate in the General Council of the Army. He was fully aware 
that given the short notice of the forthcoming General Council the 
regiments would be unlikely to be able to send over representatives 
in timep and so urged thatp wherever possiblep officers at present 
in England should be chosen to represent the Irish regiments. The 
regiments were still to meet and to proceed with the election of 
ibid., pp. 668-669; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 119 23t 95; 
Firth and Daviesp P. 592* 
(2) 
ment in Irela 
wrongly gives 
Clarke Ms 329 f. 130v-132 repr. in B. M. 669p f. 22(38)9 
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representativest and by 10 December representatives had been chosen. 
(') 
It is extremely likely that Ludlow was requested to represent the Irish 
officers in the absence of elected representatives. 
(2 ) 
But aswith the 
Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London such activities were 
destined to be of no consequence. It is interesting to note that Jones 
wrote a respectful letter to Broghill vho still commanded an unregimented 
troop informing him that no provision had been made in the instructions 
received from London for such troops to elect representatives. Broghill 
had apparently written to Jones asking him to re-appoint the suspended 
officers, presumably those suspended by Ludlow. 
(3) 
On 6 December Jones wrote to Ludlow saying that there had 
been an attempt to disaffect the armed forces in Ireland and to win 
them over to supporting Monck. The disaffection seems to have been 
mixed with a certain amount of general discontent among some of the 
soldiery unattributable to political motives. Jones added that Badly 
the trouble was welcomed by some who had been or were considered 
supporters of the authorities. 
(4) 
Finally# on 13 December Dublin 
Castlep and three of the Irish commissionersq Jonesq Corbet, and-Thom- 
linsong were seized on behalf of the Rump by a group of officers acting 
under Hardress Waller. Brogbill and Sir Charles Coote likewise secured 
other important areas of the country. Jones accused Waller of trying 
to stir up war between England and Ireland and curiously enough claimed 
(1) Mayerp 'Inedited Letters', pp. 280p 283-287; B. M. Stowe 
Ms. 1420 f. 68. 
(2) Ludlowt Memoirsp II, p. 163. 
(3) Mayer, 'Inedited Letters', p. 286. 
(4) ibid. # p. 290. 
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to override them by virtue of his office as a commissioner of Parlia- 
ment. 
(l) 
Jones also claimed that Waller and his associates had 
deliberately kept secret from him a letter from Monck calling for the 
return of the Rump. He said that if it had been presented to him he 
would have joined with 11onck in this demand. Perhaps he felt that the 
bigger the lie the more chance it had of being believedt for nothing 
in his previous correspondence or behaviour supports this contention 
and it must have been well-known to him without the missing letter 
that Monck had declared for the R=p. 
(2) 
When the Rmnp returned to power Monck wrote to the Speaker 
on 16 January supporting the coup against Jones and his fellow commis- 
sioners. He suggested Coote, Broghillq Hardress Wallerv Theophilus 
Jones and Arthur Hill as a possible council to govern Ireland. In fact 
Cootet Hardress Waller, Henry Markhamp who played an important part in 
securing the return of the Rump in London and who had served as one 
of the commissioners for the management of the Irish revenuet Robert 
Goodwin and John Weaver were appointed commissioners. Monck also 
enclosed the votes of a Council of Officers at Dublin attacking Ludlow's 
behaviour and requesting that he be prohibited from returning to Ireland. 
Bat the Rump had already ordered Ludlowv Jonesv Corbett and Thomlinson 
to attend the House and answer for their conduct of affairs. It also 
approved of the seizure of Dablin Castle. 
(3) 
(1) ibid. 0 pp. 292-294. 
(2) ibid. p pp. 296-297; c. f. Ludlowq Ifemoirsv IIt p. 191. 
(3) Clarke Ms. 52, ff- 56,64v; C. J., VII9 pp. 803o 815- 
56o. 
In the meantime Ludlow, who had set out for Ireland after 
news of the seizure of Dublin Castle had reached Londont endeavoured 
unsuccessfully to land at Dublin. Ludlow claimed to be acting as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Irish forces. Ludlow realising the futility 
of trying to stay in Ireland obeyed the sumnons of Parliament and 
returned to England to face the impeachment which was not in fact 
proceeded with. In his Ifemo-irs, he alleges that Coote was the prevail- 
ing figure in the Council of Officers and that he was working to promote 
a restoration of the Stuarts. By February Coote was indeed in touch 
with the Royalists, and in March the officers in Dublin, who had been 
purged of what Broghill (himself in touch with the King) called the 
"Phantastick Factions Officersv Troopers and Privat foot soldiers" had 
declared for the readmission of the secluded M. P. s and a free Parlia- 
ment. The officers referred to by Droghill probably included Colonel 
Robert Saunders, governor of Kinsalep who had been Lt. Colonel of Ewer's 
(late Robert Hammond's) regiment in 1648 and who had gone over with the 
regiment to Ireland in 1649, Robert Phayreq governor of Cork and 
Salomon Richardsq governor of Wexford and Lt. Colonel of Ludlow's 
foot regiment from 1659- The number of Cromwellian officers, that is 
those who came across with Cromwell's Irish expedition in 1649 or 
afterwards and who might have been expected to take a firmer stand 
on behalf of the good old causet was thus considerably weakened. It 
is likely that those Cromwellian officers who supported, or acquiesced 
ing the moves towards a Restoration did so in the hope of securing 
their lands in Ireland. Hardress Waller and a few other officers who 
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were commited to the good old cause realised too late what the real 
motives of Coote and his associates were and unsuccessfully attempted 
a S. 2u 2 against them in February. From then on it was obvious that the 
army in Ireland would be firmly behind the demands for a free Parliament 
whicht as we shall argue in the main discussion of events between 
January and May 16609 implied a restoration of the Stuarts. On 14 
May 1660 Charles II was proclaimed in Dablin. 
(L) 
00 The above is based on Ludlow, Memoirsp II, pp. 185-199; 
B. M. Add. Ms. 459 850t f. 20 (Broghill to Richard Onslow, 
30 March 166o); Daviesq Restoration, pp. 250-251; Firth 
and Daviesp pp. 659-660t 654-6560 6ý7-628. There is a 
discussion of Ireland after the Restoration including the 
problems of a land settlement in T. W. Moody et. al. (edse)t 
A New History of 'Lrelandt III, Oxford, 1976, pp. 420-453 
esp. pp. 20t 422-429. For a discussion of other aspects 
of Ireland in the 1650's q. v. Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland. 
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I. MAY-OCTODM 1659 
The period from May 1659 to May 1660 can be divided into 
three main sections. The firstq covering May to mid-October 1659 is 
dominated by the army's uneasy relationship with the restored Rump 
and culminates in the second dissolution of the Rump. It also involves 
the development of serious rifts within the army itself. These rifts 
were not just between the forces in and around London and those else- 
where, but among the officers in London as well. The period also 
includes the recommissioning of the regiments with the purging and 
restoration of various officers. The second period from mid-October 
to the end of Decemberg from -the second dissolution to the return of 
the RinT yet againp is the only-time in the 13 years we have examined 
when the politics of the army can be said to be synonymous with the 
politics of the nation. It is during this time that the role of the 
army in the nation's politics effectively comes to an end. This is 
not to say that during the third period from late December 1659 to 
May 1660, from the re-restoration of the lb=p to the return of the 
Stuarts, a period which includes Monck's march into Englandq the army 
was not as important a variable in politics as it had been in the past; 
after all it was the army which made the Restoration, just as it was 
the army which made the Revolution. What is different about the 
army's role in these final months of the English Revolution is that 
under Monck's leadership the army gradually renounced its claims to 
be the guardian of the revolutionary cause as it had come to interpret 
itt and was now for the first time in 13 years prepared to hand over 
4k 
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power unconditionally to civiliansl who were to be given a blank cheque 
to decide what sort of government they wantedv even if it was obvious 
that this meant the return of the "common enemyllp "the King of Scots"t 
"the pretended King'19 Charles Stuart. 
This did not come about easilyp nor was it predetermined, 
least of all by Monck when he marched south on I January 1660, but 
arguably it was what the majority of the country wanted. Under Monck 
the army acquiesced in this, despite the last ditch efforts made by 
Lambert assisted by officers such as Okeyr his opponent in the second 
period we shall be examiningp but a man for so long committed to the 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty and an opponent of government by 
a single person. The acquiescence of the army is not surprising. By 
December 1659 with the exception of Monck's forces and the forces in 
Ireland under the command of men who adhered to Monck after the coup 
against Dublin Castle, it was broken and disspirited; the credibility 
of its officers in the eyes of the nation and in the eyes of fellow 
adherents of the good old cause destroyedv and its pretensions to be 
the guardian of that cause,, let alone the vanguard to further itq 
shattered. 
The shortcomings of Fleetwood and Disborowe as politicians 
are obvious. Lambert's intellectual gifts were considerable. He had 
stamina and showed considerable a&, ývJe for the political in-fight- 
ing within the army. But his temperament ruined any chances of his 
ever becoming a second Cromwell with the ability to bestride both 
army and civilian politics with such mastery and apparent ease. 
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Lambert did well when he enjoyed Oliver Cromwell's support# but once 
that was gone he came undone* 
But there was no one capable of replacing Lambert, Dis- 
borowe or Fleetwood. Cromwell's army had not been an academy for 
future statesmen. In this respect it differed from Napoleon's. This 
had never been Oliver's intention. The political role of the army in 
the 1650's was never consciously intendedg it was the result of 
circtim tances and events and of personalities. Hencet the armys enormous 
power was never form lly institutionalised within a constitution. Its 
political strength had been dependent on a two-fold quality. Firstly 
its collective nature, that is on the pressure it could exert because 
of its numbers and nature as a military force. This aspect of its 
strength worked most effectively when a fair measure of unity of 
purpose existed as in late 1648 and early 1649 and during the R=p 
period. The second side of its political strength depended on the 
individual skills of its more able memberst that is the quality of 
leadership and its success in persuading significant sections of the 
army and civilians to follow a particular course. Cromwellq Ireton 
and to a lesser extent Lambert stand in'a class apart in this respect. 
That was both a sourca of strength and of weakness for the army. 
By the end of 1659 these two facets of the army's strength 
had evaporated. The Ashfieldsq Lilburnesp Kelseys and Barksteds on the 
one side who supported the Lambert 
/Disborowe /Fleetwood factiong and 
the Okeys, IIos, s,,, Sp Alureds and Hackers on the other who supported the 
Pamp were not suited to fill the vacuum. Despite their competence in 
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various aspects of administration'both military and non-militaryg, they 
'were essentially men of the second rank. Moreoverp an army is made up 
largely of soldiers and not just of officers and, as we shall see, the 
evidence suggests that by the end of 1659 the soldiery had become 
totally disillusionedp more interested in pay than in politics, 
alienated from their officers whose activities they came to view as 
internal squabbles rather than a struggle for power to determine the 
nation's future. Indeed one of the interesting aspects of the situa- 
tion in 1659 compared with that of the late 1640's is that the officers 
overlookq even ignore, the soldieryg assuming that they will follow the 
lead of their superiors., There are no appeals to the soldiery from the 
officers. By and large the crisis is confined to the officer corps, a 
reflection of how much things had changed since the late 1640's. No 
doubt this was caused by a lingering fear amongst the officers that 
involving the soldiery in politicst as in the previous decadev could 
all too easily get out of hand; but a revolutionary movement which 
does not have a reasonable amount of grass roots support cannot expect 
to get very far, unless it has the discipline and tight-knit organisa- 
tion of the Bolsheviks, a philosophy which was quite alien to seventeenth 
century England, and to the nature of the army between 1647 and 1660. 
Two days before the return of the Rump on 7 May it was 
reported that the army was very unan mous 
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"having as one man resolved uppon a Common- 
wealth constituciong and have appointed 8 
persons vizte Lord Fleetwoodt Lord Lambert, 
Generall Disborovet Colonel Sydenhamq Sir 
Henry Vanet Sir Arthur Hesilriggep Lt. Gen. 
Ludlow and Major Salway to agree uppon a 
modellwhich is to bee debated by the field 
officers of the army"; 
in other words the leading figures involved in securing the Rump's 
restoration. All were to become members of the Committee of Safety# 
a body which was not in fact charged with drawing up a new constitu- 
tion. 
(') 
It seems likely that the committee formed on 5 May was very 
soon forgotten about. It was extremely overoptimistic to imagine that 
a committee of such diverse individuals with fundamentally different 
viewpoints would be able to work out a constitution acceptable to all 
sides. But the fact that the committee was set up at all emphasises 
the point that in the eyes of the army the restoration of the Rump 
'was a temporary measure and that the army was holding fast to its 
claim to be consulted about any constitutional change. 
This was made even clearer in the army petition to Parlia- 
ment on 13 May. The petition which had been under discussion over the 
previous days was presented by a delegation of 18 officers on behalf- 
of the others with Lambert as spokesman and whose numbers included 
Disboroveq Barksted, Berryo Ashfieldq Lilburne and Okey. 
(2 ) 
The peti- 
tion amounted to a catalogue of the progrmme which the army expected 
Clarke Papers, IV, P. 8; C-J-9 VII, pp. 646t 647; c-f- 
IL )4 lansdowne Ms. 821, f. 154 repr. in American Historical 
Reviewq VIIIp 1902-1903p pp. 87-88. 
(2) WeeklX Postv 10-17 May 1659; Mercurius Politicusq 12-19 
May 1659; Bakerg Chronicle, pp. 644-646; O. P. R.. ' XXI9 
pp. 400-405; E89 , The 
ilumble Petition and Address of 
the Officers of the Army to the Parliament of the Common- 
wealth of England. 
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from the Rump and as a reiteration for public consumption of the 
army's conception of the good old cause. The petitioners welcomed 
the Rump's own declaration of intent of 7 MAY in which it had declared 
that it would carry forward the work of settlement based on a form of 
government without a single person, kingship or the House of Lordsq a 
government that would secure civil and religious liberties and further 
reform. The petitioners appeared to be slightly inhibited about making 
proposals to the Parliament 
"Yet this nevertheless we have judged it our 
Duty to represent what was chiefly and 
unanimously upon our heartsp when we engaged 
in that which made way for your return, which 
we humbly (as becomes us) lay before you. " 
This passage suggests that the army did not agree on conditions prior 
to the recall of the Ramp with Haselrig and his fellow negotiators. 
The armyq as has been mentionedt later claimed that the recall of the 
R=p was conditional. The petition was designed to set out for the 
record, as it were, what the army felt the conditions ought to have 
been. 
There followed 15 requests. They dealt with a wide variety 
of issues including civil and religious libertiesp law reform, an act 
of oblivion for everything done since the original dissolution of the 
Rumpq a purge of Royalists and others not committed enough to the cause. 
There was also a call for successive Parliaments and for the separation 
of legislative and executive powers. In this latter request one can 
detect the hand of Lambert. The legislative was to consist of a House 
of Commons elected by the people (the franchise to be determined by the 
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present Parliament) and a select senate 
"Co-ordinate in power, of able and faithful 
persons, eminent for Godliness, and such as 
continue adhering to this Cause. " 
The senior officers did not necessarily have themselves alone in mind 
as senators, although they must have assumed fairly reasonably that 
they would be included among its members. Just how senators were 
to be created was not mentioned. It is unlikely that the officers had 
any detailed proposals themselves anyway. Besidest as we have seent 
the discussions among the officers at the end of April showed that 
they were not themselves united on this question. Those who supported 
the idea of a senate hoped that it would counteract any future danger 
of a dictatorship by a unicameral Parliament and that it would also 
give the army some form of official representation. Those who opposed 
it or who had qualms about it were glad that it was being left to 
Parliament to decide the issue. 
(') 
These controversial requests were 
referred to a grand committee of the House. 
(2) 
In the press'the 
Weekly Intelligencer called for "Perpetual Interunion" between Parlia- 
ment and army. It said that since the army had restored the R1=p it 
was the business of the 1b=p to settle the army's pay. The lh=P did 
in fact vote 
"That speedy and effectual care be taken for Payment 
of the Arrears of the Amy" 
butt as we shall seeg arrears were sadly neglected. 
(3) 
C. f. -Daviesp Restorationg PP- 97-98; Woolrychq Milton, 
PP- 71-72. 
(2) Daviesp Restoration, P. 93. 
(3) Weekly Intelligencer, 17-24 May 1659; C. J. t VII, pp. 656- 657- 
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Although the terminology of the request for a senate is 
Harringtoniant it must not be assumed that the officers envisaged a 
select senate along the lines that Harrington had presented in his 
writings. The officers were quite vague about their proposals for 
a senatev perhaps deliberately sop as they were not all agreed about 
it in the first place, but perhaps also because they had not thought 
about it too profoundly. The concept of a senate advanced in the 
petition seems to have more in common with the Other House of the 
Humble Petition and Advice than with that of Oceana. 
Of the new Council of State established by act of Parlia- 
ment on 19 May only six of the 31 members were serving officers at the 
time (Haselrigg Fleetwoodt Lambert, Disborowev Berry and Sydenham). 
Ludlow and Morley became members of the army over the summerv indeed 
Parliament instructed the committee responsible for nominating commis- 
sion officers to "take care" that Morley be made a Colonel. John Jones 
was well known and trusted in army circles and appears to have acted 
as temporary governor of Beaumarais. 
(l) 
It also seems likely that 
matters of national security were left to the army officers on the 
Council of State. On 8 July the question of arresting and disarming 
dangerous persons was referred to the army officers who were on the 
Council for suggestions. 
(2 ) 
There is no evidence to support Ludlow's 
C. J., VII, pp. 659P 707; C. S. P. D. 1658-599 PP. 349; 
jbid. t 1659-60, p. 23. 
(2) Bodl. Rawlinson 11s. A134 (Proceedings of the Council 
of State 7 June-20 October 1659) sub 8 July. 
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attack on the military members of the Council of State as obstructive 
and poor attenders. Their scruples about taking an oath are probably 
- 
to be understood more in the light of their scruples about oaths 
in general. 
(L) 
Richard Cromwell had been overtaken by events. He was 
surprised and disappointed that support for his cause did not come 
from Scotland, Dinkirk or the fleet. His overtures to Monck came to 
nothing and on 25 May he signed his declaration of abdication. By 
that time he had ceased to be of any importance anyway; he was not 
even a pawn to be manipulated by either the Ib=p or the army. 
(2) 
The 
extent to which he had lost credibility among his supporters can be 
judged from a remark by one of Adam Baynes's correspondents on 9 May 
that 
"my ld F(auconberp) is highly offended and 
sayeth he scames to serve a person of soe low 
a courage as the P(rotector) because he hath 
sent to him to deliver his Co=ission if it be 
demanded by ld Fleetwood. " 
Fauconberg had gone to Yorkshire to the family home at the end of April 
or the beginning of May. 
0) 
He had been one of those favouring a coup 
against Fleetwood and Disborowe. Richard had no alternative to resigna- 
tion. Monck, despite overtures from Henry Cromwell by means of Monckts 
(1) Ludlowq Memoirsp 119 pp. 84-85; Daviesl IlestoratiOn, t P- 102. 
(2) American Historical Reviewp VIIIp 1902-1903P PP. 87-89; 
Percurius Politicusp 19-26 May 1659; Davies, Restoration, 
p. iod. By january 1660 Richard Cromwell had become a 
bitter manp complaining "Who should a man trust, if he 
may not trust to a brother and an Uncle; "'R. Latham and 
W. -Ilatthews (eds. )v The Diary of Samuel Depys, Londonq 
1970t Iv p. 21. 
B. M. Add. 11s. 21f 425P ff. 449 46. 
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nephew Henryt declared for the restored Ihxmp* In a private letter 
probably to Thurloe Monck said that nothing but the return of the Long 
Parliament, meaning the Ih=pg would be able to preserve the peace of 
the nation. Indeed this was the view to which he remained consistent 
throughout 1659-(1) Henry appears to have contemplated a combined 
intervention of the armies in Ireland and Scotland on behalf of his 
brotherp but 11onck rejected this. 
(2) 
Henry could not have gone it 
alone. The army in Ireland had its own divisions besides which the 
difficulties of a successful sea-borne 'invasion' were great in them- 
selvesp not to mention the general distaste and reaction in England 
against any military force intervening in English affairs from Ireland, 
no matter in what cause. Moreoverp Henry did not have the resources 
for such an "invasion" and he realised this very quickly. 
After learning of events in laagland Henry called together 
a Council of Officers and declared 
"That for his part he was resolved to submit to 
the Providences of Godp desiring them to do the 
like. " 
Some of the opponents of a restored Rump tried to stir up the armyt but 
at a General Council of Officers "the false glosse that was before put 
upon transactions in Ragland" soon vanished. It was resolved "and freely 
Davies, Restorationg pp. 99-100; B. M. Add. Ms. 229199 L100, 
For a different vie; ý of Monck's opinions at this timet and 
throughout 16599 q. v. M. Ashley, General Monck, Iondont 1977, 
P. 152.1 disagree with Dr. Ashley's analysisq especially 
that Monck favoured a restoration of the Stuarts from 
August 1659. He relies entirely on the retrospective 
accounts of Price and Gunble (ibid., pp. 160-165). ýý 
reasons w* ill be apparent from my own account. However, 
Dr. Ashley is correct to emphasise the speculation to which 
Monck's behaviour gave rise later in the year. 
(2) 13akert Chronicleg p. 648; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 11 + n; 
Thurloev VII, p. 674. 
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assented tot and afterwards more unanimously concluded and agreed 
upon" to engage themselves to promote the good old cause. Sir William 
Bury, Colonel Lawrence and Dr. Jones were sent over with some papers 
for Fleetwood and the Council of Officers in London. Henry Cromwell's 
acceptance of the restoration of the Rump was well received in London. 
The Moderate Informer commented : 
"A two-fold Cable is of great strength, but a 
three fold cord is not easily broken. " (1) 
On 7 June the House voted that Henry Cromwell be acquainted with the 
resolution of the House that in future the government of Ireland was 
to be in the hands of commissioners appointed by Parliament and that 
he was to return to England to report on the state of affairs in Ire- 
land. Henry resigned his post as Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief 
on 15 June. 
(2) 
The Pxmp wasted no time in appointing commissioners to 
nominate officers. On 11 May the Committee of Safety on which the 
officers had a fuller representation (and presumably more influence), 
than on the later Council of State recommended five commissioners to 
nominate officers. They were Fleetwood, Lambertt Haselrig, Disborowe 
and Berry. Doubtless this was thought to be too generous to the army 
and so Ludlow and Vane were added. 
(3) 
Even before this committee got 
down to the hard work of reviewing the commissioned officers changes 
0ý 9 
ibid. 9 loc. cit.; Weekl): 
Post 10-17 May 1659t 31 Ma 
7 June 1659; 7aithful Scout, q 20-27 May 1659; E983(2 
The Moderate Informer, 
(2) C. J., VýI, p. 674; Thurloep VIIt pp. 683-684. 
(3) ca., VII, pp. 6499 650p 651t 670. 
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were made. Attention has already been drawn to some of them; for 
example the appointments of Lambertp Okey and Haselrig. At the end 
of May Colonel Richard Nortonp governor of Portsmouth, was replaced 
by Colonel Nathaniel Whethampwho was to be one of the first to declare 
for the Rump in Decemberv and Colonel Smitht governor of Hullq was 
replaced by a former governor of the garrisont Edward Salmon. Robert 
Overton eventually took over this command and Smith was given a 
regiment in Scotland. 
(') 
On 23 May Overtong Rich and Alured whose 
re-admission had been under discussion since the end of April were 
restored. The delay in Overton's re-admission. has already been 
discussed, As for Aluredq we have seen how the manuscript version 
of the charges against him in 1654 included references highly critical 
of Lambert. It could be that these remarksp as well as the suspicions 
that he had withheld arrears from his Major in 1654, were not forgotten 
in 1659. The delay in Rich's case might well have been to do with his 
association with Harrison in the mid-fifties. On the other hand, it is 
also conceivable that the three men had their own scruples about the 
intentions of their colleagues. It was felt necessary to counteract 
rumours to this effect with a gloving account in the newsbooks of an 
interview with Fleetwood at Wallingford House immediately prior to their 
re-admission. 
(2 ) 
Lt. Colonel Waldine Lagoe was dismissed. He had 
supported Richard Cromwell during the April crisis. He was considered 
for a commission in the summer and eventually made Lt. Colonel of Charles 
Clarke Ms. 31P -f - 97- 
(2) ibid. 0 f. 126; Mercu'rius Politicusp 19-26 may 1659. 
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Fairfax's regiment. He was also considered for the Adjutant General- 
ship of the army in Irelandq although there were protests against 
this proposal. 
(') 
Hopefuls wrote letters expecting to be restored 
to the army after having left it for one reason or another. A Lt. John 
Roper wrote to Adam Baynes from Dalkeith on 9 May welcoming Lambert's 
return to -the army. He said that he had heard of other officers being 
restored and mustered in the army and hoped that he too would be 
restored. He asked Baynes, who had spoken on his behalf to Fleetwood 
at his dismissal for charges unspecified in the letter, to intervene 
for him with Lambert. His request does not appear to have been success- 
ful. 
(2) 
Parliament amended the bill appointing the commissioners 
to nominate officers so that the commissions were not to be issued by 
Fleetwood but by Parliament, and to be signed by the Speaker. In the 
new commissions obedience to Parliamentp the Council of Statet the 
superior officers and adherence to the articles of war appeared in 
(3) 
that order.. The R=p must have been aware that this would not have 
been agreeable to all of the officers and indeed Vane, Ludlow and Salway 
opposed Haselrigo Algernon Sydneyt another former officerp and Neville 
in this. No single issue could be guaranteed to cause indignation 
th e 
amongst those officers for whom the recall of/Rump had been viewed as 
an expedient, as much as this, A meeting of the senior officers was 
(1) C. S. P. D. 1659-6oo Pp. 3P 13; Firth and Davies, pp. 496-487t 
5039 504. 
(2) B. M. Add. Ms. 21425, f. 47; C. J. 9 VII, pp. 668,680. 
(3) C., T. 9 VIIt pp. 673,675; Daviesq Restorationp Pp. 105-106. 
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convened hastily at Disborowe's house which Haselrig and Ludlow attended. 
Lambert claimed that the Parliament was going back on assurances given 
before its recall. In reply he vas told that 
"no private persons either could, or had promised more 
than to use their endeavours in the House to procure 
certain things to be done. " 
Haselrig, behaving more as a civilian than as an army officer, argued 
that given the previous dissolution of the Rump (a rather unpleasant 
aside) it was not surprising that Parliament should seek to preserve 
its authority. It was emphasised that the recent vote in the House 
not to continue the present Parliament beyond 6 May 1660 was evidence 
enough that they did not seek to perpetuate themselves. This issue of 
principle had all the makings of another crisis and revealed once more 
the deep tensions between some of the senior officers and Republicans 
Of both the Rt=per and Harringtonian variety in the House. The heat 
was taken out of the situation by emphasising the need to maintain 
good relations between army and Parliament in view of the danger from 
the common enemyg and despite Disborowe's provocative remarko that he 
thought his existing commission as good as any the Parliament could 
givet the officers gave way. Following Hacker's example, who took the 
lead from Haselrig, they received their commissions from the Speaker. 
Phillips suggests that once again pressure from the junior officers 
was decisive in determining the senior officers' reaction. This seems 
unlikely as one suspects that'the junior officers had no strong feel- 
ings on this question. The House sweetened the pill somewhat by voting 
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on 6 June that the officers would not have to pay for their commissions 
but would receive them gratis. 
(') 
As we have seen the committee for nominating officerst or 
the committee of Safety as it was also knowng had already been at work. 
On 28 May the officers of Fleetwood's foott Lambert's horse and foot, 
Ludlow's (formerly Goffels)p Lilburnetst Berry's and Hacker's regiments 
were considered. 
(2) 
In Fleetwood's foot regiment all the officers 
recommended on 28 May were passed without question by the Rump and 
received their commissions from the Speaker. Waldine Lagoe who had 
been purged beforehand was replaced by Jeffrey Ellatson (or Ellison) 
as Lt. Colonel. 
(3) 
In Lambert's foot Lt. Colonel Richard Elton was 
replaced by Jeremiah Campfield, who is to be distinguished from the 
Major Campfield of Ralph Cobbett's regiment 
ý4 )Elton 
was reduced to 
the rank of Captain but in July he was made Major of William Mitchell's 
regiment. He adhered to the officers of the Lambert/Disborowe/Pleetwood 
faction in the autumn unlike Campfield vho stood by the Parliament. 
(5) 
In Lambert's horse the Majorg William Goodrick, who had supported 
Richard Cromwell was replaced as Major by Richard Creed who was to 
This paragraph is based on Ludlowq Memoirs, II, pp. 89-90; 
Clarke Papersp IV9 p. 17; Bakerv Chronicle, p. 648; C. J., 
VII9 Po 673o C. f. Daviesp Restorationp p. 106; Woolrychq 
Hilton, p. 99. The Royalist observers give a different 
analysis of the state of mind of Fleetwood and Disborowe, 
suggesting they were overwhelmed and felt at a loss by 
the move (C. Clar, S. P. t IV, po 224; Nicholas Papersl 
IVt Po 154). 
(2) C. J., VII, ppo 668-669. 
i 
(3) ibid., ppo 668,679-680t 743. 
(4) Firth and Davies (index sub Campfield) confuse the two, 
(5) q. j., vii, pp, 668* 680,6819 742; Firth and Daviesp 
pp. 528-529. 
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play an important part in drawing up the Derby petition. He was also 
one of the officers cashiered by Parliament in October. Adam Baynes 
and Robert Salmon became Captains and Thomas Spilman Captain Lt. instead 
of Thompson. The nominating committee's recommendations of John Hatfield 
as Captain and John Hodgson as Lt. were referred back to the committee 
for further consideration. Hatfield was eventually passed while Hodg- 
son was transferred to Thomas Saunders1regiment. Both Lambert and 
Fleetwood were nominating commissioners themselves and must have been 
influential over appointments to their regiments. 
(') 
In Ludlow's regimentt which eventually went to Herbert 
Morleyq who was to be instrumental in the Rump's return in December, 
John Wigan who had resigned his commission in 1654 because he could 
not accept the Protectorate, was nominated Major. He was later 
selected as Lt. Colonel to Overton's regiment but was unhappy about 
this because all the officers were strangers to him. He complained 
to the nominating committee that there was a conscious campaign of 
discrimination against Fifth Monarchists on the part of the cominittee 
"but his judgment is that Jesus Christ is King of 
Saints as well as nations; His laws are laws of 
righteousness and His people ought to be employed 
in all places of public trust. " 
He suggested that this discrimination applied to appointments to the 
Militia as well. It is curious that Wigan should have objected to 
serving in Overton's regiment as Overton sympathised with the Fifth 
ca., vii, pp. 668,6so; Firth and Davies, pp. 259-26o. 
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Monarchists. The Lt. Colonel of Ludlow's regimentv Clement Keanep was 
purged but as with Lagoe was later given a commission in a regiment 
(Pearson's, late Daniells). William Farley became the Lt. Colonel and 
like the regiments- future Colonelp Morley, stood by the Parliament in 
the autumn for which reason he was purged by the Lambert/Disborove/ 
Fleetwood faction. The other officers received their commissions on 
9 June. There was some shifting around of the original nominations on 
28 May within companies but the personnel remained the same. 
(') 
Robert Lilburne's regiment had been serving in Scotland, 
but at the beginning of May itwas ordered back to the north of England, 
It was to play an important part in the debacle at the end of the year. 
Only a handful of officers received their commissions from the Speaker 
on 13 June. Captain Thomas Strangeways was involved in the Derby 
petition in September but along with the Majorv George Smithsont he 
joined with Thomas Fairfax in the north against the Colonel after the 
collapse of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in London. Captain 
Thomas Lilburne, a kinsynan of the Colonelt was replaced by William 
Peverell. Thomas Lilburne had been an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Protectorate and had written to Thurloe in October of the previous 
year warning him to beware of Lt. Colonel Mason who had been one of 
the leading anti-kingship officers in May 1657- 
(2) 
Berry's regiment received its commissions from the Speaker 
on 10 June and the officers were the same as those laid before Parliament 
C. J., vii, pp. 668t 677-678; C. S. P. D. 1659-60, pp. 44-45; 
Firth and Daviesp PP- 333-334,, 507-508. 
(2) ca., vii, pp. 669t 682; Clarke Papersq IVt Pp. 58t 2399 
2UIJ_, -Thurloet' VII, pp. 4119 4349 436; Firth and Davies, 
pp. 273-275. -, 
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on 28 May. Again Berry as one of the nominating commissioners must 
have been able to influence appointments. Certain unspecified charges 
against Captain John Robinson, to, the nominating committee were not up- 
held after an inquiry held by a committee of army officers who reported 
back to the nominating committee, Berry adhered to the Lambert/Dis- 
borowe/Fleetwood faction in the autumn but his regiment was not so 
committed to this faction as he was. 
(') 
Hacker's regiment was one of the first regiments to receive 
its commissions from the Speaker and Hackert at Haselrig's instiga- 
tion as we have seent was thefirst officer so to receive a commission. 
Major Grove and Captain Empson were replaced by William Hobart and 
Thomas Willoughby respectively. Grove might well have been transferred 
to Robert Lilburne's regiment. Empson had fallen foul of Hacker as 
early as 1650, when the latter had tried to have him replaced, complaining 
to Cromwell that he was a better preacher than a fighter. Cromwell's 
reply to Hacker is famous. Hacker was trusted by Parliamentq especially 
by Haselrigg and although his regiment was not in London in October it 
was ordered to proceed thither at the time of the crisis. Daring the 
following weeks Hacker worked actively for a return of the Ramp. Emp- 
son had been an elected officer for Fairfax's horse in 1647. Whitley 
identifies him as the-Thomas Empson who along with Packerg Spencer and 
Kiffin and others was given the right to preach in any unoccupied pul- 
pit in 1653- Empson was given some land at Theobald's Park by Packer 
and Gladynan in 1652. WhitIfy's suggestion that hewas involved in prepar- 
ing the A"eement of the People in 1647 is more questionable. 
(2) 
(1) C. J. I VII, pp. 669,679; C. S. P. D. 1658-59, P. 393; Pirth 
and Daviesq pp. 250-251. 
(2) C. J., VII, pp. 669,675-676; Abbott, Writings and Speeches, 
IIP p- 378; Clarke Papers, It P- 438; C. S. P. D. 1653-54t p. 13; 
Whit]Tp Baptist BibliograpbZv PP- 319 50; Gentlest Ph. D. t 
p. 278* For Racker q. v. also biographical appendix 
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On 13 June the commissions for Biscoels, Hewson'so Sydenham's 
and Salmon's regiments were passed by Parliament. The recommendations of 
the nominating committee werev for the most partp acceptedp but those of 
Captain Daniel Nicholls and Captain Eaton were queried. Nicholls was 
later passed but the charge against Eaton brought by Discoe himself 
was referred by the nominating committee to a committee of officers 
for examination. Eaton might-vell be the same person as Philip Eaton 
one of the agitators in 1647-(1) Hewson's regiment vas passed uncritically. 
(2) 
There were some queries about, appointments to Sydenham's regiment. Captain 
Richard Wagstaffe's was referred back to the committee for a higher 
appointment. Wagstaffe had reported the defeat of the Levellers'revolt 
in Oxford in September 1649 to Parliament. He did in fact receive a 
commission from the Speaker as a Captain in Sydenham's regiment but he 
was later transferred to Okey's regiment. Like Okey he adhered to the 
1h3mp in October. Richard Barker was appointed to his place in Syden- 
ham's regiment. The Lt. Colonelq Fýrancis Alleng who had been an elected 
officer for the regiment in 1647 and the Majorp John Grimes, son of Lt. 
Colonel Mark Grimesp presented a testimonial on the behalf of Richard 
Johnson. Johnson is most probably the agitator of the same name and 
regiment in 1647. The appointment of William Illin as Lieutenant was 
ordered to be recommitted to the, nominating commissioners but he was 
eventually approved. Richard Johnson vas also given a commission as 
Ensign in place of David Francis. Francis was made a Lieutenant in a 
(1) C-J-9 VII#, p 682; C. S. P. D. 1658-59t PP. 3789 379; Clarke 
Papersp It p: 161; Firth and Davies, p. 402. 
(2) C. J. t VII9, p. 682, Firth and Davies, p. 412. 
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company in Ireland as compensation. Captain Consolation Fox had also 
been an elected officer in 1647twhile Captain John Shrimptonp who was 
brought back into the regimentp had been cashiered in September 1649 
for suspected implication in the Leveller mutiny in Oxford. Salmon's 
regiment was passed with the existing Major being replaced by William 
Walters. 
(') 
On the same day as these regiments were passedp Parliament 
ordered that Captain Messervy be given some employment in the army. If 
he was employed we have no record of his commission. He had been one 
of the committee to peruse and refine the army's Remonstrance of 
November 1648 for presentation to Parliament. Under the Protectorate 
he appears to have been in Jersey and was considered "a person of 
dangerous principles" by the government; why is unknown, 
(2) 
On 30 June Okey's regiment was passed as a regiment of 
horse rather than of dragoons. Major John Daberon replaced Tobias 
Bridge as Majort the latter going as Major to Lockhart's regiment in 
Ainkirk. Richard Goodgroom(possibly the author of the anti-Protectorate 
tract A Copy of a Letter from an Officer in Ireland discussed above)- 
was appointed Cornet. Goodgroom had Fifth Monarchist tendencies. In 
fact he became chaplain of the regiment. Okey himself had of course 
been involved in the discussions over Vane's Healing Question with Fifth 
C. J., VII, pp. 683,685,688; C. S. P. D. 1658-59, P. 394; 
ibid. 1659-60, P. 36; Clarke Paperav It PP- 437P 438; 
Firth and Daviest-PP. 3749,379p 299t 303. Firth and Davies 
are confused about Sydenham's regiment and overlook a 
number of interesting appointments. Mark Grimes was made 
a Colonel and given command of Cardiff (C. S. P. D. 1659-60, 
Pp- 369,221), he had b' een under consideration for Wag- 
staffe's place-in Sydenham's regiment (ibid., 1658-599P- 394; 
C-2-9 VII9 P. 770)- For more on Mark Grimes q. v. bio- 
graphical appendix. 
(2) C. J., VII, p. 683; Clarke Papers,, IIP P. 54; C. S. P. D. 1655- 
5=-t ýP- 113-114. 
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Monarchists and Rumper Republicans in 1656. 
(1) 
Packer was promoted to 
the rank of Colonel of Oliver Cromwell's old regiment replacing Boteler, 
a controversial figure in civilian eyes. Gladmant Barrington and Hunter 
who had been cashiered along with Packer in 1658 were also restored and 
Gladman was made Major. John Spencert who had Fifth Monarchist leanings 
and who had been authorised to preach in any unoccupied pulpit in 1658 
along with Packer and others including Thomas Dnpson of Hacker's regi- 
mentv was passed as Captain. He appears to have remained loyal to the 
Pump in the autumn. According to a propaganda newsbook from Monck's 
forces he excommunicated all the officers who were members of his Church and 
who had supported the dissolution of the Rump in October. Ile was passed 
as Captain of the regiment by the r e-restored Rump in January 1660. 
(2) 
Richard Morris was considered for this post but was passed over because 
he had been made one of the Adjutant Generals. Morris (or Merrest) had 
been one of the officers presenting the army Remonstrance to Parliament 
in November 1648. He was probably a member of the regiment when it was 
Fairfax's and then Cromwell'sp and became an Adjutant General sometime 
around 1651- He continued in that capacity under the Protectorate. 
The reasons for some of the changes in the regiment can be gleaned 
from the State Papers Domestic. They covered a wide variety of grounds 
such as scandalous behaviour and the keeping of a mistress. Captain 
William Disher was charged with discouraging the raising of regiments 
(1) Ca., vii, pp. 697-698t 700; C. S. P. D. 1659-60, p. 240; 
Capp, Fifth Monarchy Meno pp. 196f 2169 250- 
(2) Wor, Co. B. B. A. The Faithfull Intelligencer. From the 
Parliaments Army in Scotland Firth and Davies, p. 76- 
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in Scotland in 1650-51P perhaps an insinuation that he was too favour- 
able to Presbyteriansq and also of deceiving the soldiery of their pay. 
Captain Ezard was said to be "a lover of good men" and ordered to have 
a troop of horse. But Richard Rumball (or Ramball) himself said to be 
"a violent prosecutor of all good people" and discontented at the 
change of government, was reported to have been given a paper to sign 
by Ezard in favour of Cromwell becoming King. Rumball had been one of 
the signatories of a petition in 1649 demanding the restoration of an 
Army Council along the lines of 1647 with agitators. 
(') 
In the end 
ýzard did not receive a commission and Rumball was made a Lieutenantg 
a case of political reliability triumphing over godliness. The 
unfortunate Boteler, the displaced Colonelo suffered a serious loss 
of face. A proposal1o make him'Quarter Master General, not a very 
important office, was rejected. In November 1659 he was reported to 
be working for lihitelocke either. as his secretary or else spying on 
him. He was referred to uncharitably as "decimating Botler'19 unfairly 
personifying the heavy hand of the military. His colleagues do not 
appear to have been particularly troubled by his fall. 
(2) 
Also on 30 June Parliament requested that John Nelthorpe 
be considered for a troop. Nelthorpep like Morriso had served as an 
Clarke Papersp Up pp. 193-194n. 
(2) C. Jý., VII, p. 698; The MOderatep 14-21 November 1648; 
Rushworth, VII, p. 1130: Clarke Papers, II, pp. 194p 282; 
ibid. t IVt P- 300; C. S. P. D. 
1650, p. 187; ibid. 9 1655-561, T. 7364; ibid., 1658-59P P. 376; JI. M. C. Leyborne-Popham, 
p. 101; Hardacre, 'William Boteler'. p. 10; Firth and Daviest 
pp. 74-75. - 
Again Firth and Davies overlook some interesting 
points. 
584. 
Adjutant General and the House in fact issued him with an Adjutant 
Generalts commission on 5 August. Howeverp Alured had him in mind for 
the Majority of his regiment in October and he appears to have been 
accepted-by the nominating committee for this place, although the 
dissolution of Parliament by the lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction 
prevented him from-receiving his commission from the Speaker. The 
House also asked that Arthur Evelyng who had been in Harrison's regi- 
ment in 1647 and who had signed the letter of the agitators and 
elected officers to Walesp be considered for a place. He was made 
Captain of the guard in succession to Aluredq an important jobq and 
remained loyal to the Parliament in the autumn*(') 
In Richard Moss'sp late Pride'sp regiment two of the 
appointments are worth mentioning. The Lt. Colonelp Nicholas Audrews# 
and Captain Ralph Prentice had been agitators for the regiment in 
1647. 
(2) 
Both had risen from the ranks. Andrews was a Lieutenant 
by 1648 and Prentice an Ensign by November 1647. In Disborowe's 
regimentv Quarter Master Edmund Beare is the same man who signed the 
Case of the Army Truly Stated in October 1647- 
(3) 
Other former 
agitators appear in other regiments. Edward Starrep one of the original 
agitators in Harrison's regiment in 16479. was passed as a Cornet in 
c. j., vII, pp. 6989 748P 749; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 179 
9, ý-, ift, 176; ibid., UP pp. 54t 2139 274; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, 
pp. 2399 2439, 591.. 
(2) C-J-t VII9 PP- 700P, 701; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 161t 437; 
Firth and Davi est P- 371- 
(3) C-J-9 VIIP P. 704; Wolfet Leveller Hanifestoest pp. 222t 
234 
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the summer of 1659 in the same regiment which was then intended for 
Whalley but went to Alurede(l) In Fhilip Twisleton's regiment John 
Wilsong, an agitator in 1647, was made Quarter Master of the regiment. 
(2) 
It must of course be emphasised that these radicals of 1647 were not 
necessarily radicals in 1659; the political landscape had altered so 
dramatically in the last 12 years. 
On 12 July Parliament ordered that John Streater, who 
had served in the. army in Ireland in the early 16501sp be restored to 
some post in the army there. Streaterv as we have seentopposed the 
dissolution of the Rump almost immediately after the event. He was 
cashiered and later tried for publishing tracts hostile to the govern- 
ment. His writings greatly influenced the Three Colonels' Petition. 
In 1659 he was given command of the train of artilleryp supported 
the Rump in the autumn, and helped put down Iambertts attempted rising 
in April 1660, 
(3) 
The nominating commissioners seem to have been uncertain 
of the army in Irelandt possibly fearing that Henry Cromwell had 
tampered with it. On 16 June Colonels Coopert Richard Lawrencet John 
Clark and Jerome Sankey were ordered to be given regiments without any 
debate but Colonels Sadlert Barrow and Axtell were to be asked to 
appear before the commission in person. 
(4) 
Discussion of the Irish 
(1) C. J. t VIIt P. 749; Firth and Daviesp p. 178. 
(2) C-J-9 YIIt Po,. 724; Clarke Paperst It P- 439. 
(3) Clj*t VIIP P. 714; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o P. 52. 
(4) C. S. P. D. 1658-59t P- 375- 
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officers continued into July. On 2 July Sankey presented a list of the 
commissioned officers in Ireland to the committee and made a short 
speech. According to Ludlow, the list had been drawn up by Sankey, 
Lawrence, Edward Roberts, Auditor General of the Irish armyq and Major 
Peter Wallis at the instigation of Fleetwood. They were to press for 
Ludlow to be Commander-in-Chief. Ludlow suspected an ulterior motive 
behind this last proposalv but in view of Ludlow's previous experience 
of Ireland his re-appointment to serve in Irelandp a militarily important 
countryq seemed a very logical choice. 
(') 
The list was in fact given to 
Ludlow and the nominating committee decided to deal with it two days 
later. But some objections were raised by Colonel Robert Barrow against 
Colonel Hills, who had sided with Richard Cromwell in Aprilt Lt. Colonel 
William Keane of Cooper's regiment and Waldine Lagoe whom we have already 
come across. All three were being considered for appointment or re- 
appointment in the army in Ireland. Barrow's objections "were not for 
dissenting in judgment from himself as was said" - he was in fact a 
Baptist - "but from the good old cause now maintained by Parliament". 
But Lawrence, who had himself been distrusted by Henry Cromwellg spoke 
on their behalf emphasising their 17 years service. 
(2) 
Further considera- 
tion of the list was delayed until 8 July. Again Lawrence spoke on be- 
half of some of the more controversial suggestions. He argued that Sir 
Charles Coote had declared his loyalty to the Parliament. This was 
_4, ,ý f- 
(1) ibido, 1659-60, PP. 2-3; '-Ludlowt Memoirst II, p. 94. 
(2) C. S. P. D., 1659-6o, pp. 12-13. 
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contradicted by Judge Advocate Henry Whalley who intimated that Coote's 
behaviour had been against the Parliament. Axtell argued that shortly 
after the dissolution of the Rump in April 1653 when Fleetwood and 
Henry Cromwell came across to Irelandt Coote told his soldiers 
"A pox take them! we have bitten our tongues for some 
time, but now we may speak out. " 
Axtell's story is a bit confused. Fleetwood arrived in Ireland in 
September 1652 and Henry Cromwell made his firstp briefq visit to 
Ireland in March 1654. In the event Coote was kept on; he was too 
important an individual in Irish politics to be left aside. In December 
he was one of the instigators of the seizure of Dublin Castle; by that 
time he was more of a Royalist. Of the other appointments Keane was 
made Lt. Colonel of Brayfield's regiment and Waldine Lagoe was suggested 
as Adjutant General. Peter Wallis was given Henry Cromwell's horse 
regiment. William Allen and John Vernon were also restoredq Allen as 
a Colonel of horse and Vernon as Quarter Master General. Allen, Vernon, 
Barrow and Axtell had all resigned their commissions in 1656. Hewson, 
Vho like Lawrence had been distrusted by Henry Cromwellt was made 
Commander-in-Chief of the foot regiments. Alexander Brayfieldq an 
elected officer of Hewson's regiment in 1647P who had been cashiered 
by Henry Cromwell in September 1657 on the grounds that 
ýe had been 
intriguing against his go'vernment was reinstated. As we have seent 
Oliver and Broghill had considered Henry's action unwise at the time. 
Brayfield was to be given a regiment. He took over Cooper's who was 
in turn given Fleetwood's regiment of horse in Ireland, 
(') 
(1) ibid. ', loc , 'cit.; Firth and Daviesq pp. 626-6279 670. 
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There also seems to have been a move to get Droghill 
reinstated. Sankey and Wallis spoke in his favour. Their argument 
'was that he had used his influence to preserve order during the 
April crisis 
"and that he was a means of sending the proposi- 
tions Cof the Army to EnglandD saying it were 
better to do it by proposition than capitulation. "(1) 
It was a surprising recommendation as Broghill had not only been one 
of the key supporters of kingship but had been quite active against 
the army during that crisis. Whoever was responsible for the suggestion 
must have looked upon it as an act of appeasement to a man who was 
potentially still an important political figureq but it is unlikely 
that it would have been popular witht let alone be approved by any 
considerable number of the Eaglish officers. On 16 July the commissions 
for the Irish officers were ordered to be delivered to the officers by 
the commissioners for Ireland. John Jones was instructed to take them 
over to Ireland. 
(2) 
The regiments in Flanders also came in for close scrutiny. 
Originally six regiments were sent to Flanders in May 1657 under the 
command of Sir John Reynolds, knighted by Cromwell, The other five 
Colonels were Thomas Morgan, who had been Monck's second-in-command 
in Scotlandv Roger Alsop, who had been a Captain in Pride's regiment 
in 16479 Samuel Clark who had probably served in the Low Countries, 
Sir Bryce Cockraneq a Scot who had fought against the Commonwealth 
C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, p. 13. 
C-, T-v VIIP P. 721. " 
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and been taken prisoner at Musselburgh in July 1650 (he wasq howeverg 
known to Monck who used his influence to get Cockrane his command in 
Flanders), and Henry Lillingston who had possibly served in Scotland 
in the early 165018 as well as in the Low Countries. Of the 6,000 
men who were sent across only about lv475 were members of existing 
regimentst the rest were volunteers. Of the officers the vast 
majority were men of little previous military experience. Subsequently, 
reinforcements were sent over eventually including the regiments of 
Robert Gibbon and Edward Salmon part of which formed a composite 
regiment under Lt. Colonel John Pepper (neither Gibbon nor Salmon 
served in Flanders and with the exception of two companies they were 
ordered back to England in December 1658). As with the Western Design 
the recruiting and dispatch of the force for the West Indies were not 
determined by political considerationag although as we have seen in 
the case of the circumstances surrounding Reynoldsloriginal appointment 
in April 1657 there were rumours that politics were involved. 
(') 
Reynolds himself had remained in touch with Henry Cromwell from 
Flanders and expressed a constant desire to be able to return to 
Ireland. The expeditionary force fighting# in the field was serving 
with an ally and was thus not an independent command allowing its 
The. above is based on C. H. Firthq 'Royalists and Cromwellian 
Armies in Flanders 1657-1662tg T. R. H. S. 9 New Seriesq XVII, 
1903P pp. 67-119t. esp. PP. 79 (There is a mis-print on 
p. 88, the date of recall of Gibbons'and Salmon's regiments 
should be December, 1658t not 1659); Boldl. Rawlinson 11s. A499 
f. 292 (Accounts of Major General Kelsey and Captain 
Hatsell for transporting the 6,000 soldiers to France); 
Lbid. t A50t f. 155 
(*Accounts of moneys disbursed for the 
pay of the respective companies shipped from Dover into 
France-. Mercurius Politicust 30 April-7 May 1657- 
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senior officer a free hand. It also had to rely on poor provisions 
and quarters provided by the French which caused hardship and death. 
In November 1657 Reynoldsfather-in-lawp Sir Francis Russellprocured 
permission from the Protector for Reynolds to return briefly to 
England. There were subsequently rumours that Reynolds had been 
indiscreet, even traitoroust at a meeting he had had with James# Duke 
of York and that he was returning to vindicate himself from such 
aspersions. While it is highly possible that such a meeting did take 
place and that Reynolds might have appeared over-friendly to an 
embodiment of the 'common enemytt the story is unlikely. Reynolds had 
long wanted to return to England and the rumours about what was alleged 
to have taken place began to flow after his father-in-law had beent at 
Reynolds's own request, to see Cromwell for a warrant for his return. 
The suggestion that Lt. Colonel Francis Whitev who had been sent to 
Mardyke as governor in Octoberp and who was killed with Reynolds in 
the same shipwreck, was the person who accused Reynolds of consorting 
with the enemy can be discarded likewise especially as it rests solely 
on the retrospective evidence of the Duke of York. Nevertheless, it 
is ironical that two of the more radical officers of 1647 should be 
killed simultaneouslyt although they had shed their radicalism well 
before their deaths. 
(') 
B. M. Lansdowne Its. 822, ff. 214-215t 226-227p 268-269; 
Clarke Paperal IIIt pp. 122t 127; A. Lytton Sellsp The 
Memoirs of James 119 Londong 1962, pp. 244-246; Thurloe, 
Vit . 630 (Sir Francis Russel to Reynolds, 24 November 1657ýpt 6309 681, (Fleetwood makes no reference to the 
rumours and gives no hint that Reynolds was in any way 
under suspicion)t 687-688 (Sir Robert Honeywood to Sir 
Walter Vanep Haguep 28 December 1657. Firth makes much 
of this lettert but Honeywood being in the Hague could well 
have been hearing the Royalist rumours about Beynolds 
which he reported back to London), 731 (Lockhart's 
refutation of the stories); c. f. Firth, last Yearst It 
pp. 296-298 for a different interpretation. 
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However, to return to the summer of 1659, commissioners 
were sent over to report on the officers serving there. These commi- 
ssioners were in fact army officersv Ashfieldp Pearson and Packer. 
(L) 
They received plenty of information about various officers. The 
charges against them were very wide rangingo both political and non- 
politicalq including drx, nkennessq swearingg whoringt false musters 
and discrimination against "anabaptists". The presence of the 
commissioners provided malicious gossipers and scandal mongers with 
a field day. The unfavourable reports addressed to them were directed 
at all ranks. Colonel Alsop was called 
"an active man as a souldierp butt an enemie to 
religion and godliness ... holding itt a thing 
altogether unnecessary for a souldier to minde. 11 
The charges were, for the most partp very generalised and they caused 
much resentment. Colonels Lilington and Alsop wrote to London on 18 
August expressing their disgust at the way 
"some unworthy persons have traduced some officers 
of this garrison to ye Co(pmmitteit). Il 
-Z They wanted to send a man to the Council of State vindicating the 
garrison from the 'Islander of favour seekers". 
(2) 
Some of the companies 
even petitioned on behalf of officers 
I 
who were displaced. 
(3) 
The commissioners drew up lists of the various officers 
with a cross against the names of, those to be displaced or a tick or 
Bodl. Rawlinson Ils. A65, f. 17. 
ibid. p f-ý497-- 
ibid. t f. 51o 
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the letters "g(ood) o(officerDII against the names of those to be kept 
on. Occassionally there were other comments. William Witham, was 
considered a good officer and "a civil Tnan but fo=erly a royalist". 
but he was kept on. Colonel Samuel Clark was said to be "a very civil 
man but never served the parliament till now" and his Major, Samuel 
Battebyp was described as an "ancient -an and alwayes served ye 
parliament". 
(') 
Once the commissioners had returned to Englandq Pearson, 
along with two of the nominating commissionerst Fleetwood and Berry, 
studied the lists and changes were finally agreed upon. 
(2) 
The fact 
that the commissioners sent to the continent in theýfirst place were 
army officers and that the final lists were drawn up by army officers 
shows that the officers had more influence in the nomination process 
than their mere numerical strength on the nominating committee 
suggests. 
As far as the regiments in Scotland were concerned Monckts 
plea that they should not be altered went unheeded. Even his request 
that, if there had to be alterations# then his own two regiments and 
that of Talbot with which he was personally acquainted should be left 
alone was ignored. Parliament disliked this interference and a stiff 
replyg prepared by Haseirig, was sent to Monck. It reminded him that 
(1) jbid-P ff. 739 185. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1,659-6o'. pp. 120-1229 150-152; Bodl. Rawlinson 
ms. A65, passim. Some of the reports to the parliamentary 
commissioners are reprinted by Sir Charles Firth in 
'Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders 1657-1662t, 
T. R. H. S., 1903P PP- 111-115. 
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Parliament was better suited to judge of these things than he. Monck 
replied a few days later making his famous remark that "Obedience is 
my greate principle". 
(') 
This did not stop him from trying to 
influence the appointments. On 30 August he wrote to Haselrig about 
changes in his horse regiment. 
(2) 
According to Phillips# Pearson and 
Mason advised thenominating committee about changes in the Scottish 
regiments. 
(3) 
Mason had served in Scotland as a member of Pride's 
regiment but appears*to have spent much of his time in London. He 
was offered the governorship of Inverness or Jersey in the summer of 
1659 and opted for Jersey. He was charged by some of his fellow officers 
on the island of actively promoting the Iambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood 
faction in Jersey. 
(4) 
He had been in the capital in December 1654 
at the time of the Three Colonels' Petition and in 1657 was an important 
figure in the army in opposing kingship. Pearsong soon to take over 
Daniels' regiment was, as we have seeng one of the commissioners sent 
over to Dunkirk so Phillips's assertion is quite plausible except that 
Masong having spent such a long time away from Scotland, could not 
have been all that well-informed about the officers of the Scottish 
regiments, 
(1) Clarke Paperst IVp pp. 16-17,18n, 22-23; Daviesj Restorations 
P. 110. 
(2) Bodl. Tanner Ms. 519 f. 113 repr. but not noted in Firth 
and Davies( p. 136). 
(3) Baker, Chronicle, p. 648. 
(4) Clarke 11s, 257; B. M. 900K 13 Satan in Swnuelfs Mantle; 
H. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamp PP- 73-174. 
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Monck protested against the proposed changes in his horse 
regiment and some modifications were made by the nominating commis- 
sioners. Captain Christopher Keymerv whom Monck had cashiered in 
1654 at the time of the Three Colonels' Petition for suspected disaffec- 
tion to the governmentt was restored and received his commission from 
the Speaker. 
(') 
There were also a few changes in Monck's foot regiment. 
Abraham Holmes, the Major, became Lt. Colonel of Sawrey's regiment. 
He had been an elected officer for Robert Lilburne's regiment in 1647 
and during Overton's Oplott he had fallen under suspicion because the 
letter of the 'conspirators' at Aberdeen calling for a meeting to 
discuss their attitude -towards the Protectorate had been addressed to 
Holmes. In the autumn he supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood 
faction and after the Restoration he remained committed to the good 
old cause. He was implicated in the Rye House plot. His transfer 
to Sawrey's regiment meant that the Majority in Monck's foot remained 
vacant. The four Baptist Captains who had signed the address of loyalty 
to the Protectorate at the time of Overton's 'plot' from the gathered 
Churches of St. Johnston'sp Leith and Edinburgh were kept on. They 
were George Parker, Benjamin Groomet George Walton and William Downes. 
(2) 
Colonel William Daniel was replaced by Pearson. The exact 
motive for his removal is unclear but it seems to have been the result 
of an anonymous paper against him; however he seemed quite happy to 
(1) Firth and Daviesp PP. 1339 136-137. 
(2) C-J-P VII9 P- 742; Clarke Paperap I's P- 436; Thurloe, 
1119 pp. 29-30; Firth and Daviesp PP- 539-540. 
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leave the regiment so long as it was made clear that he was not being 
discharged for "basenesse or unworthiness". 
(') 
In Talbotts regiment 
it was proposed to make Wroth Rogers Lt. 'Colonel. He had originally 
been in Constable's regiment and had served as Governor of Hereford, 
a post to which he did in fact return. There is no reason to suppose 
(2) 
that he was a protege of Lambert. Ralph Cobbett's regimentl formed 
in 1651t was changed entirely except for the Colonel and the Lt. Colonel, 
Arthur Young. The Colonel had played a full part in army politics in 
the late 1640's as a member of Barksted's regimentt in which Arthur 
Young had also servedt and had been an elected officer. Robert Cobbott, 
probably'the same man who had been a Leveller in 1647 and a contractor 
for army clothing in the 1650sp replaced Campfield as Major. 
0) 
Robert Overton's restoration to his old regiment meant the displacement 
of William Mitchell who received a new regiment. Colonel Henry Smith, 
who had been governor of Hull, was given command of Fitch's regiment 
in Scotland as Fitch had become Lieutenant of the Tower of London. 
(4) 
The officers serving in Scotland were to receive their 
commissions from commissioners for the government of Scotland to be 
appointed by the Rump to replace the Council of Scotland. Such commis- 
sioners were never appointedt a legal nicety in Monck's favour when he 
(1) C-J-P VIIP pp. 762-763; Firth and Davies, p. 494. 
(2) Firth and - Davies,, pp. 466-467; Daviesp Restorationt p, 111; 
C-J-q VII9 P. 721, 
(3) C-j-f VIIP pp. 743P 781; Clarke Papers, 1, pp. 408n, 437; 
Firth and Daviesp p. 473- 
(4) Firth and Daviesp PP- 556-557. 
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came to remodel his forces in the autumn. 
(') 
Howevert some commissions 
were sent to Monck for distribution by the Council of State according 
to an order of Parliament. The commissions were for members of 
Twisleton's and Saunders's regiments. 
(2) 
Saunders's regiment is worth 
further comment. Saunders had been restored to the army and to his 
old regiment of horse in April. The regiment was still serving in 
Scotland but in July some troops were ordered back to England. 
Nathaniel Barton was appointed Major but was troubled because his troop 
was to be sent to Scotland. He wrote to Saunders on 27 July who -was 
then at his home in Little Ireton (sic), Derbyshire asking him to 
intercede with Fleetwood so that he and his troop would not be sent 
to Scotland. Three days later he wrote again to Saunders and told him 
that he had spoken with Fleetwood who promised to write to Monck to 
pass absent officers in the musters and about his (Barton's) staying 
in England. Monck was himself very concerned about the number of 
absentee officers in the troop late Robert Hope's in Saunders's 
regiment, still serving in Scotlandq and wrote to Barton ordering him 
to write to Captain Thomas Izodp who had succeeded to the command of 
the troopq and other officers of the troop to set out for Scotland to 
assume their commands. Barton asked Saunders to urge any officers who 
(1) C-J-9 VIIP P. 731; Baker, Chroniclev p. 648. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, p. 67. 
597. 
were technically serving in Scotland but who might be with him in 
Derbyshire to set out speedily for Scotland. In fact Izod remained 
in England and actively worked for the return of the Rump in Decembert 
along with Saunders and Barton. 
(') 
Clearly Monck was not adverse to 
all the changes being made in the regiments in Scotland. One of his 
main concerns was that absentee officers should return to Scotland, 
or as the case may be, take up their commands there. The fact that 
Barton preferred to stay in England also shows that even with the 
Rump insisting on issuing commissions to the officerst Fleetwood 
still retained the right to determine where they would serve. Most 
of those commissioned over the summert if they were not already serving 
in Scotlandq did not have time to take up their places before the 
autumn crisis. On 9 September the nominating committee authorised 
Honck to pay the arrears of officers in Mitchell'sp now Overton's. 
regiment who were to be reducedt as the officers who were to replace 
them had not yet come to their charges. 
(2) 
The nominating committee were assisted in their task by 
a committee of army officers who investigated the various charges 
brought against their comrades. 
(3) 
This gives us further evidence that 
the army officers had a fair degree of influence over the changes in 
Firth and Daviesp pp. 287-289; National * 
Register of Archivesp 
18686, Derbyshire Record Officep 'Correspondence and other 
papers relating to the career of Thomas Saunders of Little 
Iretontp Numbers 80p 81t 82p 83t 86. These papers are 
very informative about Saunders career in the 1640ts and 
in 1659 but contain no material on the rest of the 1650's. 
They are calendered virtually verbatim at the National 
Register of Archives. For Saunders qov. also biographical appendix. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, p. 184. 
(3) ibid., 1658-59, PP. 379P 394t 395. 
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the regiments over the summer. On 30 June the question of who was to 
deputise for Lockhart in Flanders was referred to Fleetwood and 
Lambert. 
(') 
There was no single criterion by which men were assessed 
as to their suitability either to remain as officers or to be restored. 
Political grounds, either disaffection towards, or support for the 
Protectoratet were not the only reasons for removing or restoring 
people. Drunkennessp loose living and what can generally be called 
ungodliness were others. 
(2 ) 
Doubtless prejudice also played a part. 
Howevert there were cases of people being removed or re-appointed solely 
on political grounds. 
(3) 
Sometimes this was decided by -the 'evidence' 
of an informer which was assessed by the nominating committee. 
(4) 
Those officers whose suitability was queried but who had connexions 
with senior officers or who were favoured by them could rely on their 
(5) 
superiors to speak on their behalf. Captain William Gough or Goffe 
of Alured's regiment, not to be confused with the Major General or the 
Lt. Colonel of Monck's foot regimentg was charged by a fellow officer 
'with describing the Instrument of Government as a "second Magna Chaitall. 
It was also said he forced men to subscribe to an address of loyalty 
to Oliver Cromwell. Colonel Ashfield spoke on Gough's behalf. In the 
end Gough who had been in line for the Majority was recommended to be 
Bodl. Rawlinson Ms A134 (Proceedings of the Council of State, 
7 June-20 October 1659)- 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1658-590 pp. 394t 387; ibid-t 1659-60, p. 243. 
(3) ibid., 1658-59, -Pp. 334t 392; ibid. t 1659-60, pp. 289 238- 
239. 
(4) ibid*tj65q-6o,, pp., 25p 28. 
(5) Libid. V, 1659-60, pp. 29t 30-31. 
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Captain. 
(') 
There also ýappears to have been a prejudice against Quakers 
in the nominations. 
(2) 
The more senior officers could present their 
own amendments or adjustments to the lists which were usually approved 
by the committee. 
(3) 
Some of the more radical figures from the past,, such as 
John Wigan weret as we have seen,, approached directly. Rich recommended 
that John Breman, who had played an important part in the discontent 
surrounding the Three Colonels' Petition and Overton's IplotIt for 
which he had been cashieredt be reinstated. He wanted Breman to be 
made Major in preference to John Merriman who had been an elected 
officer in 1647 but who was now in retirement. Rich was overruled, 
although Dreman became Major in September when Merriman resigned. 
Breman was instrumental in the defection to the Parliament of the forces 
beseiging Portsmouth in December. 
(4) 
Some men wrote to the nominating 
committee asking to be reinstated. Colonel Eyres asked for any officet 
even that of corporal. 
(5) 
We have seen how efforts were made to restore Lagoe despite 
his former support for Richard Cromwell. More surprising was the 
M jLid. t 1659-60, pp. 238-239- 
Firth and Davies (index 
subt Gough, William) confuse Monck's Lt. Colonel and 
this William Gough. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1658-599 pp. 202P 387; ibid., 1659-6o, p. 240. 
(3) ibid., 1659-6o, pp. 36t 226. 
(4) C. S. P. D. 1658.;. 59t P. 387; ibid., 1659-6o, pp. 177t 202; 
Clarke Papersp 1. p. 439. 
(5) C. S. P. D. -1659-6ov P- 35- It is not clear if this was 
Williamt the former Levellerp or Thomast the governor of 
HuisP. Castle in 1648. The latter was appointed governor of 
HuriL. inSeptember (ibid. 9 p. 226) the former took over 
Lambert's foot regiment in January 166o (Firth and Daviest 
PP. 528-529). 
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nominating committee's recommendation that Edward Whalley be given 
Montagu's late regiment. The move appears to have had the backing 
of Fleetwood. The Parliament vetoed the suggestion in a division in 
which Vane and Neville were tellers for the 'noes' and Sydenham and 
Strickland tellers for the Iyeas'. The regiment went to Alured. 
(l) 
Clearlyp for some, the purge was not intended to be an occasion to 
eradicate, root and branch all those who had stood by Richard Cromwell. 
One of the most surprising omissions from those reinstated was Harrison. 
The most likely reason for this was that he was looked upon as the man 
most responsible (after Cromwell himself) for the dissolution of the 
Rump in April 1653. On 30 September the House voted that Harrison was 
(2) 
to be disbarred from ever being an M. P. 
Before completing this analysis of the summer purges we 
have evidence to suggest that the displacement of officers caused some 
resentment. On 6 June Cornet Thomas Pease of Adam Baynes troop in 
Lambert's regiment wrote to his brother-in-lavp Adam Baynesp that the 
reduced officers in Lambertts and Lilburne's regiments 
"are very high and promise to themselves great thingst 
and new changes. " 
But such remarks on the part of the reduced officers were probably said 
in the heat of the moment. 
(3) 
Finallyq there is no evidence to support 
the view that the army representatives on the nominating committee 
(1) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, P. 78; C-J-9 VII9 P. 749; Guizott Richard Cromwellq It 
- 
p. 450. Whall ey and his son-in- 
law Colonel 71 11iam Goffet who had likewise been purged 
after the fall of th e Protectoratep fled the country at 
the Restoration and lived in exile in America. There are 
lives of both inthe D. N*B 
(2) COJOP VII9-p- 790. 
(3) B. M. Add. Ms. 21425P f. 59. 
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steamrollered through appointments and least of all that they consciously 
picked men who would stand by the army against the Parliament. 
(') 
Few, 
if anyq were working with such a confrontation in mind over the si-er. 
The unpopularity of receiving commissionkr from the Speaker 
among certain officers was only the first factor to embitter relations 
between the army and Parliament. The vexed problem of indemnityp one 
of the main grievances in 1647, and in this highly legalistic age of 
key importance to participants in public affairs# also dogged their 
relations. Parliament dealt with the indemnity bill over a period from 
late May to early July. There was even an amendmentt in the end 
defeated, to exclude Barksted from indemnity from suits or-actions 
brought against him on behalf of Overton during his imprisonment in 
the Tower when the former was Lieutenant there. 
(2) 
When the bill was 
finally passed on 12 July Lambert# probably speaking on behalf of a 
sizeable number of officers, denounced it before Ludlow and Haselrig. 
There had been meetings of the officers before this. No doubt they 
were keeping an eye on developments in Parliament. Haselrig commented 
sardonically 
"You are ... only at the mercy of 
the Parlia- 
ment who are your good friends" 
and Lambert retorted 
"I know not ... why they should not 
be at our mercy as well as we at theirs", 
hardly the sort of language from either side conducive to compromise 
and settling the nation's future on a more secure foundation. Wariston 
Daviesp Restorationg p. Me 
C. J. p VI[Itp- 713. 
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commenting on the tension between army and Parliament said 
"I find every one of them thinks the uther 
has broken their privat conditions to them 
maid befor the sitting of the House. " (1) 
The plans for a militia force were another source of 
contention. A militia force raised by the Rump could be used as a 
counterweight to the standing army. 
(2) 
Howeverg a good many serving 
officers were appointed militia commissioners in the counties. The 
officers appear also to have had a say in the appointment of these 
commissioners and Fleetwood had some influence over the appointment 
of the militia force officers. Nevertheless, the officers were 
probably suspicious that the Rump had ulterior motives in setting up 
the militia. 
(3) 
In terms of the Rump's relations with the country at 
larget Professor Woolrych's argument that the Parliament's intention 
that it should approve each local militia officer by name and that 
the commissions should be handed out by the Speaker "was a foolish 
over-assertion of central authority" 
(4) 
reminds us that the Rump 
was not as universally popular with the nation as such a move assumed. 
It was running the risk of alienating both the army and a large part 
of the nation and of thereby isolating itself. 
The officers beginning-to group themselves around Lambert 
and Disborowe no doubt felt confident because they viewed the Rump as 
(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, 119 pp. 100-101; C. Clar. S. P., IVt p. 263; 
Waristont Diary. IlIt pp. 123t 125; Daviest Restoration,, 
pp. 112-114. 
(2) c. s. P. v. 1659-61,; p. 44; Guizotp Richard Cromwell, t It PP- 432-434. 
(3) Firth and Raitp IIp pp. 1293-12981, 1308-1342; National 
Register of Archivest 18686t Saunders Paperst Number 85; 
Nicholas Papersq IV, pp. 164-165v 167-168. 
(4) ifoolrychp Miltont p. 100. 
603. 
only a temporary expedient. They were looking ahead to what would 
replace it and were discussing alternative forms of government. The 
evidence for these discussions is quite thing and stems from Royalist 
reports and those of the French and Venetian ambassadors. 
Meetings of the officers went on throughout this time. 
Some reports suggest there was a Council of Officers and this may 
have been the case. If so, we have no record of its deliberations 
and it is unlikely that it was on the scale of earlier Councils. 
What seems more likely is that officers sharing various viewpoints 
were meeting informally amoilgst themselves and that some civilians 
also attended such meetings. The idea of a senatewas mootedt an 
issue which was likely to cause division amongst the officers. But, 
as has been pointed out, this was less Harringtonian than one which 
had much in common with the Other House of the Humble Petition. How- 
ever# some of the literature being directed at the army, officersq and 
no doubt influencing their thoughtsp was Harringtonian in essence and 
was part of a conscious campaign. 
(') 
The officers who favoured this 
wanted the senate to include themselves and to be co-ordinate with the 
House of Commons, a view which had already been expressed in late April 
and in the army petition of 13 May. This seems to have been opposed 
by sections of the junior officerst and no doubt by those of the 
senior officers who had opposed it in April as well. Their reasoning 
appears to have been that it would give their superiors too much power 
Woolrych,, Milton, p. 103 n9;, Clarendon State Papers, 
IIIp p., 511; C. Clar. S. P. 9 IV9 p. 262. 
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at the expense of the Commonst a view shared by many of the Rump. 
There were efforts to bridge the gap by urging the officers favouring 
a senate to drop their demand for a perpetual senate and to have it 
elected annually along with the Commons. 
(') 
But if the officers were 
divided on the question of the Senate so too was the Rump. Wariston 
reported that Haselrig did not favour Vane's or Neville's (a Harringtonian 
Republican) views on government. 
(2 ) 
There is also evidence to suggest 
that the junior officers, under the burden of lack of payp were becoming 
less interested in politics anyway and like the soldieryp were more 
concerned with mundane things. The soldiery themselves do not seem 
to have been at all moved by the political developments. Indeedl the 
grievance of pay arrears9 so fundamental to politicising the army in 
16479 was beginning to come to the front again. It was to become very 
important in early 1660 6nly then, and even at this timet it had no 
political overtones. Some of Lambert's forces were reported to have 
mutinied for lack of pay on their way out of London to suppress Dooth's 
rising. 
(3) 
Guizot, Richard Cromwellp It Pp- 391t 392t 400; Wariston, 
-- 
. This Diary, III, pp. 123t 125; C. Clar. S. P., IVt p. 273 
confirms the officers meetings and gives some of the parti- 
cipantsq but the suggestion that there was a serious discussion 
about making Lambert Protector is absurd. Royalists were 
to give much credence to the reports that the officers 
favoured a new Protector jLbid. # pp. 279P 286; Clarendon 
State Papers, IIIP P- 345). The Venetian ambassadorg 
reporting the officers' meetings thought Parliament might 
be dissolved but added that the officers were uncertain 
about what to replace it with (C. S. P. V. 1659-61, pp. 44,47P 
50). The French ambassador also heard rumours ýbat the army 
intended to dissolve the Rump (Guizott Richard Cromwell, 1, 
p. 434)- Howevert these stories must be tempered by the 
fact that Major Robert Harlowp a Royalist, was up before 
the Council of State for spreading rumours that the army 
intended acu against Parliament (National Register of 
Archivest IS 8 Saunders paperst Number 80; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, 
Pp-, 32t 369'79t,, 86). 
(2) Waristong Diaryt III, p. 125. 
(3) Nicholas Papers, IV, pp. 168-169t 170-171; C. S. P. V. 1659-61, 
P. 56; National Register of Archivest 18686, Saunders 11apersp 
Number 88. 
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The divergence between army and Parliament was smoothed 
over temporarily by Booth's rising which occured in Augusto although 
the government had had knowledge of such a rising in July. Lambert 
and Disborowe were given command of the forces to crush the rising, 
Lambert in the north and north-west and Disborowe in the south-west 
and south Walesq areas in which they had both worked before. 
(') 
Lambert was overjoyed to be taking to the field once more. On his 
way out of London he was reported to be "obviously highell against 
Cavaliers and Presbyterians and to have said 
"that he will perishe or not allowe life to any 
gentleman engaged or above 20OLl per annum (sic) 
to any of that party or persuation surviveinge. 11 (2) 
The defeat of the rising was important both militarily 
and psychologically from the army's point of view. As with the cam- 
paigns culminating at Worcester in 1651 it gave a much-needed boost to 
morale and seemed to show that God was on the side of the army and 
encouraged some of the officers to become more resolute in putting 
pressure on Parliament. Could military success# apparently backed by 
God, be transformed into political success as well? Lambert emerged 
from the campaign with enhanced prestigep but his vanity was pricked 
by Parliament's rejection of Fleetwood's proposal to restore his title 
of Major General. 
(3) 
It must have recalled the Rump's earlier refusal 
(1) Daviesl Restorationg p. 139. For a full account of the 
rising q. v. ibid., pp. 123-143- 
(2) Nicholas Papersp IVP pp. 177-178. 
(3) Daviesq Restorationg p. 146. When Overton was restored 
to the army he was given the title of Major General but not 
the pay (C. S. P. D. 1658-29t P. 375). C. f. Thurloe's tart 
comment in May. He mentions that Lambert has his regiment 
back, but not his Major General ,s place "which I suppose 
he must bell (B. M. Add. Its. 22919, f. 100). 
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to make him Lord Deputy of Ireland. 
The immediate outcome of this renewed self-confidence 
amongst some of the officers was the Derby petition. The petition 
emanated from the forces under Lambert. Some 50 officers were involved 
in the discussions from which it emerged. Sankeyp the commander of the 
Irish Brigade (1,000 foot under Axtell and 500 horse under himself, sent 
out of Ireland to help suppress Booth's rising, a body which was to play 
an important part in army politics over the next few months)p together 
with Colonel Mitchellp Major Richard Creed of Lambert's horse and others, 
'were specifically charged with the drafting of the petition. In its 
final form the petition called on Parliament to prosecute the demands 
of the army's petition of 13 May- It went on to make specific demands 
for alterations in the army's senior commandt ostensibly on the grounds 
of trying to prevent attempts to sow division in the army. Fleetwood 
'was to remain Comander-in-Chief and his commission which was soon to 
expire was to be renewed. Lambert was to be his number two with Dis- 
borowe number threet as chief of the horse. Monck was to be next in 
command in charge of the foot. Reading between the lines of the draft 
of the petition there appears to have been some unease at giving Monck 
such a senior position, but, as must have been obvioust he was too 
important an individual to be brushed aside. The final two demands, 
calling for a remodelling of the corporations which had been favourable 
to the Royalists and the punishment of all recent rebels and their 
sympathisersp reflected the view that notenough was being done to stamp out 
the dangers from the Royalists. 
(')-- 
Clarke b1s. 31P f, 2.17v; H. M. C. Leyborne-Popham, pp. 122-123; 
Bakerp Chroniclep pp. 654-655; Clarke Paperst IV# Pp- 57-58 
for the letter to Monck by the officers supporting the petition 
enclosing a copy, thus showing their awareness of his 
importance. 
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The petition was addressed to Parliament but was forwarded 
to Fleetwood to be laid before the General Council of Officers. Fleet- 
wood passed it on to Haselrig who took it to the Housep where a debate 
ensued and it was even proposed to commit Lambert to the Tower as the 
man chiefly responsible for it. 
(') 
The petition was by no means sub- 
versive$ even if in the last two clauses the petitioners did not 
confine themselves to strictly military mattersp although arguably 
even these dealt with national securityp a matter of prime concern 
to the army. Fleetwood would have been better adivsed to have laid the 
petition before a General Council of Officers for discussion. His action 
in handing it to Haselrig displays ineptitudet especially if he believed 
that Haselrig would present it to the House uncritically. The crisis 
was abated somewhat by the R=pIs decision not to commit Lambert. How- 
everp the motion that 
"to have any more General Officers than are already 
settled by the Parliament is needlessq chargeable 
and dangerous to the Commonwealth" 
ensured that the confrontation had only temporarily subsided. 
(2) 
One problem which cannot be settled conclusively about the 
Derby petition is Lambertts role. Both the late Godfrey Davies and 
rrofessor Woolrych support the view that Lambert had no knowledge of 
itv although Davies suggests that the officers in Derby were acting in 
concert with some officers in London. Ile cites Baker's Chronicle in 
support of this. 
(3) 
There is no hard and fast evidence to support the 
(1) Woolrychp Miltong pp. 112-113; Davies, Restoration,, p. 148. 
(2) Woolrych, Milton, p. 113. 
(3) ibid., loc. 
--cit,,; 
Daviest Restoration,, p. 147. 
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view that Lambert either was involved in the petition or had fore- 
knowledge of it. The discussions preceding it certainly took place 
when Lambert was in Derbyp(l) although he appears to have left for 
London before the petition was completed. It would be surprising if 
Lambert did not, at the least, get wind of the discussions. Ile must 
certainly have sympathised with the petitioners' objectives. His 
departure for London before the completion of the petition might well 
have been with the intention of preparing a General Council of Officers 
for it. 
(2) 
If this were the caset he can hardly be blamed for failing. 
to anticipate Fleetwood's action in passing on the petition to Haselrig. 
He must have known that his offer to resign 
(3) 
would not have been 
taken seriously. He had managed to manoeuvre himself into a position 
of strength in the armyt almost a position of indispensibilityp since 
his return in April. The Derby petition affair helped strengthen his 
position amongst the officers in London. The reaction that the petition 
provoked-in the parliament was said to have caused resentment among 
some of the officers. 
(4) 
On 22 September the House had ordered Pearsonv Ashfield 
and Ralph Cobbett to bring the original of the petition before it. 
This does not appear to have been insisted upong perhaps because it 
could have been construed as too much of a humiliation of the officers 
(I) H. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamp pe 123- 
(2) Bakert Chroniclep p. 654- 
(3) Woolrychp Miliont pe 113- 
Waristonv Diaryp IIIv P- 138- 
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concerned-. On 23 September Fleetwood was ordered to communicate the 
House's vote that the petition was "dangerous to the Commonwealth" to 
the officers. 
(') 
The following day at a meeting in Wallingford House 
he carried out this instruction. The officers agreed to drop the Derby 
petition and instructed a committee to draw up a "more moderate', 
address professing adherence to the authority of the House. This was 
to be presented to a General Council on 27 September. 
(2 ) 
According 
to Phillips the committee of officers responsible for drawing up the 
new petition departed from their original brief and brought in a 
petition which attacked the Rump for its proceedings against Lambert's 
forces. They were thus trying to outflank a group of officers who by 
and large sympathised with the Rump and who were to stand by it over 
the next few weeks. This group consisting of Colonels Okeyp Hacker, 
Saundersg Lt. Colonel Nicholas Andrewsp Majors John Daberonp Nathaniel 
Bartong William Hobartt Arthur Evelyn and CaptairsClement Needham and 
John Breman amongst othersp protested against this new petition and 
tried to hold it up. Some of them wrote to Nonck asking him to use 
his influence with Fleetwood and Lambert to stop this petition. 
(3) 
It is worth adding at this point that Haselrig appears to have attended 
these meetings of the Council of Officers in his capacity as Colonel. 
According to one report he was threatened with being cashiered as a 
mutineer. Wariston says that het Haselrigp asserted that absolute power 
C-J-9 VII, pp. 7849 785., The Pnblick Intelligencer 
(19- 
2 ptember 1659) says, that the three officers summoned 
before Parliament wereýAshfieldp Cobbeft and Lt. Colonel 
John Dnckenfield. The. latterg along with Major Richard 
Creed, -was,, instructed by 
the officers at Derby to go up 
to London to acquaint the officers there with the petition 
(Clarke Papers, --IVt, pp. '57t 58n. ). 
(2) Bakerg Chronielep p. 656; Loyall Scout, 23-30 September 1659; 
Publick Intelligencer, 19-23 September 1659; c. f. Ludlow, 
Memoirsp 119 P- 135- 
(3) Bakerg Chronicleg p. 656; Clarke lis. 32t f- 5v.; Dodl. 
Clarendon Mse tf 102; Thurloet VIIt P. 
754ý-755 for 
Clement Needh ts interes-f-ing and articu3ate attack on the 
supporters of the new petition. 
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was in Parliament to which the officers replied that they were employed 
to counteract arbitrary power no matter in whom, thus implying that 
they were the judges of what constituted 'arbitrary power'. Fleetwood 
in his usual indecisive way urged both sides to sleep on the whole 
business. 
(') 
Iffiether or not Okey and his colleagues wrote to Monck, 
the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland had already discouraged meetings among 
his forces in support of the Derby petition which had already been sent 
to Scotland. 
(2 ) 
The attempts by Okey and the others to frustrate the 
new petition were successful in delaying its presentation until 5 
October by which time some 230 signatures had been appended to it. 
(3) 
The newsbooks tried to give the impression that there was unity within 
the army and that there was harmony between them and the Rumpt which 
was, of course, far from the truth. 
(4) 
In fact the officers were 
split more than at any time since early 1647 when the issue of disbanding 
had posed such a threat to unity. Wariston was more accurate than the 
newsbooks when he described developments as a struggle for supremacy 
between army and Parliament. 
(5) 
But as we have seen the army itself 
was divided. 
The Rump began to brace itself for a confrontation with 
the army. The question of pay arrears was discussed and there was 
(1) C. Clar. S. P., IVt P. 394; Waristong, Diaryt 1119 P- 139. 
(2) Clarke Papers, IVq pp. 58-59 + n. 
(3) Bakert Chronicle,, p. 656. - C. f. the Publick Intelligencer 
(26 September-3 October 1659) which says that on 27 
September some 23 officers met to discuss the new petition 
which it says was to be presented to the Council of Officers 
on 3 October. 
(4) Weekly Postg 27, September-4 October 1658; WeeklX Intelligencerl 
27 September-4 October 1659. 
(5) Waristong Diaryp IIIf p. 140. 
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talk of recruiting the House which was only likely to aggravate the 
situation even more. 
(1) 
In the north Ashf ield Is regiment had framed 
its own petition but on hearing of "some demurs among the officers at 
London concerning it" they decided to postpone sending it. 
(2) 
The 
army petition was finally presented on 5 October. It could hardly 
claim to represent the views of all the officers of the army. Those 
in the capital were already split and Monck was showing signs of 
diverging from those who supported the petition. They in turn realised 
the weakness of their position and tried to get subscriptions from the 
forces in Scotland and Ireland. 
(3) 
The petition was presented by Disborowe; Iambert would 
have been a bit too provocativep given the prevailing view of the RUMP 
that he was responsible for the Derby petition. Disborowe was accompanied 
by Berryp Packerp Axtell and Barrowo(4) The petitiong or Representation 
and Petition as it was known - opened 
by vindicating the Derby 
petitioners. It went onto deny that there was any intention of 
setting up a single person and re-affirmed loyalty to the good old 
causeq urging Parliament to continue to promote it. The petitioners 
went on to make several demands relating to the army# including a re- 
affirmation of the view, so often expressed in 1647, that members of. 
the army had not lost their right as freemen to petition Parliament 
Woolrych, Miltong p. 114; Davieso Restorationt P. 149. 
The extent to which the armyts arrears had been neglected 
can be judged from the fact that on 2 September the Council 
of State ordered that clothes be given to the non-commissioneJ 
officers and soldiers in lieu of arrears. 
(2) B. M. Add. Hs. 21p 4259 f. 141. 
(3) Bakert Chroniclet p. 659- 
(4) Clarke Ms. 32p f. 5v- 
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merely because they were soldiers. They conceded the right of Parlia- 
ment to approve the nomination of officers but requested that only those 
who had been approved by, the nominating committee should be allowed into 
the armyt thus indirectly admitting that they had had a fair amount of 
influence over nominations any way. 
(') 
Over the next few days the House got down to the business 
of discussing the petitionp but broke off the debate because word was 
passed on to Haselrig by Okey on 11 October that letters were being 
sent to the regiments urging them to subscribe to the petition. There 
was nothing necessarily sinister in thiso but it did show that the 
officers in London who had promoted the petition were aware that they 
were acting out-of-step with their brethreng and that they were trying 
to remedy this, Haselrig over-reacted. Fearing a coupq the House 
passed a bill declaring that all legislation enacted since April 1653 
'was null and void unless confirmed by the Rump and that as from 11 
October it would be treason to raise money in any form 'without the 
consent of Parliament. This was calculated provocation. The following 
day the signatories of the letter to Okey and to the other regiments 
asking for subscriptions to the petitionp Lambertv Disborowet Berryt 
Kelseyt Ashfieldt Cobbett Creedq Packer and Barrow were cashiered. 
Fleetwood was displaced as Commander-in-Chief and replaced by seven 
commissionersq himself, Ludlowq 11onckp Ilaselrigg Waltont Morley and 
Overton. Wariston and his Scottish associates thought it "a strange 
Balcerg, Chroniclev pp. 657-659; E100(5) The Representation 
and Petition of the officers of the A0 
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and judicial madnessell to cashier the officers without first being sure 
about being able to rely on the rest of the army* 
(1) 
The officers now 
had the perfect excuse to intervene. On 12 October Haselrigt Walton 
and Morley acting under their power as commissioners ordered Morley's 
own regiment and Moss's to guard the area around the Parliament. The 
following day despite the attempts by Morley and Haselrig to woo them 
with money most of these men defected to Lambert who headed the forces 
carrying out the coup against the R=p. For the second time in just 
over six years the army dissolved the 1'h=p. 
(2) 
(1) Wariston,, Diary, IIIp po 144o 
(2) Bodl. Clarendon Ms. 65t ff. 227-228. Ifoolrych, Milton 
pp. 115-117; Daviesp Restoration, q pp. 151-153. 
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ii. OCTOBM'Iý-DEXEMDER 1659 
The coup against the lb=p caused confusion and those in 
the army who had brought it about at first showed hesitation over 
their next move. There was talk of trying to work out a compromise 
'with the Rump. Meetings took place between some of the leaders of the 
Lo 
.a and some of 
the leaders of the Rump. The Council of Statep which 
continued to sit until 25 Octoberp might have been viewed as a 
possible way of keeping up contacts between army and civilians in an 
effort to achieve a compromiseq but its numbers were very depleted 
after 15 October. It must have been painfully obvious to allq except 
the most naive, that there was little chance of the R=p and the 
Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction burying the hatchet. 
(') 
After all fundamental differences about the constitution 
and about priorities had existed since April and the ]Parliament had 
never shown any great enthusiasm for the army's proposals as laid out 
in the petitions of 13 Jlay and 5 October. If these differences had 
not been settled over the simmer why should they be now after so much 
acrimony and in such a highly inflamed situation? Haselrigq who made 
the running in the Ihmp, and Lambertv who made the running in the 
armyp were digging themselves'into, entrenched positions; indeed they 
had already dug themselves in before the events of 12 and 13 October. 
Guizot, Richard Cromwellp, II, pp. 2679 272; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, 
p. XXV; Waristonp Diaryg, 1119 p, 145; Clarke Paperst IV, 
pp. 62-63; Whitelocket Memorialst IV9 P- 365; Woolrychq 
Milton. pp. 118-119. 
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Attempts would be made to try and build a bridge between some of the 
R=pers and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction andp if we are 
to accept Ludlow's highly personal accountp he was to be one of, the 
principal actors involved in trying to mediate between unyielding 
Rumpers and equally unyielding army officers. 
(') 
Some of the M=Pers 
were of course to sit on the Committee of Safety. It was to be mooted 
at various times in the course of the next few weeks that the Rump 
should be restoredp and just before its return in December Disborove 
was reported to -favour making 60 of the best and most able of its 
members into the select senate so dear to some of the officers. 
(2) 
It would have been in effect a fag-end of a fag-end of the Long 
Parliament. Such a proposalp and other equally impractical ones which 
were bandied about over the next few weeksp merely serve to emphasise 
the near anarchical manner in which the nationts politics were 
conducted during this time, 
In the end the Rump was restored or rather returned* but 
not as it had been in May as part of a presumed deal between army and 
Rump to safeguard the good old cause and carry it along to greater 
achievementsv but rather by force of circumstances; there really was 
no alternative. The Lambert/Disboroye/Fleetwood faction in London had 
collapsed from within as had its attempts to work with civilianst and 
there was no desire or enthusiasm amongst those officers who had 
either supported it or acquiesced in it to take on Haselrig and the 
(1) Ludlow, Memoirs, II, pp. 143-146. 
(2) ibid. 9 pp. 182-183. 
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forces at Portsmouth, or Monckv or the fleet. In the north Lambert's 
force was also disintegrating, The leaders of the faction were forced 
to drop their plans for a new Parliament and the lbimp returned by 
default. Asias pointed out in the introduction to this chapter the 
re-restoration of the Rump in December 1659 effectively marks the end 
of the army's political role. 
If there was no likelihood of the leaders of the coup 
patching things up 'with the Rump, the formerp as had always been the 
case in the pastp sought the assistance of civilianst including members 
of the dissolved Parliament who were willing to work with them, to 
share their newly assumed power. Five officersp Fleetwoodt Lambertt 
Disborove, Sydenham, and Berry (whot as we have seent was reported to 
have had a hand in drawing up the Instrument of Government in December 
1653) and five members of the Council of Stateg 14hitelocket Vane, 
Salwayt Sir James Harrington and Johnston of Waristont were set up by 
the Council of Officers as a temporary committee to work out how the 
government of the nation should be carried on, 
(') 
It seems most likely 
that their brief was intended to cover the pressing short-term need for 
some satisfactory and viable form of government rather than to answer 
the long-term question of settlement. The five officers were the 
principle movers behind the dissolution of the 11umpt but the civilians 
were a very disparate group. The officers were clutching at any 
available straws. This was not the way to go about achieving a lasting 
settlement, one that would be acceptable to a significant number of the 
political nation. 
Woolrychg Miltong p. 119* 
I 
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During these days the Council of Officers continued to 
meet. Colonel Ralph Cobbetbwas instructed to go to Scotland as a 
personal envoy to explain and justify the recent coup and Colonel 
Robert Barrow went on a similar mission to Ireland. 
(') 
Both officers 
had been amongst those who had had their commissions revoked before 
the dissolution of the R=p. The officers who had adhered to the 
Ramp on the 13th were suspended from their comands. It was at first 
decided to leave it up to a court martial to determine whether they 
should be kept on or cashiered# but it is unlikely that any court 
martials took place. With the possible exception of Robert Overton's 
treatment, vindictiveness towards their own nunbers had never characterised 
the officers at any time during the 1650's. 1he number said to have 
been suspended initially was 15 and these included Haselrigg Morley, 
Okeyt Alured and Saunders. 
(2) 
Over the next few weeks other officers 
andmen deserted the Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction. 
(3) 
Among the other resolutions reached by the Council of 
Officers at this time was a decision that the articles of war should 
be reviewed; this was referred to a committee. Fleetwood was voted 
Commander-in-Chief of the' land forcesp Lambert Major General of the 
forces of England and Scotland'and Disborowe Commissary General of horse 
in England and Scotlandq a palid reincarnation of the Fairfaxq Cromwell 
Clarke Ms--32t, f., 2lv. - ForAhe attitude of the army in Ireland to events in ]Dagland and Scotland q. v. above. 
(2) E1010(loh The Deelýration of the Officers of the Army, 
Opened, Examined and Condemned and the Parliament Vin icate 
Ludlowt Memoirstýllt p. 148; Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 62-63- 
Clarke Ms 32, f. 129v lists 20 displaced officers including 
Cornet John. Giegory who''had been implicated in Overton's 
'plo-e and subsequentlY cashiered. - He was reinstated in the 
summer of 1659. 
(3) Clarke PaperstIVp pp. 93P 94- 
618. 
Ireton leadership structure of 1647-1649. No mention was made of - 
Monck. The nominating committee was to continue with the exception 
of Haselrig, and its quorum was to be three. Commissions were to be 
granted in Fleetwood's name and no officers were to be tried except 
by a court martial., Existing commissions were to be renewed without 
a new approbation. Lambert appears to have been very influential at 
these meetings. 
(') 
There is some indication that Fleetwood was 
reluctant to accept the generalship until his colleagues made their 
intentions clearer. 
(2) 
But if sog he was easily prevailed upon to 
accept it. It was also intended to circularise the regiments with the 
results of these deliberations. A form of engagement to be loyal to 
the leaders of the coup was also devised and tendered to both the 
officers and soldiery for subscriptions. Ludlow says that this was 
the means by which the 15 officers were removed from their commands. 
He also says that Moss who had tried to oppose the c2=9 and Rich 
were allowed to stay on without subscribing. But the list of officers 
in the Clarke Mss contradicts this assertion as it includes Moss. 
(3) 
Nine of the officers removed from the army drew up an 
address to Fleetwood at the beginning of November. They were Morleyq 
Evelyng Farley. (Morley's Lt. Colonel)p Okeyq Streaterg Aluredp Barton 
(Saunders, Major)q Saunders and Markham. The document shows signs of 
being the work of Streater. It is extremely articulate. In it the 
M Loyal Seoul, 16-21 October 1659; Thurloeq VII, p. 771; 
Clarke Ms 32p f. 21v. 
(2) Mayerg"Inedited LettersIt, pp. 270-271. 
(3) Weekly Intel'li'gen'cert 18-25 October; Ludlowt Memoirs, 
Up p. 148; Clarke Ms. 321f* 129v. 
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nine officers said that their comrades "have no parliamentary sanction" 
for their present course of action. They were accused of striking 
"at the Liberties of the English nation# and there 
is none now upon the stage of actiong that can 
pretend to the same advantagesp that the former 
Protector had". 
a point showingg and perhaps calculated to showt sympathy and under- 
standing as to why some of their fellow officers had served Cromwellt 
unlike Okey, Aluredt Saunders and Streater who had not and who had 
supported the concept of parliamentary sovereignty from quite early 
on. It was also an indication of their respect for Oliver Cromwell 
and an appreciation of his qualities as a statesman. 
(') 
The nine 
. 
urged their comrades to recall the R=p and to drop their claims to 
be working in the interests of the nationg 
"The good people of this nation have been formerly 
deceived by good words and fair promises. Setting 
days apart for seeking of God in fastings when the 
way is not goodq will not hereafter blind English 
eyes; doing things unwarrantablyq and then intitl- 
ing God to themt as they will never the more be owned 
by Godp so they will be never the more acceptable 
to discerning men. " ' 
In so arguing the nine were in fact stripping away the godly clothes 
(the fastst the prayer meetingst the seeking of the Lord) which had 
shrouded army actions in the past* Indirectlyt and probably not 
consciously, they were attacking and depreciating the mythology by 
which the army had sought to justify its actions to itself and to 
the world. The appeal to "discerning men" and the implicit confidence 
that these men had the ability to see through the bombastic language 
C. f. Monck and his officers' disparaging remarks about 
Cromwell (Clarke Ms- 32# ff- 32t 49vt 115). 
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of godly propaganda, so much favoured by the armyq and to judge 
politics in a more obviously secular way represents a high level of 
sophistication in political discussiont one which had previously been 
displayed by the levellers. 
(') 
The address continued with a eulogy, 
of the Rumpp an esteem for what the nine saw as its achievements. 
They rightly pointed out that successive attempts at settlement in 
the last few years had included Parliamentaq despite some attempts 
"to wean this Baglish nation from love unto their parliaments". 
Again this suggests a more elaborate kind of argumentt and a more 
modern onet that of learning from the past. The nine felt that 
there was no way of circumventing the peoplets love for Parliaments$ 
and their support for the m im that sovereignty resides in the people 
in their representative Parliaments. They point out that 
"the spirit of the free born Englishmen (notwith- 
standing Parliament interruptionsp yet) is still 
working towards a Parliament. " 
In fact their comrades fully realised this as their attempts to get 
a new Parliament were to prove. The difference between them was 
largely that between trust and distrust of unicameral Parliaments. 
It was more about means than about endst but the army, the vanguard 
of the good old causep the revolutionary causep was hopelessly split 
over these means. The supporters of the coup and their fellow travellers 
had no intention, as the nine suggestedt of setting up a "sword govern- 
ment". The inclusion of civilians on the interim governing bodyp the 
The nine do in fact talk about "the free born Englishmen". 
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committee of ten set up after the dissolution of the lt=pt showed this. 
The nine officers alleged that the dissolution of the Rump was carried 
out merely as a result of the cashiering of nine officers. This was 
indeed the immediate causep but, as we have seen, the background to it 
was far more complex than that. They also suggested that current 
discussions in the Council of Officers were not really free and 
certainly not representative of their own views. They concluded by 
urging their fellow officers to restore the Rump so that it 
"may take some effectual course for as comprehensive 
an election of a succeeding parliament# as the 
safety of the cause will bear. " (1) 
In other words the Rump was not to be allowed to sit in perpetuity and 
its successor was not to be a free Parliament. These two suggestions 
would certainly have met with the approval of their comrades. 
During the rest of October discussions were held to deter- 
mine what should be done to achieve a more lasting settlement. Various 
ideas were bandied about including that of a select senate which was to 
remain a favourite over the next few weeks. A more satisfactory solution 
to the short term problem of goverment was achieved. This was the 
Committee of safety, which received its authority to govern from the 
Council of Officers on 26 October* Sir-onses to sit on the Committee 
were sent out by the officers. It was the first time the army or a 
part of it had acted in such a way since Cromwell sent out the writs 
E1005(8)9 The Humble Representation ... to General ]Rleet- 
wood, repr. in Thurloet VIIP Pp. 771-774. 
I 
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for Barebones in his capacity as Captain General and Commander-in- 
Chief. Of the 2j members of the Committee of Safety ton were army 
officersp Fleetwood, Lambert, Disborowet Sydenhamo Derryt Ludlow, 
Hewsonq John Clarke (Clerk)t Lilburne and Bennet. 
(1 ) 
The Council 
of Officers had a considerable say in the selection of the Committee. 
The French ambassador even reported that the junior officers tried 
to get Harrison elected. But the list was finalised on the 25th 
hastily because of the deteriorating relations between Monck and the 
supporters of the coup. 
(2) 
-Dv and 
large the Committee of Safety exercised the same 0 
powers as the Council of State had donep but it also had power to deal 
with delinquents and to indemnify those who had acted for the state 
since 1641. These powers were also defined on the 25th. During the 
discussions about the Committee it was suggested that if it did not 
come up with a new constitution within six weeks then the Council of 
Officers should undertake to do so but that during these six weeks it 
should nevertheless consult the officers about a new constitution. 
This serves to emphasise just how much control the Lambert/Disborove/ 
Fleetwood faction wanted the army to exercise in public affairs and 
the claims they were making on behalf of it to be the guardian of the 
good old cause. 
(3) 
Whether they could have come up with an alternative 
Clarke Hs- 329 f. 57; Whitelocker Memorialst IV, P- 367- 
The late Godfrey Davies"(Restorationt pp. 157-158) does not 
mention the substantial influence of the Council of Officers 
in shaping the'Committee of Safety. 
(2) Guizotq Richard Cromwellp 119 275 (the French ambassador's 
report is important for, dating 
; Weekly Intelligencer, 
18-25 October 1659; Waristong Diaryq 114 P- 147; Woolrych, 
Milton, pp. 131-132. 
(3) Guizotv Richard CromwelIq Up pp. 276-277; Weekly Intelligencer, 
25 October-I November 1659. 
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constitution let alone one that would prove workable and acceptable 
to a sufficient number of the political nation so as to make it 
practicablet is doubtfult despite the strong feeling in the Council 
of Officers for a select senate. The idea of a senate seems to have 
obsessed the Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction and they appear to 
have hoped it would be a deus ex machina, that would magically solve 
the problem of settlement. In the event a sub-committee of the 
Committee of Safety was appointed early in November to consider a 
suitable form of government for the three nations "in the way of a 
free state and Commonwealth". Presumably this sub-committee superseded 
the committee of ten set up after the dissolution of the Rump, if indeed 
that committee was concernedwith proposing long-term answers to 
settlement, Of the 13 members who were originally appointed to sit 
on the sub-committee Fleetwoodt Ludlowt Lambertt Disboroweq Berry and 
Hewson were officers. 
(') 
The model of government which eventually 
formed the basis of discussion at the General Council of the Army in 
December was the outcome of this sub-committeets deliberations. 
The Committee of Safety was expected to liase with the 
Council of Officers, no doubt so that the Council of Officers could 
keep a close watch on its activities and -thus show to the world that 
it was not backsliding once again. The co-existence of the Committee 
of Safety and the Council of Officers created a situation whereby there 
Ludlow, Memoirs, I10 p. 149; Whitelocke, Memorials, IV, 
PP- 368--379'-. Ee sub-committee was originally made up 
of five members appointed on 1 November. The others 
were added on 3 November (Weekly Post, 1-8 November 1659; 
Weekly Intelliaencer, 1-8 November 1659). 
624. 
were two potentially competing sources of power and authority. The 
declaration of the General Council of Officers on 27 October went so 
far as to declare that the acts of (the R=p) Parliament passed immediately 
before its dissolution, that is those relating to legislation enacted 
since April 1653 and to the raising of moneyq were void. 
(') 
This was 
an exercise of military power as never before. The alienating effects 
of this on those members and former members of the army vho did not 
support the coup and on large and significant sectionsof the political 
nation are-obvious. One suspects that at times the Lambert/Disborove/ 
Fleetwood faction were not really aware of the implications of some 
of their pronouncements and decisions* 
This declaration of the Council of Officers also set out 
the lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction's side of the story of the 
conflict with the Rump and of the dissolution. It claimed that the 
.y 
Parliament was an attempt to break the army issuing of commissionsb 
into factions not only by 
"bringing divers persons into Command of 
prejudicial mindesq but by removing faith- 
full officers into remote parts of this 
Commonwealth" 
without cause and without consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. 
No wonder the nine "discerning" officers were cynical about such mis- 
representation in their address to Fleetwood. The Declaration also 
expressed the hope that the new goverment would assume liberty to 
all the free born in civil and religious matters and promised reform 
E1001(12)9, A"Declaration'of'fhe General Council of Officers 
Agreed y1on at Wallingford House; Guizotv Richard Cromwell, 
Ur p. 282. 
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of the law,, the encouragement of godly ministers and the removal of 
tithes. It concluded by saying that the establishment of the Committee 
of Safety was a guarantee that the officers did not intend to set up 
a military dictatorship. 
(') 
As we have seen, even while these developments were taking 
place Monck's attitude was already beginning to influence decisions 
being made in London. The eventual conflictt albeit a bloodless one, 
between the forces under Monck and those of the Lambert/Diaborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction under Lambert's leadership was to be importantt but 
not crucial, in deciding the fate of the insecure 'goverment' in 
Londonp but decisive in determing the fate of the good old cause. 
Howeverg before going on to look at this conflict we shall consider 
the stance of Ludlow and Overtong two of the most important officers 
not in London during the October crisis, 
Ludlow, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in 
Ireland over the summerv was in Ireland during the crisis and decided 
to return to England. He was informed of the Rmp's dissolution when 
he landed at Beaumarais and despite some doubts pressed on to London, 
where he played a full role in the events of the next few weeks. In 
his Memoirs he is careful to present himself in the most favourable 
light as a moderate and as working all along for the return of the Rump. 
(2) 
But his role is a little more ambiguous than that. According to John 
Jones, who was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief in Ireland in 
(1) E1001(121 A Declaration of -the General Council of Officers 
(2) Ludlowv Memoirs, II, pp. 124-131- 
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Ludlow's absenceg the latter wrote to him on his way to London saying 
that he would work with those now in power if they resolved "to 
establish honest righteouse things" and that if they did not he would 
retire*(') 
If Ludlow's behaviour is ambivalentf that of Robert Over- 
ton is even more so. His somewhat maverick approach to developments 
defies classification as either a Rumper or a Harringtonian republican, 
although he did have some Fifth Monarchist leanings. In this respect 
he blends in with a renewed millenarian mood in late 1659 reflected 
in the attempt to have Harrison and Carew elected as members of the 
Committee of Safety. Vaneg who shared in this mood, felt that this 
body ushered in the Kingdom of God. 
(2) 
Howeverg although TP suggested 
above that millenarian views were a brand of Republicanism# with the 
exception of individuals like Vane and Overtonp those subscribing 
to themg particularly the Fifth Monarchistst were never vell-enough 
organised or united to play a leading and influential part in the 
more mundane task of political activity. 
(3) 
In September 1659 Overton 
had joined with a predominantly Fifth Monarchist group of individuals 
in signing An Essay towards Settlement which supported the original 
expulsion of the Rump in 1653 and urged the setting up a new rule of 
the saints and the purging of all former-Protectorians from office. 
Yet the following month the leaders of the Rump still trusted him 
enough to make him one of the seven commissioners to rule the army 
Mayer, tInedited Letteralp pp. 282-283- 
(2) Waristong Diaryt IIIP P. '149. 
(3) For the renewed millenarian mood q. v. Capp, Fifth 
Monarchy Ment: pp. 124-128. 
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just before the coup. Perhaps this is an indication of just how wide 
the R=p leadership was prepared to cast the net of supposed Republi- 
canism. On 11 October Overton and the garrison of Hull refused to 
sign the Humble Representation and Petition, and called instead for 
unity and submission to the authority of the Rump. By 27 October 
Overton was said to have declared for the Rumpq although this can be 
interpreted as meaning that he had rejected Monck's overtures to him 
rather than adherence to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Ile 
set out his views in his Humble and Healing Advice in which he viewed 
the dissolution of the Rump as an act of providence and reiterated 
his Fifth Monarchist sympathies and his determination to remain 
neutral should fighting break out between Monck and the lambert/Dis- 
borowe/Fleetwood faction. 
(') 
There was no mistaking the way Monck would respond to the 
dissolution of the Rump in view of his attitude to the Derby petition 
and his refusal to let his forces subscribe to the Humble Representation 
and Petition. 
(2) 
Howeverg we have evidence that an oath of loyalty to 
the Commonwealth as established without a single person# kingship or 
a House of Lords circulated and was subscribed by at any rate some of 
the forces under his command at this time. Subscriptions to this 
oath were taken in Charles Fairfax's regiment during September and 
in October after the dissolution. Fairfax# hardly a radical but more 
Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 60-61,94; Clarke Ms- 32# ff. 469 
57; Loyal Scoutý 21-28, October 1659; WeeklX Intelligrencer, 
1-8 November 1659; Guizotp Richard Cromwell, II, pp. 274P 
2809 284-285; B. M 669 f. 21(73)0 An Essay Towards Settlement; 
B. M. 100 f-75P Th: Humble Healing Advice; D. N. B.; Woolrycht 
Milton, p. 111; Capp, Fifth Monarchy Mpn,, Fp-. 126,128. 
(2) Clarke Paperst IV, pp. 60-61n. 
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of an apolitical mant was trusted by Monck which gives one good 
grounds for assuming that the oath had Monck's approval. 
(') 
Monck 
heard of the dissolution on 17 October and declared his intention to 
stand by the dissolved Parliament on 20 October in three letters to 
Fleetwoodq Lambert and the Speaker. 
(2) 
Colonel Ralph Cobbet the envoý 
of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction was not the bearer of the 
news of the dissolution. The news reached him in an express letter 
from Clarges. Monck's order book records that instructions were sent 
to Berwick on 20 October that, in case Cobbet should turn up there, 
he was to be arrested. On 22 October a formal order for securing 
Cobbet was issued. Cobbet was said to be working for the officers 
adhering to the faction and aiming to divide those loyal to Parliament. 
(3) 
This would seem to suggest that right from the start Monck had little 
or no intention of trying to reach an understanding and compromise with 
his comrades in England. 
Monck's three letters were the opening shot in a heavy 
barrage of attacks and counter-attacks over the next few weeks in which 
both sides sought to secure the greatest advantage to themselves both 
politically and militarily. It was a phoney warp or as Gumble put it 
"For all the War was nothing but Paper-bullets, 
mutual Messages and letters. " (4) 
W B. M. Add. Ms. 15t 858t f. 236. 
(2) Bakerp Chroniclet p. 663; T. Gumblep Life of General Ifonek, 
London, IMP P. 132v (This edition is unfortin tely badly' 
paginated); Daviesp'Restoration, g pp. 162-164. 
(3) Clarke Ms. 49 (Monck's Order Book), unfoliated; Dakerv 
Chronicle v pp. 663p 665. 
(4) G=blep MonSk. p. 131- 
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It was largely fought at the level of inferior journalistic propaganda 
more than on any profoundly philosophical one* 
Two things stand out about Monckts behaviour at this time. 
The first is the speed with which he acted in starting to ensure that 
his forces would support the lb=pp and the second that all along he 
acted in close consultation with certain of his fellow officers. His 
'inner circle' was not as small as one contemporary tract suggested. 
Twelve officers are recorded as having attended a Council of Officers 
at Linlithgow on 21 October at which a letter to the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction was drawn up. Those attending included three Majors 
and three Captains, so it was by no means exclusively confined to very 
senior officers. 
(') 
Other letters continued to be drawn up after 
further meetings of the Council of Officers. 
(2) 
But by and large it 
'Would be fair to say that Monck preferred by instinct to work with 
smaller groups of men. Neverthelessq even before he sei out for 
Linlithgow he had called a Council of Officers at Edinburgh. Ironically 
it met in Grey Friars Church where the National League and Covenant 
had been subscribed. At this meeting he declared that "he was resolved 
to make the Military Power subservient to the Civil" and to obey the 
Parliament. Those who could not agree with him were to have the chance 
to resign their. commissions and passes would be issued for their journey 
home. Some of those present were hesitant to commit themselves whole- 
(1) Clarke Ils 32, f. 27v; B*M. 669 f. 21(86)t A Letter from a 
Person of Quality at_Edinburgh. C. f. Clarke Papersp lVt 
P. 97n and F. D. Dowt 'The English Army and the Government 
of Scotland'. York,,, D. '. Phil. p 1976t p. 61o. 
(2) Clarke US 3,2p f. 63-'' 
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heartedly to Monck as they had fears that his course of action could 
lead to possible warfare with their comrades. They suggested treating 
with the latter. 
(') 
Monck had already started to purge some of the regiments 
of men whom he felt were not faithful to the Parliament's interest. 
On 19 October he wrote to Colonel Timothy Wilkes authorising and 
ordering him to purge his regiment and to appoint new officers and to 
inform Monck of these new appointments. Monck claimed his authority 
to do this as one of the seven commissioners appointed by the Rump 
before its dissolution to govern the army. Ile also sent a letter to 
those officers distant from Edinburgh informing them of his action 
and inviting them to join with him. He also requested lists of those 
dissenting so that appropriate action could be taken against them. 
(2) 
It is conceivable that a test or oath was administered to the officers 
and soldiers in the form of the one tendered to Charles Fairfax's 
regiment referred to above. Monek and the officers adhering to him 
were able to re-model the forces in Scotland by a mixture of purges 
and voluntary resignations. Contemporaries said that between 140 and 
144 officers were displaced. Dut this figure includes N. C. 0s. The 
men who left Scotland were allowed to take their horsest arms and other 
necessaries and their servants if they had any. 
(3) 
This could have had 
Baker, Chronicleg p. 664; Gumblep Monckq p. 134v- 
(2) Bakerp Chronicle, p. 664; Clarke, Ms. 49g (Monck's Order Book). 
(3) Bakert Chronicle, p. 669; Gumblev Monck, p. 136v.; 
Mercurius Politicust 24'November-l December 1659; A. Wool- 
rychq 'Yorkshire and the RestorationIq Yorkshire Archaeo- 
, 
logical Journal'. IXXIXt 1958t p. 486n2; Dowt D. Philt 
pp, 618-622. ,, 
Q. v. also, Clarke , 
Ms. 49 (Monck's Order Book) 
for'the passes-granted to those leaving for England. 
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the effect of swelling Lambert's forces. Judged from the military 
standpoint it was a surprising gesture from one who prided himself so 
much on being a professional soldier. 
ýMeanwhile in the north of England steps were taken by, 
Lilburne to secure both the forces and the region generally for the 
Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction in anticipation of trouble. All 
the officers in Disborowe's regiment stationed in Durham and North 
Yorkshire were expected to sign a declaration of loyalty to the new 
government before being sent to Newcastle. On 28 October Lilburne 
and the various officers under his command sent a pledge of support 
to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. BY 5 November when Lilburne 
was in Newcastle it was reported that -there were great divisions among 
the soldiery with some declaring for the Rmp. This should not be 
exaggerated. There certainly was some trouble but one of the sources 
describing it was a letter to William Clarke which no doubt played up 
the divisions as much as possible. On 7 November both Newcastle and 
Tinmouth were reported to have declared for the Lambert/Diaborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction. 
(') 
It is not clear exactly when Robert Lilburne 
went to the north. He was in London at the time of Richard Cromwell's 
fall but by July he was in the north. He remained absent from London 
throughout the crisis, 
(2) 
The garrison of Carlisle decided to hold out against any 
attempt by Ilonck to secure it. On 31 October they sent an address to 
(1) Clarke Ms- 32j : Ef. 60t 74vt 96; c. f. ibid. 0 f. 58 and 
B. M. Add., Ils. -21p, 4259 f- 175; Publick Intelligencer, 
7-14 November 1659. z 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o,, PP- 59p 690 859 86p 87- 
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Monck declaring that they were determined to resist any force sent 
against them until they were fully satisfied about both Monckta and the 
English army's proceedings. They justified this on the grounds that 
they were afraid of more bloodshed and because of their remotness. 
(l) 
The purges Monck carried out in his regiments were soon 
reported to London, but not without some distortion* On 27 October 
Robert Baynes wrote to Adam Baynes that Monck had imprisoned 
"a great many honest officers and some private 
soldiers and preferr'd men of meane ranke and 
parts to great places. His way looks not well. 
I wish he have not a worse designe then ye 
restoring the parliament. " (2) 
At first sight this evidence dating from quite soon after the u ý Lo 2. 
against the Rump suggesting that Monck's motives were suspect lends 
weight to Dr. Ashley's view that Monck was a secret Royalist from 
August 1659 (however it is not cited by him))a more plausible inter- 
pretation is that people were genuinely puzzled by Monck's vehement 
stand in favour of the Rump. After allt why should a former Royalist 
'who subsequently served under the Commonwealth and the Protectorate 
suddenly become so committed to Republicanism and particularly to the 
Rump? Baynes's comment is based on suspicion and fear. As we shall 
see, right up to March 1660 Monck had not made up his mind about a 
restoration of the Stuarts and until then he was still distrusted by 
Royalists close to the exiled Prince's court. Monck was also reported 
to be recruiting Scots into his army* 
(3) 
He might well have recruited 
(1) Clarke lis. 329 f. 64., ý, C. f. Phillips(Uker# Chronicleg 
p. 665) who claims that the garrison favoured the Lhglish 
army. Firth and Davies (P- 523) follow Phillips. 
(2) B. M. Add. Ms. -'21-, '*425t f. 168. 
(3) Lb_id f 170. 
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some Scots to, fill up the vacancies caused by purging or by those who 
had left voluntarily. In December Ifercurius Britanicus, the propaganda 
newsbook of Monck's forces, claimed that there was no harm in recruiting 
a few Scots who had fought with them for the cause and alleged that 
there was no threat of a rising in Scotland as Monck was popular with 
the Scots. 
(') 
This was not how it was seen in Iondon. The Weekly 
Intelligencer, reported that Monck had left the Highland garrisons to 
the Scots 
11vhich will mean that once Monck's design is 
frustrated in England we'll have to reconquer 
Scotland. " 
In fact Monck's relations with the Scots were a good deal more complex 
than that. 
(2) 
The Weekly Intelligencer also reported that Monck addressed 
the soldiery at Edinburgh promising them their arrears "at which they 
made a loud shout, and gave him 3 volleys of shot. " It contradicts 
this statement a few paragraphs later whe it alleged that Monck's 
forces were full of discontent. Howevert as far as money was concerned 
Monck was better off than the forces in Englandp especially those under 
Lambert which had to rely on free quarter thus contributing to their 
unpopularity. Clargesq who was sent by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood 
faction to request a treaty between themselves and the Scottish commandert 
made Monck well aware of his advantageous financial positione(3) 
The first approaches for some sort of negotiations between 
Manck and the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction came from the latter(4) 
M Wor. Co. -B. B. a. 4. t Mercurius Dritanicus q 8-15 Docember 
1659. ' 
(2) Weekly Intellilzencer, g 1-8 November 1659- On the subject 
of Monek and the Scots and the question o f allowing them 
to arm themselves q. v. Dowt D. Phil. p pp. 624-632p esp. p. 630- 
(3) WeeklZ IntelligencerO 1-8 November 1659; Bakerp Chronicleg 
p. 666; Dow, D. Phil. t p. 623- 
(4) Daviesq Restorationt PP- 171-172. 
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although, as we have seen, some of Monck's own officers had suggested 
that there should be some discussions between the two forces. Monck's 
sincerity about these negotiationsg which eventually resulted in the 
drawing up of a treatyg was rightly questioned by contemporaries. The 
negotiations certainly enabled him to consolidate his position with 
regard to his own forces and the Scots and to allow for the weaknesses 
within the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and its associates to 
paralyse and impair it fatally. As a precaution against any hostile 
move by Monck either before or during the negotiationsg Lambert went 
northwards to take coimnand of the forces there. Judging by Fleetwood's 
remarks before the final collapse in Decembert that he could do nothing 
without Lambert's consent concerning a change of policy there must 
have been some form of unanimity and trust between the leaders of the 
faction. 
(') 
It was hinted at in a newsletter that Lambert intended 
to raise all the north country militia on his way. 
(2) 
His personal 
connections and previous spells of duty there might have encouraged 
the hope that he could do this. It mighto in addition to Lambert's 
own lust for gloryp help explain why he went and not Disborowe whose 
regiment was stationed there. Clearly a very senior officer was 
required and Fleetwood was excluded because of his political importance 
in Iondon. 
Even before form 1 negotiations betveen the two forces 
got under wayp inform 1 contacts were made with Monck. A delegation of 
(1) Whitelocke, Memorialst IVP P- 332, 
Clarke Papersp IVp p. 101* 
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people representing the congregated churches in and around London went 
northwards at the beginning of November to apply pressure on Monck to 
negotiate. The delegation included two former army officers purged at 
the fall of the Protectorateg Whalley and Goffe. Ifq as seems likely, 
the delegation, one of whose prime movers was John Owent had the 
support of the factional leaders in Londong this was a shrewd move. 
As we have seen# Lambert, Disborowel Fleetwoodt Berryt Sydenhamt Goffe 
and Whalley were all members of Oven's Church earlier in the year. 
(') 
The army in Scotland decided upon three commissioners to 
represent them in the negotiations with the Lambert/Disborove/Fleet-7 
wood faction in London. This was settled at a Council of Officers at 
Edinburgh on 3 Novemberg the same day as Lambert left London for the 
north. There were 23 officers present at this meeting, Gumble says 
that such 'democratic' practices were anathema to Monck who 
"though he was good at Driving ... he vas nov forced 
to lead gently. " (2) 
The fact that Monck submitted to such procedural. forms is in itself 
an indication of how his freedom to act was circumscribed. According 
to Gumble's account Monck acted as a chairman at these meetings at which 
the officers were free to agree or disagree with the various proposals. 
(3) 
(1) Weekly PoEtt 1-8 November 1659; Bakerg Chronicleg pp. 668p 
670. Th' ther evidence to support Gumble's view 
(Monck, p. 142v. ) that Whalleyp Goffe and Samuel Hammondq 
the Newcastle divine who had been Haselrig's personal 
chaplain, were fifth columnists trying to undermine Monck's 
forces. 
-The story 
is very unlikely. C. f. Clarke Papbra, 
IV9 pp. 82-83n. 
(2) Clarke Pa I Ritra, IV, pp. 96-97; Gumblet Monck, p. 140v, 
(3) ibid., loc. cit. 
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This is a useful corrective to the widely held assumption that Yonck 
was a virtual autocrat over the army in Scotland and that he went about 
things during these weeks in a calculated systematic fashion. It would 
be more accurate to say that he was working in concert with a number of 
his officers. Monck was not infallible; even in military matters he 
could make foolish errors as the order and counter-order to seize 
Newcastle suggest. Phillips suggests he ordered his Majorg Ralph Knightt 
to seize Newcastle to "amuse" the faction in Ikgland. A more plausible 
explanation is that Monck realised the importance of the town and tried 
to gain control of it-before reinforcements could be sent to strengthen 
itp but that he underestimated the speed with which reinforcements were 
sent up and was forced to abandon the attempt to seize the town. 
(') 
The three commissioners chosen to go to London were 
Colonel TimotlyWilkes, Lt. Colonel John Clobery of Reade's regiment 
and Major Rdph Knight of Monck's horse. 
(2) 
Clobery was a Devonshire 
-an and kinsman of Monck and had been one of Monck's inner circle from 
after the coup. Earlier in the year Royalists had hopes of winning 
him over to the Stuart cause and by December were confident he was 
on their side. In 1660 he was one of Monck's closest advisors and by 
February was working for a Restoration. lie was knighted in June. 
(3) 
These commissioners were later charged by 11onck with having exceeded 
their authority and it was rumoured that Wilkes betrayed "their 
Bakerg Chronicle, pp. 665-666. 
Clarke Papers, v IVt P- 97- 
(3) C. Clar. S. Pet Vp index sub Clobery John; Clarendon 
State Papersp III, pp. 621-622l 652: 6589 6-75t 69-9-9708t 
723P 739; Firth and Daviesp PP- 171-174- 
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secret instructions". Just how secret their instructions were is 
debateable. Wilkes had been one of Monck's trusted advisors and 
colleagues since the beginning of the crisist but when the commis- 
sioners returned from London he had Wilkes arrested and gave his regiment 
to the Majort Thomas Hughes. 
(') 
Clobery was given Philip Twisleton's 
regimentv and Knight Thomas Saunders' (Saunders who had been restored 
to the army over the summer did not join his regiment which was serving 
in Scotland), 
(2) 
It is worthwhile to have a closer look at the con=is- 
sionerst instructionst in particular those referring to constitutional 
matters. The fourth article says that the members of the Rump should 
be allowed to return "with security against future interruptions till 
the 6th of May next", the date by which they had voted to dissolve 
themselves. No new form of government was to be set over the country 
"butt by Parliamentp unlesse they should refuse 
to sitto or sitting should refuse or neglect to 
establish the same betwixt this and the 6th of 
May next. " 
Thusp there was to be no unconditional return of the Rt=p. It vas 
going to have to stick to its own promises. The eleventh article of 
the instructionsq perhaps unintentionallyt gave the commissioners much 
more leaway in these matters. The army's petition of 12 May (it was 
ibid-P PP. 197nq 299-300- This same source alleges that 
Wilkes was a Fifth Monarchist. Dut there is no other 
evidence for this and itis doubtful. C. f. Capp (Fifth 
Monarchy Meng p. 268) and also Gumble (Yonckq p. 144)- 
who, says. that the commissioners were almost made prisoner 
in London and were told that all Monck's horse had revolted 
to, Lambert and that this hastened them into an agreement; 
an unlikely tale. 
(2) Firth and Daviesp pp. 1719 288. 
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presented to Parliament on 13 May) was to be "owned" by the officers of 
the armies of the three nations 
"with such ratification of the 4th, 12th and 13th 
Articles, and parte of the 9th as shall be agreed 
by the Commissioners of the Army now appointed to 
treate. 11 
These articles respectively referred to legislation enacted since the 
Ramp's dissolution in April 16539 Fleetwood's position as Commander-in- 
Chief# the legislative power being in a House of Commons and a select 
senate co-ordinate in power with the House of Commons# and qualifications 
for public servants. 
(') 
At the very leastf then# the instructions were 
ambiguous about the commissioners' authority to deal with constitutional 
matters. 
But even if there are grounds for arguing that technically 
the commissioners did not exceed their instructionsp that is how Monck 
and some of his fellow officers chose to interpret it. 
(2) 
As we have 
suggested Monck's commitment to these negotiations was in the first 
place pretty dubioust and the belief that the commissioners had 
exceeded their brief played right into his hands as did the subsequent 
demand for fresh talks. Doubts about the efficacy of a treaty were 
also shared by some of his officers. 
(3) 
As for the commissionersp they 
were probably motivated by a genuine desire to ensure a peaceful out- 
come to the conflict between the army in Scotland and the Lambert/ 
Disborove/Fleetwood faction. They must have felt that the treaty 
represented the best solution under the circimstances, 
(4) 
(1) Clarke Paperst IVt PP- 97-99; Daker, Chroniclep pp. 645- 
646. 
(2) ibid. 9 pp. 
670-671; Clarke Pap ersp IVo PP- 116-117. 
(3) Gumblet Monckt pp. 144vp 151, 153; Dakerv Chroniclep p. 672. 
(4) Clarke Papersp IVP PP- 116-117. The treaty is printed in 
Bakert Chroniclet pp. 671-672; Weekly Post, 15-22 November 
1659- Clarke Papers, IV, pp. 17n gives a summary, 
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The main feature of the treatyq agreed upon on 15 Novemberg 
was its insistence that no new constitution was to be initiated without 
the consent of a General Council of the Army and the Navy. In one sense 
this was the most radical political move made by the army in the past 
12 years. In 1649 it had, with the help of civilians, also drawn up a 
constitution. Bat it had tendered this constitution to the Rump 
expecting the Parliament to enact it. The army had been won over to 
the Instrument of Government once it had been offered to Cromwell, 
although it had been devised by an army officer. But now in 1659 it 
was claiming to be the ultimate-arbitrator of such matterst in effect 
it was claiming to know what the people wantedp what was good for them. 
As we have seen the seeds of this claim were already present In 1647. 
It was implicit in the Remonstrance of 14 November of that year. But 
now it was being asserted consciously and unashamedly if not by all 
of the armyq then at least by an important section of it. It is some- 
times argued that in 1647 the army was more representative of the nation 
than the Parliamentq that it reflected more accurately the feeling and 
aspirations of the nation than the Presbyterian controlled Parliament. 
(') 
It -was after all composed of men of every social class. The Parliament 
was not. There can be no doubt that this is the way it viewed itself. 
So long as it maintained both a high degree of unity and of consensus 
about what it wanted to achieve then it could convincingly adopt this 
stancet namely that it was no different from the peoplep indeed that it 
was just the people in arms. That was the source of its strength in 
the period 1647 to 1649. But despite the fact that it could have acted 
in a dictatorial manner in those years by claiming to be the sole body 
(1) Aylmer (ed. )v Interregnumq p. 15* 
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capable of advancing the revolutiong and there were influential persons 
in the army who would have preferred such a course of actiont it never 
did so. The denial of such claimsp or rather the unwillingness to push 
such claims to their logical conclusiono as many similar modern revolu- 
tionary movements have justified themp was the whole basis of the 
limited revolution of 1648-1649; working within established institutions 
to make the revolution respectable. It was alsop I have arguedq one 
of the reasons why the chances of a more radical revolution were still- 
born. In 1659 the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction were insisting 
upon a General Council of the Army to decide the nation's future govern- 
ment, but they could not claim to be representative of much. They did 
not represent all of their fellow officersp they did not represent the 
soldiery who were excluded from tle Councilp and they most certainly 
did not represent any significant element of the political nation. 
In short they really only represented themselves. With such a slender 
power base and such a tenuous hold over power they could not even do 
that for long. If it was a fag-end of the Long Parliament which 
legitimised the revolution of 1648-1649, it was the fag-end of the 
army which was attempting to further that revolution in late 1659. 
The General Council of the Army was to consist of two 
commission officers from each regimentp chosen by the commission 
officers or a majority of them convened for that purposet the governors 
of garrisons which were not garrisoned by regiments and who could 
safely be-, spared (they were not to be elected by the garrison officerst 
perhaps an indication of the lower status of garrisons in the army 
hierarchy)t and ten officers from the fleet. This General Council 
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was to meet on 6 December, which did not leave much time for prepara- 
tions* The parallels with 1647 are obviousp but this General Council 
was intended to be a very watered down version of the previous one. 
The emphasis was on the commission officers, nothing was said of the 
N. C. O. s. let alone of the soldiery. 
The treaty also provided for a Parliament to be called 
with qualifications to be determined by a committee of ten members of 
the Committee of Safety plus three commissioners for Ireland (two from 
the army and one civilian)v three commissioners of the army in Scotland 
and three for the army in England. The last three were to be nominated 
by Fleetwood. 
(') 
The committee at least gave the appearance of 
representing the three nations and the three armies. In practice it 
was redundant forg as we shall seet the General Council took upon 
itself the task of debating the qualifications for the new Parliament. 
Wariston says that news of the conclusion of the treaty 
disgusted some of the civiliansp especially Vane and Salwayt because 
it had been made without the consent of the Committee of Safety. 
Vane and Salway disliked the idea of Monck becoming "the balance'19 
or arbiter, in any settlement. Wariston correctly observed that 
the officers had become "the supream delegating power without represen- 
tatives from the people". 
(2) 
Throughout November the sub-committee of the Committee 
of Safety had been working on the new constitution. Dy the 28th it 
Baker, Chroniclev p. 671; Weekly Post, 15-22 November, 
1659. 
(2) Waristont Diaryg 1119 P- 153- 
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was reported that most of the new constitution had been finalised 
and was being given to a committee of army officers to examine and 
comment upon before it was returned to the sub-committee. From there 
it was to go before the General Council. 
(') 
We have little indication 
of the deliberations of this sub-committee but some people were trying 
to press for a scheme along Harringtonian lines. This was of course 
the time when the Rota club met and when Harrington's ideas were at 
their most fashionable. 
(2) 
The following discussion of the events surrounding the 
General Council should be read in conjunction with Professor Woolrych's 
account(3) with which. I differ on some points especially on the 
reliability of Ludlow. I also use some additional source material 
not used by Woolrych. The General Council of Officers convened on 
6 December against a background of growing discontent in London in 
which the apprentices played a large partt a sign of great crisis 
in London as it had been in 1647 when the Presbyterians attempted 
their coup against Parliament. On 5 December there was a riot in the 
City which was vigorously and violently suppressed by a force under 
Hewson. The cause of the riot was the attempt by the Sergeant-at- 
Armsp on orders from the Committee of Safetyp to read a proclamation 
against the circulation of petitions for a free Parliament. Such 
heavy-handed behaviour by the armed forces to quell the trouble in 
a situation which must have'been along the lines of some of the 
Loyal Scoutt-25 NoVember-2 December 1659- 
(2) Guizotq-Richard Cromwell, II, p. 285t but c. f. ibidO, 
p, - ., 
287; Woolrychl Milton, pp. 129-130 and n- 31; J. Aubrey, 
Rrief Lives, Oxfordp 1893p It pp. 289-291; Latham and 
Matthews (7eas. )p Diary of Samuel Pepys, It PP- 139 17t 
20-21, 
Woolrychp Miltong pp. 142-150. This account is-far more 
detailed and satisfactory than the late Godfrey Davies's. 
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student riots of the late 1960's could only help alienate the 
from 
population at large/the army even more. 
(') 
The goverment of the 
City too was showing signs of division between those who ranged from 
indifference to tacit support for the Committee of Safety and those 
who favoured challenging its authority over the question of the 
Cityts liberties, especially its claims to be able to dispose of its 
own militia. There was also a growing opinion in the City in favour 
of a free Parliament. 
(2) 
It was becoming more and more apparent 
that the Committee of Safety and its military backers in the Lambert/ 
Disborowe/Fleetwood faction were beginning to lkýse the City. 
By 6 December too Haselrigg Walton and Iforleyp three 
of the commissioners appointed by the Ib=p on 11 October to govern 
the army, had arrived in Portsmouth where the governort Nathaniel 
Whethan, had declared for the Rump. Together with six others these 
three had already sent a letter in the name of the former Council of 
State to Monck authorising him to issue commissions and encouraging 
him to act towards a restoration of the Rump. 
(3) 
Other ex-officers 
such as Okey and Hacker were workingg or would soon be workingg actively 
on behalf of the R=p. Thus, by the time the General Council of the 
Army met, any real chance of implementing the new constitution it was 
summoned to discuss was already gone. 
For accountjof the incident q. v. Firth and Daviest 
pp. 414-415; Daviesq Restorationg pp. 181-182; Wool- 
rych, Milton# pp. 144ý146. He n. a regicidet escaped 
at the Restoration. In September 1660 the apprentices 
prepared A Charge of High Treason against him (ElO45(9))- 
Hewson was satirised because of his former profession 
as a cobbler (q. v. for example B. M. 669 f. 22(64)t a verse 
satire on him). 
(2) For a fuller discussion of developments in the City 
q. v. Woolrychp Milton, pp. 144-146. 
(3) Clarke Paperst IV# PP- 137-139; Bakerg Chronicle, p. 673; 
Woolrychp Miltong P- 143- 
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Given the short space of time between the decision to 
smmon such a Council and its first meetingt very few regiments had 
the time to select and send up representatives. John Vernon wrote 
to John Jones, the acting Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, that only 
37 officers were present on 12 December. 
(') 
Ludlow suggests that the 
"Wallingford House party"t his label for what I- have preferred to 
call the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood factiont deliberately tried 
to keep the numbers smallp especially by ordering various officers 
to return to their commands on grounds of national security. 
(2) 
91 
This is very unlikely. It was in the interests of the Lambert/ 
Disborowe/Fleetwood faction to have as many officers as possible to 
support the proposed constitution. The General Council had to meet 
quickly because it was essential to try and get the new constitution 
finalised and accepted speedilyp so that it could be shown to the nation 
that there was a viable alternative to the Rump capable of guaranteeing 
the good old cause. It was unfortunate that the need for speed 
ultimately undermined the principle underlying the General Council, 
that of a supposedly representative body of all the officers in the 
three nations and in the fleet. We have seen how in early October, 
when events were moving incredibly fastt the officers decided to 
push on with the Humble Representation and Petition and to get more 
subscriptions to it after it had been presented to the lb=p. Efforts 
were made to get representatives to attend the General Council and 
the difficulties caused by the deteriorating outlook for the "govern- 
C. Clar., S. P. 
19 
IVp 481. 
(2) Ludlowt Memoirsq II, pp. 163-165. 
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ment" in London were understood. On 10 December Allen Barnard wrote 
to Colonel William Mitchell saying that he had informed Lt. Colonel 
John Wade that he had been chosen one of the representatives of the 
regiment for the General Council and that he would acquaint Wade with 
Mitchell's further orders. Mitchell had commanded Robert Overton's 
regiment in Scotland until the summer when Overton was restored to 
it. Mitchell was given comm nd of a new regiment formed out of loose 
companies. His Lt. Colonel was John Wade who was probably the same 
person as the man in charge of ship building andiron works industries 
in the Forest of Dean area. Who Barnard was is unclear*(') On 28 
November Robert Baynes wrote from Newcastle to Adam Baynes mentioning 
that the preparations for further negotiations with Monck had taken 
up so much time. He urged Adam to request Fleetwood to proceed with 
the General Council despite the fact that no representatives had come 
from Scotland for it 
"To the end noe tyme may be 10 11 t. delay being 
now the greatest danger. " (2) 
On 6 December John Jones wrote from Dabling where the instructions for 
sending representatives to the General Council had arrived late because 
of contrary winds and had thus made it impossible for the Irish regi- 
ments to elect representativeso advising Fleetwood that 
"Whatsoever ye Lord directs you to doe att yo 
r 
Generall Councell doe it quicklyp Delayes and 
longpDebates are exceedingly dangeouset if ye 
Springe overtake you before you come to a 
Settlit I cannot see how you will avoyd ruine 
according to the reasonings of man. " 
B. M. Add. Ms. 18t 979t f. 266; Firth and Daviesp Pp. 556-5571 
Ay1merp State's Servants, p. 41. 
(2) B. M* Add. Ms. 21p 425P f. 184. 
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Jones nevertheless pressed on with arrangements for the election of 
representatives from the Irish regiments. 
(') 
Dut unfortunately from 
the point of view of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction the 
time scale'within which they were operating was not as long as Jones 
imagined in his letter; hence the haste in convening the General 
Council. Howeverg according to the Venetian ambassador# once the 
General Council got under way its numbers increased daily as representa- 
tives arrived from the various units in the country. He also noted 
that none-came from Scotland. 
(2) 
Thust if the charge of trying to 
wreck the General Council can be levelled at anyone in the army then 
that person was Monck. 
The General Council soon got down to the business of 
deciding on a new constitution. The sub-committee of the Committee 
of Safetyhad already come up with part of a draft for a new constitu- 
tion, the contents of which are unknownt which it had presented to 
the Council of Officers on 2 December, 
(3) 
This draft was at first 
shelved by the General Council and a wide-ranging debate about calling 
a Parliament and a senate ensued. By Y December the consensus of the 
meeting favoured a Parliament of two housesp and the sub-committee's 
draft was taken up again. The following day there was an intense 
debate as to whether the General Council should elect the second housev 
or senate, or whether it should be left to the "people". The latter 
course was decided upon. Wariston remarked that many of the officers 
(1) Mayert 'Inedited lettersIg pp. 289j 290. For Jones's 
arrangements for the election of representatives from 
the. regiments in Ireland q. v. above (chapter Five, 
Section IV). 
(2) c. s. P. v. 1659-61,, p. 102. 
(3) c. s. P. v. 1659-611 p. loo. 
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were inclined 
"to please the peoplep becaus officers had 
gotten good estats and would not hazard 
them in feighting with the people. " 
His implication was that the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction 
realised how isolated and unrepresentative it and the General Council 
were becoming and that anything that savoured of an attempt at military 
dictatorship might well meet with resistance. Ludlow warned the 
General Council of its unrepresentative nature in terms, bf the armies 
in the three nations. He also attempted to swing the Geheral Council 
over to support for a recall of the Rump during the debates butp accord- 
ing to his own account, Disborowe was vehemently opposed to any further 
dealings with that body. Disborowe felt that the Rump 
rL, I. "had deceived them k2me army) twicep and that they 
were now resolved to put it out of their power to 
do it again. " 
He also complained that the Itump had failed to fulfil certain under- 
takings alleged to have been given by its most influential members 
before its recall in May and that it had sought to purge the officer 
corps over -the summer. As we have seeng this last accusation in 
particular was absurd; irrational factors were beginning to influence 
the decisions of the leaders of the faction# a complete contrast with 
the decisiveness and clarity of thinking involved in pushing through 
the revolution of 1648-1649. While the debates were in progress there 
appear to have been behind-the-SCenes meetings between Fleetwood and 
other officers and Ludlow, 
_Vane 
and Salway. These meetingsp about the 
new constitution, further emphasised how isolated the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction was becoming; it was fast losing credibility even 
among those civilians who at first had been at the least willing to 
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acquiesce in the coup against the Rump. Howeverg the outcome of the 
debates was the vote, on 10 Decemberp that a new Parliament should 
meet in or before the following February. 
(') 
Ludlow accepted the outcome of the debates. According 
to one report "his dissatisfactions abated" after it had been reached, 
(2) 
but a more likely, interpretation is that he was being realistic and 
was aware of the fact that there was little he could do against such 
strong-anti-Rump feeling amongst the officers. Dut he was afraid that 
under the proposed new constitution the army would seek to gain as 
much. power as possible by trying to ensure that the new Parliament 
was its own creature. To avoid this he suggested that 
'The essentials of our cause might be clearly 
stated and declared inviolable" 
and that any dispute arising between Parliament and army should be 
settled by a body of 21 Conservato rs*(3) Clearly he was afraid that 
the senate would be too much under army influence to carry out this 
functiong although this is the role the officers conceived the senate 
would have. Thus, the competition between the Committee of Safety 
and the Council of Officers for authority# which had existed since 
Novembert was in danger of being perpetuated under the new constitution 
in the form of disputes between the Conservators and the senate. This 
could become a source of conflict in the future in addition to any 
tensions between legislature and executive. The philosophy behind 
1.1 "ý- i,, II- 
Waristonp Diarve III, PP. 155-156; Ludlowo Memoirs1v Up 
pp. 165-1679-, -Guizot# Richard Cr, omwellp IIP P. 306; c. f. 
Woolrych ,ý Milton PP- 147-148. Godfrey 
Davies (Restorationg 
p. -186) 
iswholly inadequate on these events. Q. v. also 
Mayerp'Inedited Letters', pp. 281-232 for evidence that 
Ludlow'was disillusioned with the activities of the Lambert/ 
Disborowe/Pleetwooa faction in the latter part of November. 
He wrote to Jones in Ireland suggesting that the acting 
Commander-in-Chief had deserted the Parliament. Ludlow's 
letter does not survive but its contents can be surmised 
from Jones's reply to it. 
(2) C. Clar. S. P. IVO p. 481. 
(3) Ludlowp Memoirs, Ht PP. 171-172. 
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the Conservators perhaps anticipates the role of the Supreme Court 
in the American constitutionp and looked at within the broader historical 
perspective perhaps the concept of the judiciary as the ultimate referee 
on constitutional disputes was what men were gradually groping towards. 
But such a role for the judiciary would not have been possible in the 
English Revolution. They were not trusted by the army and other 
supporters of the good old cause. This was one aspect of the demands 
for law reform. In an age when the common law played such a central 
and crucial part in the nation's politicalq social and economic life, 
and when so much of the ideology justifying the attacks on the King 
and his evil counsellors between 1640 and 1642 had been garbed in 
the language of the common lawq the failure to bridge the huge gulf 
between the lawyers and the guardians of the revolutionary causeq the 
armyq explains in part the collapse of the Eaglish Revolution. In a 
sense, the failure of earlier attempts at law reform came home to roost 
in late 1659. 
The "essentials of the cause" were drawn up under seven 
heads and passed by the General Council on 13 December. They declared 
against kingshipp goverment by a single persong a House of Iordst and 
impositions upon tender consciencesp and in favour of the separation 
of the legislative and executive powers and both Houses of Parliament 
being elected by the people duly qualified. The army was to be maintained 
in the interests of national security and not to be disbanded without 
the approval of the Conservators*(') 
Mercurius Politicus, 8-15 December 16599 repr. in Ludlow, 
Memoirsp -14 PP,, 
177ý-173n. 
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The army's commitment to a new Parliament raised the 
question of how it was to be elected. New schemes were put forward 
and discussed. These discussions about the franchise were conducted 
by both the General Council and the Committee of Safetyt or its sub- 
committeep although the General Council had originally assigned this 
task to the former. 
(') 
One proposal envisaged both the House of 
Commons and the senate being electedp another suggested the election 
of electoral colleges by the hundreds whichwould then go on to elect 
members for the county. There were proposals to allow towns to 
elect only-their own citizens and not outsidersq which could well have 
affected non-resident gentry sitting for the boroughs. There was 
renewed talk of constituency reformt of disenfranchising certain 
smaller constituencies and enfranchising "towns of more importance", 
The complete exclusion of Royalists was also mooted. 
(2) 
How all this 
was supposed to ensure the return of a Parliament that would advance 
the good old causep as the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction defined 
it, and one that would command the loyalty ofq or at least the acquies- 
cence-ofp a sizeable number of the political nation so as to ensure 
its ability to governo remains a mystery, The army's previous attempts 
at managing elections had not been successfulp nor had the franchises 
of the Instrument and Humble Petition succeeded in excluding the 
oppositions of the day. 
(3) 
(1) Whitelocke, Memorialsq IVP P- 379; B. M. 669 f. 22(51)t 
The Monthly Intelligencerg December 1659-January 1660; 
Waristonp Diaryt 1119 P- 158. 
(2) B. M. Add. Ms. 18979P f. 266; Guizotp Richard Cromwell, II, 
pp- 312-313- 
(3) C. f. the French ambassador's perceptive remarks (Ii-bi-d-t P- 368). For a study of the electorate and elections in the first half 
of the seventeenth century q. v. D. Hirst, The Repres-entative 
of the People? 9 Cambridget 1975. 
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From the start, aspects of the new franchise proposals 
proved quite unacceptable to Whitelocke although he does not appear 
to have been opposed to the principle of a new Parliament. He opposed 
some of the franchise proposals on the grounds that they were "expressly 
contrary to the law". If Whitelocke's account of his behaviour is' to 
be accepted then this was a strange and naive argument on his part, 
for what was the "law"? He had quite readily served under other 
governments, including the Committee of Safetyt to which the same 
objection could have been made. Howeverv it can also be read as an 
excuse to leave a sinking ship. Whitelocke refused to seal the writs. 
Some of the more radical officers said they would do it themselves. 
One even said 
"that it could not be wellp when in imch a time 
as this a lawyer should be instructed with so 
great a charge as the keeping of the great seal, 
and that it were more proper for some who had 
endured the dangers of the wars and adventured 
their lives for the service of the Commonwealth, 
to have the keeping of the seal, than for a 
lawyer to have itv who had not undergone dangers 
as others had. " 
Here the gulf between soldier and lawyer was articulated quite drama- 
tically. Fleetwood found the unnamed Colonel's language too excessive 
and reprimanded him. 
(') 
Bat the Colonel had a point. The only alter- 
native to this last effort on the part of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleet- 
wood faction to achieve a new constitution was a military dictatorship. 
Whitelockeg, Memorialsq IV9 PP- 379-380. Bat c. f. Waristong 
Diaryt, III9 P. 159P Wariston says that Whitelocke was one 
of a group,, including Diaborove and Sydenham attending 
Fleetwood on 20 December and urging him to issue the writs. 
t 
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Wariston says that some officers even favoured marching forces to York 
to join with lambert. 
(1) 
But the leaders of the faction did not want 
this. 
Yet another pigeon was coming home to roost. The policy 
adopted to bring about the revolution of 1648-1649, to got further 
reform under the Rmpt to guarantee civil and religious liberties 
under the Protectorate and latterly to further the 'good old cause', 
sought to achieve those ends as far as possible by constitutional 
means. It had considerably weakened the chances of a more thorough- 
going revolution in 1648-1649 and by 1657 it had brought the army to a 
state of uncreativity and ultimately by 1659 to a position whereby the 
use of force to solve political problems was becoming almost an end 
in itself; it was not, as with Pride's Pargep the trial and execution 
of Charles It the dissolution of the Ibmp and the dissolution of Bare- 
bonest an expedient to introduce a newt alternative and vibrant path 
towards settlement. Now in 1659 the reluctance to contemplate a fullyý- 
fledged military dictatorship revealed the army to be no more than a 
paper tiger. 
Of course there were other factors contributing to this 
state of affairs. When we use the term 'army' in this context we 
really mean that part of the army in and around Londong and by December 
more especially the Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction. Even this 
part of the army was itself considerably weakened by the purge of 
(1) Waristonp Diary III, p. 159. 
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October which had split the more obvious supporters of the 'good old 
cause' within the army into those officers adhering to the faction and 
those who remained loyal to the 3h=p. But both these groups were the 
heirs of the army's political role of the last 12 yearst much more so 
than those units and officers serving in Ireland or under Monck in 
Scotland uhich were distant from political developments in Londong and 
more so than those officers who had stood by the Protectorate in its 
last days and who were now discredited. No doubt also the leaders of 
the faction may have been uneasily aware of their insubstantial hold 
over power as well as of their own shortcomings as statesmen, and in 
the case of Fleetwood of his feebleness as a leader. Wariston remarked 
that 
"Everyone of the officers told to us their confusion 
and unfitnesse to manage such a business as govern- 
ment. " (1) 
They were not made of the same stuff as their twentieth-century counter- 
parts who have shown no hesitation about trying to run goverments by 
themselves after coups against the civilian authorities. 
Neverthelessp the long term reason for the collapse of 
the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and ultimately for the collapse 
of the army's political role as it had been enacted in the late 1640's 
and 165018 lies in the fact that the army decided to try to reach 
settlement by proceeding along the constitutional path. In this respect, 
to use modern terminologyp the army as a revolutionary movement was more 
akin to the Monsheviks, than to the Bolsheviks. Thus, in December 1659 
(1) Ibid., loc. cit. 
654. 
'when some of the most important. officers were being called upon by 
force of circurn tances to seize full power they were incapable of doing 
so. They were victims of the army's past. They no longer had the 
conviction of being an aggressive and creative revolutionary movement; 
their revolutionary ardour was spent. Ihis helped make the return of 
the Rump so easy. It also enabled army politics to decline into sub- 
servience to the civilian authorities. Even while the General Council 
of the Army was discussing the-franchiset the fleet under Lawson 
declared for the Rump. It is unlikely that the fleet had even sent 
any of its alloted ten representatives to the General Council. Lawson's 
declaration was another nail in the coffin of the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction. 
For the sake of clarity it is necessary to interrupt the 
narrative for a brief account of the whereabouts of the fleet during 
these events. Until September the fleet'had been under Montaguls 
command as Admiral (he had been appointed a General-at-Sea in January 
1656). Montagu, had lost his regiment with the restoration of the Rump 
but had retained his naval commission. In March the fleet had been 
ent to the Sound to back up English diplomacy in the Northern War. 
n June the Council of State appointed three additional commissioners to 
the Kings of Sweden and Denmarkt namely Algernon Sydeny (who had 
served in the army as governor of Dover but who had been removed in 
1651), Sir Robert Honeywood - with Syda-gy a member of the Council of 
State - and Thomas Boone. The dispatch of the three commissioners was 
probably an indication that the R=p did not really trust Montaguq who 
maintained his independence. A difference arose with the Dutchq with 
whom the English had agreed in July to work together to secure a mutually 
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advantageous outcome to the war, over the question of the number of 
ships to be left in northern waters to coerce the Kings of Denmark 
and Sweden. Hontagu won the day and persuaded his fellow commissioners, 
with the exception of Sydney,, that the whole fleet should return to 
English waters which it did,. setting sail on 24 Augustq anchoring in 
the Downs early in September. The suspicions the Rump held of MLontagu 
were well-founded. Sir Edward Hyde had written to Edward Montagu, the 
Admiral's cousin, in June urging him to use his influence to get his 
cousin to work for a Restoration. On 27 July the Admiral himself wrote 
to Hyde from Copenhagen offering his services on behalf of Charles 
Stuart if a suitable occasion arose. It seems likelyv 
ýiereforep 
that 
Montaguls decision to take the fleet back to England was influenced 
by a desire to intervene in Booth's rising on behalf of the Stuart 
cause. Howeverv he still remained on good terms with Richard Cromwell. 
The Council of State disapproveJof 11ontaguls action in bringin,,,,, back 
the fleet and ordered that 15 ships should return to the Sound. Given 
his uneasy relationship with that body and with the army leadership 
and the well-founded suspicions about his loyalty it was no surprise 
that he was pushed aside and retired to Hinchingbrooke. For the next 
few months the fleet was under Lawson's command as Vice-Admiral. Lawson, 
about whose loyalty to the good old cause there was no doubt, had been 
appointed Vice-Admiral in may 1659. Montagu was re-appointed to the navy 
in February 16609 as General-at-Sea (along with Monck)t and he worked 
for a Restoration. 
(') 
D. N. B*, sub Montagut Edward and Lawsonq John; F. R. Harris, 
The Life of Edward Montafrul K. G. First Earl of Sandwich, 
London, 19129 1, PP- 138-161; C. J., Vil, pp. 666P 773; 
C. S. P. D. 165 9 pp. 200# 201-202; Clarke Papersp IVr 
pp. 296-298 
fi-60rO 
Montaguls correspondence with Richard 
Cromwell in mber); Clarendon State Paperst III, P- 497; 
C. Clar. S. POP IV,, pp. 296-297 (Montagu t; Hyde, Copenhagen 
27 July); Un-derdown, Pride's Purgep p- 350 + n. I agree with 
Professor Underdown's criticisms of the late Godfrey Davies. 
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Before continuing the narrative to discuss the events 
surrounding the return of the R=p, something should be said about the 
21 Conservators. Ludlow gives an account of their election and names 
some of those elected but his list does not tally with two other lists 
we have, and which have not been used by modern historians. One is in 
the Clarke Ilss. in Worcester College and the other is in a newsbook. 
(l) 
Both lists give 20 namesq Lawson's is missing from the Clarke Ms. list 
and Packer's from the newsbook onet so the names of the 21 are 
Fleetwood, Lambertt Vanet Salwayt Ludlowp Thomas Harrison, John Carew, 
Robert Overtont Lawsont Berryt Packert Hewsont Disborowev Alderman 
Iretont Steelet Whitelocket Waristont Sydenhamt Sir James Harringtong 
Thomas Lord Fairfax and Robert Titchbournep an incredible mix. 
(2) 
According to Ludlowt Rich, whom. he sugggests was also working for the 
return of the Rumpt was nominated but rejected by the leaders of the 
faction "because they suspected him not to favour their arbitrary 
designs". This has to be modified by Wariston's more contemporaneous 
account which shows that whatever their scruples or motives both Rich 
and Ludlow played a full part in the selection of the Conservators. 
Wariston alleges that Ludlow and Rich opposed his 
(Wariston's) nomination 
on account of suspected hostility to liberty of conscience and latent 
Royalism. 
(3) 
The Conservators as finally agreed upon included-a hotch 
potch of diverse groups and individualsp established army officers and 
Clarke Ms. 
-32p 
f- 175v; Particular Advice from the Office 
of Intelligence, 9-16 December 1659. 
(2) Ludlowp Memoirst 119 P. 173 says that the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction secured Strickland's and Pickering's 
nominationg but in view of the contemporary lists this must 
be doubted. 
(3) Ludlowq Memoirsp 119 pp. 163P 173-174; Wariston, Diary# 
1119 pp. 157-158- 
657. 
adherents of the Uobert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction,, Fifth Monarchists 
like Harrison and Carew# members of the Committee of Safetyp City figuresp 
and men like Overton, Lawson and Fairfax to give it the appearance of 
being broad based. Even if all these men, or even a majority of them# 
could have been persuaded to sit together as guardians of the good old 
causeq the definition of which they disagreed about anywayq they did 
not represent anything like a popular front of adherents to that cause. 
Arguably, it was only some such sort of popular front that could by 
this time have savedit and its supporters from disaster. A Ramp-army 
alliance would have been a step in that direction but, as we have seen, 
that proved impossible. With the supporters of the good old cause so 
hopelessly divided amongst themselves it is not surprising that the 
cause itself soon collapsed. 
Lawson's declaration for the Rt=p threw the General Council 
M 
completely off-balance. They were reported to be "at a stand" by it. 
(Some naval officers had previously expressed cautious support for the 
Lambert/Diaborove/Fleetwood faction. ) 
(2) 
Vane, Salway and Salmon were 
sent to Lawson to win him over to the proposals for a new Parliament. 
But Lawson was acting with the advice of Scotp Streater and Okey 
(who 
was well-known to him since the days of the discussions about the Three 
Colonels' Petition). 
(3) 
Interestingly enough there had also been contacts 
(1) B. M. 669 f. 22 (51)t The Monthly Intelligencer, December 
1659-JanuarY 166o. 
(2) Pabli& Intelligencerv 12-19 December 1659. 
(3) Publick Intelligencerg 12-19 December 1659. For an account 
of the negotiations with Lawson q. v. Daviesp Restoration, 
pp. 183-184. The Parliamentary Intelligencerv 19-26 
December 1659) adds that Salway apologised for subverting the 
Parliament during the negotiations. Robert Barrow also 
appears to have taken part in the talks (Ludlowg Memoirst 
UP P. 176). 
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between Honck and the fleet. Monck justified his position and refuted 
charges that he was working for Charles Stuart. 
(') 
The pledge of a new Parliament helped appease the City 
government for a whilet but the fear of more trouble from the apprentices 
lingered on and anti-army feeling began to grow in intensity. Disborowe's 
regiment was ordered from the north to London to help keep the peace 
therev an indication of how seriously fears of trouble in the capital 
were treated. 
(2) 
The Anni, 1 elections to the Co=3ion Council on 22 
December also saw an influx of Presbyterians more favourable to the 
idea of a freely elected Parliament# and in time to a Restoration. 
Haselrig and his fellow R=pers at Portsmouth urged the City government 
to declare for the Rt=p. On 7 December lEaselrigt Morley and Walton 
wrote to the Lord Mayor saying that the restoration of -the Parliament 
was the only way to avoid national ruin and that they would write to 
the Speaker to have the Parliament meet at Portsmouth if necessary. 
This gives some indication of the deliberations at Portsmouth. They 
wrote again on 20 Decembert in case the previous letter had not reached 
Londonq recommending the City goverment to join with Lawson and the 
fleet for the Ramp. They suggested that the new Parliament agreed to 
by the General Council of the Army and due to meet on 24 January would 
not be able to command any authority. They said that only the Ramp 
could lay the foundations for future Parliaments and that the original 
dissolution of the Ramp in April 1653 "caused all our miserie". 
0) 
(1) Clarke Hs. 32, f. 133 ff. Monck to Vice Admiral Goodson and 
the flýet. Lawson's name is crossed out. 
(2) Pablick Intelligencerip 19-26 December 1659. On its way south 
it eventually declared for the Ramp on hearing of the virtual 
collapse of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in 
London (jkl: d. ). 
(3) B. 11. Sloane 11s. 9709 ff. 6,8. 
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But, on the face of it, the City government always remained more 
concerned with the City's safety and interests. They were determined 
to keep their options open. Various commissioners were appointed to 
consult with Fleetwood, Haselrig and his associates at Portsmouth, 
and Lawson; a letter was also to be sent to Monck. John Knight and 
Robert Blackstone were requested to attend the commissioneis to both 
Haselrig and Lawsonp an indication of who the City government felt 
was gaining the upper hand. 
(') 
Meanwhile in the north the phoney war between Lambert 
and Monck had been continuing* Lambert had seen through Monck's 
procrastination over further negotiations on the treaty and had 
written to Fleetwood at the beginning of December 
"signifying his trouble at the losing of time in 
the Northern expedition by adhering to a grant 
of too long time for a Treaty with General Monck, 
conceiving thereby itt onely makes vay for the 
design of the publick enemy. " (2) 
This was apparent to his fellow officers in the north as well. Robert 
Baynes wrote to Adam Baynes on 8 December that 
"we have little reason to conclude yt. Genll Monck 
and his new created officers have any intentions 
for peace however they pretend thereunto. " (3) 
A stream of propaganda issued from Monck's armyg denouncing the Lambert/ 
Diaborove/Fleetwood faction and trying to undermine its morale. 
(4) 
The 
M Guildhall Journalq Jor. 41X# ff. 214vq 215. 
(2) B. M. 669 f. 22 (5),. The 11"onthly Intelligencerg December 1659- 
January 166o. 
(3) B. M. Add. Ms. 21,4259 f- 185; C. f. Pnblick Intelligencer, 
12-19 December 1659. 
(4) The literature is located in Wor. Co. B. B. a. A. (volume of 
pamphlets). Q. V. also G. Davies, The Early History of 
the Coldstream Gualts, Oxford, 1924, pp. 130-136. 
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main component of this propaganda was a newsbookq the first issue of 
which was called The Faithful Intelligencer and subsequent issues 
Mercurius Britanicus. Like its earlier namesake in the 16401s, no 
doubt its title was meant to imply that it was speaking on behalf of 
majority feeling in the three nations. The newsbook tended to be a 
gloss on Mercurius Politicus. Its contents provide further evidence 
of howwll-informed Monck and his colleagues were on developments in 
England. 
(') 
Events in London immediately preceeding the return of the 
Rump have all the elements of G6tterdammerung in them. On 20 December 
the Council of the Army seems to have decided to send commissioners 
to Lawson to inform him of their plans for the new Parliamentq a last 
minute attempt to win him over. 
(2) 
Writs were also sent out for the 
new Parliament. According to Waristong Fleetwood refused to authorise 
the issuing of the writs on the morning of the 20th despite being 
requested to do so by a delegation consisting of Oven, Whitelocke 
(who had changed his tune)9 Titchburnp Sydenhamp Disborowe and Wariston 
himself. The Army Council thereupon voted to ask the Committee of 
Safety to issue the writs. Fleetwood was breaking down under the 
strain. The order to issue the writs was revocked the next day. 
(3) 
But it was too late. On 21 December Lawson declared once more for the 
Rump. Ile sent his reasons to Fleetwood. He felt that the "Wallingford 
(1) 
. 
C. f. Gumble, Monck, pp. 169-171. 
(2) B. M. 669 f. 22 (51). The Monthly Intelligencerg December 
1659-January 1660; Mercurius Politicus, 15-22 December 1659. 
(3) Clarke Papersq IV, pp. 215-216; Waristong Diaryq III, 
P. 1599 160; olrycht Miltont PP. 153-154. 
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House" proposals (his phrase) for a Parliament were not likely to safe- 
guard the cause and the nation would only be subject to more changes 
without any legal foundations and that this would open the way for the 
Stuarts. He said that the Rump alone could authorise the raising of 
the money necessary for the army's and navy's arrears and that thus he 
could not send up any of his officers from the Downs to London to 
treat. 
(') 
It was strange that the Rumpg the fag end of the Long 
Parliament purged by the armyt should come to be looked upon by Lawson, 
by Monck, by -the Ih3mpers themselvesq and even by some of the Committee 
of Safety, as the only legal body in the nation. 
In the meantime the forces sent to beseige Portsmouth 
under Major Breman of Rich's regiment had deserted to the garrison 
and had submitted to the authority of Haselrigq Walton and Morley. 
They were joined by two troops of Berry's regiment under Major Unton 
Crooke and Captain Robert Huttong both of which had declared for the 
lb=p on 15 December. 
(2 ) 
The Council of the Army, or what was left of 
itp appears to have rejected a suggestion to send a force to oppose 
that under Haselrig and his colleagues in Portsmouth, as well they 
might for they could not rely on their own men by this stage. 
(3) 
Two troops of Packer's regiment declared for the R=p on 22 December 
and the following day the officers of the General Council themselves 
decided to submit to the Rt=p. They drew up several resolutions con- 
(1) N. L. S. Adv. Ifs. 35-5-11t f- 14- 
(2) Clarke Papersp IVp pp. 210p 216; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 
19-26 December 1659, 
(3) rxuizoto Richard Cromwell, UP P- 317- 
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cerning their indemnity which they presumptiously intended to style 
as "the unanimous Agreement Csic) of the Officers of the Three Nations". 
It was given out to be signed by both officers and soldiers in the 
regiments in Londong "but most of them refused to be any longer 
seduced from their obedience". 
(') 
In the highest rank of the army confusion reigned during 
these days. It is plausible that Whitelocke urged Fleetwood to get in 
first and declare for Charles Stuart, but even Fleetwood for all his 
faults could not have agreed to this. Anyway he was soon reminded by 
Vaneq, Disborowe and Berry that such a move was not on. Neither the 
adherents of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction nor many, if anyq 
of those officers who had gone over to the Rmnp would have supported 
such a move at this stage. Whitelocke's other suggestion that Fleetwood 
should seek an alliance with the City for a new Parliamentt (presumably 
the one for which he had refused to sign the writs), was also a non- 
starter. We have seen how the City government was swinging to the 
right. Even if an alliance had been possiblep it would only have 
increased the likelihood of new bloodshed. 
(2) 
Fleetwood appears to 
have given up the ghost by this stageg realising that all was lost. 
On the 20th (the same day as he refused to authorise the signing of the 
writs for the new Parliament) he'apparently sent word to Lambert askinf,, r 
him to come to London. He seems to have tried to secure a deal with 
the former 'enemy'. On 23 December he sent to some M. P. sp asking for a 
(1) B. m. 669 f. 22 (51)t The IfonthlY Intelligencerv December 
1659-January 1660; Parliamentary Intelligrencer,, 19-26 
December 1659. 
(2) Whitelocke, Memorialsp IVo PP. 381-383- C. f. C. Clar. S. P.,, 
Ivt P. 494. 
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meeting at the Speaker's House. They refusedv upon which he wrote 
again 
"to acquaint them that the doors of the House were 
open to them, to return to the exercise of their 
Trust, and the sooner they did it the better,, 
because of the disordered posture the Nations were 
at present in. " (IL) 
His colleagues, Disborowep Berry and Ashfield were reported to be "in 
a mourning condition". 
(2) 
On 29 December Disborowe wrote a letter of 
submission to the Parliament and offered his assistance. He said he 
would pray that God would give them strength 
"that such a Foundation of settlement may be laid by 
you as the children yet unborn may have cause to 
bless God for". 
He pledged loyalty to the Commonvealth. 
(3) 
There was really nothing 
more he could say, 
On 24 December, according to the newsbookst the soldiers 
marched down Chancery Lane to Fleet Street and showed their obedience 
to their Generalq the Speaker, who stood at his door with Sir James 
Harrington and Colonel Thompson among othersp both former members of 
the Committee of Safety. Okeyt who had stood by the Rump and who had 
been involved along with Streater and others in the plot to seize the 
(1) Wariston, Dia III, pp. 159,160; Parliamentarv Intelli- 
M 669 f 22--T 1) The 16 B b 9 . . ; . . er gencer, 19-2 Decem 5 - C. f. Monthly Intelligencer, December 1659-january 1660. 
the French ambassador's account that the Speaker sent to 
Fleetwood for the keys of the House (Guizotq 11ichard Cromwell, 
IIP P. 3181 
(2) Clarke Papers, IV, p. 220 vhich adds that Fleetwood wrote 
to the Speaker saying that the lard "had blasted them and 
spitt in their facesllp a bitter realisation that perhaps 
after all the Lord was not on their side. C. f. Wariston, 
Diaryt 1119 p. 160. 
(3) Publick Intelligencert 26 December-2 January 166o; E1011(5), 
A Letter sent from Col. John Disborowe. 
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Tower on 12 Decemberg 
"delivered the sense of all that followed him, 
in a short but pithy speech, comparing their 
return to that of the prodigal Child. " 
A ma ch past then took place led by Okey's regimentq followed by Alured's 
and Markham's. Lt. Colonel Francis Allen led Sydenham's regiment which 
was followed by Hewson'sp whose Colonel had played such a notorious 
part in suppressing the apprentices riot earlier in the month. The 
rest of the forces in London were on guard duty. The Speaker then went 
to the Tower which Lt. Colonel John Miller gave up to him. - Miller had 
replaced Fitch, the Lt. of the Tower, after the latter's implication 
in the plot to seize it. The Speaker gave L25 to the soldiery. The 
Parliamentary Intelligencer commented 
I'methinks the soldiers may see in this what General 
thy are likeliest to thrive best by. "# 
a shrewed and apposite observation. One of the first acts of the 
restored Rump on 26 December was to vote one months pay to the private 
soldiery. 
(') 
On 29 December Monck wrote from Coldstream to the Speaker 
in reply to a letter of his of 22 December pledging "absolute Obedience" 
to the Parliament. He was still unaware that the R=p had rebarned. 
Howeverg by 1 January he had received word that the R=p had been 
restored. 
(2) 
(1) B. M. 669 f. 22(51), The Monthly Intelligencer, December 
1659-January 1660; Parliamenlary Intelligencjr, 19-26 
December 1659; Publick Intelligencer, 19-26 December;, 2. J. 9 
VlIt P. 797. (Two d after voting'a month's pay -to the 
private soldiery the R=p likewise voted a month's pay to 
officers below the rank of Captain and to non-commissioned 
officersp perhaps a recognition of their efforts on behalf 
of the Rump earlier in the year and that these ranks together 
with the soldiery were now more important than the senior 
officerst jbid. p P. 798; Clarke Ms. 32, f. 208v); Pirth 
and Daviest PP- 343-344. 
(2) O-P-H-t M It PP- 39-41; Clarke Papers, IV, p. 237. 
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One final thing must be said about the way the Ih=p returned, 
and that is that the regiments of the senior officers adhering to the 
Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction either seized the initiative for 
themselves and declared for the lb=p, or were so disillusioned and 
demoralised that they would not respond to the commands of their 
superiors. 
(') 
As we shall seeg in the next section# the same was true 
in the north. There it was reported that at the height of the phoney 
war 
"some of both armiest though far asunder run to 
each otherg and that the scoutes of both sydes 
lately mett and instead of fightingo shott their 
pistolls on the ground and friendly discoursed 
and parted. Indeed the soldyreo generally say 
they will not fight, but will make a ring for 
their officers to fight in. " 
This story is supported by some other evidence in the Parliamentry 
Intelligencer which talks about the disintegration of Lambert's forces. 
It said that the soldiers say they would not fight against Monck "but 
leave their officers to dispute their own quarrel". 
(2) 
Wariston with 
a hint of naive incredulity says the 
"under officers and sojOurs would not stand be 
(by) their superiors no(us (the Committee of SafetyD, 
Thes thinges astonished us. " 
The officers of the Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction had spent too 
much time away from their regiments and had become so involved with 
politics in London, that they were out of touch with the feelings and 
opinions of their juniors and of the ranks. It could no longer just 
Wariston, Diaryp III, p. 160; Guizot, Richard Cromwellq II, 
P- 318; C. Clar. S. P., IV9 p. 492. 
(2) Clarke Papers, IV# 300; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 
19-26 December 1659; Waristong Diaryq III, p. 160. 
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be assumed or taken for granted that the men would follow their superiors. 
The senior officers had thusq inadvertentlyp cut themselves off from 
their power bases and by so doing ultimately destroyed themselves 
politically. That was something Oliver Cromwell had never allowed 
to happen to himself. 
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III, DEcamm 1659-my 166o 
In addition to securing pay for the soldiery one of the 
first acts of the Rump on 26 December was to appoint interim commis- 
sioners to govern the army until at least three of those appointed 
on 11 October arri4ed'in London. These were Alexander Popham, Robert 
Thompson (a member of the late Committee of Safety)# Thomas Scottt 
Okeyq Anthony Ashley Cooper,, Alured and Henry Markham. The quor 
was to be three. On 28 December Weaver was added to their number. 
(') 
On 27 December the Rump ordered that no forces were to be raised , 
except by the authority of Parliament and that all forces that had 
been raised during its interruption were to be disbanded. This was not 
'to apply to Monck's forces. The Rump was re-asserting its claims to 
supremacy over the militaryq but at the same time realising the 
. ortance of Monck who was still Commander-in-Chief according to 
the commission given him in the name of the Council of State in November. 
This was only to be confirmed by the Rump on 23 Januaryq an indication 
of its ambiguous attitude towards him. 
(2) 
Haselrigt Morley and Walton 
reached London on the 29th and resumed their jobs as army commissioners. 
Parliament asserted the right of the commissioners to be able to call 
courts martial and to appoint officers to the various regimeilts. 
(3) 
The House soon got down to the business of an indemnity 
for the army. On 28 December a committee was set up to draft an 
(1) C-J-P VII9 pp. 797P 798. 
(2) ibid. t pp. 797t 823; C. S. P. D. 1659-60,, pp. 2999 301; Tiarke Papersp IV9 PP. 137-139. 
(3) C. J. 9 VII9 pp. 800t 801. 
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indemnity bill which was eventually passed on 2 January. A division 
was taken on whether to include Lambert. Haselrig and Neville voted 
in favour of including him, Weaver and Hutchinson against. The French 
ambassador said that Vane spoke in Lambert's favour in the House and 
that Fleetwood and Disborowe were only included in the indemnity with 
difficulty. 
(') 
Bat the R=p was not in the mood for seeking revenge 
against individuals, a point in its favour. Later in January a Royalist 
was to characterise Haselrig's feelings on the subject thust that his 
anger against them was much abated 
"because as he frequently declared they were the true 
enemies to Charles Stuartp and true friends to a 
Commonwealth, how false soever they had been (blinded 
with their own ambition) to him and their fellow 
members. " (2) 
A new Council of State was elected on 31 December and 
2 January. It included Haselrig and Monck as well as Morley who had 
been made a Colonel over the siumner but purged by the lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction in Octobert Walton who had been a garrison commander 
in the early 1650's and who was shortly to be given Disborowe's regimentp and 
Fagge# Morley's brother-in-law who had worked for the return of the 
Rump as commander of the Sussex militia and who was to receive a 
regiment in February. Ashley Cooperp also a member of the new Council, 
was soon to command Fleetwood's horse and Fairfax had of course been 
(1) jbid-9 pp. 798P 802; Guizott Richard Cromwellf Ht PP. 323p 
328; Davies, Restorationg pp. 260-261; Woolrychq Milto I 
p. 157. 
(2) Clarendon State Papersp III, p. 655- 
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Lord General. Howeverv with the exception of Monck and possibly Morley 
none of these men had a predominantly military outlook. They were 
civilians who held military office incidentally. 
(') 
In these early days of the re-restored Rump there was 
much anxiety about Lambert's intentions. In London it was feared that 
he might indeed march south. The City continued to take steps for its 
own safety including the raising of six regiments for its own defence. 
(2) 
In fact, as we have seeng his forces were already in a state of disinte- 
gration but this was not yet clear in London. On 27 December realising 
the precariousness of the situatidnt Lambert called a meeting of his 
officers to discuss their next move. According to one report no 
decision was reached as to whether they should march against Monck or 
else go southwardsp presumably to try and intervene on behalf of the 
Committee of Safety and the army faction. Colonel Samuel Clarke who 
comanded a foot regiment in Flanders which had been recalled for 
service in England in August 1659 is reported to have been doubtful 
if Parliament would grant them an act of oblivion. Another report 
says that the meeting in fact decided to march on London and to call 
on their brethren and the congregated Churches to support their demands 
to the Parliament for liberty of conscience and indemnity. This would 
seem to suggest that they were more concerned with salvaging what they 
could rather than trying to make a stand on behalf of the Committee of 
Safety. Lambert must have realised that his day was over. Colonel 
Salmon had been sent northwards from London by the officers to inform 
(1) C. J. 9 VII9 pp. 800p 801; Firth and Daviesq P- 503. 
(2) Guizotp Richard Cromwell, Hp p. 237; C. S. P. V. 1659-61, 
p. 106; -C. S. P. D. 1659-609 p. 298; Wool'77ch, Milton, 
pp. 157-158. 
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their colleagues in the north of the decision to allow the Rump to sit 
again. BY 3 January it was reported that all the forces lately under 
Lambert had declared for the Ramp and were returning to their quarters 
as on 20 October. Two days later Lambert was said to be at Northallerton 
with only 50 horseg the rest of his forces having dispersed and sub- 
mitted to the Rmp. He made his way privately to London. 
(1) 
Lilburne 
who had marched to seize York on 23 December to prevent it from being 
seized for the Ramp gave up the city to Fairfax at the beginning. of 
January. Lilburneq who was reported to have been "the only man that 
hath heightened Lambert" against the R=p and to have said 
"that he hoped never a true Englishmen would 
name the Parliament againp and that he would 
have the house pulled down where they sat, for fear 
it should be infectuousilp 
tried unsuccessfully to get Fairfax's force to subscribe to an engage- 
ment against a King and a single person before surrendering 
(2) 
., 
the city. 
Ike 
Clearly he feared thatA intentions of some were not just limited to the 
return of the lb=p. 
Forces in other parts of the country also declared for the 
Rumpe On 2 January Mark Grimesq governor of Cardifft pledged support J9 
for the Parliament. YAjor Unton Crooke's troop of Berryts regiment 
which had been in the west and had already declared for the Rump in 
mid-Decembert drew up a declaration which was printed in Mercurius 
Politicus. In it they spoke out for civil and religious libertyq for 
Clarke Ms- 32, ff. 200vv 2109 218v; B. M. Add. Ms. 21# 425t 
f Publick Intelligencer, 26 December 1659-2 January 
14109-0; 
(2) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 26 December 1659-2 January 
1660; E.. S. P. D. 1659-609 p. 295; Clarke Ms- 32t f. 218v; 
Woolrycht 'Yorkshire 7ýid the Restorationlp PP. 497--498. 
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a free commonwealth without single persont King or Lords, and against 
the interruption of the Parliament. They said they had no ill-feeling 
against their fellow soldiers and called for differences to be resolved 
by discussions. 
(') 
Some of the ideals of the good old cause lived on, 
at least with them. Hackerv Saundersp Major Nathaniel Barton and Major 
Beke had seized Coventry for the lb=p and Captain Clement Needham 
amongst others had done the same in Leicester. The officers in Colonel 
John Biscoets company (under the command of Captain Lt. Thomas Andrews) 
and Captain Daniel Nichols company sent in a declaration for the Parlia- 
ment from Chester. Other companies of the regiment had been sent to 
beseige Portsmouth but had defected to Haselrig and his associates. 
Biscoe himself was replaced by George Fleetwood at the beginning of 
February; why is not clear. Both Andrews and Nichols were kept on by 
the Rump during the new year purge but in late February they were both 
accused of having carried out orders of the Committee of Safety. 
(2) 
From Lancashire there was a declaration from the foot regiment of the 
Irish Brigade. One of the signatoriesp Thomas Shepherd, could well be 
the same person as the agitator of that name who was one of the three 
who appeared before the Commons in April 1647 and who was then a member 
of Ireton's horse. 
(3) 
Meanwhile the government soon got down to the task of 
re-modelling the army. On 9 January the House voted that Lambertp now 
in London, Disborowep Ashfieldt Berryp Kelseyq Cobbett Barrowq Packer 
and Creed should be ordered to leave the capital. On 13 January the 
(1) C. S. P. D. '1659-60 p. 293; Mercurins Politicusq 29 December 
175§:: 5- January 1 60. 
(2) ibid.; IT. M. C. Leyborne-Popham 
'tP. 
157; C. J. 9 VII, p. 829; 
Firth and Daviest pp. 402-403- 
(3) Ifercurius Politicus, 29 December-5 January 166o; Clarke 
Papers, It PP. 430t 438- 
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Council of State also ordered Majors John Clarke of Gibbon's regiment, 
John Daberon of Ckey'sp John Gladman of Packer'st John Grimes of Syden- 
ham's and Hezekhiah Haynes of Fleetwood'sp Colonels John Clarket Hewsont 
Salmon and Swallowq Lt. Colonels Francis Allen of Sydenham's and John 
Miller of Fitch'sp who had commanded the regiment after the attempt to 
seize the Tower at the end of December, and Captain Griffith Lloyd of 
Fleetwood's regimentt to leave the capital* Not all of them complied 
(1) 
with these orders which had to be repeated later on. On 7 January, 
after a votet Morley was appointed Lieutenant of the strategically 
important Tower of London. 
(2) 
On the same day the House voted against giving Ingoldsby 
Morley's old regiment. According to some of the secluded membersq on 
27 December Ingoldaby had promised to speak on their behalf in Parlia- 
ment "and we believe he did", There were also suspicions that he was 
a crypto-Royalist. ILaselrig is alleged to have charged him with 
participating in Booth's rising. The Royalists did indeed believe he 
was on their side. Ingoldsby had also been opposed to the oath of 
abjuration to be imposed on the Council of Statep although he was by 
no means alone in his opposition; Monck refused it and on his arrival 
C. J. 9 VII9 pp. 806,812; C. S. P. D. 1659-6og PP. 305P 308, 
309# 328t 342. With the approach of the Restoration 
Disborove tried to escape from England but was arrested 
by the Sheriff of Essex. He had not been a regicide so 
there was no threat to his life or property but he was 
regarded with obvious suspicion by the Restoration govern- 
ment and eventually fled to Holland. He returned in 1666 
and died in 1680 (for full details of his life post-1660 
q. v. D. N. B. ). As for Fleetwood he was well away from 
London by the end of January and by the beginning of March 
he was at Feltwell Norfolkp a somewhat broken man (Latham 
and Matthews (eds. 
ý# Diary of Samuel Pepyaq It P- 34 + n5; 
D. N. B. ). Neither Disborowe nor Fleetwood attempted'. to 
join with Lambert in April and both played no part in 
politics after the collapse of the faction in December. 
(2) C-J-I VII9 P. 805. 
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did not participate in the Council's proceedings. Ingoldaby's previous 
association with the Protectorate cannot have helped him either. 
(') 
However, on 7 January the House read lists of various regiments which 
must have been prepared during the previous few days. The lists were 
of Okey'sp Alured'st Unton Crooke's (late Berry's)p Haselrig's (late 
Packer's)t Rich'st Jeremiah Campf ield's (late Lambert's but soon to 
become William Eyres's) and Streater's (late Hewson's) regiments. 
The House did; -notget round to debating the lists until the 
llth. On that day it passed Crooke'st making a number of changes. 
George Sedascue who as Adjutant-General had been purged in October by 
the Lambert/Disborove/Pleetwood factiont was made Major, One Nathaniel 
Whetham was given a troop. It is possiblep as Firth and Davies suggest, 
that this is the same man as the governor of Portsmouthp but if so it 
seems a pretty small reward for his prominent part in restoring the 
Rump. His biographers are not at all helpful on this point. On 10 
February Whetham, the governor of Portsmouthp was given a regiment which 
seems to have been made up of companies in the Portsmouth garrison and 
surrounding areas. It is conceivable that Monck with whom he had 
served as a councillor in Scotland under the Protectoraiet and who 
was also his friendt was influential in getting him this post. 
(2) 
On 12 January the House voted that Valentine Walton should 
have Morley's regiment but changed its mind and gave him Disborowe's 
instead. The Captains of the regimentp which had been in the north 
ibid. t loc. cit. t Clarendon 
State Papers, q 1119 pp. 489p r5Cý51; Elou(4). A Brief Narrative; Baker, Chronicle 
p. 678- 
(2) C. J. 9 VII9 P. 807; Firth and Daviest pp. 251P 584-585; 
C. D. Wetham and W. C. D. Whethamt A History of the Life 
of Colonel Whethamt Londong 1907- 
674. 
at the time of the coup against Parliament and which had served under 
Lambert before its defectiont were drastically purged. Major Robert 
Huntington who had resigned his commission in Cromwell's horse regiment 
in 1648, was made Major in place of John Blackmore. The only Captain 
who kept his place was Edward Scottent one of the regiment's elected 
officers in 1647, despite the fact that he had adhered to the Lambert/ 
Diaborove/Fleetwood faction. 
(') 
Okeyt who had remained loyal to the 
Rmp during the autumn crisisp was restored to his regiment and John 
Daberont who had nott was replaced by Richard Wagstaffe as Major. 
Robert Rose and William Eyres were brought into the regiment and 
William Lynley was dropped. 
(2) 
Alured also returned to his command, 
The officers of his regiment had not been finalised before the October 
coup because of the resignation of Theopholus Hart as Major and 
because of various charges of favouring government by a single person 
brought against William Goffe. In January 1660 Christopher Alured and 
James Strangeways who had been under consideration for commissions in 
the regiment in October were given Captaincies. 
(3) 
In Haselrig's 
regiment (late Packer's) Gladmant Barrington and Hunter, who had been 
purged by Cromwell in 1658 but reinstated the following yeart were 
once again removed and replaced by new men including Haselrig's son 
Robert. There were considerable changes in the more junior ranks and 
among the N. C. O, s, 
(4) 
Campfield had been created Colonel of Lambert's 
C. J. 0 VIIt pý. 808-809; 
Clarke Paperaq Iq p. 438; ibid. 9 
IV, pe 146; Firth and Daviest pp. 208-209. 
(2) C. J. 9 VIIP pp. 
697-69s, 8og. Firth and Davies (P. 300) 
wrongly suggest that Richard Ward was new to the regiment 
in january 1660. He had previously been Captain Lt. 
Lc. j-, VII, p. 697). 
(3) C. J., VII9 pp. 749P 809; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, pp. 202-2039 
239. Firth and Davies (P- 195) ar; thus 'somewhat inaccurate 
in describing Alured and Strangeways as new. 
(4) C. J. t VII, pp. 
693t 810. 
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foot regiment when the latter was cashiered on 12 October but on 
12 January the House decided to give the regiment to William L)rres 
who had been a Leveller in 1649. Campfield became Lt. Colonel again. 
Christopher Skipper became the Major. Richard Elton who had signed 
the Derby petition and who had once been Lt. Colonel of the regiment 
was reduced to the rank of Ensign. Thomas Spilmanp the Captain Lt. 
who had adhered to the Iambert/Disborowe/rileetwood factionp was also 
purged and replaced by a new Tnant James Cleaver. 
(') 
Streater's regiment 
(late Hewson's) was also extensively purged. The Lt. Colonelp John 
Duckenfield who adhered to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction, 
was replaced by George Weldon. The Major retained his place but five 
of the eight Captains were removed. 
(2) 
In Ashley Cooper's regiment 
(late Fleetwood's) Hezekhiah Haynest the Majorv and Captain Griffith 
Lloyd together with three other Captains were purged. Thomas Izod 
who had been removed the previous summer was made Major and four new 
Captains were brought into the regiment. One of them was ]Peter Bets- 
worth who had been governor of Calshot Castle in 1649. Some time in 
the course of his command articles were presented against him 
for scandalous misdemeanours including swearingg drunkenness, giving 
malignants places of trust and allowing one Samuel Baxter to preach 
weekly in the castle although he had been charged with drunkenness. 
Betsworth allegedly made the'soldiers contribute to Baxter's up-keep 
c. i., vii, pp. 68o-681,810,815-816; Clarke Papers. 
IV9 PP. 53t 146. 
(2) c. i., VII, pp. 682p 810-811. 
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out of their pay. Baxter himself was charged with singing bawdy ranting 
songst denouncing Cromwell and drinking to Charles Stuart and with 
instructing men how they could drink for 24 hours and not got drunk! 
(') 
Rich who had not been dismissed by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood 
faction in October was retained but there were some changes in his 
regiment. Breman remained as Major. John Toombesp who had been 
cashiered for his part in Overton's 'plot' but restored in 1659, was 
made Captain, and John Gregory, who had likewise been cashiered in 
1655 when a Qaater Master and restored in 1659 as a Cornetq became 
Captain Lt. The reference given by Firth and Davies to suggest that 
Rich's appointment was opposed does not support their argument. on 
29 December the House had voted to thank Rich and Breman for their 
efforts on behalf of the Commonwealth. 
(2) 
On 27 January the House considered Hacker's regiment whose 
Colonel had remained loyal to the Rump and who had worked actively 
for its return. The Captains were changed. Captain Clement Needham 
was brought back and the former agitator Nicholas Lockyer removed. 
The Major, William Hobartp was also restored. 
(3) 
On the same day 
Pitch's foot regiment (late Fleetwood's) was dealt with. Samuel Gooday, 
who had been in Fairfax's foot in 1647 but had left the army because 
he was willing to accept Parliament's terms for the Irish serviceq 
became Lt. Colonelq and Christopher Copperthwaiteq who appears to 
(1) C-J-p VIIP P. 817; Clarke Papersp IVt P. 147; Bodl. Ilawlinson 
ms., A26, ff. 430P 431; S-P- 28/619 f. 690; Firth and Daviesp 
pp. 98-99. 
(2) PP. C. J. t VII 799s 817; C. S. P. D. 1658-59,9 P. 387; Firth ;, 
and Davie p. 156. 
(3) C. J. 0 VIIV pp. 
669, 824; Firth and Daviest p. 237- 
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have come from outside the regimentt 
Captains only three were kept on. 
(') 
became Major. Of the seven 
In Moss's regimentg passed on 
1 February, three Captains were purged including Ralph Prenticeg one 
of the regiment's agitators in 1647. Another agitator from 1647, 
Nicholas Andrews, remained as Lt. Colonel. 
(2) 
In Herbert Morley's 
regiment four Captains were purged and one James Priest (Priece) was 
promoted to the Majority. 
0) 
Sir John Lenthall's regiment (late 
Sydenham's) was extensively purged. John Millp who had been Colonel 
until the summer of 1659 and who had supported Richard Cromwellf was 
restored to the regiment as Lt. Colonel. The Majorg John Grimesp was 
replaced by Robert Linson, and only one of the seven Captains was 
retained. Their places were taken by new men as the Lieutenants 
and Ensigns remained largely the samee(4) Sydenham himself a supporter 
of the Protectoratet but closely allied with Lambert in opposing king- 
ship and then an important figure in the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood 
faction, had been expelled from the House on 17 January for his part 
in the coup. 
(5) 
In George Fleetwood's regiment (late Biscoe's) the 
Majorg Mathew Cadvell, was replaced by Henry Goldt a newcomerg and 
five of the seven Captains were purged; as in other regiments they 
tended to be replaced by new men rather than by internal promotion. 
C. j., VIIO pp. 668t 824; Firth and Daviesq P. 325. 
(2) C-J-9 VII9 ppý- 701-7029 8299 
(3) Lbid. 9 pp. 677P 781t 829, 
(4) jbid. t pp. 683P 829, 
(5) ibid-t P. 813- 
(6) Lbid. 0 pp. 682t 829. 
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Even after Monck's arrival in London the commissioners 
for the army continued the purge. On 8 February Smithson's regiment 
(late Lilburne's) was dealt with. Smithson had been instrumental in 
ensuring that most of the regiment defected to Monck and the latter 
recommended as early as 12 January that he be given command of the 
regiment. In the new list Thomas Strangeways was made Major and 
Thomas Lilburne, a keen supporter of the Protectorate who had been 
purged the previous summert was restored. Captain William Peverel 
whose troop had adhered to Robert Lilburne at the end of the year was 
kept on. The suggestions of Thomas Lilburne about some of the appoint- 
ments to the regiment appear to have been taken up by Haselrig and 
his fellow commissioners. Monck made further changes to the regiment 
later in the month. 
(') 
Alterations were also made to Lilington's 
regiment in Flanders. George Fiennes was restored to the Majority he 
had lost the previous sirmerv and George Fitz Williamsq the former 
governor of Mardykep was restored but only as an Ensign, not as a 
Captain. 
(2) 
On 10 February the Rump passed the final three regimental 
listsp those of George Twisleton's (late Miller's)p Saunderss(late 
Swallow's) and Whetham's whichp as has been saidt was made up of 
companies from Portsmouth and surrounding area. George Twisleton was 
possibly the brother of Philip who had co-anded a regiment serving 
in Scotland at the time of the cou . Ile was not in Scotland at that 
j-bid-P P. 836; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, p. 295; Firth and Davies, 
pp. 275-276. 
(2) C-J-9 VII9 PP. 836-837. Firth and Davies (p. 691) wrongly 
say that Fiennes was only restored in March by Monck. 
679. 
time and appears to have remained neutral. Monck -appointed 
Clobery 
in his place, an appointment confirmed by the Rump on its return. 
(') 
In George Twisleton's regiment Miller was kept on despite his adherence 
to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Three of the other Captains 
were retained although Monck made changes later in the month. 
(2) 
Saunders was made Colonel of Swallow's late regiment because Monck 
had been forced to fill up the vacancies in his old regiment during 
his march south. Saunders had been restored to his old regiment after 
Richard Cromwell Is, fallq but he had not joined it as it was serving 
in Scotland. In Satinders's new regiment the Major was Nathaniel 
Barton purged in November from Saunders 
I 
old regiment in which he 
likewise held the Majority. Captain Daniel Dale kept his place as did 
Lt. Richard Ireland but the other officers appear to have been 
replaced. 
(3) 
The purge carried out by the lb=p was substantial but 
not as extensive as Ludlow claimed. 
(4) 
One of the important features 
to emerge is that by and large the new Captains were new men who do 
not appear to have had any previous connexion with the various regiments 
to which they were appointedg or, in many cases even with the army. It 
is possible that they were brought in from militia regiments and that 
the aimy commissioners may have felt that they would be more reliable 
For George Twisleton q. v. Firth and Daviesq PP- 345-346 
and the note by W. D. Pink in Notes and Queries,, 8th Series, 
January 1894, p. 28. 
(2) C-J-9 VIIP-P- 83P; Firth and Daviest P. 346. 
(3) C-J-9 VIIP PP. 713P 839- Firth and Davies (p. 229) are 
incorrect to say that only one of the old officers kept 
his place. For Saunders and Barton q. v. biographical 
appendix. 
Ludlowp Memoirsq Up p. 204. 
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and loyal to the R=p. There was very little internal promotion with- 
in the regiments. Together with the gulf between officers and men 
that had already developed these changes further undermined the 
cohesion of the regiments and reduced even more their corporate identity 
and thus their potential to be the sort of political units or soviets 
they had been in 1647-1649. 
On, his march south Monck also made some changes in the 
various regiments under his command. Hugh Bethelq a Yorkshireman, who 
had been governor of Scarborough until the spring of 16499 was given 
Lambert's horse and Smithson vast as we have seeng given Robert Lilburne's 
regiment. In Lambert's horse regiment Monek brought back Major William 
Goodrick who had been dropped the previous summer. He was the man who 
Robert Lilburne had considered "much a new Royalist" in 1657. Monck 
also purged Joseph Pease# Adam Baynes's brother-in-law and one of his 
correspondents, Thomast Spilmant Robert Salmong Thomas Lowellq Tho s 
Paul and one Bright. 
(4 
Unlike his purges in Scotland Monck did not 
allow those ousted to keep their arms and he ordered the seizure of 
the arms and horses of those dismissed from Lambertts regiment. 
(2) 
Some of those who had served under Lambert did not know how they would 
fare with the restored R=p and Monck's march into England. On 4 
January Robert Baynes wrote to his brother Adam from York saying that 
he and his comrades did not know how they would stand in Parliament's 
reckohing but that the officers and soldiers would stick close by the 
(1) B. M. Add. Ils. 219 4259 : f. 193. 
ibid. t f. 194. 
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Parliament if it should so wish to employ them. He asked Adam to use 
his influence to this end if he could. 
(') 
Robert Baynes was being 
totally unrealistic. The division between the Rump and the adherents 
of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood factiong whether active or merely 
passivev was too great just to be brushed aside or papered over as 
easily as he thought. In addition to the naivety one can also detect 
a certain degree of self-interest behind the request. Robert Baynes 
had devoted his career to the army and clearly must have felt worried 
about his job and his financial interests. 
(2) 
He also failed to 
realise that his brother had been one of the first persons purged by 
the Rump. 
Monck seems to have had it in for Ashfield's regiment. 
The regiment had served in Scotland until May 1659 when it was ordered 
to the north of England. The Colonel had been absent from the regiment 
for a long time and during the late 1650's he wasp as we have seen# 
quite active in politics in London. Daring the troubles under Richard 
Cromwell Monck had written to the Protector saying that if Ashfield 
and Lt. Colonel Gough were sent back to Scotland they "could signify 
as little as any two officers in Scotland"*(3) In 1660 Monek dismissed 
all the officers except the Majort Henry Dorney. This did not come as 
a surprise to the members of the regiment# one of whose members was 
Robert Baynes. On 14 January he wrote to his brother that it was 
expected any day that all the officers would be dismissed and the 
(1) ibid. p f. 191. 
(2) c. f. 9 ibid. 9 f. 203. 
(3) Thurloet VII, p. 638- 
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soldiers dispersed to other regiments. He said that Monck was very 
much incensed against the regiment. Robert thought this understandable 
as the regiment "was more not lesse guilty than many others" in the 
late disturbances. Four of the regimen4 companies at Newcastle had 
already been purged and divided up and Baynes felt that the other six 
companies could expect the same treatment when Monck moved further 
South. 
M 
On 14 January Monck authorised Colonel Thomas Morgang who 
had been serving in Flanders until late 1658 but who still had a 
regiment of dragoons in Scotland, to take command of those regiments 
not going to London with him. These were Bethells, Smythson'sq the 
Irish brigade, Charles Fairfax'st Samuel Clarke's. the six companies 
of Ashfield's. and one of Salmon's. He was instructed to remodel them 
and discharge such men as need be. Morgan was eventuallyordered back 
to Scotland to take command there. He did not arrive there until late 
February, despite the fact that his commission to command in Scotland 
was dated 25 January. The uncertain military situation in the north 
of Englandprobably accounts for his delay. Nevertheless, the fact 
that Monck left Scotland without a replacement Commander-in-Chief during 
these critical weeks suggests either a great deal of trust in the Scots 
or else that he was taking a chance on their quiescence, 
(2) 
Robert Baynes gives us somo very useful information about 
what was happening in the north during Monck's march. On 14 January he 
reported that 
(1) B. M. Add. Ms. 21v 425p f. 195. 
(2) Clarke Ms. 49 (Monck's Order Dook)t sub. 14 January; Firth 
and Davieso Pp- 311-312; Dow, D. Phil., pp. 634-635- 
Morgan had made his way to Scotland after the October 
coup. Ilis dragoons soon became a regiment of horse TIE-rth and Daviest P. 312). 
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"all the officers in these parts yt were dismissed 
at the last change and some yt were laid aside in 
(1648) and others are earnestly soliciting for 
commands and are not with out great hopes to accomplish 
their desire. For my owne part I shall be very willing 
to relieve myself if it be the parlementh pleasure to 
have it soe and shall be glad if the nacon be preserved 
in peace who ever be the intstruments but to me its a 
paradox yt persons who the other day were layd aside 
for being soe hott for a kingly gouvernment should 
now be thought the fittest persons to support the 
interests of the parliment and comonweall. 11 (1) 
It should have been quite obvious to him what the activity of those 
seeking places meant. There is a general feeling of fatalism running 
throughout the letterv a feeling which must have been shared by many 
in the aftermath of the events of the last few weeks, The re-emergence 
of a confident right-wing consisting of people who at best were advocates 
of government by a single person and at worst of a Restoration was 
appreciatedg but there was a feeling of helplessness in the face of 
it. At the end of January Baynes wrote that the cavaliers and supporters 
of a free Parliament were working hard to procure arms and horses 
'land are not without hopes of finding some friends 
lately crept into the Armie. 11 
He added that Major Goodrick had been to see Fauconberg before setting 
off for London to receive his commission. He concluded 
"I wish the parliament doe not take too many that 
will but act coldly to their interest if occasion 
be. " (2) 
The question of the justification for Monck's march into 
England is problematic. Professor Woolrych rightly points out that he 
(1) B. M. Add. Ms. 219 425p f. 195. 
(2) ibid. 9 f. 201. 
684. 
crossed the Tweed without any specific orders from the restored 
Rump, 
(') 
It was only on 6 January that it was decided that he be 
specifically asked to come up to London and a letter was sent to 
him to this end the following day. 
(2) 
What is beyond doubt is that 
Honck was determined to make himself a key figure in subsequent attempts 
at settlement. His actions since the October coup had been directed 
towards seeing a return of the Rump, but as we have seen he made it 
clear that this would not be an unconditional return; the Parliament 
would have to adhere to its decision to dissolve itself by May 1660. 
Ile set out from Coldstream uncertain as to how he would be received, 
(3) 
but determined that the 'tyranny' of the Lambert/Disborowe/rleetwood 
faction should not be replaced by the 'tyranny' of the 11h=p, It is 
extremely unlikely that he came to England with any preconceived plans 
or even vague commitment to restore the Stuarts. His temprament and 
his leisurely pace southwardsiduring which time he took every opportunity 
to acquaint himself with opinion in the country, show that this was not 
the case. Daring the next few months Monck displayed an ability to 
follow the prevailing wind; first with the lh=p, then with the City 
and secluded members, and finally for a Restoration. There was nothing 
subtle or scheming in this, it just happened that way. A man with more 
cunning and ambition could have ensured a different outcome. 
Much of the prestige for ending the imagined threat of %2 
military rule and for restoring the Rump accrued to Monck. This was 
00 Woolrychl Ifiltong p. 160. 
(2) C. J. 9 VIIp p. 804; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, p P- 303; Clarke Papers. IVO pp. 240-241. 
(3) Gumblep Monckq p. 187. 
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apparent on his march south. Ile became a focus for attention and for 
hopes. It was not just Royalists who expected things from him. The 
Rt=pers too realised his importance as de facto head of the army. On 
16 January the House voted that a letter be drawn up saying that it 
was glad Monck was moving to London. Scott and Robinson were instructed 
to go to Monck, ostensibly to congratulate him but no doubt to get a 
clearer picture of his intentions and hopefully to try and influence 
him as well. The likelihood of tension between Monck and some of the 
Jbimpers was apparent to the French ambassador*(') Two other persons 
also went to meet Monckg Whethamt the governor of Portsmouth and 
Clarges who brought with him a list of the quarters of the forces in 
London which he had managed to obtain from Quater Master General John 
Butler. 
(2) 
Using this information it was decided to draw up a letter 
to the Speaker requesting the removal of all the regiments in London 
to new quarters. Only Morley's and Fagg's were to be excepted, We 
rely on Phillips for this account; which regiment he has in mind when 
he refers to Fagg's is unclear. It seems that a regiment made up of 
loose companies from other regiments came up with Haselrig and Morley 
from Portsmouth, probably under the command of William Farley. Farley 
had been Lt. Colonel of Morley's regiment (a regiment of which he 
became Colonel over the sunnner of 1659. It had previously been Ludlow's 
until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland - Goffe's and 
Oliver Cromwell's). He had been a member of the regiment since before 
C-J-t VII9 P. 8139 Bakerv Chronicleg P- 878; Ludlowq 
Memoirsp Up p. 209; Guizotp Richard Cromwell# 119 
PP- 330-331- C. f. Ludlow# Memoirsq II, pp. 210-211. 
(2) Baker, Chroniclet p. 679. 
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1647. Both he and Morley had been purged by the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction in October. Morleyp and presumably Farleyp had been 
instrumental in ensuring the defection of Portsmouth to the Rump. On 
3 January the House ordered that a month's pay be given to Farley's 
regimentp one of those that had come up from Portsmouth. Faggp a 
Sussex gentlemen not previously a member of the army but Morley's 
brother-in-lawg had attempted to raise forces on behalf of the Rump 
in Sussex in December but had been arrested. On 25 February he was 
appointed Colonel of the regiment under Farley's command which had 
come up from Portsmouth. Parley had in the meantime been reinstated 
as Morley's Lt. Colonel (I February). It could be that Phillips is 
muddled about the date of Fagg's appointment and that he means that 
Monck requested that Morley's and the regiment nominally under Farley 
should remain in London. 
(') 
For this reason the two regiments must 
have been considered relatively uncontaminated by the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction. The regiments which were to leave London (Okey's, 
Haselrig'sp Cooper's and Rich's of the horse; Eyres1p Markham'sq Streater'sq 
the regiment late Fleetwood'sp presumably the one now Fitch's, Moss's 
and Fitch'st now Twisleton'st of the foot) had their new quarters 
pretty widely scatteredt so that communications between the regiments 
and even within regiments would be extremely difficult, unlike 1647. 
The letter to the Speaker contained two listst the one of the regiments 
ibid. t loc. cit.; C-J-t VIIt PP- 803g 807t 829; Clarke 
Papers, IV9 p. 188; Firth and Davies pp. 507-509. Firth 
and Davies are themselves a bit muddled about Farley, 
The account cited does not square vith their account of 
Farley's career on PP- 334-335- 
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to leave Londont the other a list of those regiments accompanying Monck 
and the quarters that were to be given them. Monck's forces comprised 
his own horse and foot regimentst Cloberrylaq Read'st Lydcott's and 
Hubblethorne's. Lydcott was eventually chosen to deliver the letter 
possibly because he was a kinsman of the Speaker. On 30 January the 
House approved Monck's request after rejecting Haselrig's suggestion 
on behalf of the Council of State that only four regiments leave 
London and only four of Monck's seven enter the capital. 
(') 
The 
request was very significant. With Monck and his force present in 
London and regiments whose commanders had been consistently loyal to 
the Rump, such as Okey and Streaterl, removed from it, Monck would be 
in a position to hold all the military cards in his hand should any 
confrontation arise with the Rump. 
Howevert the withdrawal of the regiments from London did 
not take place without trouble. This was caused by lack of pay and 
was confined to the foot regiments. It started on 1 February among 
either Twisleton's or Eyrest (late Lambertts) regiments at a rendezvous 
in St. James's. An officer struck a soldier for offensive behaviour 
and the soldier retaliated, at which point a general mutiny or riot 
broke out with the soldiers saying 
"they would have mony first and that they would 
see theire officers hanged first eare they would 
march without monyp neither would they goe to 
their gards. Some cried Lett us hang up our 0 
officerst some saidt Letts teare theire cloathes 
from of theire backs and stript them naked. " 
Bakert Chronicle, pp. 679-681; Woolrycht Miltong pp. 164-165; 
Daviest Restoration, t p. 273- 
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The intervention of the Colonel was unavailing. The next day the 
mutiny spread to the troops quartered around Somerset House. Here 
the trouble was started by an old man and his two sons who were loath 
to leave London. Sir John Lenthal and Colonel Iýyres played important 
parts in putting down the mutiny. But the officers generally were 
afraid; petrified by the venom of the men. Drink seems to have been 
important in stirring up the men and Lenthal ordered that no more drink 
be delivered to the soldiery and asked that two members of each company 
should come and confer with him. This seemed to divide the mutineers 
and reduced their numbers to about 100. Howeverv Presbyterian elements 
from the City tried to exploit the trouble and to turn the mutiny into 
an act of revolt against the Rump and one in favour of a free Parliament, 
even of a Restoration. Some of the soldiers were invited to the 
'Cardinals Hat' where certain "citizens of quality" promised them money 
if they would move into the City. The next morning the apprentices 
attempted to mount a demonstration which was suppressed by Farley's 
regiment (who was now commanding it is unclear. Fagg did not take 
over until later in the month). The newsbooks boasted that a massacre 
had been avoided. The Rump's quick decision on 2 February to vote a 
month's pay to Twisleton's and Lenthal's regiments took the beat out 
of the situation and the regiments involved in the disturbances marched 
from London. The trouble so alarmed the Rump that at its height they 
sent Scott to Monck to ask him to march into London without delayq but 
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he saw no reason to bring forward his march. 
(') 
The ringleaders of 
the mutiny were arrested and examined. A sergeant and eight soldiers 
were singled out for punishment. Four were sentenced to death but 
sentence was only carried out on two after lots had been cast. The 
(2) 
other offenders were all whipped. Monck was re-asserting his 
authority in no uncertain terms. The affair had shown just how far 
discipline had been eroded during the past few months. These justifi- 
able material grievances prompted no raising of the level of political ts 
consciousness among the men as in 1647. Judged against those earlier 
political activities and the previous military glories of the army it 
was a sad decline from a once great military body. 
There was also trouble in Cockrane's regiment at Gravesend. 
This regiment had been one of the three regiments recalled from Flanders 
the previous August to help suppress Booth's rising. In November part 
of the regiment had been quartered at Gloucester along with some of 
Derry's which placed quite a strain on the city. The inhabitants were 
expected to provide both board and lodging. The corporation took up 
the matter with the Committee of Safety. It seems as if Cockrane and 
his fellow officers had condoned this and in January the Council of 
(1) W. L. Sachse (ed. )v The Diurnal of Thomas lhigRe 1659-1661, 
Camden Society# 3rd Seriest XCIq 19619 PP- 34-35; Publick 
Intelligencert 30 January-6 February 1660; Parliamentall 
Intelligencert 30 January4 February 1660; Latham and 
Matthews (eds, ), Diary of Samuel PeMq It PP- 36-38; 
Ludlowq Memoirst 119 p. 214; Bakerg Chronicleg p. 682; 
H. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamp p. 214; C. " 
Clar. S. P., IVP PP. 543- 
544; C-J-9 VII9 P- 831; C-S. D. M357-09 P- 344; Waristont 
Diaryt III# P. 175; Davies, Restoration, pp. 274-275; 
Woolrychq Milton, pp. 165-16U. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, t P- 357; Rugge, p. 42. 
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State hinted at fraudulent behaviour on their part. Cockrane and possibly 
some others were cashieredg although it is not clear if this was for 
financial impropriety or for adhering to the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleet- 
wood faction. - Part of the regiment was ordered to return to Dinkirk 
and while quartered at Gravesend they mutinied over pay. They also 
demanded the reinstatement of their old officers. Two of the soldiers 
(that magic number again) were sent to Monck to request the return of 
their old officers but he told them bluntly that 
"their business was but to carry a Musquet or Pike 
under what officers soever, that they must submit 
to them the Parliament set over them, that in so doing 
he should cherish them but if they should fail in 
their obedience he should take strict course to 
reduce them to it. " 
r 
Monck ordered Lt. Colonel Campfield of Eyres' regimentp one of those 
which had complied with the order to leave London and which was 
quartered in Kentt to suppress the mutiny. According to one report 
Campfield said to his men 
"that they had now an occasion providentially 
bestowed on themp whereby they might justifie that 
theire late disorder Ci. e. in adhering to the 
Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction) proceeded 
onely out of distempert and not disaffection to 
the Parli(ment). 11 
Some people were obviously ready to sacrifice honour to prove themselves 
loyal to the authorities even if this meant turning upon their erst- 
while colleagues and friends. This was an attitude that was to increase 
up to and after the Restoration. With the mutiny quelled the men were 
transported to Dunkirk-land those of the old officers who had not already 
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been dismissed were so then. The mutineers themselves were disbanded. 
(') 
These mutiniest especially the ones in Londong as with the use of armed 
force to put down the apprentice riots in early Decemberp could not 
help but alienate the civilian population even more from what it 
conceived of as an already over-oppressive military presence in the 
nation. 
Monck finally entered London on 3 February and was greeted 
by the Speaker. He refused to take the abjuration oath and thus to sit 
on the Council of State which aroused the suspicions of Haselrig and 
his associates despite Monck's constant reiterance of loyalty to the 
Parliament. Monck was in an anomalous position. The House had by 
this time confirmed him as Conmander-in-Chief but showed a reluctance 
to treat him as such. Haselrig was even said to have been unable to 
stand anyone calling him "General" in the House. This attitude did 
not go unnoticed. The French ambassador said that Monck tended to be 
treated like one of the seven commissioners appointed to govern the 
army on 12 October and that it was even said that his commission as 
Cornmander-in-Chief had ceased with his arrival in London. Bordeaux 
shrewdly observed that if his authority regarding the army was only 
as one of the commissioners 
"His power is very differentp as the troops recognise 
him as their only leaderg and all parties look upon 
him as the man upon whom depends the establishment 
or the ruin of the Government. " 
H. M. C. Mss. of the Duke of Beaufort etc *9 PP. 517-518; 
C. S. P. D. 1659-609 P. 321; Publick Int-e-l-ligencert 30 
Janua77Z February 1660; Parliamentary Intell1frencer, 
30 January-6 February 16607-r-13 February 1660; Guizott 
Richard Cromwell, II# P- 343; Ruzaep P- 37; Firth and 
Daviesq PP. 687-689. C. f. II. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamq P- 145 
which alleges that the mutineers at Gravesend deciared for 
a free Parliament, 
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Even the foreign ambassadors were said to be courting him. 
(') 
What 
must have caused so much resentment to Haselrig was the point that had 
been made so obvious during the mutinies in Londong namely that the 
Rump for all its pretensions was still very much dependent on the 
army and its de facto leader,, George Monck. 
Monck's importance was buttressed by his attendence 
in the House on 6 February. He was received with great solemnityt 
in a manner befitting a foreign ambassador as the Venetian envoy 
described it. Soldiers were also present in the palace of West- 
minster. 
(2) 
His speech in reply to that of the Speaker made a number 
of political assumptions. He flattered himself that he had been in 
some measure instrumental in restoring the Rump. He told the House 
that on his journey south despite all the addresses made to him 
urging him to declare for a free rarliament he had upheld the authority 
of the Rump. He went on to make a few points which some of the Rumpers 
found offensive. He suggested that the fewer oaths and engagements 
that were imposed the easier it would be to reach a settlementt a 
clear reference to the abjuration oath. Drawing upon what he had 
observed about the mood of the political nation he said 
"I know all the sober Gentry will close with yout 
if they may be tenderly and gently used. " 
He urged that neither the "cavalier" nor "phanatick" parties should 
have any share in governmentp military or civilian. Monck was advocat- 
Guizotp Richard Cromwell# UP P- 344; Woolrych, Miltonj 
pp. 166--lU7--. 
(2) c. s. P. v. 1659-61,, pp. 115-116. 
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ing a swing to the right, but in a sense he was reiterating Cromwell's 
policy of healing and settling# although he was of course no Cromwell. 
He also requested that care should be taken to settle the government 
of both Scotland and Ireland and especially to satisfy the adventurers 
in Irish land. 
(') 
Scott and others were alleged to have remarked that 
Monck "seemed to affect Popularity" with the speech, and there is 
something in this. Whatever one may feel about Monck's political 
talentsp or lack of themt he did at least have the ability to guage 
the temperature of the country and to fall in line behind it. However, 
their other allegation that the speech gave "the Cavaliers a possibility 
of being received into the exercise of Trust" is not borne out by the 
, (2) 
speech, Bat speculation about his motives continued. On 11 February 
John Baynes wrote from Leith that he hoped the malignants' expectations 
of Yonck "will if not already vanish as a cloud". Ile said he had 
heard Monck declare often and convincingly against a single person 
and Restoration. 
"Howevert he hath been aspersed lately and indeed 
itt was exceeding ill done of some that I can 
name that gave out that report that he was upon 
a cavaleir designe and that itt was the 2nd 
part of Sir Geo. Boothe" (3) 
It did not take long for a crisis between the Rump and 
Monck to blow up. The cause was to be the City of London. The 
sequence of events has been well covered by both the late Godfrey Davies 
(1) Bakerg Chronicleg pp. 683-684, 
(2) ibid. 9 p. 
684. 
(3) B. M. Add. Ms. 21t 4259 f. 203- 
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and Professor Woolrych. 
(l) 
The crisis marks a decisive stage in the 
developments of January-May 1660 iri that it turned Monck and a signi- 
ficant number of his officers against the Rump* They resented being 
used merely as the tools of the Rump. Their action in tearing down 
the defences of the City could be interpreted by civilians as yet a 
further manifestation of arbitrary military mightl especially at a 
time when Monck was trying 
., 
to project himself and the army as being 
upholders of liberty. According to Giimble some of the officers felt 
that Lambert had been right 
"and would discourse; That they feared the Parliament 
would enforce them to follow his Methods. " (2) 
The outcome of the Parliament's request for the army to occupy the 
City and then to pull down -the gates and portcullises was the army's 
letter to the House of 11 February. 
After the initial move into the City Monck was made aware 
of the distaste of his fellow officers for their orders. Two of them 
were said to have informed him that the Council of State was growing 
jealous of him. Gumble implies that the two were Morley and Fagge. 
(3) 
On 10 February the Council of State had recommended to Parliament that 
Alured be appointed Major General of London# which could be interpreted 
as an anti-Monck move. 
(4) 
Hubblethamet who had taken over Talbot's 
regiment serving in Scotland in Novembert was said to have especially 
Daviest Restorationp pp. 277-284; Woolrych, Milton, 
pp. 166-: 11-71. 
(2) Gumblep Monck# p. 240. 
(3) Bakerg Chroniclev p. 684; Gumblep Monck, p. 243- 
(4) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, v P- 354- 
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resented the order to march into the City. The nominating commissioners 
had wanted to reduce him from Major to Captain the previous sumrner, so 
there must have been no love lost between the new established Colonel 
and someof those in power. 
(') 
Two officers who somewhat surprisingly 
are mentioned as being in favour of a stand against the Rump are 
Saunders and Barton. Both men had remained loyal to the R=p over 
the autumn and Saunders had of course been one of the Three Colonels. 
Phillips goes so far as to suggest that both men inclined towards a 
readmission of the secluded members at this stage. 
(2) 
Monck decided to call a meeting of a dozen or so of his 
senior officers, mostly men who had served under him in Scotland, to 
decide on a course of action. On 11 February a letter to Parliament 
was drawn up which as Professor Woolrych has said "was nothing less 
than an ultimatum". 
(3) 
The army was once again acting in an unambiguous 
political fashion. Only nowq for the first timep its aims were in 
line with those of a majority in the nationg a very important distinction 
from the previous year. The letter reminded the R=p that the army, 
meaning really the army in Scotlandp had been responsible for its 
sitting once again. However, the authors were afraid 
"that the late wonderful and unparalleled Deliverancep 
is not so publickly and solemnly acknowledged as it 
might be. " 
Exception was taken to the fact. that Lambert and Vane amongst others 
were still tolerated in Londont indeed that Lambert seemed to be 
(1) Bakerg Chronicleg p. 684; Firth and Daviest p. 467. 
(2) For further important details about Saunders and Darton, 
in 1659 and 1660 q. v. bibgraphical appendix. 
(3) Bakert Chroniclep pp. 685-686; Ifoolrycht Miltonp p. 170. 
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"winked at". and that the purge of officers who had adhered to the 
Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction was not as thorough as it should 
have been. Any extension of the abjuration oath was rejected. Priase 
God Barebones' petition (presented to Parliament on 9 February) which 
had advocated such an extension was condemned. There was a plea for 
curbs on religious toleration. The authors did not want to "incur 
the censure of unjust Rigidityllp but they did not want to permit 
"corrupt designs" to be carried on under the guise of liberty of 
conscience. This was in effect casting aside one of the main com- 
ponents of the good old cause. There followed the main demando namely 
a call for recruiter elections. The qualifications were to be left 
to Parliament but those who-actually fought against the Parliament and 
those who had declared their disaffection to it ought to be excluded. 
Was this to apply to "phanaticks" as well as Ileavaliers"? The writs 
for these elections were to be issued within six daysp a guarantee 
that Monck had already given to appease the City. The Rump was 
reminded about its pledge to dissolve itself and to set up a succession 
of Parliaments of the people's own election. Whether or not this was 
to mean freely elected Parliaments was not made clear. To make sure 
that the Ib3mp did not miss the pointp the letter concluded that the 
present guards assigned to the Parliament would continue but that the 
rest of the forces would be drawn into the City 
"that we may have the better Opportunity to compose 
spirits, and beget a good Understanding intthat 
great Cityq formerly renowned for their resolute 
adhering to Parliamentary Authority; and we hope 
that the same Sprit will be found still to breathe 
amongst the best, most considerableg and interested 
Persons there. " 
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The letter was signed by Monck and 14 others including Saundersq Barton 
and Daniel Redmant who had played a leading part in ensuring the 
defection of the Irish brigade from Lambertt the only officers in the 
group who were not members of the Scottish regiments. In the events 
leading up to the Restoration Monck's decision to ally himself with 
the City against the Rump is crucial. It could have been no secret 
to him that opinion in the City was favourable to the return of the 
secluded members, a free Parliamentp and ultimately a restoration of 
the Stuarts. Monck was slipping into line with mainstream feeling 
in the country. 
(') 
Lydcott and Clobery were instructed to present 
the letter to the House. 
(2) 
Clobery had been one of the three commis- 
sioners sent to treat with the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction in 
November. By February 1660 he was working for a Restoration. Sir 
John Barwick approached him for information about feeling in the army. 
As to Monck himself, Barwick feltt significantlyp that he "will venture 
rý2- (3) 
no further than he knows they Une armyD will follow". 
Parliament's reaction to the letter is well-known. On the 
afternoon of 11 February it voted to appoint five commissioners to 
govern the armyp Haselrigo Waltong Morleyp Monck and Alured. The latter 
was apparently a compromise candidate instead of Overton and Ashley 
Cooper. A move to ensure that Monck was always one of the quorum of 
three was defeated. Haselrigg Marten and Neville were the main figures 
(1) O-P-11-9 =It PP- 98-103- M. Woolrychq Milton, p. 171 
for a different interpretation. 
(2) Baker, Chroniclev p. 686. 
(3) Firth and Daviesq pp. 171-172; C. Clar. S. P., IVt P- 550. 
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behind this snub to Monck. These votes only served to push Monck 
further into the embrace of the City. That night saw the roasting 
of the lb=p. 
(') 
This incident greatly alarmed members of the R=p. 
Monck was asked to provide a guard for the safety of the Parliament 
and to attend the Council of State on the 13th. In fact, he declined 
to attend. He said that his officers and some eminent citizens had 
dissuaded him from leaving the City for fear of its safety. It was 
a very transparent excuse. On 14 February the Council of State 
instructed Alured to guard the Parliament and passed an indemnification 
of Alured and Okey. 
(2) 
On 12 February the Council of State directed a letter to 
the various garrisons in England about the events of the past few days. 
It emphasised that Honck was "unchangeably fixed and resolved to adhere 
to the Parliament" despite the rumours circulating that he favoured a 
free Parliament. The letter was prompted by Imowledge that there was 
a steady correspondence between the City and the provinces. The garri- 
son commanders were urged to deny these rumours and to prevent dis- 
turbances. 
(3) 
Addresses on behalf of the secluded members continued to 
reach Monck during this time. There were also riots in support of a 
free Parliament, or even of a Restorationp in some provincial areas. 
One of these riots was in Bristol where a somewhat similar incident 
00 C. J. 9 VIIt p. 841; Ludlowp Memoirsq Ht pp, 223-224; Woolrycho Nilton, p. 172; Daviesq Restoration, pp. 282- 
284. 
(2) C. S. P. D. 1659-60P PP- 359-P 362; Clarke Papers, IVt pp. 261- M. 
(3) C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, P. 363. 
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to that in London at the beginning of the month appears to have taken 
place. Soldiers who were ordered to march from the city to make way 
for new forces rioted because they had not been paid. Cries for a free 
Parliament were interspersed with demands for pay. The apprentices 
appear to have joined in with demands for a free Parliament as well. 
As a result Okeyt one of the most consistent supporters of the Rump, 
was dispatched to Bristol to suppress the trouble. 
(') 
In Yorkshire the most considerable persons in the county, 
and some from outsidep including Sir Horatio Townsend of Norfolk and 
Thomas Wharton of Lincoln, met and drew up an address calling for the 
readmission of the secluded members, and if not, then for a free Parlia- 
ment. The two senior officers present in Yorkq Morgan, who was about to 
leave to take up his duties in Scotlandt and Charles Fairfaxq heard about 
the petition and went along to see the contrivers of it to get it 
stopped. They felt it was of "dangerous consequence" and threatened 
the peace of the nations. Their advice and caution went unheeded. 
This was not surprising becausep although there were units present in 
and around Yorkp their quarters were widely scattered. This might have 
been in keeping with Monck's policy of dividing up the regiments to 
try and prevent comminications. If so it showed the dangers of such 
a policy in a time of possible emergency. In Yorkshire there were also 
few officers around to command the men. Those who had been commissioned 
by the R=p had not yet shown upp particularly Bethel, Goodrick and 
Rgj(. f&e,, pp. 40-42; H. M. C. Leyborne-Popham, p. 144; 
C. S. P. D. 1659-609 P- 351- 
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Strangeways. Fresh commissions for the officers had not yet arrived 
either. All this made Morgan comment that things could not 
"be in a good posture till such time commissions 
come down for them and the respective officers 
enter to the discharge of their duty. " 
There was also the problem of moneyt or rather the lack of itt to pay 
for the army. This last point was given even more immediacy because 
the signatories of the Yorkshire declaration had threatened a taxpayers' 
strike if their demands were not met. Morgan's assessment was supported 
by Robert Baynes who feared that with Morgan's departure for Scotlando 
Smithson's continued absence and Charles Fairfax as the most senior 
officer "all will not be well for want of some stirring person to 
connand". Baynes felt it was time somebody did something to prevent 
ruin. On 20 February he wrote that if only those officers who had been 
discharged by Monck were allowed to return to their chargesq 
"it would abundantly please most of the private 
sdes Csoldiers: ) in these parts and under yt 
coRduct would stick very close to the P(arliamenD 
we under new officers will be wavering under 
uncertaintie to what new interest they shall be 
drawne. 11 
News of the letter of 11 February had also reached York and as a result 
the chief officersp military and civiliant ordered bonfires to be lit 
and bells to be rung. Baynes said this troubled some of the private 
soldiery. Some townspeople also drank the King's health openly. Others 
drank to Monck saying that he was the cause of their joy. Baynes 
added IlSadd dayes seeme to threaten"*() 
H. M. C. Leyborne-Popham,, pp. 146-1509 esp. pp, 148-149; 
B. M. Add. Ils. 210 4259 ff. 204p 208. C, f. Ifoolrycht 
'Yorkshire and the Restoration'. pp. 501-503. 
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Baynes was probably being over-optimistic about the 
reactions of the soldiery. Apathy seems more likely to have ruled 
amongst them. Bat the situation in York as described in his letters 
shows why the Council of State was so concerned about the effects of 
rumours in the provinces and why it was calling on the garrisons to 
fulfil the modern role of the media. Corresponding lyt the lack of any 
active role by the 'pulpit' in this respect is noteworthy. The letters 
of Baynes and Morgan also reveal how confusion and paralysis had taken 
a hold on the army in this area. No doubt the same was true else- 
where as well. With its command structure so weakenedv especially by 
the purges of the summer and of the new year, the regiments divided 
one from the other, even troops and companies separatedq the soldiers 
unpaid and mistrustful of their officerst it is hardly surprising 
that the army was in no position to formulate a political position and 
carry out a policy commanding widespread support among its memberst 
let alone among the political nation. We are back once again in a 
situation whereby the part of the army in and around London was able to 
make the running, and the other forces followed its lead. But that 
part of the army had undergone a considerable change from the previous 
year under the impact of the purges of January and February, the 
expelling of certain regiments from the metropolis and the arrival of 
11onck's Scottish regiments. Monck was in a key position in all this 
came 
because he A06surrounded by officers most of whom were prepared to 
fall in behind a common policyt even if it led to a restoration of 
the monarchy. 
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lie have sug ested that Ifonck's alliance with the City was t. 9 
a major step in opening up the way for the return of the secluded 
members. Daring the next few days after the presentation of the 
letter to Parliament events moved further in that direction. Haselrig 
and Rich were alleged to be co-operating with Vane and Lambert to 
undermine Monck's position in the army, a charge which Haselrig denied. 
His letter to Monck setting out his denial seems quite tame. It is 
not written by a 'fiery spirit' but rather by a man who shows signs 
of being afraid for his own future. It is interesting that Alured 
was the intermediary between Monck and Haselrig. It is another 
indication of the close ties between the Colonel and Haselrig. In his 
original letter to Haselrig Monck reaffirmed his own commitment to a 
Commonwealth without King, single person or House of Lords. 
(') 
The Rump went some way towards satisfying the demands 
laid out in the letter of 11 Februaryv especially by making provision 
for fresh elections. 
(2) 
But by this time Monck was actively engaged 
in negotiations with the secluded members. He made no secret of this 
and invited some of the Rumpers including Haselrig to attend. Monck 
might well have been trying to effect a reconciliation and to get the 
Rumpers to agree freely to readmit the purged members; but this did 
not really have any chance of success. Monck probably did not make 
up his mind about readmitting the members until quite late ont after 
it became obvious that Haseirig and his supporters would not agree to 
Clarendon State Papersp III, pp. 678-679; Clarke Papers, 
IV9 pp. 260-261; Bakerg Chroniclet p. 687-- 
1w 
(2) Q. v. Daviest Restoration, pp. 285-286. 
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a voluntary readmission and after he had sounded out opinion among 
his officers. The latter decided not to oppose such a readmissiont 
provided that the secluded members would declare themselves in favour 
of a Commonwealth and pass an act to confirm the sale of lands. Self- 
interest was fast becoming an important influence on their calculations. 
Clarges, Clobery and Gumble were appointed to treat with some of the 
secluded members. In these talks the secluded members were unwilling 
to tie the hands of a future Parliament. The three commissioners 
reported back to the officers, and Clarges recommended that the secluded 
members' reluctance not to be drawn on the question of confirming land 
sales should not be made into a reason for breaking off the talks. 
It would appear to the outside world that the army was only motivated 
by sectional interestv he argued. A paper with four heads was 
drafted which the members were to be requested to sign before their 
admission. These were that they would settle the command of the armyp 
provide for its maintenanceg appoint a new Council of Stateg and dissolve 
themselves. These requests did not prove hard for the secluded members 
to swallow and on 21 February under the aegis of the army they returned 
to Parliament in what amounted to a virtual coup against the lbmp. Why 
did Monck support and work for their return? This is a question that 
could lead to endless speculation. The most plausible reason# and one 
that is consistent with the analysis of Monck's behaviour in this 
section, is that he and his closest advisors came round to thinking 
that the Rump was no longer representative of opinion in the nation 
and that it might prove reluctant to dissolve itselfg whereas with 
the readmission of the secluded members and a more legal dissolution 
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of the Parliament the next assembly would have a better claim to 
legitimacy than almost any other government in the 165018 - News of the 
declaration of the army in Irelandq now under the control of people 
with whom he was quite friendlyq for the readmission of the secluded 
members must also have hblped him make up his mind. Honck was never 
a man to put himself out on a limb. 
(') 
The question of how this stepp which was yet another 
lurch towards a Restorationt would be accepted by the rest of the 
army now arose. This was soon put to the test. Monck summoned a 
meeting of all the officers in and around London to consider a letter 
to be sent to the various forces in the three nations asking for their 
concurrence in what had been done. The drafting of the letter was 
referred to a committee which quickly produced one that was signed 
and sent from headquarters on 21 February. The letter claimed that 
the readmission of the secluded members followed by a legal dissolution 
of the Long Parliament and the election of a new Parliament "under such 
qualifications as may secure our Causellp was the only way to satisfy 
"good people" and guarantee the peace of the nation. They pledged 
that there would be no return to the old bondage and that the goal of 
a free state which they desired was inconsistent with the perpetual 
The fullest accounts of the readmission of the secluded 
members are in Daviesp Restorationg pp. 287-289; Woolrychp 
Milton, pp. 173-175; Ashleyq 11onck pp 201-202.1 have 
used Baker (chronicle -, pp. 
68t7tý mo; e than these three 
scholars. K. H. D. ffýley (The First Earl of Shaftesburyg 
Oxford# 1968t pp. 130-132) accepts too readily Ashley 
Cooper's account although he is not alone in this 
(q. v. Davieso Restoration, pp. 288-289). Dr. Ashley also 
rightly emphasises the impact of the declaration of the 
Yorkshire gentry, headed by Fairfaxt in favour of re- 
admitting the secluded members in helping Monck make up 
his mind (Monck, p. 202; II. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamp pp. 1119-150, 
154-155). 
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sitting of the Long Parliament. (Thgr conveniently forgot to mention 
that the R=p did not intend to sit perpetually anyway, but any sugges- 
tion that it did was useful propaganda. ) The signatories said that 
they were confident that the Parliament would interpose with the next 
one to get confirmation of all land transactions in the three nations 
passed in a bill. Anyone who rose in favour of Charles Stuart or any 
other pretended authority was to be arrested. All the regiments and 
garrisons were also asked to send up a representative with a written 
testimonial that they would acquiesce in the action of the army in 
London. In this way the forces distant from London could have the 
illusion that they were still participating in decision-making. The 
letter was signed by Monck and 11 Colonelsp five Lt. Colonels, eight 
Majorsq two Captains and the Quater Master General. The signatories 
included Saiinderst Eyreso Ilossp Evelyn$ Streater, Wagstaffe and Barton 
all of whom had supported the Rump in the previous year. 
(') 
The 
Republican officers who had stood by the Rt=p during the October tM 
crisis were now divided. Those who were likely to oppose the readmission 
were soon to be removed. 
Over the next few days the forces throughout the three 
nations drew up addresses supporting the readmission. These were 
printed in the newsbooks. The general tone of these addresses can be 
judged from that of Unton Crooke's regiment. His troop had, as we 
have seent declared for a Commonwealth and against a single person 
(1) Bakerg Chronicleg pp. 688-689. 
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and House of Lords in late December. In the new address the regiment 
declared that 
"our good Old Cause cannot decay nor impair# 
whilst Otis in the hands of those who first 
understood it, and in whose quarrel and 
invitation we first drew our Swordsq and 
shall be willing to sheath them when they 
command itp since its no pleasure to us to 
continue our commands or employment longer 
than they judj the necessities of our poor 
country require it. " (1) 
It seems like an act of blind faith in the secluded memberst coupled 
with a quality of naivety. It was amazing to suggrest that the good I= 
old cause and the intentions of the secluded members were compatible, 
yet that is what the address implies. It amounts almost to resignation 
from the political struggleg an attitude which is echoed in other 
regimental addresses. 
But not all the officers were as passive or naive as this. 
There was trouble in Rich's regiment. News reached London of a rendezvous 
of the regiment at Bury St. Edmundsp scene of some of the army's 
activities in 1647. According to the newsbooks some officers 
"held forth dangerous principles to engage them 
against his Excellency and the present parliament. " 
Some of the men joined with themg but others left the regiment determined 
to remain loyal to Monck. When the news of the rendezvous reached 
Londong Monck with characteristic swiftnessp sent Ingoldsby, a former 
Colonel of the regimentf with six troops of horse and the Life Guard 
under Philip Howard to reduce them. It was quite a large force. Rich 
parliamentary Intelligencer, 27 FebruarYý5 Harch 1660. 
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in a letter to Ingoldsby suggested that this was over-reaction and 
that 
"though I may be reckoned one of them to whom this 
late change seems somewhat strange, yet what I 
have expressed by way of dissatisfaction never did 
amount to occasion any such motion. " 
lie called a second rendezvous at which he gave his own views on current 
affairs urging his men to remain faithful to the Parliament but 
opposed to Charles Stuart. After this rendezvous they returned 
to their quarters ready to submit to what orders should come from 
Ilonck. Rich, a member of the House, appeared before it on 7 March. 
He denied the charges against him. The House referred the matter back 
to the Council of Statet newly elected. The substance of the charge 
against Rich was laid out in a letter from Ingoldsby, but we have a 
record of other charges against him. These alleged that he had 
re-established agitators in the regiment to represent grievancesp that 
he had filled up the regiment with men of "dangerous principles'19 
that he had supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction judg- 
ing it 
"both lawful and expedient to break all civil 
authority to make way for the Fifth Monarchy". 
that he had also abetted Cavaliers and forged signatures. It was an 
am zing catalogue of contradictory accusations. As a result of the 
incident the officers were purged. Ingoldsby replaced Rich and 
Thomas Babington replaced Bre-an who was also implicated in the 
trouble. Rich was kept in custody for several weeks. Whether or not 
he was tryingto. forment a rising-in the Eastern Association against 
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the return of the secluded membersq which seems unlikelyt his actions 
provided the government with a good opportunity to silence a potential 
dissident. 
(') 
Okey also gave some indications of being unhappy with 
the readmission of the secluded members. The Recorder of the City of 
Bristol wrote to Monck claiming that Okey was trying to make the city 
into a garrison "in opposition to you and the now Parliamentst com- 
mands" and that he was endeavouring to make Lambert the head of all 
the forces in the west. These reports were denied by Major Thomas 
Izod now of Ashley Cooper's regiment (Izod had been transferred from 
the regiment, then Fleetwood's, in the sunmer of 1659 to Thomas Saunders' 
most of which was then serving in Scotland. He. like his Colonel and 
Major, did not join the regiment there and Monck filled their places. 
Saunders and Barton became Colonel and Major of Swallow's regiment and 
Izod returned to his old regimentp now Ashley Cooper'sq with promotion 
as Major. ) Izod wrote to Monck that he was amazed that there were 
aspersions cast against Okey : 
"It is true that when I first acquainted him with 
your letter he was somewhat disturbed fearing 
that Charles Stuart would followl, but when he 
had consideredv he said that if those things 
which you had declared for were made good he was 
satisfied. " 
A letter which Okey received from Lawson also helped to settle him. 
Izod said, if Okey had tried to do anythingt he would have tried to 
Parliamentary Intelligencerg 26-27 February 1660; Publick 
Intelligencer, t 27 FebruarY-5 March 1660; Mercurius 
Politicust 23 February-I March 1660; Baker, Chroniclet 
pp. 690-691; C. J., VII9 p. 866; IT. M. C. Leyborne-Popham. 
pp. 157t 158P IU-3ý-164,165-1669 168-169; Firth and 
Daviest pp. 157-158; Davies, Reatoration, g PP- 301-302. 
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prevent him because 
"I fear this fanatic generation - which I 
suppose you expect trouble from - as I do 
the Cavaliers. " 
He also commented on Rich and Dreman saying that he considered them 
"two as dangerous persons as any in the army". The shift to the right 
amongst some of Monck's officers (or was it opportunism? ) was becoming 
increasingly obvious. The Recorder of Bristol wrote to Monck shortly 
afterwardst revising his opinion of Okey and supporting Izod's assess- 
ment. 
(') 
Okeyq who had had similar misgivings about political 
developments after the original expulsion of the 1h=p, had good enough 
reason to fear the consequences of the return of the secluded members. 
Shortly after he had left London for Bristol an action against him and 
Alured for secluding Sir Gilbert Gerrard in December was brought in 
Upper Bench. Prynne, the likely author of A Brief Narrative, 9 an 
account of the attempts by the secluded members tosit when the Rump 
was re-restored and which specifically mentioned the two Colonels as 
being the officers preventing the return of the membersq seems to have 
had a hand in the action as well. Okey also featured on a list of 
persons involved with the London militiat apparently drawn up for or 
by the Council of State for presentation to Parliament. It was a list 
of people allegedly disaffected to Monckt office holders under the 
Committee of Safetyt so-called sectariest and even people in favour 
II. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamv pp. 16o-161,164-165; Firth and 
Daviest P- 301- 
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of toleration. 
(') 
A hardening of attitudes towards 'sectaries' was 
also witnessed at Shrewsbury where the soldiers of the castlep with 
the encouragement of those in the town and its citizenst turned out 
all Quakers and "anabaptists" from the castle. 
(2) 
In early March 
Captain Walcott of the Irish brigade quartered at Chestert made an 
attempt to stir it up and to arrest Redman and other officers and to 
declare against Monck. This was soon put down. Walcott was allowed 
to return to Ireland. 
(3) 
It is at this time too that Hull and its controversial 
governor Robert Overton come back into the limelight. As we have 
seent during the October crisis and after it Overton had been rather 
ambiguous in his attitude towards national affairs. On his way south 
Monck had written to him asking him to give an unequivocal declaration 
for the Rump. Overton replied that for his part he was glad that 
Monck adhered to the Rmp and was not in favour of re-admitting the 
secluded memberss a free Parliament or a single persont despite 
rumours to the contrary. Ile justified his various postures during 
the last few months on the grounds of trying to preserve his command. 
Monck let the matter rest there for the moment. Howeverg with the 
return of the secluded members Overton declared against the actions 
of his colleagues in Londont fearing that it would be the prelude to 
a restoration of the Stuarts. Monck sent Alured and Major Jeremiah. 
H. M. C* VII Regort po 483; E1011 (4)9 A Brief Narrative 
BoM. 81boM-I. (105ýt A Copy of the Presentment and Indic 
ment Found and Exhibited by the Grand Jury of Middlesex 
H. M. C. Leyborne-Popham, p, 166,, 
(2) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 27 February-5 March 1660. 
ibid, t 5-12 March 1660; Ludlow, Memoirst 119 pp. 238-239. 
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Smith, an old friend of Overton'sl to Hull to try to win him over. At 
the same time he ordered Charles Fairfax to prepare to seize Hull by 
forcep and an ultimatumwas sent to Overton to deliver up the town. 
Alured and Smith reported that Overton was not at all informed of. 
events in London, but that he had given them assurances of his loyalty 
to Monck. The suggestion that Overton was quite out of touch with 
developments in London is borne out by the declaration that he and 
his fellow officers sent to Charles Fairfax'st Bethel's and Smithson's 
regiments, calling on them to assist in the defence of the cause and 
against the rising star of monarchy. Overton and his officers were 
under the impression that several regiments had declared against the 
return of the secluded members and had expressed their determination 
to adhere to the cause. As we have seenp there had really only been 
trouble in Rich's regiment. Howeverp there is no doubt that Overton's 
view# that there was a general drift towards a Restorationt was 
correct. Overton was deprived of his commission on 6 March. Charles 
Fairfax took possession of Hull on the 12th and Overton arrived in 
London on the 18th. According to LudlowOverton gave in so easily 
because he realised that he had no chance of holding out. Another 
upholder of the good old cause had been neutralised, 
(1) 
In the meantime what it is now appropriate to call the 
Long Parliament, or as one Royalist called it the "gigot" Parliamentq 
(2) 
had the task of fulfilling the four demands which the 
officers had"made. On 21 February the act appointing the five commis- 
Publick Intelligrencerp 23-30 January 1660; Mercurius 
Politicus, 1-8 March 1660; Mercurius Publicust 7-14 June 
19-0.2-9 August 166 ow, Ilemoirsp II, p'. 247; 
Firth and Daviesq PP. 559-560; Woolrychq 'Yorkshire and 
the Restoration'# PP- 499-500. 
(2) Clarendon State Papers, III, p. 639. 
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sioners to govern the army was repealed and Monck confirmed as 
Commander-in-Chief. 
(') 
A new Council of State was elected, a much 
more obviously right wing and civilian one. Moncht Iforleyl Ashley 
Cooper were the only serving army officers on it although Rossiter, 
who had already declared for a free Parliament and who had left the 
army in 1647 because he supported the Parliament's proposals for 
disbandingg was soon to have command of Okey's regiment and Montagu 
was soon to be given Alured's. 
(2 ) 
The Parliament also voted in 
favour of a new Parliament to be siumoned on 25 April. 
On 27 February the Houset presumably with the approval 
of Monckv issued a proclamation that all officers absent from their 
MAccording, 
to Phillips this was charges should repair to them at Once* 
done because there were too many officers present in the City and 
because of the danger of regiments attempting to rendezvous as Rich's 
had done. The fewer the number of officers there were in London the 
less likely were the policies of Monck and his advisors to run into 
(4 
opposition. 
) 
The presence of large numbers of officers in London 
had in the past been an important factor in the army's political role. 
The proclamation could only undermine this. 
It was at about this time that rumours started to circulate 
either that Richard Cromwell was going to be restored as Protector or 
else that Monck himself would be offered the chance to become the Single 
C. J. 9 VII9 pp. 847p 849, 
(2) C-J-9-VII9, p. 849; Clarke Ms- 329 f. 252; Davies,, Restoration, 
pp. 294-295* 
(3) C. J. 9 VIIt p. 848. 
(4) B. m. 66o f. 23 (65); Bakert Chroniclet p. 691. 
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ferson. There is no clear chronology for this but on 24 February 
Royalists reported that Haselrigp Scott and Robinson and others with 
some officers of the "old amyllp presumably those displaced in Januaryo 
were working on proposals to re-establish the Protectorate 
"as being the only expedient they can find to 
save themselves from utter ruin. " 
Another Royalist report said that St. Johnp Pierrepointq Thurloet 
Montagu and Philip Jones were in favour of restoring Richard and that 
this was why Ingoldsby and Charles Howard were restored to the army. 
(The latter took over Walton's regiment towards the end of February. ) 
This report is pretty dubious. Ingoldsby and Howard replaced Rich 
and Walton for other reasons. But it is possible that at any rate some 
of these old Cromwellians momentarily toyed with-the idea of a return 
of Richardp but if at all it was very likely only momentarily. At the 
beginning of Harch the Venetian ambassador heard stories about Monck 
becoming Protector, and as late as 12 April Whetham wrote to Monck 
saying that if there had to be a single person he hoped that Parliament 
would make it him. 
(') 
These rumours coincided with a period of renewed disquiet 
in the army which took place in the first half of March. The chronology 
of this discontent is difficult to work out exactly# but it seems 
evident that it occurred in two waves, the first prompted by the 
Parliament's resolve to establish new militia commissioners and the 
second by its repeal of the Eagagement. 
(2) 
Monck emerged greatly 
Clarendon State Papersq IIIt pp. 689-690p 693; C-S-P-V- 
1§12-6-fg p. 125; IIJI. C. Leyborne-Popham, p. 173- C-f- 
Guizot# Richard Cromwellq 119 P- 355; IIJI. C. VII Report, p. 483- 
(2) Ify analysis and chronology differs from -that of Godfrey 
Davies (Restorationg pp. 298-299) and Professor Woolrych 
(Milton, pp. 192-193) both of whom misread Phillips (Bakerg 
Chronicle, p. 693)- 
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strengthened from the crisis. It was to be the last time that there 
was to be any major attempt by serving officers in London to try and 
force him to change his policy. It was also the last political 
struggle in the army in the old style among serving officers. In the 
struggle the leading officer opposed to Monck was Okeyt newly returned 
from the west country. He was working in collaboration with civilians 
and with Haselrig who was still technically a member of the army. 
On 7 March a group of officers mett provocked by groving, 
fears that the Parliament was not committed enough against a Restora- 
tion. A remonstrance was drawn up against monarchy and a House of 
Lords. One Royalist account suggests that the remonstrance was also 
against all single persons. Haselrig and Scott were said to be behind 
it. That night the officers went to Monck who argued with them and 
threatened them saying that 
"he was resolved to acquiesce in ye determinacion 
of ye Parlementp soe he expected that all under 
him should do ye likep and if they were not 
pleased with theire commands upon those termest 
he would finde others that would bee. " 
On the 8th the officers went to Monck again and asked if he would sign 
their remonstrance or not. Realising that his bullying tactics were 
not working he organised a meeting between ten of the officers and ten 
M. P. s. to discuss matters. This also took place on the 8th. The 
officers demanded confirm--tion of all things done since the start of 
the troublesq that is an indemnityt which was to include the High 
Court of Justice and execution of Charles I. The officers also expressed 
concern about their property rights and about the militia. According 
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to one report on the question of the militia they were told that 
Parliament had already determined this and therefore it could not 
be discussed but that if they had anything to say they must petition 
the House; on the indemnity they were told that 
"a care would be had to it since all were equally 
concerned in it". 
and on the question of a single person they and the whole nation Mu t 
submit to Parliament's decision. As this report originates from a 
Royalist source the forwardness of the M. P. s on this last question 
is perhaps exaggerated. One thing is clearg howeverg the M. P. s were 
arguing with self confidence from a position of strengtho the officers 
were insecure and very an ious. Nothing seems to have come from these 
meetings probably because the M. P. s argued that with a dissolution and 
new Parliament imminent it would be improper to commit their successor. 
On 9 March Monck appears to have attended the House (which is possible 
because the bill voting him and his heirs lands was engrossed on that 
day) and to have been urged to keep his officers in better order. 
(') 
A few days of calm seems to have followed. This might 
have been helped by Monck's order for officers to repair to their 
commands, The order was apparently issued by order of Parliament, 
(2) 
As with earlier orders that of 27 February seems to have been difficult 
to enforce. This deceptive calm came to an end with the House's vote 
on 13 March to repeal the Engagement. According to Phillips, it was 
Nicholas Papers IV9 pp. 200-201; B. M. Add. 11s. 15P 750P f-55 
James Mowbray to William Larne); Clarendon State Paperaq III, 
pp. 696-697; Guizot, Richard Cromwell, II# PP- 376-3779 
379; C. J. 9 VII9 p. 868; C. S. V. 1659-61p p, 128, 
(2) Daviest Restorationt P- 300- 
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at this stage that Haselrig and Seottt working in collaboration with 
some of the officersp went to Monck to try and persuade him to become 
the Single Person. They argued that the actions of the Parliament 
showed that it was aiming at a Restoration. As a republic was likely 
to be unacceptable to most of the nation "who are always bad judges 
of what is best for themselves" a Single Person was necessaryt and 
that no one was better suited than Monck for this role. Monck replied 
that he too had some worries about the repeal of the Engagement but 
that he had been personally assured by "many of the most discreet 
Members" that there was no ulterior motive behind it and that it was 
in keeping with their policy of not binding their successor. As for 
becoming the Single Persont he refused saying : 
"The experience of Cromwell's fate gave him 
Reasons to avoid the Rock on which that 
Family split"; 
to which they replied that Cromwell had usurped his position whereas 
Monck would have it by the unanimous consent of all the people "and under 
what Name and Title be pleased to accept it". He rejected this. 
(') 
Just how they thought they were going to get the consent 
of the people for such a move begged an enormous question. The offer 
sounds like the desperate and grotesque action of men on the verge of 
defeat. According to Phillipso Honck refused to betray the identity 
of these men to the Council of Statewhich had been informed of these 
proceedings by Clarges. 
(2) 
Howeverp there was still one last card to 
playp the army. 
(I) Bakert Chroniclep p. 693- 
(2) ibid. t pp. 693-694. 
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Further meetings between some of the Ilumpers and their 
sympathisers in the army were held and a declaration was devised for 
Monck and the officers to sign in which they declared their support 
for a Commonwealth and against a single person. Parliament was to be 
asked to join in this declaration. The men behind this programme show 
some signs of confusion by renouncing government by, a single person 
given, their offer to Monckt unless of courset they only meant monarchy. 
The declaration was taken to Monck who on the advice of Clarges and 
William Clarke managed to have discussion of it postponed until the 
following day, the Ilth, when there was to be a deneral Council of 
Officers. The French ambassador said that daring the previous 24 hours 
there was 
"much uncertainty in the course of eventsp because 
the officers of the army in London continue 
loudly to threaten*" 
He expected some decisive action and said that hitherto they had never 
deferred to their other commanders. The delay gave Monck time to 
prepare arguments against the declaration. When the Council of Officers 
met (it was more likely a meeting of those officers in and around London 
called by Monck and not a Council of Officers in the manner of 1659 let 
alone the late 16401s) Okeyiho had returned from the west countrywas 
one of the main spokesmen in favour of the declaration. He argued 
that if Parliament refused to join in it then such action should be 
taken "as God should put into their hearts to Save the Nation from 
destruction". This was the sort of language that had characterised 
army politics when the army was. at the peak of its power and influence 
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but that time was now over and Okey's language sounds out of place. 
Monck would not lead a coup against the Parliamentt and Okey and his 
supporters in and out of the army were in a minority. There was now 
a complete reversal of the 1647 situation. Those officers who supported 
the Parliament were now the majority, while in 1647 they had been a 
minority. Clarges warned Okey that the Parliament would sooner dissolve 
itself than submit to pressure from the armyt in which case they would 
have to have recourse to Richard Cromwellp for he knew that Nonck would 
not assume the headship of the government. The opposition within the 
officers evaporated almost as quickly as it had appeared; no one was 
preparedp or able, to try to force Monck's hand. The incident Ma ks 
an important watershed in terms of army politics over these months. 
Monck had finally to decide whether to side with the army or with the 
Parliament. He chose the latter and remained committed to a dissolution 
and to a new Parliament. By this time he must have realised that -this 
course of action implied a restoration of the Stuarts. It did not take 
a great deal of skill to realise the mood of the army. Okey and those 
who shared his defiant attitude were unrepresentative of majority 
feeling among the officers now changed considerably from the previous 
year because of the purges of January and Februaryq the removal of 
certain regiments from the capital/and the presence of Monck's Scottish 
regiments. They were in no position to oust Monck. As far as the army 
in London was concerned, 11onck could not count on their following his 
lead. He told the officers that 
"Nothing was more injurious to Discipline than their 
meeting in Military Councils to interpose in Civil 
things" 
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and from then on prohibited any further aqsemblies. 
(1) 
The meetings 
of officers which had been behind much of the army's politics from 
1647 onwards were thus terminatedg with ease. 
Monck's letter to Parliament urging them not to proceed 
with the militia bill which was causing alarm to many of his officers 
was probably intended to show that he was not being reckless in his 
trust of civilians. When the House received the letter on 16th a 
committee was appointed to go and see 1.1onck to clarify aspects of the 
bill. They reported back that Monck "rested well satisfied" upon 
reading it. It did not really matter anyway for on the 16th the Loong 
Parliament dissolved itself. 
(2) 
Monck had nailed his colours to the 
mast. Civilians would dictate the settlement of the nationt even if 
this meant a return of the Stuarts* 
Daring the next month moves in that direction became more 
obvious. As Professor Woolrych has saidp the real question was not 
whether Charles Stuart would return but whether the restoration of 
the monarchy would be conditional or noto(3) Dut there still remained 
the problem of ensuring that the army acquiesced in all this. This 
was made easier because the concerns of most of the officers by this 
time were not ideological but based more on fears for the future of 
their material interests especially the ex-Crown lands. These kind of 
-fears could be allayed more easily than ideological ones. There 
appears to have been a further purge of the army. On 12 March Colonel 
M Baker,, Chronicle# p. 694; Guizotv Richard Cromwellp II, 
PP- 3809 383- 
(2) Nicholas Papersp IV9 p. 201; C. J. 9 VII9 p. 880. 
(3) Ifoolrychp Milton# p. 195- 
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Robert Bennet had been ordered to disband his force in St. Michael's 
Mount. 
(1) 
Royalists reported that Monck was remodellint-, T, the army and 
that he had appointed five officers to examine the reliability of 
their comrades. The five included Cloberyp Knight and Ilubblethorne. 
One of the five (unnamedp but an informant of Darwick's) said they 
were all favourable to a Restoration. This might well have been wish- 
ful thinking. The new officers were said to be 
"post nati to the spoyles both of the Church and 
Crown, for there the shoe pincheth most". 
a shrewd observation. 
(2) 
Monck was also taking up contacts with Royalists 
and, according to one sourcev shortly after the dissolution of the Long 
Parliament actually declared privately for Charles. But contradictory 
reports still reached Charles, One said that Monck had in fact been 
offered legislative power. By whom was not made clear. 
(3) 
Charles 
Howard was already in touch with the King. On 23 March he wrote to 
Charles that Monck was far from being his enemy "but will go his own 
pace". He felt that the army was not quite ready for a Restoration 
but that they soon would be. 
(4) 
There were rumours that some of the 
Rumpers and their sympathisers still in the army were trying to stir 
up trouble. Some "seditious persons" were said to be telling the 
soldiery that they would not get their arrears if there was a Restoration. 
(5) 
The Council of State issued a proclamation denying such rumours* 
M Clarke Ms. 49 (M6nck's Order Book)p sub 12 March. 
(2) Clarendon State Papersp III# p. 699; Thurloe, VII, p. 860. 
(3) Davies, Restorationg P- 312; Clarendon State Paperst III, 
P. W6. 
(4) Clarendon State Paperst 1119 PP-710-711- 
(5) ibid, t P. 708; C. S. P. D. 1659 -6o, p. 414. 
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In case such attempts escalatedv the Council of State issued a proclama- 
tion ordering all officers civil and military to arrest anyone suspected 
of trying to disaffect the soldiery. The proclamation was to be read at 
the head of every regiment. 
(') 
It seems likely that Monck took the opportunity to purge 
at least some officers. One Royalist report says that Haselrig, 11ackerp 
Okey and Moss were purged. Hackerp who had been ordered to appear 
before the Council of State on 6 Marchq was re-commissioned by Monck 
on 24 March. He and his regiment signed the army declaration of 9 
April whicht as we shall see, amounted to the army's resolution to 
accept unquestioningly civilian decisions. He was replaced by Francis 
Lord 11awly only after the Restoration. Okey was most probably purged 
in late March and his regiment given to Rossiter. Moss might well have 
also lost his commission at this time. ]1is regiment had been one of 
those ordered to leave London at the end of January. It was disbanded 
on 21 April. As for Haselrigg Phillips says that he "quietly submitted" 
his commissions shortly after Lambert escaped from the Tower. This 
is confirmed by a letter Monck wrote to the Speaker of the Commons after 
the Restoration saying that Haselrig had given up his commands without 
trouble after Lambert's escape from the Tower. The letter was obviously 
designed to be as favourable as possible to Haselrig. It was written 
at the request of his friends. 
(2) 
Bx. -, 
669 f. 24 (40);. Baker, Chronicle, pp. 696-697; 
Clarke Paperst IV, pp. 266-2,6-7; Guizotv Richard Cromwell, 
lip P. 401. 
(2) Clarendon State Papers, III# PP. 715P 724; Rugge, p. 62; Tarliamentary Intelligencer, 23-30 April 16-60; B. M. Add. 
Ms. 38p 091t f. 102; Bakert Chroniclep P. 701; Firth and 
Daviesp pp. 237-238P 301-302t 372, 
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It was decided that a symbolic gesture of acquiescence 
in civilian government by the army was required. This took the f orm 
of a declaration from the regiments not to meddle in affairs of state 
to obey all commands from Monckv the Council of State and whatever 
the new Parliament would determine. Clargesp Charles Howardq Ashley 
Cooperv Arthur Ansley and Knightp presumably with the approval and 
encouragement of Monck, were the instigators of the declaration. The 
declaration was tested out by Knight on his regiment, on Monck's horse, 
on the Life Guardq and by Howard on his. Pleased with their success 
they decided to extend the subscriptions to the declaration to all 
the regiments in and around London. A meeting of the officers of these 
regiments was called at St. James'sp which it was emphasised was to be 
held with 11onck's permission. The numbers of signatures was soon 
increased with the regiments that had come from Scotland with Monck 
taking the lead. The declaration was presented to Monck on 9 April. 
(') 
Threats of dismissal seem to have played a part in securing signaturest 
althoughp as in the pastv the newsbooks tried to paint a picture of 
cheerful and willing subscription to the declaration, 
(2) 
It is an extremely important document; more than anything 
else it can be said to mark the army's renunciation of its political 
roleg a development made easier as a result of factors we have already 
mentioned (the purges of January and Februaryp the removal of certain 
regiments from the capital and the presence of Monck's Scottish regiments). 
(1) Bakerv Chroniclep pp. 696-697; Parliamentary Intelligencer, 
9-16 ipri-17-11WO. 
(2) National Register of Archivesq 18686, Saunders Papers# 
N=ber 104; Parliamentary Intelligrencer, 16-23 April 166o. 
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The army said it would not hold meetings to meddle in affairs of state, 
thus making itself a divided interest from the rest of the people. 
In 1647 a similar charge had made the army adopt the philosophy that 
it was not a mercenary army but an army of citizens in arms. This 
gave rise to the belief 0 always at the back of the army's actions over 
the next years, that it knew best how to interpret what the people 
wantedq and what was best for them. This was of course tempered first 
of all by the nature of the limited revolution of 1649 and the sub- 
sequent policy of the respectable revolution. In 1660 this notion of 
the army not being a separate interest in itself 9a corporation within 
the sta14 a charge which Monck's propaganda from Scotland had levelled 
at the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood factiont was being turned on its 
head. Instead of being used to justify the army's predominance in 
politics it was now being employed to justify its subservience and 
sub-ordination to the civilian power. That is really what Monck had 
been working for in these months and that is what he had finally 
achieved. The declaration said that only Parliament "can secure us 
in our Religious and Civil Rights". That was not the language of 
definance and revolution that had been characteristic of 1647-1649 
and which Okey had echoed in March. In the context of 1660 it was the 
language of demoralisationp defeatt resignation and self deception. 
Subscriptions to the declaration from the various regiments 
continued to come in during the next few weeks. Presentation of the 
declaration almost coincided with Lambert's escape from the Tower on 
10 April. His attempts to raise a force to fight for the good old cause 
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were indeed the last fling of that cause. Nevertheless it did cause 
alarm among the authorities. News of the escape travelled fast. Unton 
Crooke said it "flew" to his troops. 
(') 
A number of suspected dissidents 
were arrested. These included Captain William Rainborowet brother of 
Thomas who had been sympathetic to both Levellers and Ranters in the 
past and who had been dismissed from the army in 1649 after the Leveller 
revolt although he was given a milita regiment in Northamptonshire 
in 1659p Griffith Lloydp one of the officers ordered to leave London 
in January 1660, and Packer. 
(2) 
Whalley and Goffe were both secured 
at Holdby Houset the residence of Adam Baynes but were released upon 
giving an engagement to appear before the Council of State. Wildman was 
likewise arrested and released. 
(3) 
Prominent among those who rallied 
to Lambert were Okeyj Richard Creedp one of the officers cashiered by 
the Rump on 12 Octobert Captain Timothy Claret a serving officer in 
Ingoldsby's regiment, Captain John Gregory, who had been cashiered for 
his part in Overton's IplotIt and Captain Anthony Spinage who had been 
cashiered along with Packer in 1658- Others who were ordered to give 
themselves up on 21 April were Harrisont Salmon# Robert Lilburnev 
Ashfieldt Millert Vagstaffet Gladman and the former treasurers at wart 
Blackwell and Deane. Breman was also arrested. 
(4 ) 
There were also 
some attempts to disaffect Smithson's regiment in Yorkshire in order 
(1) II. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamt P. 174. 
(2) Parliamentary Intelligencerp 9-16 April. 
(3) An'Exact'Accompt, 13-20 April 1660. 
B. M. 669 f. 22 (71); H. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamg P- 178. 
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to get them to lay seige to York, but order was soon restored. 
(') 
In Nottinghamshire there was also trouble involving Captains Gabriel 
Wayne and Nicholas Lockyer. Both had been cashiered for supporting 
the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Lockyer had been an agitator 
in 1647. A certain Captain Jonathan Everrard was one of the chief 
instigators of the rising. Both Lockyer and Everrard had been 
arrested at the end of March bur released shortly thereafter. 
(2) 
As 
a result of the attempted rising Monck ordered that the declaration 
of 9 April should be tendered to the soldiery as wellp which Phillips 
suggests led to many of them leaving the army. 
(3) 
The attempted rising was finally suppressed on Easter 
Sunday, 22 April near Daventry. Lambert and those who rallied to him 
had-no programme. The rising was one of desperationg a last ditch 
effort on behalf of the good old cause. The most detailed account we 
have of its suppression, and it must be emphasised that this is an 
official one, sug ests that Lambert and his associates even favoured .. 9 
setting up Richard Cromwell again which prompted a reply from a 
"stout officer, telling them their only end in that 
was to set up one againg who they themselves had 
already learnt to pull down ... " 
The same account describes Lambert as a broken mant but this is not 
really supported by Phillips who doesq howevert support the view that 
the rising was a desperate bid. 
(4) 
The two men who played the most 
(1) Parliamentary Intelligencer, 16-23 April 166o; IT. H. C. Leyww 
borne-Poph2aq pp. 1759 176-177- 
(2) Mercurius Publicust 19-26 April 166o; Parliamentary 
Intelligencerg 26 Ilarch-2 April 1660; National Register of 
Archivest 6, Saunders Paperst N=ber 105; Firth and 
Daviesp pp. 237-238. 
(3) Bakerp Chronicleg p. 698; II. M. C. Leyborne Pophamt p. 180. 
(4) Mercurius Politicus, 19-26 April 1660; Bakerp Chroniclet 
pp. 668-669; Clarendon State Papersý 1119 P- 735; Firth 
and Davies, pp. 159-161. 
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important part in defeating Lambert were Ingoldsby and Streater. The 
former no doubt relished the chance to settle old scoresl while the 
latter was continuing to ingratiate himself with the government, 
probably fully conscious of the way things were going. Along with 
John Mocock he had printed Parliament's order of 27 February ordering 
all officers to return to their charges. 
(') 
Another officer who 
played a part in helping to suppress Lambert's rising was Thomas 
Saunders. After its defeat he wrote to his wife that 
"this black cloud is suddenly blown over almost 
without a drop of blood. " 
He was also pleased to record that his regiment was "unengaged" to 
Lambert. Unlike his erstwhile comradet Okeyt Saunders like Streater 
was shedding his earlier Republican commitment. 
(2) 
Monck used the 
rising as an excuse to purge Fitch and Alured although the latter was 
said to have dissociated himself from the rising and from the troops 
of his regiment which took part in it. The regiments went to Sheffield, 
who had left the army in 1647, and to Montagu. 
(3) 
On 28 April Redman 
visited Chester to make "diligent search" if any of the Irish brigade 
had been involved in Lambert's rising. But he found them all faithful 
to Monck. 
(4) 
The Red Castle in Herefordshirep held out for Lambert 
until early May. Under whose command it was is not clear. 
(5) 
M B. M. 66o f. 23(65). 
(2) National Register of Archivest 18686v Saunders Paperaq 
Numbers1069 107. 
(3) Parliamentary Intelligencerg 23-30 April 1660; Firth and 
Daviest p. 159. 
(4) Mercurius Publicus, j 26 April-3 may 166o. 
(5) ibid. 
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The very last effort to save what could be saved from the 
wreckage of the good old cause had been made and failed. It had bad 
little chance of success anyway. On 25 April the Convention Parliament, 
with House of Commons and House of Lordst assembled, and it was clearly 
only a matter of time until Charles Stuart would be re-called. On 27 
April a letter was presented to Monck by Sir John Grenville from Charles 
constituting him Coymnander-in-Chief. Monck advised Grenville to deliver 
it to the House first of all. The House read the letter and on 1 May 
requested Monck to communicate it together with the Declaration of 
Breda to his officers. Accordingly Monck summoned the officers in and 
around London to St. Jamests. Lydcott made an important speech in 
favour of the letter and Declaration. He said that the army now had 
the opportunity to fulfil the reasons why it was first raised namely 
the safety of the King's persong the Protestant religiont the privileges 
of Parliament and the liberty of the subject. There was no indication 
in the speech that Lydcott understood that these things meant different 
things to different people. It was almost as if the last 13 years were 
being brushed aside. Knight called for a written declaration to be 
drawn up and subscribed. It was referred to a committee of officers 
to draft one and an Address was presented to Monck on 2 May. The 
Address repeated the substance of Lydcott's speech and stressed the four 
main points of the Declaration of Breda :a free and general pardon 
(from which some of their erstwhile colleagues would soon be excepted)p 
liberty for tender consciencest satisfaction of arrearsp and Charles's 
willingness to confirm the purchases of land and grants of land to 
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people in possession thereof. All four were to be subject to the 
approval of ýParliament. They felt -that the fulfilment of these points 
would bring about peace and that the army thereby would have complied 
with the obligations for which they had first been raised. The Declara- 
tion of Breda appeared most likely to secure their material interestst 
which is no doubt what the vast majority if not all of the serving 
officers were most interested in by now. Revolutionary ideology and 
ardour had ceased to matter for them. Monck informed the House of the 
Address and obtained leave to forward it together with a letter to the 
King entrusted to Clarges. 
(l) 
01,3 May Monck sent letters to the regimental conimanders 
enclosing the King's letter, the Deýlaration of Breda and the Address 
of the officers ordering them to obtain subscriptions from all the 
officers and to return them to him in London. Subscriptions were soon 
forthcoming. 
(2) 
The Address and its acceptance by the regiments merely 
put the final seal on the army's abdication from politics. The politics 
of the army were finally at an end. All that remained was for the 
regiments in and around London to play their part in the reception of 
the King on his arrival in the capitalp which they did on 29 Kay. A 
further address of loyalty was presented to him by Knight whose regiment 
along with the Life Guardp Clobery'sq Fauconberg's (late Haselrig's) 
and Howard's (at one time Oliver Cromwell's) accompanied the new King 
Baker,, Chroniclev PP. 705-706; Clarendon State Papersp IIIv 
P. 737; 13.11.669 f. 25(5), The Humble Address of the Officers 
of the Army; Daviesp Restorationt PP- 342-343. 
(2) Parliamentary Intelligencerp 30 April-7 MaY 166ot 7-14 
Tlia-y-IMO-. 
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into the capital. 
(') 
The-army's part in the events immediately prior 
to the Restoration was thus ceremonial. The army had made it possiblep 
civilians had made it a reality. 
On 3 August Charles II appointed Monck Captain General of 
the armed-forces for life. 
(2) 
Despite the fact that some Royalists 
were given what amounted to honorary-commands in the regiments over 
the summer, Monck's main concern was a peaceful disbanding of the army 
regardless of the fact that the Declaration of Breda, and subsequent 
$memos' from Charles had suggested that the army would be kept on. 
(3) 
The Convention, Parliament sought Honck's advice about disbanding and at 
the end of August he presented a plan to the House. The Parliament 
instructed the Committee of the Army to bring in a bill to this end. 
On 13 September the bill was passed. It included a loophole clause 
which allowed the'King to raise soldiers in future so long as he paid 
for them. Thus, Parliament, in effeetp lost the argument it had had 
with Charles's father over control of the armed forces - whether that 
control should be in the King or in Parliament. The Restoration 
settlement placed it in the King. In July 1661 the Cavalier Parliament 
W Mercurius Publicus, 17-24 May 166op 24-31 MaY 166o. 
(2) For what follows I rely heavily upon Sir Charles Firth's 
introduction to the Regimental Historv of Cromwell's Army 
(Firth and Daviesp pp. XXXIII-XXUI) and L. G. Schwoerer's 
useful account (! 'No Standing Armies. '"q Baltimorep 1974t 
PP. 72-79) and on the references cited by them. J. Childs, 
The Army of Charles 119 London, 1976t P. 7 ff. also mentions 
the disbanding. 
(3) For the summer appointments q. v. Thomason tracts vol. E186 (newsbooks)t passim. 
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1 
stated finally that control of the militia was under the King's 
command alone. 
(') 
During the next three months demobilisation proceeded 
despite complicationst mainly of a financial nature, and by the end 
of the year the army in England had been disbanded with the exception 
of 11onck's regiments which were form lly disbanded but inuediately 
re-established in February 1661 as the Lord General's regiment of foot 
guards (the famous Coldstreamers) and the Lord General's troop of 
guards. 
(2 ) 
The disbanding went smoothlyp essentially because of the 
material inducements offered-to the members of the army : satisfaction 
of pay arrears (with an additional week's pay)9 provision for those 
injured or disabledg and a waiver of apprenticeship requirements for 
those who had previously been in a trade. All had been grievances 
in 1647 and, perhaps significantlyg had more appeal for the men than 
for the officers. 
0) 
Of the forces not stationed in England which were quite 
numerous those in Scotland were disbanded over a period until 1662. 
Some of the Scottish regiments served in Tangier. 
(4) 
In Ireland there 
(1) The reasons why there was so little parliamentary opposition 
to this are given by Mrs. Schwoerer (op. cit-9 PP. 72-75). 
(2) Firth and Daviesq p. XXXIII; Daviest Coldstream Guards,, 
pp. 111-112; Schwoererp OP- cit-9 P. 77. 
(3) Schwoerer, op. cit-P Pp. 77-78.1 disagree with Mrs. Schwoererl 
unqualified view that the "inherent" anti-militarism of the 
men, rAas as important a stimulus to disbanding as disillusion- 
ment. The analysis above has shown the extent of disillusion- 
ment and bitterness against the officers existing amongst 
-the rank and file from 1659. It is difficult to imagine how 
members of an armed force can be described as inherently 
anti-militarist unless they are conscripts. 
Firth and Davies, pp. XMII-MIV; Dowt D. Phil., pp. 
667-670. 
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was still a necessity to maintain a fighting force for security 
reasons but most of the older regiments were effectively disbanded in 
1661 in a general reduction of the fighting forces, there, Only some of 
the non-commissioned officers and some of the rank and file provide 
any continuity with the older regiments. 
(') 
The units in Dunkirk remained 
in service, under new commanderst until the town was sold to the French 
in November 1662. The small force remaining in the West Indies was 
disbanded in 1662. 
(2) 
Neither the expeditionary force in Flanders 
nor the remnants of the Western Design had played any real part in 
army politics. 
M Firth and Daviesp p. XM* 
(2) ibid. t ppo XV-XKVI. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that the army was a revolutionary 
movement that brought about the revolution of 1648-1649 ýand sought 
to further that revolutiong ultimately failing and thereby enabling 
the Stuarts to return to the British thronep almost by default. Why 
did this come about and what sort of revolutionary movement was the 
army? 
The army was both a redoubtable fighting machine and a 
formidable political one, yet it represented a minority of the nation 
and the majority of its members were not even members of the normal 
political nation. The first part of this statement requires little 
further clarification because it is a trdsm that revolutions are the 
work of minorities, and revolutionary movements are frequently minorities 
as well. Even the second part of the'statement is not so controversial 
in that most of the senior officers were members of the political 
nation. Forg as we have seent one of the most important conclusions 
to emerge from this study of army politics is that the officerst despite 
Leveller attempts earlier on to stir up mutinyt remained firmly in 
control of the army and shaped its politics and destiny in the 165018. 
Thusp when one talks about the army one effectively means the officers, 
and for most of the time the senior officers. The junior officers in 
London emerge as an important pressure group in the aftermath of the 
kingship crisis-and remained so until the restoration of the R=p in 
May 1659, but they were only a pressure group and one that was confined 
to those of their kind in or around London. There is no evidence to 
suggest that they challenged the leadership of the senior officers or 
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that they attempted to make their influence felt in those units distant 
from London, as had the agitators in 1647- Howeverg this is not to 
underrate their importance in the context we have just mentioned. 
As for the rank and file, radicalism originating from this quarter 
had. no. chance of success after Ware and was defeated finally in 
September 1649 with the suppression of the Oxford mutiny. True, the 
rank and file came to the fore as an important variable in the power 
struggle of late 1659 but by that time there was no external political 
movement, such as the Levellers in the late 1640's, to create political 
grievances out of material ones. In 1659 the rank and file were of 
importance largely for negative reasons - armies, or factions in armies, 
need men to fight their battlesq whether military or political. It is 
as a weapon to gain and maintain power that they are important in 1659, 
not as a group themselves contending for power. 
With regard to the senior officers themselvesp many were 
members of the traditional ruling class. Most did not belong to the 
upper echelons of their class but were men who came from families of 
some standing in their immediate localityp although not necessarily 
in their counties. They are, best described in Professor Everitt's 
eloquent words : 
"They shone, instead as lesser stars in the larger 
constellations'of counIX gentry ... 11 
(l ) 
The senior officers tended to be educated menjusually at one of the 
universities and at one of the Inns) or had entered a trade. Some were 
younger sons. This was-'the sort of background of men like Henry Iretont 
Everritt'Community of Kentq p. 34. C. f. Aylmerq State's 
Servantst p. 328. 
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John Lambertq William Sydenham, Robert Lilburneq Thomas Saundersq 
Mathew Alured, Edward Whalley, William Goffe (son of a rector)9 John 
Jones and John Disborowet although not all were younger sons (e. g,, 
Ireton, Lambert, Lilburne and Sydenham). These names span a wide 
spectrum of political opinion and allegiance among the officers in 
the 1650's. They were not the sort of men who emerged as leading 
figures in their localities and as M. P. s very soon after 1640, men 
like Sir William Brereton in Cheshire or John Pyne in Somerset, or even 
Oliver Cromwell himself (it soon becomes obvious to any student of the 
English Revolution that Cromwell's career is full of contradictions 
which defy neat classification. In the case of this study it is the 
conflict between the military and civilian aspects of his career). 
There is a sense in which it was only the war and their subsequent 
army careers which made these men politically important. One can 
envisage a talented man like Ireton or Lambert playing a leading 
role in local or even national politics in virtually any circumstances 
but it is difficult to see how a Robert Lilburnet a Thomas Saunders, a 
Hathew Alured, a John Jones or even a John Disborowe would have reached 
such positions of power without the war and their military careers 
(and in the case of Disborowe without his family ties with Cromwell). 
(') 
Even some of those who did not come from this background, e. g. John 
Okey, in origin probably a substantial citizen of Londont soon showed 
that they shared in its, style and. laspirations. 
The argument that it 
was the war that made these people applies to such officers as well. 
It should of course be remembered that Fleetwoodt Itichard 
Ingoldsby and John Reynolds came from county gentry back- 
grounds but they were also younger sons. Fleetwood and 
Ingoldsby were also related to Cromwell. 
735. 
Thusp it would be valid to suggest that the most important 
army officers were affected by vhat Professor Underdown has characterised 
as a conflict betveen 
"two contradictory elements# one moderate and 
reformistt the other radical and revolutionary" 
vhich influenced many of the traditional. ruling class and their attitudes 
and reactions to events during the Revolution. 
(') 
Intellectually they 
also shared with many of their contemporaries what Prof essor-Pocock 
has described as 
"-the dilemma of Cromwellian Puritanism ... a 
dilemm-a between several modes of action. " (2) 
Their background and their investment in -the crown lands gave many 
seniort and juniort officers a tendency to share in some of the accepted 
assumptions about the established social and economic system. This 
inhibited their revolutionary ardour. Dy way of illustration let us 
focus on law reformwhich remained one of the consistent demands of 
the army in the period. Would not too radical a reform of the laws 
have endangered their own position and in many cases their newly 
acquired wealth? They needed a comprehensive legal framework legitimised 
by a constitution acceptable to the majority of the nation as much as 
any other landholders to secure their standingt and were, as a result, 
uneasy about casting their fateg and fortunet to the winds of profound 
revolutionary social change. The officers were incapable of executing 
the policy of fundamental reform of the courts and property laws which 
(1) Under-down-0 Pride's Purge, p PPo 89 353- 
(2) J. G. A. Pocockp The Machiavellian Momentlo Princetong 1975, 
P. 338o 
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according to one distinguished contemporary, Sir Mathew Halev would 
have made a Restoration more difficult to achieve. 
(') 
Nor were they 
capable of giving the necessary leadership to -the second component of 
what Mr. Conrad Russell has called the "alliance" or 
"union between the discontents of the 
Parliamentary gentry and those of their 
social inferiorsIlp 
an alliance based on Puritanism and resentment of arbitrary taxation 
which helped cause the Civil liar in the first place. 
(2) 
If the army 
officers had been men able to provide the leadership of these "social 
inferiors" then what Russell calls the second of the two revolutions 
within the English Revolutiong the revolution of 1647-1649, "the 
revolution of the army'19 would have been more thoroughgoing. 
(3) 
Thereforet we should not be too surprised when we come to 
characterise the nature of the army's political role to use a modern 
parallel as more akin to a Menschevik one than to a Bolshevick onet 
despite the fact thatv as we have seeng particularly in late 1648 and 
early 1649t there was some quite strong feeling in army circles in 
favour of a more complete revolution. Given the social economic and 
educational background of many of the officers and the social and 
(1) M. Halep Some Considerations Touching the Alteration of 
Laws,, ref. in Veallp Popular Movement for Law Reformp 
pp. 228-229. 
(2) C. Russellp (ed. )p The Origins of the English Civil Warp 
Londong 1973p p. 27- 
(3) ib-id-P P- 3- With all due respeett my analysis of the 
period 1647-71649 suggests that his statement that the 
revolution of 1647-1649 "was supplied by the Levellers 
and the Fifth 1110narchists with truly revolutionary ideologies" 
is misleading (ihild., p. 2). Mr. Rassell's notion of the 
two revolutions echoes, but is not the same asp Dr. Hill's 
concept of two revolutions in the mid-seventeenth century 
(C. Hillp World Turned Upside Down, p. 12). For the reasons 
given above the army was incapable of ensuring the success 
of Dr. Hill's second revolutiong (the establishment of 
communal propertyt more democracy in politics and law etc. ). 
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economic aspirations of others and the intellectual turmoil of the 
I Puritan mind it was likely that the armyts political role.. would be 
Menshevik. 
(') 
Neverthelesso the army did want to see political legal 
and most certainly religious reforms introduced. But it hampered 
the likelihood of achieving this by deciding to follow through the 
logic behind the policy of the limited revolutiont or respectable 
revolution of 1648-1649 and by the army's subsequent willingness to 
follow Cromwell. These twin policies characterised the period from 
1649-1657 until the kingship crisist which posed the greatest threat 
to army unity since the Levellers in 1647t threatened to blast away 
any chance of a settlement being achieved. The Three Colonels' Peti- 
tion and other contemporaneous 'plots' werep as we have seeng confined 
more to individual officers and were in no way movements. Indeed the 
officers involved, especially the Three Colonels, had not thought through 
the full implications of their demands9 especially about a free Parlia- 
ment. What makes the kingship crisis so much of a turning point is that 
it not only threatened to ruin Cromwell if he had lost his power baset 
the armyg but that it also posed the threat of ruin to the army. Assum- 
ing it (or rather a significant number of officers) had ditched Cromwell 
if he had accepted kingship it was in no position to offer any alternative 
solution to the question of settlementf and by this time it had tied 
up its raison dletre with the search for settlement. It had reachedt as 
we have emphasised aboveg a state of uncreativityg of bankruptcyp and in 
(1) C. f. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, t PP- 336-337- 
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the wake of the Major Generals, of unpopularity with the nation. Thus, 
the near anarchy of 1659 could have set in two years earlier. But both 
sidesq Cromwell and the army, perhaps realising the danger, drew back 
from the abyss, possibly in so doing throwing away the one great chance 
of achieving settlement, as Professor Underdown has hinted at. 
(') 
The crisis highlights a fatal contradiction in the nature 
of the army's political role. It was unlikely that a settlement 
acceptable to a substantial majority of the traditional political 
nation could be achieved while the army remained present in politicst 
and obversely it was unlikely that a satisfactory measure of reform 
acceptable to the more radical supporters of the Revolution could come 
about without the presence and influence of the army. The history of 
Portugal since the revolution of 1974 provides a modern parallel to 
this state of affairs. The army gradually threw away its claim to be 
representative of the peoplet the people in arms (a claim it could 
make with some considerable justification from 1647-1649) and to be the 
repository of the good old cause. 
(2 ) 
Gradually force came to be used 
as an end in itself. The army lost the ability to differentiate 
between the creative use of force, or 'right and might well met' (the 
military interventions and revolution of 1647-1649, the dissolution of 
the R=p and of Barebonest possibly even the Major Generals - in all 
of which the power of the sword had been used to help set up an 
alternative, and what was hoped viablet route to settlement) and its 
Underdown,, Pride's Purge, 9 PP- 344-345; UnderdownO 'Settle- 
ment in the Counties'. in Aylmer (ed. )p Interregnumg 
P. 177. 
(2) C. f. Dr. Hirst's view that the main defence of Parliament 
against the King was that it represented the people and 
the King no longer did (Representative of the People?, 
P- 193), The army took up this argument but ultimately 
proved that it did. noýrepresent the people. Dy 1659 it 
had become hopelessly splitt and the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwoolfaction with its tenuous hold on power and its 
claim to be acting in the interests of the good old cause was 
not representative of anything but itself* 
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uncreative uset more apparent after 1657 and which reached its peak 
in 1659 when the army discarded one prop after another (Protectoratet 
Ramp, Committee of Safety and Army Council) in its search for support 
for a vision of settlement it had only the vaguest ideas about. 
This may seem hard on the army which was also the victim 
of other circumstances placing limits on what it could hope to achieve 
practically : the dispersal of the regiments into the distant parts 
of the three nations and abroadl, thereby ending the possibility of the 
sort of unitedv purposeful action of 1647-1649 made easy by good 
comminications between the regiments. This helped break up army unity. 
The departure of Ireton for Ireland, an exile that seems to have been 
self-imposed, and his death in 1651 deprived the army of a great 
political mind and of a man who could have helped shape events in 
a different way had he lived. The decline of the 'popular movement' 
which had been so important in politicising the army in the first place 
and in influencing some of its most creative offerings towards settlement 
between 1647 and 1649 must also be taken into account, as must the 
failure of a united opposition to the Protectorate to develop. A strong 
popular movement or such a united opposition might have weaned the army 
from the policy of the limited or respectable revolution onto some other 
one. What sort that would have been is impossible to say but it is 
unlikely that it would have made settlement any easier. Indeed it is 
difficult to imagine how an alliance of say Fifth Monarchists and Rumper 
ilepublicans could have survived for long despite the fact that, as we 
have seen, such an attempt was made in 1656. The way the 'alliance' 
between 'Co-unists' and 'Social Democrats' fell apart quite soon 
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after the revolution in Portugal is a modern example of how expediency 
can lead to easy marriages and unhappy divorces. To be fair to the 
armyg howeverg it must be remembered that it genuinely sought reform 
and that the only time its energiest rightly or wrongly-channelled 
as the case may beg lapsed from pursuing this task was from 1649-1651 
when it took to the field once more to secure and defend the revolution. 
In conclusiong the army collapsed as a revolutionary move- 
ment and as a political force for all these reasons : the social, 
economic and intellectual ones shaping, its responses to politics and 
its policiest as well as for the more immediate ones just mentioned. 
In an age which lacked political parties the army came close to being 
one. --But it lacked a true identity : whether it was reformist/gradualist 
or radical/revolutionary (or to put it another way whether it was 
Menshevik or Bolshevik: ) although by and large it tended towards the 
former. This crisis of identity ran deep* The implicationjof this 
were important not just for army politics but for the English Revolution 
as a whole, Was the armyt and in particular its officers who shaped 
its policy virtually alone from late 1647t to pursue a moderate or 
limited revolution or a radical one? Were the officers, largely from 
the landowning classes or else men newly recruited to themo to proceed 
cautiously along the road to reform# or risk all by pursuing a fully 
fledged revolutionary policy which could have brought about a social 
of 
revolution the consequenceqlwhich they feared? Their inability to make 
up their minds about this lies at the root of the army's politics in 
the years we have examined. It was a tragic flaw which led to the 
chaos of 1659 and ultimately to the downfall of the good old cause. 
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The army made the revolution of 1648-1649; it also made 
the Restoration of May 1660. But it was not really the army of 1647- 
1659 which brought about the latter development. It was the force 
under Monckt a man keen on discipline who came to be surrounded by 
officers of like mind. Neither Monck nor his fellow officers shared 
in this identity crisis. They had resolved itt perhaps it had never 
even troubled them. For them the army ought to be subservient to the 
civilian authorities. It was this attitude which helped make the 
Restoration a reality and which continued to exist after it. It 
amounted to turning the political role of th Ie army from 1647 to 1659 
on its head, and it is an attitude of the modern British army which has 
so far persisted into our own time. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL APPMTDIX 
The following appendix does not contain exhaustive bio- 
graphical entries on all the officers who served in the army between 
1647 and 1660v nor even on those who appear at various stages in the 
course of the narrative. It is selective both as to those included 
and in terms of the details it gives about them. Its main purpose 
is to supplement the main narrative by providing in one place informa- 
tion, firstly, about the careers,, those officers who are less well-known 
from the works of scholars of this period butwho are# nevertheless, 
important in army politics (e. g. John Reynolds, Robert Overton); 
secondlyp about individuals about whom some ambiguity or confusion 
exists (e. g. William Eyres); and thirdly, to provide new or additional 
information about officers or to modify the existing authorities 
(e. g. Thomas Saunders). The entries are in alphabetical order and 
are intended to be used in conjunction with the main narrative. 
ABBOTT DANIIM (fl. 1649-1663) 
In 1647 an elected officer for Okey's regiment. His troop was one 
of those selected by lot in 1649 for Ireland where he served during 
the 1650's as a Colonel. He retained his command in the simuner of 
1659 but was arrested by Sir Charles Coote in January 1660 for having 
opposed Parliament. In 1663 he was suspected of being involved in 
Blood's plot and a reward was offered for his arrest. 
(Clarke Papersp It pp. -170-173P 416,439; Firth and Davies, pp. 621-623. ) 
I 
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ALLEN, wimm (fl. 1647-1667) 
A warwickshire man originally but origin obscure. Was a felt-maker 
in Southwark. Early Civil War service for Parliament, by April 1646 
a trooper in Cromwell's regiment. One of the original agitators and 
was called before the Commons in April 1647. He came to have more 
in common with the Grandees and when the Levellers denounced the original 
agitators and urged the setting up of new onesp John Lilburne attacked 
Allen as Cromwell's "officious and extraordinary creature" (E409(22). 
The JugRlers Discovered; Wolfep Leveller Manifestoest p. 42). Firth 
(Clarke Papers, t Iv pp. 432-433) correctly identified Allen as the future 
Adjutant-General of horse in Ireland. The date at which he received 
his commission is unknown but it must have been sometime in 1648 
(Professor Hardacre says it was sometime in the autumn of 1647 but 
cites no evidence (Hardacrep 'William Allen't p. 296. The Firth and 
Davies reference he cites does not support his point). Sydenham 
Poyntz refers to Adjutant-General Allen in October 1648. He says that 
after his arrest in York Allen treated him with civilityt although it 
is not clear if he means once he (Poyntz) was brought to headquarters 
or if while still in York, (E469(23)t The Vindication of Collonell 
Generall Points). His commission was anyway only for that of Captaint 
as Firth points out, Adjutant-General did not imply high regimental rank 
(S. P. 28/589 ff. 5t 7; Clarke-Paperst It P- 432), Allen is responsible 
for the account of the Windsor Prayer meeting in the spring of 1648 at 
which it was decided to call Charles I to account "for that blood he 
had shed" (E979(3)P. A faithful Memorial of that Remarkable Meeting ... 
at Windsor Castleg repr. in Somers Tracts 3rd Collec. t IV Vols. t 1751, 
UIP pp. 307-313). From 1649 to 1654 Allen was serving in Ireland. 
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The contrivers of the Three Colonels' Petition felt that Alured could 
speak openly of his disaffection with the Protectorate to Allen on his 
trip to Ireland (Bodl. Rawlinson )1s. A41p f- 561), but it is unknown 
if Alured contacted him. Allen was surprised at Cromwell's elevation 
to the Protectorate but did not oppose it (q. v. above, Chapter Fourg 
Section II); for his subsequent relations with Henry Cromwell and the 
relations of the Baptistsp of whom Allen was onet with Henry q. v. above 
Chapter Fourt Section III and Chapter Fivep Section IV. In 1659 during 
the summer purges he was given command of the displaced Redman's 
regiment but did not go to Ireland to take up his position. He was 
removed from the army the following January. Quite what his attitude 
to the October coup was is unknown. In December along with Hugh 
Courtney he went as a commissioner to the fleet but on whose authority 
and with what purpose is not stated (Clarke Papersq IV, p. 165). He 
was arrested on various occasions after the Restoration. The last 
recorded mention of him is in 1667. (Hardacre 'William AllenIq pp. 292- 
308; H. Wheeler Robinsont 'A Baptist Soldier - William Allen't Baptist 
Quarterlyq 1119 1926-19279 pp. 237-240; Whitleyp Ba]2tist Bibliograpla, 
index sub Alleng William; Clarke Paperst It index. ) 
ALUIM, MATIMV 
Y. son of Henry Alured of Charter Housep near Hullp Yorkshire and 
Prancesq daw. of Francis Vaughan of Sutton upon Derwent. M. Kathleenp 
dau. Thomas Stephenson. Alured was brother of John Aluredt the M. P. 
and regicide (C-C-C-t P. 171; -G. Peacockv The Army Lists of the Round- 
heads and Cavaliersq, Londonq 1863, P. 48; Minster Library, York, Add. 
11s. 164/4 (York Genealogies by Thomas Wilson)). He served under his 
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brother in the first Civil War but by 1645 was a Colonel. His regiment 
petitioned Fairfax to be incorporated into the New Modelp but without 
success (S. P. 28/34p f. 399; Bellt Fairfax Correspondencep Ip pp. 214- 
215). A Colonel Matthew Alured signed the pro-Presbyterian military 
petition presented by Sir Thomas Essex to both Houses of Parliament on 
22 March 1647. It is not clear whether this is the same man as the 
Yorkshire Alured (C. J. 9 Vt p. 120; L. J., IXt PP. 95-96). Alured played 
no part in army politics during the years 1647-1649. During the second 
Civil War Alured's regiment remained active and still cherished 
ambitions of being made part of the standing army, but again unsuccess- 
fully (C. S. P. D. 1648-499, p. 99). In August 1650 he was given command 
of a regiment of foot originally raised by Colonel George Gill (Gell) 
after the latter was accused of defrauding the state. Alured commanded 
it in Scotland (C. S. P. D. 16509 p. 263; C-2-9 VIt PP. 450P 493; ibid-t 
VII9 pp. 229 97; Innocency Cleared or the Case and Vindication of Col. 
George Gill (10 September 1651)t in which Gill accused Alured of 
conspiring to ruin him in order to further his (Alured's) ambition; 
Wor. Co. 6.5-11 (117), Col. George Gill's Case. Gill, to whom Cromwell 
was well-disposedp was acquitted in February 1652 (Several Proceedings, 
26 Februaryý-4 March 1652)). In addition to his role as a sequestra- 
tion commissioner for the City of York and Hull he was made receiver 
for'Yorkshire in 1649. He was accused of misusing his position as a 
committee man by farming a sequestered estate (C-C-C-o Pp. 171t 2155- 
2156; Kiw7domls Weekly Intelligencers 3-10 July 1649; Sheffield City 
Librariesq Bright Papersp 102bp 'Papers concerning the fee farm due 
to the crown for the manor of Eccleshill'). Pettiness and minor 
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corruption appear to have been two of his character traits. He was 
suspected of withholding arrears from 
ýis 
Major by John Baynes (Acker- 
man, Letteiz; from Roundhead Officers, t PP- 799 820 84t 92t 100-104t 109t 
114; B. M. Add. Ms. 21t 422t f. 485). Alured was cashiered for his 
part in the Three Colonels' Petition but was detained in custody for 
ten months. During this time he renounced his claims to lands in 
Scotland formerly belonging to the Duke of Hamilton (B. M. Add. Ms. 25t 
347# ff. 15-20t 20v). In August 1655 he wrote to Thurloe asking him 
to try to arrange an interview with Cromwell, but he was not released 
until the end. of the year when he gave a pledge to the Protector not 
to do anything prejudicial to the present government and to live 
peacefully (Thurloep IIIt P. 707; ibid., IVt P- 359). BY August 1656 
he had become politically suspect again and was arrested with Rich. 
On 14-August Alured was ordered to be committed to the Isle of Mant 
well out of harm's wayq but this was suspended for a day or two. It 
is during this time that he gave his version of the genesis of the 
Three Colonels' Petition in 1654 (Gardinert Commonwealth and Protectoratel 
IVt pp. 262-263; C. S. P. D. 1656-579 pp. 71t 581; Clarke Paptrs, IIIt P. 70; 
Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A419 ff. 560-561). His detention lasted six months 
and when released he seems to have returned to his estates where early 
in 1658 he was reported to be living peacefully (B. M. Add. Ms. 41599 
f. 105, repr. in C. H. Firth, 'Two Letters addressed to Cromwell't E. TI. R.,, 
XXII9 1907t P. 313. ) , With the restoration of the R=p in May 
1659 Alured re-emorged onto the national scene. He petitioned the 
Parliament for, the removal of the sentence imposed on him in December 
1654. His request was considered by a comnittee which reported on 10 
June in his favour (C. j*9 VII9 pp. 678-679). He was soon restored to 
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the army and adhered to the Rump in October. With the return of the 
Rump in December he became of some importance until Monck took the 
opportunity of Lambert's rising in April to purge him from the 
army, 
BARTON, NATHANIEL 
of Caldwell, Derbyshire 
Had been a chaplain to sij Thomas Burdett of Foremark and during the 
dispute between Sir John Gell and Thomas Saunders had been appointed a 
temporary commander of Saunders! men (for the dispute q. v. under 
Saunderst Thomas). By April 1646 Barton was a Captain in Richard 
Graves's regimentt and felt happy with this. When Graves left the 
regiment in June 1647 because he adhered to the Parliamentp Barton was 
promoted to the Majority and Scrope became Colonel. Barton was quite 
active in army politics between 1647 and 1649. John Lilburne accused 
him (and Okey) of being against the Leveller Agreement of the People 
in December 1648. Bat his recorded remarks during the Whitehall debates 
do not substantiate Lilburne's charge. When Scrope's regiment was 
disbanded in 1649, after the Leveller mutiny in May, Barton appears to 
have left the army. On 2 March 1650 he was granted a commission by 
the Council of State as Commander-in-Chief of the Derbyshire militia. 
His own militia troop served under Harrison in 1651. After this he 
disappears from national prominence until 1659 when over the summer as 
a result of a petition from Saunders and his officers he was appointed 
Major of that regimentp but was unhappy at the prospect of going to 
Scotland. He adhered to Parliament in October and was active with 
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Saunders in working for a return of the Rump. Despite suspicions about 
his activity over the summer during Booth's rising (q. v. under Saunders, 
Thomas) Barton became Major of Swallow's (now Saunders' ) regiment. 13y 
February 1660 Phillips says that he inclined towards re-admitting the 
secluded members. After this Barton falls into obscurity. (National 
Register of Archives, 18686, 'Saunders PapersIt Numbersq 20,65,679 
809 819 829 839 859 86,89; S. P. 28/76, f. 649; Clarke Paperst I. 
p. 60; ibid., 14 Pp- 1039 106t 132t 1569 190t 265t 270; ibidet IV9 
indexp sub Bartong Nathaniel; C. S. P. D. 1650, pp. 4039 504; jbid. 9 1651, 
p. 236; J. Lilburnep Legall Fnndamentall Liberties, t P. 35t repr. in 
Haller and Daviest Leveller Tractst p. 423; Firth and Davies contains 
errors about Barton's career esp. pp. 1039 233-284). 
H1MM1, RICHARD (1630-1707) 
son of Henry Beke of Haddenhamq Backs., and Frances dau. of John Billiard 
of the county of Nottingham. 
Richard Beke is to be distinguished from his n=esake Major Robert Deke 
the M. P. for Coventry in the second Protectorate Parliament who had been 
attached to the Coventry garrison in the late 1640's (S. P. 28/6o, f. 250)- 
In 1651 Richard was a Lieutenant in the Life Guard. In 1653 he accompanied 
Whitelocket a fellow countrymanp on his Swedish embassy. Whitelocke 
described him as"a civil discreet and stout young gentleman, ingenious 
and of good parts and conversation" with whom he got on well. In 
February 1656 he married Levina Whetstone a niece of Cromwell. Ile was 
also Robert Lilburne's brother-in-law and John Jones' step son-in-law 
(q. v. pedigree). in the same month he became Captain of the reformed 
Life Guard. In 1659 he was made a Captain in Philip Twisleton's horse 
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regiment, then serving in Scotland# but he did not himself go there. 
His part in the autumn crisis is unknown but the reference to a 
"Major Beake" in Coventry being for the Rumpcould as well refer to 
Robert Beke as to Richard (Mercurius Politicus, t 29 December 1659- 
5 January 1660, repr. in Firth and Daviest p. 236). After the 
Restoration he received a Special Pardon under the Joint Seal on 2 
January 1661. It is possible that he served in the Restoration army 
He was an M. P. in 1689 (for Aylesbury) and from 1690-1700 (for Wendover). 
He re-married in 1684 and died in 1707. (C. T. Beket Some Particulars 
relative to Colonel Richard Bekel London# 18529 which at times confuses 
the two Bekes and-schich is slightly inaccurate about his career as an 
M. P. after the Restoration; Peckv Desiderata Curiosal, II, p. 499; 
Carte, II, p. 81; Abbottq Writings and Speeches, IV, p. 96; B. M. Add. 
Ms- 37P 346, f. 31; Firth and Daviest index; Members of Parliament, I. 
pp. 5579 564t 572P 579. ) 
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BMMY. JAMES (c. 1610-1691) 
Origins unclear but served as a clerk in an ironworksp exactly where 
is unknown but in the Midlands (The D. N. B. and Berry and Lee, A Crom- 
wellian Major-General, p. ý 4 contradict each other). Berry was a friend 
of Richard Baxter, and fought for Parliament from early in the first 
Civil War. By 1647 he was a Captain in Fairfax's horse and was quite 
active in resisting Parliament's proposals for the Irish service and 
in organising opposition to it (Clarke Paperst It P. 45). He was 
clearly trusted by the soldiery but it would be inaccurate to describe 
him as "president of -the council of adjitators" (D. N. B.; Berry and Lee, 
A Cromwellian Major Generalt PP. 30-31. This description of Berry 
emanates from Baxter (Reliquiae Baxterianae, 9 P. 57)). In about 
August 1647 Berry was made Major of Philip Twisleton's regiment 
(late Rossiter's who had adhered to the Parliament and left the army 
(Firth and Davies, p. 165). Berry and Lee (A Cromwellian Major Generall 
P- 33 + n. 4) argue that he had become a member of Rossiter's regiment 
before this). In 1651 he became Colonel of Haselrig's horse regiment 
(Haselrig had only been a nominal Colonel). The regiment saw service 
in Scotland. Berry was said to have helped draw up The Instrument 
(Reliquiae Baxterianaep P. 72), In 1655 he became Major General of 
Hereford, Shropshire and Wales. In 1656 he was M. P. for Worcestershire. 
He opposed kingship but was nominated to the Other House. He was quite 
an important figure in army politics during the last years of the 
English Revolution and a prominent member of the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction. He was one of the officers cashiered by the restored 
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Rmp in October 1659, the immediate cause of the coupp and after the 
second return of the R=p he was ordered to leave London. Ile was 
subsequently imprisoned in Scarborough Castle. He refused to give any 
acknowledgement of guilt and remained a prisoner for many years. He 
died in 1691. 
(D. N. B. which has to be modified by his biographyg Berry and Leet 
A Cromwellian Major General; Firth and Daviest index. ) 
EtAy, wimm, ti. 1647-1659 
In November 1647 Bray was Captain-Lieutenant in Robert Lilburne's foot 
regiment, andwithout authority led the regiment to Corkbush Field. 
He was the only officer of this rank or above to side with the soldiery. 
He was arrested but after a trial in December he was restored to his 
regiment. He fell foul of Lt. Colonel Henry Lilburne and was suspended 
shortly afterwards, but returned to the army during the second Civil 
War, with a troop he raised in Kent and which was attached to John 
Reynolds' regiment. When the soldiery refused Reynolds's inducements 
to get them to serve in Ireland they moved that Bray be made Colonel. 
In March 1649 he was expelled from the General Council of Officers for 
supporting the Leveller attack on the Council of State and Council of 
Officers. Despite pleas by himself for release he remained in prison 
until October 1651- On 13 September 1655 a pass was issued to one 
William Bray to travel to Amsterdam. In 1659 the nominating committee 
received a recommendation for commissions preferably in the horse on 
behalf of Bray and Captain Robert Everard. (The divines of Newcastle 
had complained to Cromwell in 1652 about Everard's extreme religious 
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views. Everardq a member of Charles Fairfax's regiment$ was said to 
be supported by his Lt. Colonel, John Mason. ) Neither in fact received 
commissions. Later in the year Bray published a tract in which he 
attacked Harrington's Political Aphoris . He laid great emphasis 
on the law, favouring "good ancient laws" and "successive parliaments". 
On religious matters he refers to a tract by Robert Everardq Nature's 
Vindication, which appeared in 1652 (B. M. 4257. a. 40). 
(Clarke Papersp It pp. 411-412n. and sources therein cited; C. S. P. D. 1655t 
P. 597; ibid. 9 1658-59, pp. 249-50p January is evidently a mistake for 
June; E763(7). A Plea for the Peoples Good Old Cause,, 2r the Fundamental 
Laves and Liberties of England'...; Firth and Davies, indexq pp. 502-503-) 
13RAYFIELD, ALEXANDER 
In 1647 Captain Brayfield was an elected officer in Hewson's regiment 
but his political views and activities are unrecorded. During the 
summer months of 1648 he acted as governor of Dover Castle (Bodl. 
Tanner Ms,, 57t f. 102; S. P. 28/56, f. 221). In 1649 when the regi- 
ment was selected by lot to serve in Ireland Brayfield went with it. 
In 1650 he left the regiment to become Major of Axtell's regiment 
(Firth and Davies (pp. 409,6260 62s) are muddled on this). In 1653 
he was Lt. Colonel and when the regiment was disbanded in 1655 he 
was transferred to Henry Cromwell'sp although it is possible that this 
tran fer took place earlier. At the time of the Three Colonels' 
Petition he was a confidant of Ludlow's but when examined by Fleet- 
wood he reported the former's involvement in distributing subversive 
literature. Fleetwood thought highly of him (Thurloe, III, P. 567). 
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In 1657 Henry Cromwell court martialled Brayfield. He associated 
Brayfield with the Baptist critics of his government and accused him 
of promoting seditious papers. Brayfield was sentenced to be cashiered 
but Oliver disapproved of Henry's action and urged that Brayfield 
should be reinstated. In 1659 he was given his own regiment (Firth 
and Davies, p. 670) and in Octoberp like many of his fellow officers 
erving in Irelandq acquiesced in the coup (Mayerp 'Inedited Letters', 
p. 264-266). In December his garrisong Athlone deserted him in 
favour of Coote and those who had seized Dublin Castle. Ile was one 
of the 30 persons whom the Irish Parliament proposed to except from 
the Act of Indemnity in 1661p (Firth and Davies, p. 670). 
RMAN (MM11N). JOHN 
In 1647 Dremen was one of the original agitators of Mch's regiment 
and by December 1647 he was a Cornet (S. P. 28/499 f. 276). He was 
cashiered for his part in Overton's 1plot1p by which time he 'was a 
Lieutenantp but reinstated to the regiment in 1659 as a Captain. He 
acquiesced in the October coup but was instrumental in ensuring the 
defection of the regiment to the Rtmp leaders in Portsmouth which it 
had been sent to reduce. He disapproved of the re-admission of the 
secluded members and was arrested in April 1660 on suspicion of 
participating in Lambert's rising. From 1679 to 1681 he was M. P. 
for Chichester. He was arrested in 1683 for alleged involvement in 
the Rye House Plot. 'After the Glorious Revolution he was Major of a 
regiment of 400 Londonýcitizen volunteers whose Colonel was King William. 
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In February 1690 he was a member of the Honourable Artillery Company 
and in 1692 he was appointed deputy governor of the Isle of Ifight. 
In 1700 he became receiver of the customs at Plymouth. 
(Firth and Davies; N. Luttrellp A Brief Historical Relation, IV Vols., 
Oxford, 1857# index. ) 
BRIGHT, SIR JOTDI (1619-1688) 
b. 1619, son of Stephen Bright of Ecclesall and Jane dau. of George 
Westby of Whaley. 
Byr 1643 Bright was a Colonel of foot and in 1648 his regiment was 
erving in the north. Bright had scruples about the army's proceedings 
specially about the King's execution. He left the army in 1650. His 
regiment was designated for Nonck but the soldiery rejected this crying 
"a Lambertq a Lambert"q to vhom it finally went. Bright remained a 
respected figure in the eyes of his ex-colleagues and in 1654 Lambert 
'wrote to him twice asking him to return to the army in a senior command, 
either to succeed Harrison or Richq or even as a Major General of foot. 
Bright in fact became nominal governor of Hullq a position he held 
until February 1658. He was M. P. for the East Riding in 1654. He 
supported the Restoration and was knighted by Charles II on 16 July 
166o. 
(Firth and Davies, pp. 525-526,555; Sir Henry Slingsby and Captain 
John Hodgson, Original Memoirs written durin!! the Civil War, Edinburghq 
1806p pp. 1279 139-140; B. M. Add. Ms. 21,417P f. 28; Sheffield City 
Libraryv Bright Papers, 78p, ff. lp 2; D. N. B. ) 
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CHILMTDEN, EmmTDI(fl. 1637-1678) 
Origins mn1mown but probably a button seller; early Civil War service. 
He was acquainted with John Lilburne but denounced him to the Star 
chamber in 1637 (E689(32), Lt. Colonel John Lilburne revived). In 
1647 Chillendeng a Lieutenant in Whalley's regimentp was an elected 
officer and played an active part in army politics during that year 
showing quite a lot of sympathy with the agitators (Clarke Papers, I. 
index). In Augfust John Lilburne used him as an intermediary between 
himself and the agitators over the question of trying to get his case 
heard at the Council of the Army (E406(26)9 The Just Ilan's Justification). 
Howeverv he did not support the Leveller mutiny at I&re and Major Tho s 
Scottl, the M. P. for Aldboroughp was sent up to London in Chillenden's 
custody. In 1647 and 1648 he was involved in a polemical controversy 
in which he advocated the right of all persons to preach (Whitley, 
Baptist Bibliographyq index). By 1650 Chillenden was a Captain in 
the regiment. In the autumn of 1653 he was cashiered from the army, 
or possibly was allowed to resign. The reason for this is unknown 
but by this time he had become a Fifth Monarchist. He was expelled 
from his Church at St. Paul's for immorality shortly afterwards (Firth 
and Davies, pp. 226-227; Gardinerp Commonwealth and Protectoratev II, 
P- 304n. Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A8p f. 127). Ile did not actively oppose 
the Protectorate and was quite willing to offer his services as an 
informer (Thurloet IVP P. 365). He was not re-instated in 1659, 
but remained on the public stage after the Restoration. 
(D. N. B., (which is rather unsatisfactory); Cappo Fifth Monarchy Men,, 
P. 245 and index (it is perhaps a bit misleading to call Chillenden 
0 
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an "agitator" as Dr. Capp does. He was an elected officer); Brown, 
Baptista and Fifth Monarchy Mello index; Whitley, Baptist Bibliography, 
index; Aylmerv State's Servants, p. 65-) 
CL=i (CLMW, ), JOHN 
In 1647 Clarke was an elected officer for Hardress Waller's regiment. 
He was vocal at Putney,, and spoke of property qualifications as being 
at the root of voting rights. In 1651 he became Colonel of a regiment 
destined for Ireland but he spent most of his time in London. He was 
a member of Barebones and sat in the two Protectorate Parliaments and 
probably in Richard Cromwell's. He was appointed a commissioner of 
the Admiralty in December 1653. He retained his commission in the 
summer of 1659 despite being mistrusted by Ludlow as a Protectorian 
and by the Rump as being a member of the emerging Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction. He adhered to the faction in October and was a 
member of the Committee of Safety. He was ordered to leave London 
in January 166o. 
(Clarke Papers, Ip index; Ludlowt Memoirst II, pp. 61,81; Firth and 
Davies, pp. 449-450t 634-635, which is a bit muddled; Aylmer, State's 
Servants,, p. 129. ) 
COBBETT, JOTIN (fl. 1647-1657) 
In 1647 Cobbettp a Majorp acted as an elected officer for his regimentt 
Skippon's foot which was garrisoned in Newcastle, He tried to promote 
the Agreement at Ware and was court martialled in December and ordered 
to be cashiered. But the sentence was not carried out and Cobbott 
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a 
remained in the army and f ought in the second Civil War. In Juno 
1649 was in trouble againg probably for trying to whip up support or 
sympathy for the Leveller rising. He was court martialled and this 
time he was in fact cashiered. Howeverg the following year he was 
back in favour and held the rank of Adjutant General of foot in the 
invasion force against Scotland. He remained in the army and became 
a Lt. Colonel of Lambert's foot. He died in Scotland in January 1657. 
Firth and Daviest Firth's edition of The Clarke Papers and Haller and 
Davies (The Leveller Tracts) muddle the identities of the three 
Cobbetts who were prominent at this time. The other two were Ralph, 
Lt. Colonel of Barksted's regiment in 1647 and afterwards a Colonel 
serving mostly in Scotland but adhering to the Lambert/Disborowe/ 
Fleetwood faction and Robertt a civilian and Leveller in 1647 but with 
the courtesy title of Majorwho went on to become a contractor for 
army clothing, and in the summer of 1659 Major of Ralph Cobbett's 
regiment. It seems very likely that the three were brothers. John 
Cobbett's will, made in 1656 and proved in 1657p names his brothers 
as Ralph and Robert (I am grateful to my supervisor Professor G. E. 
Aylmer for this information)e 
(Firth and Daviesq index. (There is no Roger Cobbottt the reference to 
p. 473 is to Robert. The reference to C. S. P. D. 1649-509 P, 59 like- 
wise refers to Robertp not John); Clarke Papers, I, pp. 407-408n.; 
ibid. 9 119 p. 265 refers 
to Robert not John. ) 
coopEn. TapitAs (: fl. 1651-d. 1659) 
Said to have been a shopkeeper or salter in Southwark and an erstwhile 
member of Thomas Goodwin's Independent congregation (A Second Narrative 
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of the Late Parliament). His regiment was probably raised in London 
in 1650 or 1651 for service in Scotland. The regiment continued to 
serve in Scotland after the battle of Worcester but Cooper was not with 
the regiment all of the time. In December 1654p along with otherag he 
presented proposals to advance reform to Cromwell which were looked 
upon as a great boost to the Protectorate at a time of difficulty in 
the face of opposition in Parliament and the Three Colonels' Petition. 
(Clarke Papers'p 1119 p. 11). In the summer of 1655 he was appointed 
one of the Council of Scotland but in December of that year heVas 
sent to command the forces in Ulster; his regiment in Scotland passed 
to the Lt. Colonel# Roger Sawrey (Firth and Daviest pp. 478-479; 
Brown# Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Meng p. 1579 ff) Cooper, a Baptist, 
was a supporter of Cromwell's Protectorate. In the disagreement between 
Henry Cromwell and the Baptist officers in Ireland Cooper acted as a 
mediator (Thurloeg IV9 pp. 422-423t 433)- His talents as a mediator 
were also employed in Ulster where he helped reconcile the Presbyterian 
ministers with Henry's government (Firth and Davies, pp. 668-669). 
Cooper opposed kingshipt but was willing to accept it for reasons of 
state (Thurioe, VI, p. 157). Ile was one of the influential officers 
who met at Wallingford House in the spring of 1659 and supported the 
return of the Rump (Clarke Papers, 9 1119 PP. 143t 196). In the summer 
of 1659 he was given command of Fleetwood's horse regiment in Ireland 
and his old foot regiment passed to Alexander Brayfield. He returned 
to Ireland and was there in October when the coup against the Rump took 
place. Like most of his colleagues there he acquiesced in the, coup 
and disapproved of honck's reactions (Mayert 'Inedited Letteralp 
pp. 264-2669 272-273. Firth and Davies (p. 125) are inaccurate to 
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call him a "thoroughgoing supporter of the army" (i. e. the lambert/ 
Disborowe/Fleetwood faction)). Ile died on 21 December 1659 (ibid. 9 
pq 126). 
COURTT&T, TRJGH (f 1.1649-1666) 
Origins unclear. -but possibly a gent. of Cornwall. M. A. Oxford 1649 
probably for part in suppressing the Levellers. In the early 1650's he 
held positions in the army as deputy governor of Deaumarais and governor 
of Anglesea. In 1650 and 1651 he was Quarter Master General. Under 
Barebones he was a member of the Council of State. Ile became a prominent 
Fifth Monarchist opponent of the Protectorateg although it is not clear 
'whether he was still a member of the army at the time of his imprison- 
ment in 1655 for allegedly encouraging armed rebellion against the 
Protectorate; probably he was notp but if so then only in a formal 
sense. He was detained and arrested on subsequent occasions including 
one in February 1658 for possessing subversive literature for distri- 
bution to disaffect the army. On 14 July 1659 Colonel John Jones 
requested the nominating committee to make Courtney governor of Deau- 
ma aisp of which Jones was then governort but nothing came of this. 
In April 1660 a warrant was issued by the Council of State for the 
arrest of Courtney and William Allen for endeavouring to disaffect 
the soldiery. Ile was in prison until 1663 and was repcrted to be 
stirring up trouble in Essex and Hertfordshire in 1666. 
(W. R. Williamst The Parliamentary History of the Principality of Wales, 
Drecknock, 1895t P. 3; Cappt Fifth Monarchists, p. 247 and index. ) 
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DIANE, RICILUM 
1647 Captain and elected officer in Robert Lilburne's loot regiment. 
He remained active in army politics until at least 1650 by which 
time he was more involved in non-army administrative work. Ile should 
not be confused with his more famous namesake and cousinp Admiral 
Richard Deane (q. v. below)v who was an Adjutant General and Grandee 
in 1647. Firth and Davies (index sub Deanep Richard) confuse the two. 
Their entries on pp. 456,460 refer to the future Treasurer at War 
not to the Admiral. In the 1650's Deane acted as more of an adminis- 
trative official than as a member of the armyp but he probably still 
kept his co=ission and most certainly his title. By February 1659 
he was closely involved in the inner army circles in London and in 
May he became clerk to the Council of State. In the autumn of that 
year he sided with the Lambert/Disborove/Fleetwood faction and was 
employed as an intermediary between them and Monck. The latter accused 
Deane of trying to disaffect his forces. At the Restoration Deane was 
banned from holding public office for life. (Firth and Daviesp PP. 456, 
460; Clarke Papers, I, pp. 161,1769 4131 145; ibid. t UP PP. 156, 
224p 272; ibid. p IIIt PP. 5t 183t 187; ibid-P IV9 PP- 1059 1079 142t 
149t 174P 300; Aylmer, State's Servantst pp. 99p 244t 277v 393P 419. ) 
DEANE. nigmu (1610-1653) 
b. 1610, y. son of Edward Deane of Temple Guitingo Gloucestershire* 
Probably entered a mercantile career in London under the patronage 
of his close relation Sir Richard Deanep Lord Mayor in 1623-29. 
Possibly became a ship owner. 
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Deane fought in the Civil War for Parliament and in 1647 was Adjutant 
General. When Thomas Rainborowe was appointed Vice-Admiral in September 
1647 Deane took over command of his toot regiment which he kept until 
early 1649. Deane was a regicide. In February 1649 he was appointed 
one of the three 'Generals at sea$ and gave up his army command. 
However, in his subsequent career until his death in 1653 he alternated 
between spells in the navy and spells in the army. Interestinglyq his 
-a riage to hary, daughter of John Grymesditch of Knottinglyt Yorkshire 
on 21 May 1647P was witnessed by Robert Lilburne and Thomas Rainborowe. 
(D. N. B.; Firth and Daviesq index sub Deaneq Richardt except pp. 456t 
460t q. v. above; Clarke Paperst Ut index, sub Deanep Richardt Adjutant 
General and Colonel. ) 
ESSEX. SIR THOMAS'(fl. 1647) 
Headed a list of 14 signatories to a Presbyterian petition presented 
to both Houses of Parliament on 22 March 1647 (L. J., Ut Pp. 95-96). 
Although the signatories have military titles this petition should be 
distinguished from a totally different petition circulating in the 
army at this time. The identity of Essex is a bit of a mystery. A 
Colonel Essex was governor of Bristol in 1643 and was arrested by 
Nathaniel Fiennes for misconduct (D. N. B., sub Fiennesp Nathaniel). 
A L*ndon pedigree of 1568 of the Essex family has an undated addition 
showing a grandson called Thomas Essex who might be the same man as 
the Colonel of 1647 (1 am grateful to my supervisort Professor G. E. 
Aylmer, for this and the previous reference). There appear to be no 
other references to Colonel Essex other than the petition dating from 
1647. 
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M LYN, ARTIRM 
In July 1647 Evelyn signed a letter from various agitators and elected 
officers to Wales. He attended the Council of War at Reading in the 
same month. He appears to have lef t the regiment by July 1648 but 
he remained in the army with the title of Adjutant General and the 
position of governor of Wallingford Castle in Berkshire, Whitelocke 
found. him very "civil". In November 1643 he was one of the officers on 
the committee to prepare a final draft of the Remonstrance. In the 
course of 1648 and early 1649 he commanded his own troopt an un ttached 
troop$ possibly belonging to the Berkshire militiat which was intended 
to be incorporated, along with other loose troops into a regiment under 
Henry Harten. This regiment was never formed. Evelyn remained governor 
of Wallingford Castle until it was demolished in 1652. He seems to 
have fiddled some of the money provided for the demolition of the 
castle and on 18 Hay 1658 he was ordered to pay back some money to the 
Exchequer. By July 1659 he had his own militia troop in Berkshire and 
in August he was appointed commander of the guards for Parliament but 
was dismissed by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction after the 
October coup. In February 1660 Monck made him Colonel of Salmon's 
regimentt a post he held until the following June* 
(Clarke Paperst It pp. 161,176; ibid. p IIP PP. 54t 213t 374; S. P. 23/48t 
f. 56; S. P. 23/57# f. 361; S. P., 28/60t f. 182; B. M. Add. 118- 37344t 
f- 170v; C. S. P. D. 16509 Pp. 510t 512; ibid. t 1651-52t p. 496; ibid. t 
1653-549 p. 41; ibid. t 1657-58t pp. 262t 350; ibid. t 1653-59t p. 28; 
ibid. 0 1659-6o. w. 50t 71t 809 94t 99; Firth and Davies, pp. 179P 197- 
193. ) 
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EYRES, WILLIAN 
In 1647 a member of the army. He was arrested for his part in the 
Ware mutiny. In 1648, along with Henry Hartent he raised a regiment 
in Berkshire. The following yearg as a civiliang he was detained 
after the Leveller mutiny in May and imprisoned in Oxford where he 
helped provoke the revolt in September. He was released in August 
1650 (C. S. P. D. 1650t p. 263)- In January 1655 he was arrested on 
suspicion of involvement in Wildman's plot in Dublin where he had 
gone on personal business. In April, still a prisoner in Dublin he 
was reported to be growing physically and mentally ill and to be 
demanding either a trial or that he be allowed to take part in the 
Western Design (Thurloet IIIt pp. 124t 126t 364). In January 166o 
the restored Rump gave him command of Lambert's former regimentt but 
he was soon ousted from this by Monck. His origins are unknown but 
it is possible that he came from a rural middle class background 
(G. E. Aylmer, 'Gentlemen Levellers? 19 Past and Present'. 49,1970t 
pp. 124-125). There were three other Eyres (or Ayres) active during 
the English Revolution who are apt to be confused. A different William 
Eyre was the recruiter M. P. for Chippenhamt Wiltshire. Ile also sat 
in the first Protectorate Parliament and in Richard Cromwell's 
Parliament. He was the son and heir of Sir William Eyre of Nestont 
Wiltshire (Yulet Independentst p. 96; H. M. C. Duke of Duccleuch and 
Queensbury, It P. 311; Underdownp Pride's Purgep index. Underdown 
(p. 186) confuses William Eyre the M. P, with Thomas Eyres the governor 
of Hurst). It is possible that he also served in the army in two 
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capacitiest namely as Colonel of a foot regiment which was disbanded 
early in 1648 and the following year as governor of Malmsbury, Wilt- 
shire, hence his title of Colonel in Richard Cromwell's Parliament 
(S. P. 28/49f f. 46; S. P. 28/50t f. 292; S. P. 28/51t f- 36; S. P. 28/60p 
f. 426; Burton, IV, index). Thomas Eyres was governor of Hurst Castle 
in November 1648 and again from September 1659 (Clarke Papers, 119 
pp. 61t 66; S. P. 28/60t f. 144; S. P. 2s/611 f. 634; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, 
p. 226). The third Eyres was also called Williamp son of Giles ByreS 
of White in Wiltshire. He was a minister and pastor of a church in 
Salisbury and published several tracts. He was also an assistant 
commissioner for the ejection of scandalous ministers in Wiltshire. 
(Peckp Desiderata Curiosat IIP P. 493 + n.; Wing, Short Title-Catalogue) 
GREGORY, JOHN 
the 
1646 trooper in Rich's regiment. Reported to/Council of War for 
erroneous doctrines. 1655 Quarter Master in the regiment and cashiered 
for implication in Overton's'plot'. He was reinstated in 1659. 
GRIMES (GRIME), MAM 
1647 Lt. Colonel of Lambert's foot regiment. He was suspected of 
having a hand in promoting the March petition. In January 1648 pay 
for Constable's regiment was issued through him. In December of that 
year he received payment for Gloucester garrison of which he was 
deputy-governor. In April 1649 some of his fellow officers arrested 
Grimes on various, unknown, charges probably to do with alleged dis- 
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orders in the garrison. The Mayor of Gloucester wrote to Fairfax on 
Grimes's behalf. The outcome of the charges is unknown but Grimes was 
out of the army in the 1650's. Howeverp in 1659 he returned to the 
army as governor of Cardiff (C. J. 9 VO p. 123; S. P. 28/45t f- 452; 
S. P. 28/50, f. 129; S. P. 28/579 f. 327; IT. M. C. Leyborne-Popb2a, p. 16; 
Firth and Davies, p. 40; C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, PP- 369 221). 
HACKER. FTUNCIS (d. 166o) 
third son of Francis Hacker of East Bridgeford and Colston Basset, 
Notts.; m. Isabella dau. of Gabriel Brunts of East Dridgeford, 5 July 
1632. 
Despite the fact that the rest of his family were Royalists Uacker 
fought for Parliament from early on in the Civil War. His part in 
army politics between 1647 and 1649 is largely uncrecorded but he was 
one of the three officers to whom the warrant for the King's execution 
was addressed and he supervised the execution itself. His regiment saw 
service in Scotland and England. Hacker attended the meetings prior 
to the drawing up of the Three Colonels' Petition (Bodl. Rawlinson 
Ms. A41, f. 360). One modern historian says that Racker was a govern- 
ment spy (11. Ashleyp Joh_n_ Wildmant Londont 1947p p. 86). ne arrested 
Mrd Grey of Groby in 1655 (Thurloep III, p. 168) which at least 
indicates a degree of commitment top or acquiescence int the Protectorate. 
The case for him being a spy is not proven and yet it cannot be denied 
that he was involved in the meetings and that no action was taken 
against him. His subsequent career adds to the mystery. He was 
closely associated with Haselrig allegedly to the point whereby "he 
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was more diligent in obeying Sir Arthur's than God's conu-nands" 
(Hutchinsono Memoirs, IIv P. 179). In late 1657 he was a member 
of Wildman's Republican club whose other members included 11aselrig 
and Okey (Walkert 'Secret Servicelt p. 235). At Haselrig's instigation, 
he was also the first Colonel to receive his commission directly from 
the Speaker in the summer of 1659. Haselrig wanted to see him in 
command of the Nottingham militia but withdrew this. One Royalist 
observer described Hacker as "a dear creature" of Haselrig (Clarendon 
State Paperst 1119 P. 530). Also during the summer R; oyalists made 
approaches to Hacker in the hope of winning him over to Charles Stuart 
with the promise of a pardon but Hacker informed the authorities of 
this (C. Clar. S. P. 9 IV9 pp. 2329 265t 346). Hacker remained loyal 
to the Rump in October and was purged by the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleet- 
wood faction. He worked for the return of the Rump and was re-com-ais- 
sioned. He remained in service until after the Restorationt and although 
technically not a regicide he was excepted from the Act of Indemnityt 
tried and executed. He put up little defence at his trial commenting 
11trulyt I have been no Councellort no Advisert 
nor Abetter of it (bigh treason)t but in obedience 
to the Command over me I did act. Ify Desire bath 
been ever for the Welfare of my Country, and that 
Civil Power might stand" (State Trials, Ht P- 336) 
a fitting description not just of Hacker's own role in politics but 
also for a great many of his colleagues. 
(E. Young, 'A History of Colston Bassetto Notts. 'r Moroton Society, 
9p 1942; C. Brown, Lives of the Nottinghamshire WorthiesP Londont 1882; 
A. E. Lawson Lowet 'Some Account of the Hacker Family', Old Nottingham- 
shire, lst Series, 1881, pp. 130-133; D. N. 13. (Firth is perhaps a little 
misleading in describing Hacker as "a strict presbyterian". He was no 
political Presbyterian); Firth and Daviesq index. ) 
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HoBsoN, PAuL (fl. c. 1643-c. 1666) 
Origins obscure but either a tailor or surgeon. Hobson was denounced 
by Thomas Edwards f6r his alleged religious extremism. Ile served in 
Robert Lilburne's foot regiment and in 1647 was Major. Sir Lewis 
Dyve recommended him as an intermediary between Charles I and John 
Lilburne. There is no evidence to suggest that he was a Leveller. 
John Lilburne respected him personally. In December 1647 Haselrig 
took over command of the regiment from Robert Lilburne (who returned 
to his horse regiment) and was appointed governor of Newcastle. 
Hobson acted as his deputy. Ile became Lt. Colonel of the regiment 
in 1648 after the death of Henry Lilburnep governor of Tynmouth who 
declared for the Royalists but was killed in the subsequent storming 
of the castle. He remained in the north during the revolution of 
1648-1649. It is unclear when he left the army but during the 1650's 
he devoted his energies to ministerial work in the north where he 
'was very influential in Baptist circles. He was critical of Cromwell's 
assumption of the Protectorate. After the Restoration he was constantly 
under suspicion and was arrested twice. Eventually he was released 
on condition that he emigrate to Carolina where he appears to have 
died'in 1666. 
(W. T. Whitley, tThe Rev. Colonel Paul Hobson', Baptist Cýuarterlyt 
New Series, IX, 1938-39P PP- 307-310 (Whitley is wrong to say that 
Hobson was out of the army by May 1650. Ile was still a serving officer 
in October of that year); R. ljowellq hTewcastle-Upon-Tyne and the Puritan 
Revolution, v Oxfordq 1967P index and esp. pp. 
248-249; Dyve, letter Dook, 
PP. 589 92; Firth and Daviesv pp. 456-460; Severall Proceedinrat 7-14 
February 1650;,, Edwardso Gangraena). 
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JONES, JOHN (c. 1593-1660 
b. c. 1593, y. son of Thomas Jones of Maesygarnedd and Elleng dau. of 
Robert Wynne of Taltrenddyn; educ. un1mown but apprenticed in London 
to the Middleton family of Denbighshire and London; m. (1) Margaret, 
dau. of John Ed-wards of Stanstyp Denbighshiret died 19 November 1651 in 
Dublinp (2) Catherine Whetstone, ifidow and sister of Oliver Cromwellp 
1656. 
Jones fought for the Parliament in the first Civil War and became M. P. 
for Merioneth in September 1647. He was also a regicide and commanded 
at this time a troop of horse which despite the confusion in Firth 
and Davies (p. 189) became a part of Harrison's regiment. Jones him- 
self served in various important posts under the Commonwealth as a 
member of the first two Councils of State and as one of the Irish 
Commissioners. He disapproved of Cromwell's assumption of the Protec- 
torate but possibly because of his marriage to the Protector's sister 
became reconciled to it. In 1657 he was summoned to the 'Other House'. 
At this time he was also governor of Anglesey. The restored Rump 
trusted him enough to make him one of the new Council of State. In 
July 1659 he arrived in Ireland, as one of the commissioners for the 
government of Ireland and when Ludlow returned to England after the 
coup against the Pump in October Jones was appointed acting Commander- 
in-Chief. Jones acquiesced in the coup but in December was ousted 
from his command in the seizure of Dublin Castle by officers sympathis- 
ing with 11onck. He was charged with high treason on 19 January 1660 
but released on giving an assurance not to act against tho existing 
government. In June he was arrested and tried and executed as a 
regicide. 
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(D. N. B. 9 J. Lloyd, 'Colonel John Joneso Ilaesygarneddlg Merionith 111sto! X 
Society Journal, 2,1954; A. M. Dodd (ed. ). A History of Wrexham, 
Wrexham, 1957; S. P. 28/519 f. 78; S. P. 28/60# f. 272; Firth and Davies 
p. 189, muddle Jones's career; G. Yulet The Independents in the English 
Civil War,, Cambridge, 1958P P- 104 wrongly says that Jones was 
expelled from the second Protectorate Parliament; Brownp Baptista and 
Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 153n, wrongly says that Jones was Ifewson's 
son-in-law. ) 
KEUEY, Tnaas (fl. 1645-16807) 
Origins obscure but possibly a button-maker in London. 
Ibr 1647 Kelsey was a Major in Ingoldsby's foot regiment and in the 
following year he was Lt. Colonel (Firth and Daviesp PP- 374-375. 
The D. N. B. is muddled on this). Ile became deputy governor of Oxford 
and was quite active in army politics in late 1648 and early 16499 but 
firmly committed to the official line. In 1651 he became governor of 
Dover Castle in succession to Algernon Sydney and thus left Ingoldaby's 
regiment. Ile supported Cromwell's assumption of the Protectorate and 
alongýwith Lambert and Berry was said to have persuaded many of the 
Barebones assembly to give up their power. Ile was an M. P. in the two 
Protectorate Parliaments and in Richard Cromwell's, As MaJor General 
of Kent and Surrey he tried to secure the return of members favourable 
to Cromwell and The Instrument to the second Protectorate Parliament. 
He opposed kingship. In 1659 he supported the restoration of the Rump 
which confirmed him in his office as governor of Dover on 18 July 
(C. J., VII, pp. 669P 723). It was probably because of this that some 
of his opponents in Kent drew up Articles of-Iligh Crimes and Grand 
Misdemeanors against him accusing him of playing a leading part in 
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helping promote The Instrument in December 1653t of being disaffected 
to the Commonwealth and rights and liberties of the people, of arbitrary 
behaviour as Major Generalp of trying - , to secure the return of malig 
nants as M. P. s. and even of supporting the Treaty of Newport in 1648. 
The charges are fanciful and were considered to be so at the time as 
no action was taken against Kelsey. The accusation of too much 
commitment to the Protectorate implicit in the charges could just as 
easily have been levelled at many of the other officers including 
Lambert, Disborowe and Fleetwood themselves. Kelsey was an active 
member of the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction and was one of those 
officers cashiered by the Rump in October 1659P the immediate cause 
of -the coup against it. With the return of the Rump Kelsey was 
ordered to leave London. In March 1660 he engaged himself to live 
peacefully to the Council of Statep but at the Restoration he fled 
abroad returning in 1666 and may well have lived outthe rest of his 
years as a brewer. 
(D. N. B.; Firth and Davies,, index; Everrittq Community of Kentq index; 
E993(8) Articles of High Crimes and Grand Misdemeanors exhibited 
against Lt. Colonel Thomas Kelsey .. * 
(23 July) 1659. ) 
KINGDOM, RICMW (fl. 1647-1659) 
Kingdom was one of the agitators of Cromwell's horse regiment in 1647. 
He is probably the same man as the Captain Richard Kingdom whom Alured 
was recommended to contact when he went to Ireland in 1654 but whom 
Fleetwood considered "a very faithfull servant" to Cromwell. On 12 
March 1656 a Captain Richard Kingdom was appointed comptroller of the 
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prize goods and on 8 July 1659 a Richard Kingdom was suggested as 
Judge Advocate of the army in Ireland. It is not clear if these two 
men were the same. On 13 October the Army Co=ittee was instructed 
on the direction of Haselrig and Colonels Walton and Morleyq three of 
the seven commissioners appointed by the Rump to govern the army before 
its dissolution to pay Captain Richard Kingdom X200 for army contingencies 
out of the 12 months assessment. 
(Bodl. Rawlinson Ms. A. 41p f. 561; Thurloe, IIIt P-, 183; C. S. P. D. 
1655-569 p. 220; ibid., 1659-6o, pp. Up 251 (there are plenty of 
references to Richard Kingdomý comptroller of prize goods in the State 
Papers Domestic); Clarke PaperspIIp pp. 92# 166v 438-) 
IMMERT, JOHN (1619-1684) 
Son of Josias Lambert of Calton and Anne dau. of George Pigott of 
Hesketh; edue. possibly Trinityv Cambridge and then one of Inns of 
Court; M. Frances, dau. of Sir William Lister of Thornton in Craven, 
Yorkshire. 
After distinguished service on behalf of Parliamentt Lambert was by 
1647 Colonel of foot in the New Model. He returned from the north 
early in 1647 and played an important part in events between March and 
July assisting Ireton to draw up the Heads of the Proposals. Ile took 
over command of the Northern Brigade in August and possibly became a 
Colonel of horse as well (Firth and Daviest p. 253; but c. f. Bodl. 
Tanner 11s. 56t f. 1). Thust he only played an indirect role in the 
important political developments leading up to the trial and execution 
of the King, although it is possible that he returned for brief visits 
to army headquarters in the south on army business (The Moderate ' 7-14 
November 1647; B. M. Add. Ms. 36996 (Fairfax transcripts) 
I 
f. 148)0 Ile 
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was in London from June 1649 and from then on began to emerge as an 
important political figure in the army and in national politics. 
(D. N. B.; Dawson, Cromwell's Understudy; T. D. Whitakert History and 
Antiquities of the Deanery of Craven, Leeds, 1878; J. W. Morkill, 
The Parish of Kirk-by Malhamdaleq Gloucesterg 1933; Heads of Chief 
Passages in Parliament,, 15 January-2 February 1647; S-P- 28/489 ff, 
2309 367; S. P. 28/49t f. 412; S. P. 23/609 f- 302. ) 
LILBUILNE, ROBIMT (1613-1665) 
b. 16139 first son of Richard Lilburne of Thickley Puncherdont Durham 
and Margaretp dau. of Thomas Hixonp yeoman of the wardrobe to Queen 
Elizabeth; m. Margaret dau. of Richard Beke of Hadenhamq Ducks. 
Entered the Parliamentary army at the start of the Civil War and was 
a Colonel in foot in 1647. He played an important part in opposing 
the Presjrýerian attempt to disband the army in that year. His 
regiment was one of those which marched to Corkbush Field in November 
without authority. In 1647 he returned to the north and to his old 
regiment of horse. He served in the north as one of the seven co=is- 
sioners charged with the management of the northern forces and remained 
there until January 1649. He was a regicide. From 1652-1654 he was 
Co-ander-in-Chief in Scotlandt a post in which he felt himself out of 
his depth. He supported the expulsion of the Rump and Cromwell's 
establishment as Lord Protector. Ile acted as Lambert's deputy Major- 
General mostly in Yorkshire and Durham. Ile was a member of the second 
Protectorate Parliament and opposed kingship. In the autilmn of 1659 
supported the Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. He was Lambert's 
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staunchest ally when both faced Monck in the north. With the collapse 
of the faction Lilburne's political and military career was over. 
After the Restoration he was tried and sentenced to deathp but this 
was commuted to life imprisonment. He died in 1665 a prisoner in 
St. Nocholas Islandp near Plymouth. The connections between Robert 
and his younger brother John are interesting. According to John 
(E400(55). Jonah's Cry Out of the Whale's Belly) Cromwell invited 
him to join the New Model in a letter of 9 December 16459 delivered 
by John. There appear to have been no contacts between the brothers 
in the crucial period from March 1647 to May 1649, although Paul 
Hobsont Robert Lilburne's Majorg was recommended as an intermediary 
between the King and the Leveller leader by Sir Lewis Dyve. In 
October 1647 John's The Innocent Ilan's Second Proffer made unto his 
present Adversaries (B. m. 669 f. 14 (28)) was delivered "unto them by 
his loving brother Col. Robert Lilburne". Robert was also present 
at John's trial in the same month. In May 1651 John acted on behalf 
of his brother in the discovery of delinquents. 
(D. N. B.; H. L. Robsont 'George Lilburnet Mayor of Sunderland19 
Antiquities of Sunderlandp XXIIt 1960; Gregg, Freeborn John, index; 
M. James, Family, Lineage and Societyv Oxford, 1974t PP. 89-90; S-P- 
19/22v ff. 2019 2089 213; C. C. A. M., pp. 1064,1339t 1344, Firth and 
Davies, index. ) 
LILDURNE, THOMAS (1622-1665) 
b. 1622, first son of George Lilburne of Sunderland and cousin of 
Robert and John. 
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In 1644 Thomas was a Captain in Robert Lilburne's regiment of horse. 
In February 1650 he successfully defended himself against charges of 
stirring up the soldiery against the officers and of being over- 
zealous in making enquiries about whether the soldiers had paid for 
their quarters. The latter charge seems curious. Perhaps he was 
suspected of trying to make the army unpopular in the eyes of the 
people by drawing attention to free quarter. In 1656 he was M. P. 
for Durham and in 1658 for Newcastle. He was a keen supporter of 
the Protectorate and made his views quite clear to Thurloe. In the 
simmer of 1659 he was purged, but was instrumental with Fairfax and 
others in securing York in January 1660. On 8 February he was restored 
to the regiment by Nonck with the rank of Major but after the Restora- 
tiont when the regiment passed to Aubrey de Veret Earl of Oxford, 
Lilburne became a Captain again. The regiment was disbanded on 15 
November 1660. In 1663 Lilburne and his father were implicated in 
a supposed rising. 
(II. M. C. Leyborne-Pophamq PP. 56-57; Clarke Paperaq IVt p. 239; Robson, 
'George Lilburne1q pp. 120,122 (Robson is wrong to suggest that 
Lilburne was a part of Monck's force that came from Scotland); Firth 
and Davies, pp. 273-277. ) 
NICHOLS, FRANCIS 
Origins unknown. In April 1647 Nichols was an Ensign in Robert 
Lilburne's regiment and was arrested, for distributing the army 
petition of the previous month. Heyas released by the Commons the 
following month (q. v. Chapter Onep Section I). Dy November 1649 he 
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was a Lieutenant and by 1650 he was a Captain and served in Scotland 
in the 1650's. He adhered to Monck in 1659 and was made a Major. He 
became Surveyor of the Ordnance of the Tower at the Restoration and 
resigned his Majority in Harch 1662. (E417(15)9 Remonstrance from 
Colonel Lilburne's Regiment; Firth and Daviest PP- 535-545. Firth and 
Davies wrongly suggest in the index that Ensign Nichols and the future 
Major are -two different people. ) 
OKEY, JOHN (c. 16o6-1662) 
of Londont origins unclear but probably a citizen of some substance. 
After service early in the war Okey was appointed Colonel of the New 
Hodel dragoons. He was quite active in army politics between 1647 
and 16499 and was a regicide. In 1650 Okey was involved in a dispute 
with one of his Lieutenantsq Francis Freemanp whom he tried to get to 
resign. Freeman was a Ranter. He drew attention to Okey's shortcomings 
as a politician saying he was apt to "hear with other men's earsq see 
'with other men's eyes and speak the language of other men". Okey had 
qualms about the dissolution of the Rump and went on to oppose the 
Protectorate actively with the Three Colonels' Petition for which 
he was cashiered. His recently acquired landholdings in Dedforshire 
involved him in local affairs there. Ile was arrested in 1656 and 1658. 
In the late 1650's he was a member of Wildman'sRepublican club in 
I, ondon which met at Nonsuch in Bow Street. Other members included 
Henry Martenp Haselrig and Colonel Francis Rackert a serving officer. 
Okey like Saunders, but unlike Aluredt was restored to the army before 
the restoration of the lh=p in May 1659 but adhered to the Parliament 
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in October. In 1660 Okey remained consistent to his Rumper Republicanism 
and emerged to challenge Monck over the slide towards a Restoration. He 
was purged in late March and joined in Lambert's ill-fated rising in 
April after which he escaped to the Netherlands only to be captured in 
1662 by George Downing. He was tried and executed along with Darksted 
and Miles Corbet, fellow regicides. There were reportedly 59000 
Quakers and Fifth Monarchists at his funeral. 
(D. N. B.; H. G. Tibbuttp 'Colonel John Okey 1606-16621, Publications 
of the Dedforshire Historical Record Societyq XXVt 1955; Clarke Papers, 
I and II, index; E615(7). Light Vanquishing Darkness; Walkerv 'Secret 
Service', p. 235; ILM-C- Hasti"st IV9 pp. 130-131-) 
OVERTON, RORMT, (c. 1609-1668) 
Son and heir of John Overton of Easington in Holdernesst Yorkshire; 
edu. St. John's, Cambridgev Gray's Inn; m. Annet dau. of Jeremy 
Gardiner of Stratfordt Bowt 1632. 
Early service in the Civil War in the north. He probably became Colonel 
of Herbert's foot regiment in July 1647. Firth speculates either 
June or July, but he was in the north at the time when the agitators of 
the northern regiments seized Major General Sydenham. Poyntz in July; 
although he had been in London in May (B. M. Add. Ms. 18979P f. 236). 
Earlier in 1647 Ferdinando Fairfax had written to his son Thomas urging 
him to give Overton a command in the army. Thomas Fairfax replied on 
23 March saying that he would be glad to have "so deserving a man into 
the army" but for the moment that was not possible. However, judging 
from Overton's wife's letter to Ferdinando Fairfax he was reluctant to 
serve in the south. It could be that he felt piqued at Lambert, being 
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chosen as northern commander rather than he. On 22 October 1647 
Cromwell wrote to Thomas Fairfax mentioning that a commander was 
needed for Hull and that the townsmen and soldiery had expressed a 
desire for Overton to be governor. Cromwell supported this and 
recommended that Overton be sent down to command the existing units 
there rather than take his own regiment there. Fairfax was still 
technically governor of Hull, but in practice the command had been 
held by a deputyv John Malevererg who appears to have been popular with 
the corporation of Hull. Overton became governor of Hull early in 
1648. His foot regiment passed to George Fenwick in May 1649. At 
Hull Overton became involved in a dispute with the local Presbyterian 
ministers one of i&om was said to have prayed against the army and 
Overton. Overton was supported by Fairfax. He served in Scotland for 
some of the time during the 1650's and was cashiered and imprisoned 
for his part in the 'plot' which bears his name. Ile was considered 
a Republican hero and victim of arbitrary goverment by a single person 
and restored to the army in 1659 and until the Restoration he maintained 
quite an independent attitude towards the political crises# but he 
remained firmly committed to the 'good old cause'. 
(Clarke Papers, I. p. 88n; Firth and Daviest pp. 529-530P 546-561; 
Bellp Fairfax Correspondencep Ht P. 333; Cary, Memorials, I. pp. 293- 
299; B. M. Add. Ifs, 18,979t ff. 236t 253 pr. in Bellp Fairfax, 
Correspondence, II, pp. 10-12; B. M. Sloane Ms. 1519, f. 170; II. M. C. 
Portland, 1, pp. 468,471P 478; Venn (eds. )t Alumni Cantabrigienses, 
Part I. IIIt p. 239; D. N. B. ) 
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READE, TUOMAS 
1647 Lt. Colonel in Herbert's regiment. On 18 July 1647 he was 
appointed a member of the committee of officers to advise Fairfax 
upon matters concerning the army. At Putney he said that participa- 
tion in the election of a representative was a privilege but felt that 
there was no reason 
"why any man that is a native ought to bee 
excluded that priviledge, unless from 
voluntaric servitude. " 
Howeverp he seems to have shed his somewhat radical sympathies. In 
1651 he took over the command of Sexby's regiment after the latter 
'was cashiered. The regiment remained in Scotland throughout the 
165018. In 1659 he adhered to Monck and worked closely with him. 
His regiment was one of those which marched with Monck into England. 
The regiment, and its Colonelp were disbanded in October 1660. 
(Clarke Papers, 19 Pp. 529 2179 341-342; Firth and Daviest PP. 563-568. ) 
REYNOLDS, JOHN (1625-1657) 
Third son of Sir James Reynoldsp of Castle Campsp Cambridgeshire; edu. 
St. Catherine's. Cambridge, M. Temple. Brother of Sir Robert Reynolds, 
Solicitor-General to the Commonwealth, 1650- Reynolds joined the 
parliamentary army quite early. He became a Captain in Cromwell's 
horse regiment and until 1648 was a strong Leveller sympathiser. He 
was cashiered in April 1648 for trying to promote a petition in the 
army which contained all the tenets of the Leveller proerammo in 
considerable detail (Perfect Occurencest 21-28 April 1648,23 April- 
4 May 1648; The Moderate Intelligencerp 27 April-4 May 1648. Firth 
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and Davies (pp. 202,606) are wrong about the cause for Reynolds 
leaving the regiment). During the second Civil War he became commander 
of a volunteer regiment of horse made up of many radicalog but by the 
latter part of the year he was beginning to work his passage and to 
conform much more with the official army linet and he played a leading 
part in the suppression of the Levellers at Darford for which he 
earned the opprobrium of his erstwhile sympathisers. He served in 
Ireland in the early 1650ts and was one of the Irish M. Ps in 1654 
and 1656. He was a keen supporter of Cromwell and the Protectorate, 
supported kingship and was a confidant of Henry Cromwell's. Ile was 
knighted by Oliver in 1655. In May 1657 he was appointed Commander 
of the British expeditionary force to Flandersp an appointment with 
which he soon grew disillusioned. He died in a shipwreck while return- 
ing to England in December 1657. The argument that Reynolds was 
suspected of traitorous behaviour after a meeting he had had with the 
Duke of York is refuted above (Chapter Sixt Section I). 
(D. N. B.: Clarke Papersý Ip II and IIIt index sub Reynolds, John; 
Venn (eds. ). Alumni Cantabrigiensesq 1119 P* 4450 
ROLPH, MMM 
1647 an elected officer in Robert Hammond's regiment. In 1648 was 
accused of plotting to kill the King. Eýr 1654 he appears to have 
been unfit for military service. 
(Clarke Papers, It P. 436; ibid. 9 IIP PP. 55p 
64; C. S. P. D. 1654t 
P- 352. ) 
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ROSE, JAMES 
April 1647 Ensign in George Weldon's troopp Robert Lilburne's regiment. 
Gave evidence of attempts to co-ordinate discontent over pay arrears. 
Remained in service and became a Captain in March 1650- Ile died the 
following year on active service in Scotland. 
(Firth and Daviesq pp. 460P 535-536. ) 
SANKEY (ZANCITY), JIMOME (HIEROME) 
Son of Mchard Sankey of Shropshire; edu. Trinity and Clare Colleges, 
Cambridge; Fellow of All Souls, Oxfordt 1648t Proctor 1649 (Venn 
(eds. ) Alumni Cantabrigiensesp IVp p. 20 where his christian name is 
'wrongly given as Jeremy). 
Sankey saw service in the Civil War as a Captain in Sir William 
Ikereton's horse regiment. His troop was disbanded early in 16118 by 
which time Sankey had become a Major (S. P. 28/519 ff. 118t 126). In 
1649 he went to Ireland as a Major in the first division of Cromwell's 
double regiment (S. P. 28/6o, f. 356). In January 1650 on the death 
of Thomas Horton, Sankey transferred to his regiment and became 
Colonel. He was active in the Irish campaigns. He was an assignee 
of Bridget Ireton and administrator to Henry Ireton for money due to 
him as Lord Deputy (S. P. 28/909 ff. 418t 420). Sankey became a 
Baptist in 1653 (N. L. Y. Ms. 11440D, ff. 145-146. Mayer ('Inedited 
Letters'. p. 216) wrongly gives the year as 1652). Henry Cromwell 
regarded him as an enemy but Sankey was subsequently knighted by him. 
He served in all three Protectorate Parliaments which meant that he 
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was in England for long periods of time. In Richard Cromwell's 
Parliament Sankey accused Sir William Petty of extortion and corrup- 
tion among other thingsp while the latter had been Surveyor-General 
in Ireland. He commanded the cavalry unit of the Irish brigade and 
was mainly responsible for the Derby petition and adhered to the 
Lambert/Disborowe/Fleetwood faction. Ile was purged at the return 
of the lbmp. After the Restoration he retained some of the lands he 
had acquired in Ireland and died in 1687 (Firth and Davies, pp. 90-91). 
Sankey's nephew, Richardv was a Captain in Fleetwood's horse regiment 
but left it in October 1651 (ibid. p pp. 91t 97; D. M. Add. 11s. 18986, 
f. 40). 
SAUNDM? S, RODMIT 
1645-1647 Major in Robert Hammond's regiment. In 1647 Saunders was 
quite active in opposing the Irish service and at the end of April 
was sirmnoned before the Commons for his activity in this respect. 
By, November 1648 he was Lt. Colonel of the regiment (now Ewer's). 
He helped secure Carisbrooke and the Isle of Wight and probably went 
with the regiment to Ireland in 1649. In Ireland he eventually commanded 
his own regiment. In 1659t as governor of Kinsale, he supported a 
restoration of the Rt=p and. adhered to Ludlow after the coup against 
Dublin Castle in December. He kept his lands at the Restoration. 
Firth (Clarke Paperst I. p. 19n. ) confuses him with Thomas Saunders 
one of the Three Colonels, 
(Firth and Daviest pp. 659-66o. ) 
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SAUNDFMS, Moms' (16lo-1695) 
of Ireton and Caldwellp Derbyshiret armigerous. 
Saunders had been one of the first in his county to take a commission 
to raise forces to fight under Sir John Gall. In 1644 Saunders was 
involved in a dispute with Gall. He was accused by Gall of being a 
Drownist which Saunders deniedt accusing Gall in turn of nepotism. 
Early in 1645 Saunders was confined by Gall and ordered to resign his 
commission by Essex. He was charged with refusing to obey orders 
and for refusing to give up his old commission and accept a now one, 
possibly because it would reduce his freedom to appoint officers to 
his troop. There were also charges of being a separatistt of heavy- 
handedness in raising moneyt fraud and cowardice. Saunders was able 
to get testimonials refuting these charges, and said that his men had 
petitioned that he might be made Colonel without his knowledge. In 
effectv Saunders was unhappy with the way Gellp and ultimately Essex, 
had been conducting the war. He applied to the Pairfaxes to intervene, 
and Sir Thomas Fairfax and Sir William Constable spoke favourably of 
him but did not want to get involved in a clash with Essex. The 
affair took place in the period just after the New Model ordýance had 
been passed and Fairfax had been appointed Lord General but before 
Essex resigned his command early in April. - Howeverg Fordinando Fair- 
fax wrote to Gell asking for Saunders' enlargement. Saunders saw 
active service over the summer and autumn of 1645. Ho also appears 
to have drawn up counter-charges against Gell of advancing cavaliers 
and dissolutes, scoffing at Godlinessp military incompetence and 
fraud. Saunders was given permission. by Sir William Drereton to 
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absent himself from the seije of Chester to attend the House of 
Commons. On 5 March 1646 Nathaniel Bartong a follow Derbyshire 
man who at one stage Gell had appointed interim con-ander of 
Saunders' men, wrote to Saunders from Liskeard where Fairfax and the 
New Model were on service to inform him that Fairfax had told him 
that he was loath to pay any attention to what Gell had said about 
Saunders and that hep Cromwell and Ireton had talked about Saunders 
and that they would try to get Saunders and his men incorporated 
into the New Model as soon as possible. If this could not be done, 
they promised that Saunders and his officers would get commands in 
existing, New Model regiments. Barton himself got a commission in 
Graves' regiment with which he was happy. On 20 April he wrote 
again to Saunders urging him to wait upon Fairfax at Oxford. In 
the end Saunders became an officer in Thornhaugh's regiment, which 
became a part of the New 11"odel in June 1647. The energy expended 
by Saunders, and especially by Bartonp to become part of the New 
Model shows how prestigious that body had become. In 1648 Saunders 
succeeded Thornhaugh as Colonel (Thornhaugh was killed at the battle 
of Preston). Mrs. Hutchinson claimed that he was a Cromwellian 
appointee and that the men would have preferred her husbandp but as 
we have seen Saunders was popular with Fairfax and Ireton as well. 
Saunders was politically unimportant between 1647 and 1649. He was 
cashiered for his part in the Three Colonels' Petition. Like Okeyt 
but unlike Aluredo Saunders returned to the army before the restora- 
tion of the Rmp in May 1659- He supported the Parliament in October. 
However, his actions over the slimmer in Derbyshire during Booth's 
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rising put him under-suspicion. He was suspected of not being force- 
ful enough against the Royalists and even of complicity in the rising. 
Barton also fell under suspicion. The Commissioners for Sequestration 
considered there was enough evidence for Saunders' goods to be seized 
and Saunders was urged by his friends to defend himself. Investigations 
continued even after the coupp although they were hampered by the 
political insecurity of these months. The charge of complicity was 
unfounded, that of laxity against the Royalists had perhaps more 
truth in it, but the reasons for this laxity are impossible to deter- 
mine. Both Saunders and Barton appear to have vindicated themselves 
from the charges, or else they were dropped. Both were active in the 
Midlands for the return of the Rump. In January 1660 Major James 
Falwood, county sequestration commissioner for Derbyt reported that 
Saunders had ordered two well-known figures in the county who had 
favoured Booth's rising and even a restoration of the Stuartsq to 
secure all arms in Derbyshire and to send home the militia but there 
is nothing to suggest that Saunders was himself a Royalist. The two 
were said to be threatening the sequestration commissioners. Fulwood 
feared that the Rump was in danger of loosing the county because of 
this. Howevert Saunders and Barton were made Colonel and Major of 
Swallow's late regiment (Monck had filled their places in Saunders' 
old regiment, part ofwhich was serving in Scotland because the two did 
not join it). Phillips suggests that both men inclined towards re- 
admitting the secluded members in February 1660. Saunders helped 
suppress Lambertts rising in April. In June 1660 Lord Falkland was 
appointed Colonel of the regiment and Saunders disappeared from the 
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national stage. Unlike Okey and Alured he had easily shed his earlier 
commitment to the good old cause* 
(J. Grangerv A Biographical History of England, 1769# 110 p. 273 and 
supplementq 1774P p. 295; National Register of Archives, 18686, 
'Saunders Papers', passim; H. M. C. 9th Report, p PP- 387P 3929 393; 
H. M. C. Portland, II, p. 141; C. C. C. t pp. 275P 754P 755P 766P 770# 
773t 3251; C. C. A. M. 0 P. 721; Firth 
(ed. )t Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson, 
119 PP- 134-136; Bakerp Chroniclet pp. 685-686. The account of Saunders's 
career by Firth and Davies (indexp sub Saunders, Thomas) has to be 
modified by the Saunders Papers which they do not use. The originals 
of the Saunders Papers are located in the Derbyshire Record Office. ) 
STYLES, WILLIAM 
1647 Captain of Lambert's regiment and active in opposing the Irish 
service for which he, and others# were summoned before the Commons 
in late April. By October 1651 he was a Major in the regiment then 
under Constable. After Constable's death in 1655 he probably became 
Lt. Colonel of the regiment which passed to John Biscoe. He retained 
his commission in the Summer of 1659 and was dropped from the regi- 
ment in June 1660, which tends to imply that he remained loyal to the 
Pxmp in October. He was of no importance in army politics. 
U-J-9 VP PP- 154t 184; Firth and Daviest pp. 401p 402t 404. ) 
SEXBY. EDWARD (16167-1658) 
Origins unclear; in his testimony before the Commons at the end of 
April 1647 Sexby said he was a Suffolk man but it seems very likely 
that he was Edwardq son of Marcus Sexby of Londong gentlemant and was 
apprenticed to Edward Price of the Grocers' Company in 1632 (Clarke 
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Papers, 19 P. 431; Aylmert 'Gentlemen LevellersVp pp. 120-121). 
In 1647 he was a trooper in Fairfax's regiment and one of the original 
agitators. In September he was employed on official army business 
in Kent, examining several garrisons (Clarke 11s. 66, f- 30v; E. Kitson 
(ed. ), 'Some Civil War Accountstt p. 143)- It is possible that he 
left the army sometime towards the end of 1647t although this is not 
known for certain. The evidence usually cited in this respect is his 
employment by John Lilburne to take a letter to Cromwell at Preston 
in August 1648 in which Lilburne undertook to stand by Cromwell in 
the face of Major Robert Huntingdon's attacks (Clarke Papers, I, p. 254)t 
and the fact that he bore news of the victory at Preston to the House 
ffl T V, p. 680). By May 1649 he can definitely be said to be in 
the army, with the rank of Captain and as governor of Portland Castle 
(C. S. P. D. 1649-50, p. 140). In June 1650 he was given the task of 
raising a foot regiment for service in Ireland but which was sent to 
Scotland. Sexby became a Colonel. In June 1651 he was cashiered on 
charges which included false musters. There is no evidence that the 
case against him was a frame-up. After a short spell as an emissary 
Of the Council of State to the Frondeurs of Bordeauxv Sexby became an 
opponent of the Protectorate and took up his Leveller association 
again* He was the author of Killing No Murder and was involved in 
Sindercombels plot. He died a close prisoner in the Tower in 
165a. 
(D. N. D.; Aylmer, State's Servantst, pp*. 155-156. ) 
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STAINES (STANE), WIML01 
An Essex man of a minor county familyp educated at Cambridge and in 
1641 a fellow of the Royal College of Fhysician (Holmest Eastern 
Associati2n, p, 128). Býr 1647 he was-Muster Master of the army and 
with Scout Master Leonard Watson played an important part in the 
negotiations between the King and the Grandeest during which he came 
to be distrusted by both his army colleagues and by the Levellers. 
But he remained in the army until at least the end of 1648. Eventually 
he returned to his medical career, and received a high post in the 
Royal College of rhysicians after the Restoration. 
(11olmess, Eastern Association, p index; S. P. 23/57P f. 445 
(payment to 
Dr. Staines, Muster Master General of the Armyp for himselfj eight 
deputies and two clerks, 29 December 1648). He might be the same man 
who advised Fleetwood in 1655 that his estate was suffering by his 
absence in Ireland (B. M. Lansdowne Ms. 821t ff. 40-41 and above 
Chapter Five# Section IV. ) 
TULIDAH, ALExANDER 
Origins unknown. In March 1647 he was arrested for involvement in the 
Levellers' 'Large Petition' along with Nicholas Tue (Tew). He was 
styled 'Majorl at this time but his regiment is unknown. Ile was 
subsequently bailed and after being summoned before the Commons in 
early May to give an account of his actions proceedings against him 
appear to have been dropped. In the army he was soon given promotion, 
he was 
By July 1647/Adjutant General of the horse# Tulidah attended the 
Council of the Army at Reading. where he spoke in favour of marching 
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on London and using force as a once and for all means of taking 
"the sword out of those hands that are enemies to justice# to equity, $. 
In September 1647 the committee of general officers discussed request- 
ing Fairfax to appoint Tulidah governor of Hereford. Nothing seems 
to have come of this and by November he had left the army. In November 
1650 he was licensed to stay in England till further notice upon tak- 
ing the Engagement, which he might well have had scruples about. 
(The Mode_rate Intelligencer, 18-25 March 1647 said he was a Scot; 
Clarke Papers, I. pp. 1769 178p 203-205t 210; Clarke Ms. 66t f- l5v; 
S. P. 28/48 f. 4029 payment to Tulidah "late Adjutant General of horse', 
for his men, 12 November 1647; C. S. P. D. 16509 P- 565. ) 
VEMON, JOIN (fý 1644ý-1667) 
Origins unknown. By 1647 he was a Lieutenant in Philip Twisletonts 
regiment, in Major James Berry's troop (S. P. 28/47t f. 414). He 
opposed the civil authority having any say in religious matters and 
'wrote a tract to this purpose in December 1648t at the time of the 
Whitehall debates (E477(3)9 The Sword's Abuse Arrested, (19 December 
1648). In this tract he describes himself as late of the army. Ile 
says that he was present at consultations about the Agreement, and 
would be sorry if it floundered because of disagreement over the 
magistrate's power over matters of conscience. He does not mention 
in what capacity and when exactly he participated in the discussions 
about the Agreement. He had returned to the army by the early 1650's and 
was serving in Ireland with the rank of Captain. His return might have 
had something to do with the fact that William Allenp the Adjutant 
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General of horse in Ireland, was his brother-in-law. Alured was 
recommended by the contrivers of the Three Colonels' Petition to 
contact him in Ireland and was told that he could speak cTiný against 
the Protectorate to him (Dodl. Rawlinson Ms. A. 41p f. 561). It is 
unknown if Alured contacted him. For his subsequent behaviour under 
the Protectorate q. v. above Chapter Fourt Section III and Chapter 
Fivep Section IV. Ile resigned his commission in 1656 and drifted 
into the Fifth Monarchists. He was not re-commissioned in the summer 
of 1659. Despite being banished after the Restoration he lived near 
London as a physician and died in 1667- 
(Whitley, Baptist Bibliographyt index; Cappp Fifth Monarchy Ifen, 
p* 267 (which is misleading about his early army career) and index; 
Brownt Bantists and Fifth Yonarchy Men,, index. At Langstone Court, 
Llangarron, Herefordshire there is a seventeenth century miniature 
portrait of Vernon with the following , 
inscription on the back 
"General CsicD John Vernon. -of Clontar (near Dublinj-)9 1655, ob. 1667". 
I am most grateful to my supervisort Professor G. E. Aylmort for this 
information. ) 
ITALCOTT, THOMAS, (f 1.1654-1683) 
Origins un1mown. 
By 1654 he was a Captain Lieutenant in Ludlow's horse regiment in 
Ireland. According, to Ludlowv Walcott assisted him to distributo 
anti-Protectorate literature includinm Some Momentos. Walcott does a 
not appear to have been questioned for -this. In 1655 when Ladlow's 
regiment was disbanded Walcott was one of those ordered by Ludlow to 
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look after his arrears (Ludlow, Memoirs, It P- 407; jb-id. 9 Ut p. 416). 
Walcott disappears from the public eye until 1659 when he re-emerges 
in command of one of the troops which formed the Irish Brigade sent 
over in August to help suppress Booth's rising (C. S. P. Ireland 1647-1660, 
p. 686); presumably in the intervening years he had been transferred 
to another regimentt or alternatively he had left the army and was 
brought back by Ludlow in 1659. After the dissolution of the Rump 
in October he supportedv or acquiesced in# the coup (Clarke Papers, 
IV, p. 146) but appears to have turned against Lambert and with some 
others to have worked against him (C. S. P. D. 1659-6o, p. 294). Ludlow 
suggests that Walcott tried to influence the Irish brigade in favour 
of the Rump in February 1660 which he says aroused the anger of Redman 
its commander and honck. However in May he was allowed to return to 
Ireland (Ludlow, Memoirsp Ut pp. 238-238; C. S. P. D. 165976ot P- 375). 
He was subsequently involved in the Rye House Plot for which he was 
tried and executed (C. S. P. D. January-June 1683, ibid. t July-September 
168 ; State Trialst III, p. 683 ff-)- 
WATSON, LEONARD 
Origins obscure but possibly a goldsmith of Lincoln. 
Was Treasurer to Lord Willoughby's force and then Scout Master General 
of the Eastern Association army and subsequently held the same post 
in the New Model. Together with Dr. William Staines, the Muster 
Master Generalp he was employed as an intermediary between the King 
and the Grandees in 1647. Ile came to be mistrusted by both the army 
leadership and the Levellerst but he still remained active in army 
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politics and was on the committee to draw up a declaration to be 
read to the regiments at the November rendezvous (Clarke Papers, 
It P- 413)- He was no longer in the army by the early 1650's and 
in 1651 he and his f=ily lived in Paris where they appear to have 
acted in some form of official capacity for the Commonwealth. 
(Holmes, Eastern Associationt P. 174; Bellp Fairfax Correspondence, 
p. 111; H. G. Tibbutt (ed. ), The Letter Books of Sir Sarmiel Dikel 
The Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Soclety, 
MIO 1963, index; Nicholas Papersq It pp. 2279 303. 
WHITE, M=CIS 
1647 Major and elected officer in Fairfax's foot regiment. In September 
1647 he was expelled from the Council of the Army but not from the 
army for asserting that there was no authority in the kingdom but 
that of the sword. He was re-admitted to the Army Council in December. 
He remained a Leveller sympathiser in 1648 and opposed the idea of 
executing the King. In May 1649 White was used as an intermediary to 
try to urge the revolting troopjof Ireton's and Scrope's regiments to 
return to their obediencep but it is unlikely that he betrayed them as 
was alleged at the time. In the course of the 1650's he appears to 
have shed his radical political sympathies. In April 1653, along with 
Colonel William G-offe, he evicted the Rimp and continued to serve in 
the army under the Protectorate. In October 1657 he was made Governor 
of Hardyke and on his way back from Flanders he was drowned at sea 
along with John Reynolds another erstwhile radical. 
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(E413(17)p The Copy of a Letter to his Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfaxl; 
Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes, PP. 45-46; Hill, World Turned Upside Downp 
PP. 52-53t 569 57; Wor. Co. AA. 2.4. (53); E571(11)9 The Levellers 
. 
(Falsly so-called) Vindicatedq repr. in Mortong Freedom in Arms'. 
Pp. 304-306; Firth and Davies, PP. 326-332; Clarke rapers, It P- 436. ) 
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